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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores two texts, each o f a different era, language
and culture, to discover what they may each tell us about the role played by
writing in the construction o f subjectivity.

Accordingly, the first part o f the

dissertation departs from custom in treating the Chanson de Roland less as a
repository o f accumulated oral performance than as a document o f singular
textual integrity.

Militating against the premise o f textual unity is the

uncontested fact that the Roland is clearly divided into two distinct narrative
panels. This reading, however, reveals the manner in which the writer o f the
Roland integrates the text’s two narrative panels by positioning ‘history’
against ‘fiction,’ and ‘word’ against ‘deed’ in order to effect a unified and
unifying literary work. The argum ent o f the first part of the dissertation
concludes with the observation, rooted in the text, that the narrative divide
mirrors a divide within the subject and the integration o f narrative effects a
reintegration o f the split subject into a newly created subject o f fiction.
Hermann Broch’s Tod des Vergil brings to writing not the integration of
‘history1and ‘fiction,’ but the integration o f fiction with the most intimate sort o f
personal experience, namely, the experience o f an encounter with death. Part

v
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two of the dissertation examines how Broch, in attempting to ‘realize’ through
fiction a prior encounter with death, creates within the text o f the TDV a
reflection of his own subjectivity.

Broch's writing reveals to the reader that

death is indeed realized (inscribed) in fiction, and that death is the m irror that
does

not

merely

reflect

subjectivity,

as

does

the

verisim ilitude

of

representation, but creates the subject through the fictionalization o f personal
experience. This reading exam ines closely the TDV fo r w hat it reveals to us
about the complex and inextricable relation between fiction and subjectivity.

vi
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AN INTRODUCTION

The texts brought under close critical scrutiny over the pages o f this
dissertation are o f vastly different tim es and cultures. The Song o f Roland1
(hereafter referred to as the Roland) was set down on parchment sometime
between the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries
C.E. This work appears at the incipient stages of what was to become and
continue to be a great and flourishing culture and, as such, plays no small role
in shaping the succession o f political entities that eventually come to define
themselves as the French nation state. The composition o f Hermann Broch’s
The Death o f VirgiP (hereafter referred to as T.D.V.) on the other hand, was
begun in a jail cell in the middle -w h ich is to say the nadir— of twentieth
century Europe. It was written not at the beginning but at what appeared to
be, at least in the eyes o f its author, the end of another long flourishing culture
with its corresponding social and political orders.
In terms of their public reception the contrast between these two works
could hardly have been greater.

The Roland remains the rare example,

alongside such like monuments as the Aeneid, the Iliad and Odyssey, of the
literary work that embraces and is embraced by a culture and its peoples as

1
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its social, political and cultural representation. T.D.V., by striking contrast, is
in many respects the orphan o f its age; it is an obscure work not likely ever to
enjoy anything more than a very limited readership. Its author is a Jew writing
in German while in detention under Nazi guard in an Austrian prison cell.
Broch had been placed in a com er o f terrible isolation at the time this work
was begun. And yet, as if in spite o f this, Broch’s literary works, the T.D.V.
being the forem ost among them, were intensely concerned with the shaping o f
the social, political and cultural spheres o f the German speaking world. Some
months after his release from prison and escape from Nazi Austria Broch was
able to write his publisher, Daniel Brody: “Ich glaube m it Recht sagen zu
durfen, dad d e r Vergil ein Werk ist, welches unbedingt derdeutschen Sprache
erhalten
stammt

warden

mud,

u.

z.

umsomehr als

das Buch ist Kulturtat

es

von

einem

Juden

” (1 believe I should be able to say

that without question the Virgil is a work that m ust help preserve the German
language; all the more so since it is written by a Jew.............. the book
(referring to T.D.V.) is ‘culture-deed’).3
Though the case fo r the T.D. V. remains to be made, there is little doubt
among scholars of all stripes that the Roland is indeed Kulturtat.

Little is

known regarding the public reception of the Roland during and immediately
following the period in which it was written. There is evidence to indicate that
there was, in fact, an extended period during which the narration developed
through oral performance. Tradition has it that parts o f the story were sung by
Norman warriors prior to the Battle o f Hastings. W hether fact or apocrypha

2
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the tradition is ‘true’ at least in the sense that it underscores the importance o f
this work in the cultural, social and political spheres o f its tim e. The date at
which the written text was produced has been determined to fall within a fairly
limited scope o f years. Scholars generally agree that this occurred sometime
between the last quarter o f the tenth and the first quarter o f the eleventh
centuries; some, however, notably Hans Erich Keller, move the date forward
to as late as 1150, C.E.4 Over tim e all trace o f the m anuscripts that replicate
what is now identified as the Roland disappear from public purview until, in
1837, what has come to be known as the Oxford m anuscript is rediscovered
and published by Francisque Michel.5 The scholarly debate in which I situate
my reading o f the Roland dates from this time.

Roland
The initial critical scholarship dating from the mid-nineteenth century
and steeped in the positivist ideology so prevalent at the tim e holds
considerable sway even to the present.6 Among the scholars and critics of
that period it is indubitably Gaston Paris whose work and whose critical point
of view continue to exert the greatest influence. Briefly stated, the scholarly
premise upon which the work of Paris and that o f his fellow positivists rests is
that the true ‘historical’ account of the events that occurred at Roncevaux lie
buried in bits and pieces within the text.

The task o f the scholar/critic,

according to this methodology, is to dislodge from the m anuscript those ‘bits
o f history1 from which to accurately reconstruct the events as they occurred.
In order to ‘attain history1 the critic has to navigate the long oral tradition that

3
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putatively flowed from the ‘actual’ event to its record as fiction. Hans Aarsleff
gives a resume o f the methodology followed by Paris and others:
The battle of Roncevaux is dated 778. but The Song of Roland is some three
hundred years younger. Since the facts of history could not possibly have
been preserved so long in the absence of written records, the oral tradition
was once more invoked to close the gap. Among the slightly different
solutions, the best known was that of Gaston Paris, which B6dier made the
chief object of his critique. Paris argued that short poems —‘Chants lyricoGpiques" or historical ballads—had been composed by witnesses at the time of
or soon after the events and preserved orally until they flowed into the later
epics.7

A principal aim o f this scholarship was the unearthing o f true ‘historical’
events; no m atter how greatly the text may be revered, it is evident that this
tradition places fiction, and so writing, in a secondary or inferior position ws-avis the evidence o f historical fact.
The 'historical fact,’ such as it is employed by the positivist critical
tradition, is decidedly oral; inevitably, the critic traces the path leading from
one ‘witness’ and then another, each leading in greater proximity to the
original event. The originary event may be the actual battle as it occurred or,
in other permutations of this same line o f critical thought, origin might be re
defined as the primal song from which all subsequent oral performances and,
eventually, from which the Ur-Text itself would ultimately be derived. Among
others Jean Rychner, inspired by the work o f Milman Parry,8 held to the view
that epic was essentially an oral tradition o f which the written text is only a
reasonably accurate transcription.

Here the scholar faces the challenge o f

reclaiming the words o f the bard. One effect o f such a theoretical point o f
view is the critical bias toward an understanding o f the written text as a
lengthy suture o f bits and pieces of ‘song’ left over from long oral tradition. In

4
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addition to the valuation o f speech over text is the always concurrent bias in
favor of ‘history1 over fictio n ’

the succession o f bards, unlike fiction,

would inevitably lead back to an originary witness.
Analogous to the attempt to ‘reconstruct1 from existent manuscripts a
hypothetical oral tradition upon which, it is assumed, the surviving texts are
based is the attempt to reconstruct the Ur-text working from the same set of
existent manuscripts. The methods used in the scholarly pursuit o f the l/r-text
borrow substantially from the editorial principles developed by the positivistinfluenced nineteenth century scholar Karl Lachmann.9 Lachmann’s method
supposed that the same textual errors would not occur in manuscripts that
were independently produced; if the same set o f textual accidents occurred in
two or more manuscripts then one o f these manuscripts would necessarily be
originary and the others mere transcriptions. The scholar could then compare
and discard until attaining the manuscript from which all others were
supposedly derived. But of course there are no Ur-texts to be found and so,
pursuant of the methodology based on sound positivist principles, one had to
make do with a reconstructed text that would be based on bits and pieces of
isolated textual fragments that would be deemed ‘authentic.1
Though versions of this method o f textual ‘recovery’ are still widely
practiced even today a revolutionary alternative was introduced almost a
century ago with Joseph B&Jier’s edition o f the Roland (1913). His approach
was disarmingly simply, as Aarsleff explains:
He based his text on a single manuscript of the seven he had because
he found that it was on the whole, in purely pragmatic terms, the
simplest, most reasonable, and most coherent, with good French

5
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grammar and consistent spelling, or in short the manuscript ‘one is
the least inclined to correct” He did not presume to know or be able to
divine what the original would have been like.10

There is more to Bgdier’s method, to be sure, than mere practicality or the
scholar’s modesty when confronted with the m ysteries of manuscript
production. Bedier’s method points to a new definition o f ‘history;’ at least in
so fa r as history is to be recovered from the text. Though the point is nowhere
made explicit in Bedier we are able to easily deduce the following regarding
the virtues of each o f these two competing methods of editorial practice. The
effort to establish something as near as possible to the originary text is
essentially an effort to approximate to the nearest degree possible the original
historic event, whether that event be understood as the primal text or the
actual historic ‘occurrences;’ in the case of the Roland, the actual battle at
Roncevaux upon which this text is based.

In the ideal, the perfectly

reconstructed text would always lead us back to the eye-witness, someone
who was there, who saw and who recorded the events as they transpired.
This methodology succumbs to the seductions o f the text that lays claim to its
own authenticity by an internal appeal to the eye-witness o f its ‘author.’ The
Song o f Alexis claims fo r itself to have been taken literally out o f the hands of
the saint whose life is its subject; the Roland tells its reader that the account is
written by St. Giles who was present on the field as battle was being waged.
History, as it is recovered in the reconstruction o f the primal text, is
reassuringly ‘factual;’ the ‘history’ of Bedier’s text, to the contrary, remains
unapologetically fiction.11

6
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By choosing to publish, with only the few necessary emendations the
‘best1 of the available manuscripts (the Oxford) as his edition o f the Roland
Bedier tacitly concedes that the ‘event* o f which he is in search as editor is
essentially a textual one. Dispensing with the essentially positivist notion that
the text is a collection o f indicators from which some exterior truth might be
deduced, the reader o f B6dier*s edition is led to conclude that the historical
truth of which scholars have been ardently in search is embedded in the text’s
own fiction. In other words, rather than pursuing the original event that has
been subsequently recounted by the text, whether ‘original event* is to be
understood as the actual battle at Roncevaux or some first oral performance
of which the manuscripts are mere transcriptions, Bedier premises his editorial
work upon the assumption that the historical event is, in all simplicity, nothing
other than the creation of the text itself. The Roland has been ‘authored’ and
as such creates its own ‘history’ all the while encouraging the reader in the
notion that it is nothing more than the record o f those events which are
presented at the hand o f its supposed actual eye- witness -th e ruseful St.
Giles.
For the purposes of this dissertation the differences between these two
critical approaches can be summed up in this way: the presumption of an
attainable Ur-text ultim ately carries with it the assumption that the narrative’s
historical subject is described by the text.

By gathering details from the

various available manuscripts the subject o f the narration can be described to
an ever greater degree of accuracy. If, on the other hand, one accepts the
idea of a ‘best* manuscript, then emphasis is thereby placed not on the

7
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superiority o f prior evidence but on the integrity o f the fiction; the ‘best’
manuscript presents the authored fiction in a form that has the fewest
grammatical errors and that renders the narration in a clear and coherent
fashion. The further implication would be that the subject of the narrative’s
historical subject is one created by the fiction itself. Rather than go in search
of ‘Roland’ in sources from which the manuscript is thought to be derived, the
reader of B£dier*s edition finds that Roland is embedded in the fiction, is a
creation of the text; no need to go searching elsewhere for him.
The theoretical basis of Bedier’s editorial method implies that the
‘subject* of the Roland is not to be found in a lost manuscript or in an
imperfectly recorded historical event but in the fiction itself; the ‘best’
manuscript would then give the best account o f the sought after ‘textual’
event.

Bedier’s brilliant contribution to the scholarship o f the Roland goes

largely unappreciated, in my estimation, so long as scholarly debate continues
to center on the quest for the reconstructed L/r-text or toward marking out a
hypothetical trail backward in time from manuscript, to oral performance, to
‘actual’ eye-witness o f the events at Roncevaux. It has only been within the
recent past that som e few medievalists have began to turn attention to an
examination o f the events within the ficition o f the Roland recognizing in them
points of great historical interest. Among those whose work demonstrates an
understanding of the full implications of Bedier’s contribution are Albert Girard
in his article from 1969 “L’Axe Roland-Ganelon: Valeurs en conflit dans la
Chanson de Roland," Eugene Vance in his article from 1979 “Roland and
Charlemagne: The Remembering Voices and the Crypt,” and Bernard

8
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Cerquiglini in his article from 1981 “Roland d Roncevaux, ou la trahison des
clercs.” All approach the Roland with an interest in the historical forces that
are generated out of, rather than represented by, the fiction o f the text.
Through the work o f these and other like-minded scholars, the
argument for a reading o f the Roland as a fiction o f great historical
consequence has been gathering.

Peter Haidu brings these arguments

together with his own highly original contribution in a work that has proved to
be of cardinal importance to Rolandean scholarship: his book, from 1993,
entitled The Subject o f Violence. Haidu makes the case fo r the Roland as the
fiction from the late tenth to early eleventh century that purposefully prepares
the way for the transition o f France from feudal society to modem nation state.
The supporting argum ent of this work is as clear as it is thorough: the Roland
is of greatest historical significance not to the era of which it pretends to report
but to the era in which it was written. The text is a powerful ideological engine
that effectively creates a new Spisteme, a structure of state that is no longer
feudal but monarchical.
I have chosen Bedier's Roland as the working edition for this study for
reasons that should now be obvious.

I have mentioned only a scant few

names of scholars whose contributions represent the recent tradition in which
my own work situates itself. No one single contribution is so im portant to this
effort as that of Peter Haidu. The chapter o f this dissertation treating o f the
Roland begins with Haidu’s thesis concerning the central role this text plays in
the transition that France undergoes at the turn o f the eleventh century
moving from a prior feudal structure to modem nation state.

9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

My particular

interests have to do with the role o f the Roland in the creation of a new mode
of subjectivity, one that is fashioned in accordance with the precepts o f the
modem (centralized) state.
The first of the four sections in this chapter, that entitled uM -M unjoie,"
examines the manner in which the Roland creates among the French a strong
political center focused on the emblem im m ediately associated with the
em peror Charlemagne. This reading follow s the rapid transformation within
the fiction of the Roland o f a political and social order in which power and
authority is dispersed, into an order in which power and authority are
concentrated in the person o f the emperor. The progress in the centralization
o f power and authority within this text parallels the progress of the
materialization of the emperor’s war cry ‘M unjoie’ into a banner o f the same
appellation.
The segment “Outlaws" demonstrates how the introduction o f a new
episteme into the old feudal structure o f state is intentional and comes into
being by way of authorial ruse. Here the ‘conversion’ o f the French to a new
mode of subjectivity is traced in its progress over the course of the narrative o f
the Roland. By the end o f the Roland the French are seen to have unwittingly
abrogated the old order o f law in favor o f the new. Their forfeiture o f the old
law is total and irrevocable. They are led to a betrayal o f their most closely
held

social

and

political

convictions

by

a

sovereign/author

(Chariemagne/Turoldus) who calculates with precision the transgressions that
will lead to an irrevocable commitment to the new social and political order.

10
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“Honur e Dreiture, ” the third of four segments, looks at the ideological
transform ation that occurs at the center o f the text, in exactly the space where
the text's two semi-autonomous narratives join together. The Roland does
indeed bring together two narratives which seem apart from one another.
Although other critics have argued that the Roland’s two narrative units were
originally independent o f one another or that the second narrative is a later
addition appended to the ‘original’ text based on oral tradition, I demonstrate
how the narrative ‘gap’ is integral to the workings o f the larger text. The break
in narrative allows for a negative textual space in which the feudal concept o f
honur is translated into the concept of divine right (dreiture), a fundamental
concept in the creation of the structure of monarchy.
The Roland chapter concludes with the segm ent “Ve/re Pate(R)ne’’.
Drawing from observations made in the chapter’s previous three segments,
and, in particular, upon the discussion of the bi-partite construction o f the text,
I examine how the exchange o f power and authority from feudal state to
monarchy is analogized in the exchange o f authority from Roland to
Charlemagne. Critical to understanding the nature o f the transition from one
social, political and cultural order to another is the understanding o f how the
change comes about through a translation o f the old into the new. Roland is a
reduction o f the old order to a single ‘letter1 planted in the heart o f the new
state. Roland has been appropriated to the new social and political order and
in the process of appropriation he has been transformed. In the process of
seeing to it that Roland becomes ‘monumentalized’, Charlemagne rewrites the
‘prescription’ fo r his form er vassal’s subjectivity, and he does so be rewriting

11
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the narrative created by Roland’s very deed while on the field o f battle at
Roncevaux.

Virgil
The critical tradition supporting the work of Hermann Broch and of his
last literary effort, the T.D.V., in particular, is fragmentary and limited in its
ability to make this very ambitious, if not to say arduous, literary project
comprehensible to a wider audience. When one considers the nature o f the
work and the circumstances under which it was written none o f this should
come as a surprise. Though incidents in the life of the author, specifically, his
detention at A lt Aussee and the imminent threat o f death experienced there,
play a critical role in the genesis o f the T.D.V. we must turn not to the
biographies12 but to the correspondence to attain a grasp of the play between
death and the subject that is very much a part o f this work.
There is no question but that T.D.V. draws to an unusual degree from
the life experience of its author. When in a letter to his publicist, Dr. Kurt W olf
(late 1943),13 Broch declares that “The phenomenon of death stands at the
center o f this Life-book” ('Das Phanomen des Todes steht also im M ittelpunkt
dieses Lebensbuches

), he may ju st as well have added that this same

‘death’ remained at the center o f his own life.

In a missive o f later date

addressed to Hermann Weigend (Feb. 12, 1946),14 Broch reveals this about
his T.D.V.: “It was not merely the death of Virgil, it was one’s own death
imagined" (‘Es war nicht m ehr das Sterben des Vergil, es wurde die
Imagination des eigenen Sterbens) Finally, in a letter to Aldoux Huxley dated

12
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May 10, 1945,15 Broch states that “

the reader must be brought to this

[experience o f death] through exactly the same process, that I have worked
through

" (‘

vielm ehr mu&te d e r Leser dazu gebracht warden, genau

den gleichen ProzeR, den ich durchgemacht habe

).

From this we

conclude that it is Broch’s intent to share with the reader his own experience
with death. Biographical material cannot explain meaning but it can, in this
case, illum inate greatly the operations o f death and the central role death
plays in this highly esoteric last novel.
Recourse to the correspondence as a source o f illumination acquires
further justification in that the T.D.V. records a particularly intimate relation
between subject and text. This novel is, in a m anner o f speaking, one lengthy
journal entry recording the author’s own experience in the encounter with
death, one he attem pts to share with the reader only after the fact.

The

author’s ‘shared’ death has both its private and its public aspects. Broch was
not merely near death at A lt Aussee, rather he was very nearly consumed by
the forces o f social and political disintegration swirling about Europe at mid
twentieth century.

Broch did not wish to m erely record a death, rather he

chose to write him self into death by means o f this manuscript, effectively
begun during the two or so weeks o f his imprisonment. Broch does not offer
the reader the mere experience, inevitable to be sure, with death; rather he
offers the reader a dying into the social and political chaos that inhabits the
text. The Virgil o f T.D.V. is a subject in the process o f being consumed by his
own writing; there the reader sees Virgil dying into his own text, offering
him self in immolation to his own work (cf.: p. 268). Hence his choice o f Virgil,

13
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whose fictionalized death becomes the vehicle to carry the reader through the
labyrinth o f this experience.
The criticism that has thus far come into print concerning T.D.V. has, to
my knowledge, been mostly silent on the three point relation, ‘death-subjecttext,’ that I believe critical to an understanding o f this novel. The biographies
bring to light little o f relevance to the topic; it is, after all, out of the general
purview o f biographies to examine issues o f intense critical speculation.
There have been critics to address issues that, in one manner or another, do
touch on questions o f subjectivity in the text.

Broch's sometime interest in

Jungian psychoanalysis has led one w riter,16 a renowned disciple o f Jung, to
apply that methodology to an understanding o f the T.D.V.

Another critic17

attempts to place Broch in a tradition of mysticism, though to my reading,
T.D.V. seems to fit even less well into that classification. The constructed
subject o f Broch’s T.D.V. exasperates any such attempt at understanding by
means of prior systems of thought.
Yet, because of the permeating influence o f models of subjectivity
based on Broch’s reading in the literature o f phenomenology, certain critics,
such as Manfred Durzak18 and Erich Kahler,19 well grounded in this
philosophical area, have done much to advance an understanding o f
brochean subjectivity as it is rendered in T.D.V.

Maurice Blanchot, to my

knowledge, is the only writer who approaches T.D.V. with a critical interest in
the interrelation between death, text and the subject; thus his work, in
particular the article on Broch that form s a chapter o f his Livre a Venir, serves
as a recurrent point o f reference in this study of Broch’s last novel.

14
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The first of the three segments o f this chapter, Ich-Veriu&t (Dissolution
o f the

begins with an examination o f Broch’s Virgil, whose subjectivity, in

the first pages of T.D.V., is seen undergoing radical disintegration.

From

radical disintegration of subjectivity, Broch then suddenly shifts to the primal
moment o f subject identification, the moment of naming at birth. Broch first
establishes the ‘name’ as the portal through which the subject enter into
language. This segment follows the progression, as it unfolds with precision
and in exacting detail, in which subject identity is constructed within the
fram ework o f the name. Three stages are presented: 1) the name given at
birth is an as yet empty vessel; 2) the name V irg il’ attains rank in an
‘unending series of names-of-fathers;’ 3) Virgil’s name/identity breaks with the
unending series of names-of-fathers’ (die undendliche Reihe der VSter, p.
178).
The segment entitled Schicksal (Fate) examines Virgil as a figure of
ongoing subjective inter-reflection.

Broch’s ‘subject’ is not a thing but a

function with three points o f reference: self, self as other, and an
unquantifiable ‘real’ immanent to the field of language -represented as death
and the te x t- into which these aspects of subjectivity can be glimpsed in
reflection. W e conclude with a consideration of the phenomenon of ‘W orlddoubling’ (Weltvendopplung), a term employed by Broch to indicate that the
subject is written twice into language, as ‘s e lf and as other. ‘W orld-doubling’
in T.D.V. also implies a representation o f the world as a state of constant
exchange in which ‘truth’ is translated into the ‘real’ and the ‘real’ into ‘truth.’
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The chapter ends with the segment ‘Rome’, which tests one o f T.D.V.’s
implied premises, namely, that the radical restructuring o f a given social,
political, cultural order begins with the reconfiguration o f a particular individual
subjectivity. W e look at ways in which the ‘real’ is predicated upon subjective
cognition. Next, from the newly reconfigured subject, ‘Virgil,’ comes the hope
o f a rejuvenation o f a social order having become moribund.

Next we

examine the scene in which th e emblem o f Augustus’ validity, the purple toga,
is metaphorically shown to be without color and desiccated. It is the language
o f Virgil’s text that will ‘re-ink’ the cloth o f Augustus’ authority. The chapter
ends with a look at the power of the ‘word’ to recreate the failing social and
political order o f Augustan Rome.
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PARTI

ROLAND
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M-MUNJOIE

As is typically the case with epic, the Chanson de Roland (hereafter
referred to as Roland) begins in the middle o f things.

The opening scene

informs the reader that after seven hard years the conflict between Saracens
and Franks, one way or the other, is about to end. Not long thereafter the text
enters into the feast of carnage that will leave the best chevaliers of both
camps dead on the field of battle at Roncevaux. Subsequent to the slaughter,
the Emperor Charles finally arrives after the fact, not having yet drawn his
sword in combat.
business.

Charles returns as if merely to take care o f unfinished

He then proceeds to reclaim the loss of honor, to defeat the

remaining Saracens and to take Spain back into the confines o f the Christian
world. Charles’ return is decidedly anticlimactic.
This second half of the Roland, beginning with the emperor’s return,
has often struck the reader as supererogatory, a surplus o f narrative
extending beyond the story’s main event, namely, the death of Roland at
Roncevaux.

Significantly, the narrative expansion that begins with laisse

CLXXXVIII maintains the illusion with which the text begins, that o f always
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being in the middle o f things.

It also perpetuates the story’s chief fiction,

namely, that the Roland presents merely an episode within an historical
continuum that stretches forward uninterrupted from the beginnings o f the
Christian world.

If that world is fragmented, the text informs us, it is

synchronically so in terms o f the ever-present opposition between Saracen
and Frank, Christian and Pagan.

W ith the eradication o f that other, the

Pagan/Saracen, all can be made well, can be made whole again; a t least for
the moment. A closer examination o f the text, however, reveals another split,
one that runs like a fault line through the center of the Frankish camp and
which threatens the political stability o f Charles’ realm. In the following essay I
will trace out this internal divide, particularly in relation to the individual
subject,

where the

reader encounters

a widening gap

between the

significance of name and body, between substance and sign.
Though Charlemagne is not physically present at the battle of
Roncevaux, neither is he altogether absent.

Inadvertently or otherwise,

Roland, Roland’s boon companion Oliver, and the text’s chief cleric, the
archbishop

Turpin,

reconstruct a

presence for

Charlemagne

in

the

vocalization o f a unifying sign that is the war cry Monjoie.1 Monjoie is the
name of the oriflame, the banner that the emperor will carry forward into
battle. Over the course o f the text this sign of Charles undergoes numerous
transformations in both name and in substance. In particular, after the battle
at Roncevaux, through certain semantic and ritualistic manipulations, this
vocal sign Monjoie will attain a materiality that Charles, as we shall see,
somehow lacks.
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Our initial narrative approach to Charlemagne comes via the agency o f
Blancandrin, the Saracens’ chief negotiator.

He arrives at the camp o f th e

Franks to offer terms o f a costly peace. This is the picture we are given upon
his encounter, which is the reader’s first encounter, with the em peror
Blanche ad la barbe e tut flurit le chef,
Gent ad le cors e le cuntenant tier
S'est kil demandet, ne I’estoet enseinger.

(II. 117 -1 1 9)2

(His beard is white and his head hoary,
His body is noble, his countenance fierce;
If anyone seeks him, there is no need to point him out)

The text describes his body in term s more general than particular -n o b le
(gent), fierce (fier)—placing into question the nature o f Charles’ own subjective
identity.

Employing the adjectives blanche (white) and flurit (flowery), the

description makes use of a rhetorical semiology which throughout the
narrative connotes virility and rejuvenescence as well as wisdom and old age.3
In later descriptions, not of Charles but of his Saracen counterpart the em ir
Baligant, the adjectives blanc and flurit will appear again to signal a renewed
vitality:
Tant par ert blancs cume flur en estet...

(1.3162)

(It was as white as a flower in summer...)
Blanche ad la barbe ensement cume flur...

(1.3173)

(His beard was white just like a flower...)
“Blanche ad la barbe cume flur en avrill.°

(I. 3503)

(‘His beard is white as a flower in April.’)

Charlemagne, at the point at which we first encounter him, stands unmarked,
‘un-inked’ -B la n ch e ...e t tut flu rit (white...and in bloom); Charlemagne w ill
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generate his own text with its own meaning not through deed in battle, as
does Roland, but through a control over the signs and the language o f the
subsequent text.
Finally, there remains this to be said about the use o f the adjective
blanc: throughout the text it serves as attribute to two primary categories of
things, namely, cloth (in this I include hair and beard taking into account a
commonplace of rhetorical equivalencies [see Curtius, in particular the
example o f G6ngora des Vizekdnigs von Neapel p. 111 - ff.])4 and
armaments; the blank page of the unwritten geste and the swords of
Charlemagne and Roland, those burnished instruments by which narrative will
be inscribed on the field of battle. One notable exception m ust be made for a
whiteness that pertains to neither cloth nor armaments, the twice mentioned
‘blanc sarcou,’ the white sarcophagus -literally, the eater o f flesh— that which
consumes flesh, consumes one narrative that is to be replace by another; but
more on this later.
If at lines 1350 and 1378 the cry Monjoie continues to evoke Charles
as referent, at I. 1260 a new alignment develops between the emperor’s sign
and those engaged in combat. To the Saracen boast that the Franks will die
in place, Turpin, the archbishop/cleric who will die fighting at Roland’s side,
responds, rather incongruously, swearing that the Franks will, in fact, not flee:
“Culvert paien, vos i avez mentit!
Carles, me sire, nus est guarant tuz dis;
Nostre Franceis n’unt talent de fuTr.
Voz cumpaignuns feruns trestuz restifs.
Nuveles vos d i: mort vos estoet susfrir.
Ferez, Franceis! Nul de vus ne s’ublit!
Cist premer colp est nostre, Deu mercit!"
“Munjoie” escriet por le camp retenir.

(II. 1253 - 60)
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('Vile pagan, you have told a lie!
Charles, my lord, will always guard us well
Our French have no desire to flee.
All your companions will be laid to rest by us,
I have news for you: you must suffer death.
Strike, Frenchmen, let no one of you forget his duty.
This first blow is ours, thank God’
He shouts ‘Monjoie!’ to hold the field.)

In remarkable contrast to the passage at line 1179 -W e must not forget
Charles' battle-cry’ (L ’enseigne Carle n 'i devum ubli'er.

)— Turpin here

states plainly that the coming strikes will be fo r none other than those present
in body on the field of battle, that their deeds here will perpetuate no memory
other than their own. Charlemagne’s failure to meet the most fundamental
obligation due his vassals, to protect them from impending death, undermines
his position of authority among the Franks at Roncevaux and places in
jeopardy the inclusion o f his name in the commemoration at Roncevaux.
Turpin revives the spirits o f the warring Franks and in the process anchors
them to the field o f battle through a re-appropriation of the sign, Monjoie, as
their own. Charles’ ‘presence’ seems waning at this point and the repeated
insistence that the Franks will stand firm does not answer so much to the
Saracen taunts as it does to a growing awareness of the fading resolve
among the Franks. Turpin’s harangue also reveals a split in logic, one that
seems cynical at the core; in urging the Franks not to ‘forget themselves’; he
reminds them that they have already been forgotten by Charles.
A t a later moment in the text, Turpin reappears to decide the notorious
dispute between Oliver and Roland over whether or not to call Charles to their
aid against the overwhelming numbers o f advancing Saracens. Oliver urges a
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call to reinforcements; Roland, citing the ‘pride o f the geste, ’ determines to do
otherwise. In fact, it would already be too late. Charles’ return w ill not rescue
anyone, and this the chevalier at Roncevaux, thanks to Turpin’s instruction,
now well know.

Plainly, Turpin’s wish is to save not the lives, but the

remembrance o f those who have fallen, and remembrance, as we shall soon
witness, is subject to easy appropriation. Turpin initiates an ending to the
events at Roncevaux by counseling Roland to blow the olifant, summoning
Charles not as savior, but as subsequent witness to events that will already
have transpired:5
“Nostre Franceis i descendrunt a pied,
Truverunt nos e morz e detrenchez,
Leverunt nos en bieres sur sumers,
Si nus piurrunt de doel e de pitet,
Enfuerunt nos en aitres de musters;
N’en mangerunt ne iu ne pore ne chen."
Respunt Reliant “Sire, mult dites bien.”

(II. 1746 —51

(‘Our Frenchmen will dismount here;
They will find us dead and hacked to pieces
They will raise us on to pack-horses in coffins.
They will shed tears of sorrow and pity for us
They will bury us in a church’s hallowed ground.
No wolf or pig or dog will devour us.'
Roland responds: ‘Sir, you say well.’)

The profane and the divine intertwine in this substitution o f the promise o f
paradise (I. 1479) for glory and pomp in burial; throughout the Roland, this
warrior cleric is a curious blend of the sacred and the profane. One quickly
remembers, however, that the subtle Turpin addresses here only Roland and
Oliver, who will indeed be served in burial with the m ost elaborate ritual
performance; the brutal fact remains that all others -th o s e excluded from this
dialogue will also be excluded from any particular remembrance— will be
placed in a shallow grave on the plains just outside Saragossa. The reader
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might well imagine that they will indeed suffer dogs and swine and wolves
digging at their bodies through a thin covering o f soil (cf.: I. 1751 ’No w olf o r
pig or dog will devour us'... (“N ’en mangerunt ne lu ne pore ne chen”). A ll but
Roland, O liver and Turpin will suffer a fate amazingly sim ilar to that o f
Tervagant and Mohammed, the Saracen idols who, the text tells us, meet their
end in corporal desecration -T h e y seize Tervaganfs carbuncle / And fling
Mohammed into a ditch / W here pigs and dogs bite and tram ple on him’
(E Turvagan tolent sun escarbunde, / enz en un foss6t b u te n t/E pore e
chen le m ordent e defulent, II. 2590 - 91).
When Charles does finally return to Roncevaux it is with the host under
his command shouting Monjoie!, a sign rejuvenated by the imm ediately
preceding ‘commemoration’ at Roncevaux, a sign soon to be made once
again interchangeable with the very name of Charlemagne. Naimes, who is
as sincere as he is narrow and literalist in his interpretation o f Frankish law
and custom, replaces Turpin as the one chiefly responsible for negotiating a
new relation between the chevalier and ‘their1sign:
Respont dux Neimes: 'Baron i fait la peine!
Bataille i ad, par le men escientre.
Cil I’at trait ki vos en roevet feindre,
Adubez vos, si criez vostre enseigne,
Si sucurez vostre maisnee gent
Asez oez que Rollant se dementet!”

(II. 1790 - 95)

(Duke Naimes replies: ‘A true vassal is pouring out his suffering!
There is a battle, so help me.
The one who begs you to pretend you have heard nothing has betrayed him.
Arm yourself, shout out your battle cry,
And ride to the aid of your noble household.
You can hear clearly Roland signaling his distress!')

Verse 1793, which associates the cry o f Monjoie with the covering o f
protective armaments, anticipates the materialization o f the sign Monjoie as
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the sword (2508) and the cloth (3094), instruments o f inscription, which we
shall momentarily take under examination. The word feindre o f the preceding
line plays a key role in our understanding o f this line. In its Latin derivative
fingere - to form an image, a simulacrum, a fiction o f the real— Naimes might
well be pointing an accusing finger at the one who has seduced the Franks
into confusing truth as representation with the presentation o f the body in
battle. The exemplary instance o f the body as self-revelatory fiction com es at
the moment when the fiction of Roland’s exploits and the presence o f his body
in battle merge at verses 1638-40: ‘He encountered Roland in his path; /
W ithout ever having seen him, he recognized him in truth / By his fierce look
and his noble body, / His gaze and his whole countenance’. (Enm i sa ve/e ad
encuntret Rollant; iE nceis ne /' vit, s i /' cunut veirement / A l tie r visage e al
cors qu'il out gent / E a! reguart e a l contenement...). In this reading Naimes
instructs the chevaliers to rid themselves o f their corporal identity and in its
place to assume a unifying identity under the wraps o f the newly reconfigured
war cry Monjoie; it is a first step into the eventual materialization o f the sign.
Monjoie’s rejuvenescence, its return to potency promises to the Franks
who are left under Charlemagne’s command a protection that it failed to afford
the chevalier left at Roncevaux; hence, the materialization o f Monjoie marks a
definitive split within the Frankish camp. The sign Monjoie m etaphorically cuts
the world of the Franks in two, dividing those who will receive its protection,
the subjects o f a newly constituted order under Charles, and those fo r whom
its protection was forfeit: the fallen at Roncevaux. Prescient o f the death and
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dismemberment that will be part of the process by which Charles’ sign
(I’enseigne Cariuri) will reconstitute itself, Roland is the one who initiates the
circulation of ‘sign and remembrance' between the Saracen and the Frank
camps:
Puis escrient I’enseigne paenisme.
Qo dist Rollant “Ci recevrums martyrie..."

(II. 1921 - 22)

Quant en cest camp verdrat Carles, mi sire,
De Sarrazins verrat tel discipline,
Cuntre un des noz en truverat morz XV.r
Ne fesserat que nos ne beneTsse.’

(II. 1928 - 31)

(Then they shout out the pagan battle cry.
Thus says Roland: ‘Here we will receive martyrdom...
‘When Charles, my lord, comes to this battlefield,
He will see such a slaughter of the Saracens
That for every one of ours he will find fifteen of theirs dead.
He shall not fail to bless us.)

In antiphonal response to the Saracen war cry Roland attaches Christian
martyrdom to a pagan sign; that the ‘pagan sign' (iI’enseigne paenisme)
remains unnamed up to this moment in the narrative facilitates the operation
o f a graft; Roland inscribes Christian martyrdom onto an unmarked sign that
emanates not from Charles, but from the pagan h o st The renewal of Charles’
sign does not occur without a troubling exchange taking place. Anticipating
Charles’ blessing of the dead, Roland mingles Saracen and Frank in the post
mortem landscape of this scene -in a ratio of 15 to 1 - glossing over the
annihilation of his own men, as though it were merely incidental to the
slaughter o f the Saracens. The absurdity o f his logic stares out at the reader.
Where in the annals o f Christian martyrdom do the martyred wreak
destruction fifteen-fold upon their persecutors? One plausible solution to this
apparent paradox would be if Saracens and Franks had somehow both fallen
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victim to the same cause, if both were martyrs to a new order established
under Charlemagne and signed by the name Monjoie.
Toward the close o f this same episode, Roland further elaborates the
interconnectedness o f the two camps, Saracen and Frank:
Ki lui veTst Sarrazins desmembrer,
Un mort sur altre geter,
De bon vassal li poQst remembrer.
L'enseigne Carle n’i volt mie ublier
“Munjoie!” escrtete haltemente cler...

(II. 1970 - 74)

(Anyone who had seen him dismembering Saracens,
Piling up one corpse upon another.
Would have remembered what a good vassal was.
Nor does he want to forget Charles’ battle-cry.
He shouts out ‘Monjoie!’ loud and clear.)

The text presents slaughter and remembrance in a circularity moving from
sign (pagan) I. 1921 to martyrdom (Christian) I. 1922 and back again from
martyrdom (pagan) I. 1970 to sign (Christian) I. 1974. W hatever the numerical
proportions Charles, upon his return to Roncevaux, will find ju st such an
intermingling o f Christian and pagan bodies:
II nen i ad ne veie ne senter,
Ne voide tere, ne alne ne plein pied,
Que il n’i ait o Franceis o paien.

(II. 2399 - 2401)

(There is no road or path there,
No open ground, no yard or foot of land,
Not covered with a Frenchman or a pagan.)

Irrespective o f form er distinctions of faith, culture and allegiance, the text
presents Saracen and Frank as a unified tableau o f bodily remains; des
m em brer becomes re-membrer, dismemberment causes remembrance, or the
dis-memberment o f those left on the field at Roncevaux w ill be re-membered,
reconstituted though in a new configuration under the sign o f Charles. W hat
Roland cannot bring him self to articulate, what he attem pts to camouflage by
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signaling out the destruction o f the Saracens, is the fact that the potency, the
memorability o f I’enseigne Cariun depends as much upon the dismemberment
o f the Franks at Roncevaux as it does upon the that o f the Saracens.
The last mention on the field o f Roncevaux o f either the cry Monjoie or
its generic I'enseigne hales from the forces under Charles’ command as he
returns from the pass at Cize:
Carles repeiret od sa grant ost li ben
De cels de France odum les graisles clers;
Grant est la noise de ‘Munjoie!' escrier.

(II. 2149 - 51)

(Charles, the brave, is returning with his great army.
We hear the clear bugles of the men of France;
The noise from those who shout ‘Monjoie!’ is great)

These verses point not m erely to a Saracen recognition of the return/rebirth
(repeiret)

o f the

Frankish

forces

under

Charlemagne

but

also

the

rejuvenescence of the sign Monjoie T he noise o f those who shout ‘Monjoie*’
is great’...(G rant est la noise de Monjoie escrier).

This rebirth will be

confirmed at the next narrative encounter with the sign of Charles. A fter the
defeat at Roncevaux, the text makes the firs t mention of an association
between Charles’ ensign (Munjoie) and Charles’ sword (Joyeuse); it is the
narrative’s first attem pt to offer an explanation o f the origins o f a newly
constituted order under Charles:
Ceinte Joiuse, unches ne fut sa per,
Ki cascun jur muet .XXX. clartez.
Asez savum de la lance parler,
Dunt nostre Sire fut en la cruiz nasfret
Carles en ad la mure, mercit Deu;
En I’oret punt I’ad faite manuvrer.
Pur ceste honur e pur ceste bontet,
Li nums Joiuse I’espee fut dunet
Baruns franceis nel deivent ublien
Enseigne en unt de ‘ Munjoie!' crier;
Pur go nes poet nuie gent cuntrester.
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(II. 2501 -11)

([He] girt about him his sword Joyeuse, which has always been without peer.
And whose (light) changes thirty times a day.
We could say a good deal about the Lance
With which Our Lord was wounded on the Cross;
Charles has its point, thanks be to God,
Which he has had mounted in the golden pommel of his sword.
Through this honor and through this grace.
The name Joyeuse was given to the sword.
French barons must not forget it
From it they derive their battle cry 'Monjoie.'
For this reason no race on earth can withstand them.)

C[S]einte Joiuse receives a consecration making it sacred beyond all other
instruments o f war; although, or perhaps because, up untit this point in the
narrative, the reader has yet to see it strike a single blow. Joyeuse, Charles’
battle sword, performs another crucial function in incorporating the history of
events at Roncevaux into the larger history of the Christian world. By merit of
the contents o f its pommel, Joyeuse leads the narrative to ‘the Zero Hour1(die
Stunde Null) of the Christian era, which for cleric/scribe would be the
beginning o f eschatological time.

Joyeuse, encasing the spearhead that

pierced the divine Redeemer hanging from the cross, reaches into the interior
of the body of God, and if for no other reason than this, the text finds
justification in proclaiming this an instrument o f both war and narrative:
‘...which had no peer1 (unches ne fut sa per). This last remark -unches ne fut
sa per— as well as the description o f the luminescent qualities o f the sword
invites comparison with Durendal, Roland’s own blade, and we shall see that
the two swords here contest priorities as the instruments o f historical
inscription.
If only in terms o f their respective properties o f light, there is no
question, if one were to grant an im plicit trust in the honesty o f the text, but
that Joyeuse is the superior instrument of historical writing. Returning to the
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last mention o f Durendal while still in Roland’s possession we find that it, too,
is presented in terms of a description o f its luminescence:
“E! Durendal, cum es bele, e clere, e blanche!
Cuntre soleill si luises e reflambes!"

(II. 2316 -17)

(‘O. Durendal, how fair you are, how clear and white!
How you shimmer and sparkle against the sun.)

Brilliant though it may be, because o f stated physical properties —how clear
and white!’ (‘e clere e blanche!1)— Durendal appears to do no more than to
reflect light while there exists at least the suspicion that Joyeuse is able to
generate light, of its own power —’And whose (light) change thirty times a
day’...( Ki cascun ju r muet .XXX. clartez).

This is supported by further

evidence in the only other passage within the text to mention the name
Joyeuse:
Ki pur soleill sa clartet n’en muet...

(1.2990)

(Whose brillance is not diminished by the sun.)

The light emanating from Joyeuse is both lambent and able to rival the light of
the sun in its intensity.
Joyeuse’s other mark of superiority is that its relic is a unity (‘One’),
whereas the relics of Durendal are multiple, namely, ‘a tooth o f St. Peter,
blood from St. Basile, hair from the head of St. Denis, a portion of the Virgin’s
vestments.' The many as opposed to the One deflects a sought after mark of
hereditary legitimacy, o f immediacy and linearity; it is the mark o f a diffusion o f
power and o f authority that will in the end coalesce under the sign o f Charles.
Ultimately, the multiple nature o f Durendal’s reliquary, signaling multiple rather
than a unified point of origin, doubles back on the very question o f Roland’s
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own suspected bastardy.6

W hen the Franks are instructed not to forget

Monjoie, a forgetting is implied in the substitution o f one material sign,
Durendal, in exchange fo r another, Joyeuse. Through the agency o f the text,
Charlemagne achieves what Roland could not, the supplanting o f Durendal,
Roland’s own instrument o f inscription, by the even more powerful instrument
Joyeuse, Charlemagne’s own.

The metaphorical incorporation o f Joyeuse

into Monjoie reestablishes the guarantee o f protection that Charlemagne
forfeited by his absence from Roncevaux; it also privileges his telling of events
in that the history o f Roncevaux will be re-inscribed by Charles’ own
instrument, Joyeuse, which, unlike Durendal, had, up until mid-narrative,
remained unexposed to view, inactive, silent; though always attendant upon
this moment o f supplanting.
In laisse 183 we find an act o f exchange that will effectively bind the
two halves o f the narrative text; it is an exchange o f the instruments o f
inscription; then follows the textualization o f the cry Monjoie. In preparation
for the final encounter with the Saracens the narrative assigns the name
Monjoie to the the orieflambe, the golden cloth taken from the service o f St.
Peter:
Puis sunt muntez, la bataille demandent;
“Munjoie!” escrient; od els est Carlemagne.
Gefreid d’Anjou portet I’orie flambe:
Seint Piere fut, si aveit num Romaine;
Mais de Munjoie iloec out pris eschange.

(II. 3091 - 95)

(Then having mounted their horses, they demand battle
They shout out ‘Monjoie!’ and Charlemagne is with them.
Geoffrey of Anjou carries the oriflamme:
It once belonged to Saint Peter and it bore the name Romaine;
But from Monjoie it has received a change in name.)
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Monjoie now amasses a unity under one sign that is a t once military
(Joyeuse), religious (Romaine) and political (Charles’ emblem) in form : ‘From
it they derive the ir battle cry ‘Monjoie.’ / For this reason no race on earth can
withstand them ’....(Enseigne en unt de Munjoie c r ie r / Pur go n ’es poet nule
gent cuntrester, II. 2510-11).

In each instance the unity o f the Franks under

Charles is earned out through a process o f exchange: Durendal fo r Joyeuse,
Romaine fo r Monjoie, and the fallen at Roncevaux fo r the new order o f host
under Charles. The only tim e we see Charles’ sword drawn it is against his
Saracen counterpart, Baligant, and unlike the combat at Roncevaux, we
witness not two chevaliers measuring one another up, but the cataclysmic
coming together o f two heretofore separate worlds:
Cii sunt vassal ki les oz ajusterent
Lor enseignes n’i unt mie ubliees:
Li amiralz “Preciuse!” ad criee,
Carles ‘‘Munjoie!’’, I’enseigne renumee.
L'un conuist I'altre as haltes voiz e as cleres.

(II. 3562 - 66)

(Those who brought the armies together are valiant.
They have not forgotten their battle-cries:
The emir cried out ‘Precieuse!’
And Charles his renowned battle-cry 'Monjoie!'
They recognized each other by their loud, clear voices.)

Only one sign will survive the battle and surely it will be Monjoie:
‘‘Munjoie!* escriet pur la reconuisance.

(I. 3620)

(He shouts out ‘Monjoie!’ (that they might recognize him.)

Charlemagne

has,

as

the

text tells

us,

‘Repaired

is

his

and

his

remembrance’...(Repairet lo i vigure remembrance, I. 3614). In context of our
discussion, to recover remembrance is to recover vigor. Charles’ rejuvenation
is at the expense o f the forces under Baligant, but also, and indiscriminately,
all of those fallen at Roncevaux, Franks and Saracens alike. W hereas at line
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119 Charles appears in the narrative as sign w ithout need o f interpretation - if
anyone seeks him, there is no need to point him o u t...’ (S ’est kel demandet,
ne I’estoet enseigner...)— then ‘un-inked’, one m ight say, with the blood of
direct combat, here we find Monjoie replete with the full history of the battle
against the Saracens before during and after Roncevaux.
remembrance imbues Monjoie and so, too,

The blood o f

it imbues the name of

Charlemagne.
In conclusion, let us reconstruct an archeology o f the sign Monjoie such
as we find it at the end of the conflict between Saracens and Franks. The
ori'eflambe, the war cry ‘textualized’ as Charles' w ar banner, swathes Joyeuse,
having replaced Durendal as the sole instrument o f historical inscription, which
in turn encases the point of the sword reputed to have pierced the body of
Christ. These circles within a circle all circumscribe an absent body which,
according to the most immediate reading o f textual description, would seem to
be the unnamed body of C hrist
Asez savum de la lance parler,
Ount nostre Sire fut en la cruiz nasfret
Carles en ad la mure, mercit Deu...

(II. 2503 - 05)

(We could say a good deal about the Lance
With which Our Lord was wounded on the Cross;
Charles has its point thanks be to God...)

But the profane nature o f the text such as we have seen it over the course of
this discussion leads us to suspect the possibility o f yet another exchange, an
exchange o f something sacred for something profane; Charles is in need o f a
material referent fo r his sign without locus. Remembering that Monjoie has
covered over the name that is divine in its association with Rome {Romaine), it
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is more than a little curious that this same name Romain should be the very
name of the church into which Charles has placed the bodies of the only three
among all the fallen at Roncevaux to receive ‘proper1burial: Turpin, O liver and
Roland. If one allows fo r a confluence between Mojoie and Romaine by virtue
of their shared name, then one finds only these three peers named at the
center o f Charles’ sign. They are there, buried at the heart o f this church, far
from the center and, perhaps one m ight add, from the active remembrance of
Charles’ seat o f authority at Aix. But just as Christ was said to have had a
resurrection and in this way to have disappeared from the grave after death,
so, too, the pilgrim might have doubts about the covered remains o f these
three bodies placed, after all, in that enclosure which consumes all flesh, the
blancs sarcous into which the bodies o f Turpin, O livier and Roland have been
placed.

The only physical trace o f Roland remains at another place of

monumentalization ‘Upon the alter o f noble Saint Seurin’... (Desur I’alte r seint
Sevrin le baron, line 3685).

Here the instrument o f Roland’s voice pa r

excellence rests a silent cipher, like a single, now unintelligible letter that has
fallen from the forgotten alphabet of an extinct language.

The rhetorical

covering written over the surface of Roland’s horn, the olifant, has fallen into
pieces upon the ground during Roland's last kill at Roncevaux. Its letters have
been replaced by a pure gold that, cruelly, is meant to at once to fill the horn’s
cavity and to silence its voice:
Met I'oliphan plein d'or e de manguns:
Li pelerin le veient ki la vunt

(II. 3686 - 86)

(He places the oliphant, filled with gold and with mangons,
Pilgrims who visit the place still see it)
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OUTLAWS

On the surface o f things, it appears as though conflict within the Roland
can be determined by an ever extending set o f pairings: Roland versus
Ganelon; Charlemagne versus Baligant; Saracen versus Frank; Christian
versus Pagan, and so forth.

But these ‘contests’ merely reflect a much

greater underlying division from which all other difference emanates.

The

partitioning o f the text into two narrative panels o f near equal length— one
ending with the announcement o f the death o f Roland (I. 2397), the other
beginning with Charlemagne’s return (I. 2398)— provides tangible limits to two
distinct worlds, and, as we shall see, separate laws govern the make up o f
their respective social, political and m ilitary institutions.

The unrelenting

course o f transition between these two worlds, one, moribund, whose laws
have become dysfunctional, and the other which has yet to obtain the validity
o f its own structuring principles, becomes the source o f a violence out o f
which all struggle within the Roland narrative originates.
The movement from one narrative unit to the next, from one world to
the other, can be described as a process o f translation. From 'honor’s ruin,’ o f
which the ultimate expression is the death o f Roland and the loss o f the
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French at Roncevaux, will derive the absolute prerogative o f the emperor’s
right, his dreiture. How Charlemagne carries the French, how fo r that matter,
the text carries the reader, from failed honor to dreiture will be the focus o f this
essay.

I proceed with an examination o f five scenes, each o f which

demonstrates a significant advance in the transition from the ‘old order,’ of
which Roland is the exemplum, to the new. They are the council of Saracens
(II. 10-95); the council o f Franks (II. 96-365); the oratorical dispute between
Oliver and Roland over the return o f Charlemagne (II. 1722 - 36 and II. 1851 68); the burial o f the Franks, the battle with Baligant and the consequent
rejuvenation o f the emperor (lines 2845 - 3682); and the conversion of the
French to the emperor’s dreiture during the trial o f Ganelon (II. 3751 - ff.).
Through each o f these scenes a single paradigm will continue to replicate
itself, one that Blancandrin, the subtle Saracen negotiator, establishes during
the council o f Saracens. There he puts forth a rhetorical construct that makes
it possible to displace individual figures o f social and political authority,
principally Baligant and Charlemagne, with the absolute authority of an
abstracted law.

In attacking the protective bonds o f vassal allegiance (the

basis of honor) Blancandrin ‘frees’ men to turn their allegiance to the
sovereign state and ultimately to become the subjects o f the emperor’s, that is
to say Charlemagne’s, dreiture. It begins with the Saracen council and with
Blancandrin’s ingenious proposal.
There is no word to better describe the situation o f the Saracens at the
opening of the Roland than desperate. After seven years o f warfare against
the invading Franks they take refuge in their last stronghold, Saragossa,
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attending the enemy’s final assault. Their protector, the em ir Baligant, has
been absent despite repeated pleas fo r a return. Despairing o f his aid at this
critical moment, the Saracen stand ready to abandon their allegiance to lord
and to godhead. It is under these circumstances that Marsile convenes his
barons to council and that Blancandrin, described by the text as a good
chevalier and among the wisest of Saracens, delivers a proposal that aims to
reverse their ill fortune.
In place o f Baligant and the ‘pagan’ gods, Blancandrin would pretend to
substitute Charlemagne and the ‘law o f the Christians’ as the supreme
authority o f the realm. In so doing, he appears to carry through on what we
later learn has been a threat o f long standing. From the first year o f combat,
Marsile, the embattled Saracen king, sought protection out o f Babylon from
the emir Baligant.
reinforcements
Charlemagne,

The failure of response and the absence o f necessary

has

already led

Marsile to consider an

one

that would,

presumably,

have

accord with

brought about an

unencumbered transfer o f allegiance from the absent Baligant to the emperor
Charlemagne (lines 2413 - 21). Blancandrin’s treaty, however, proves further
reaching than this. It sees this failure o f protection and support as something
not individual, but systemic; it recognizes that not merely Baligant, but that the
very gods are them selves at fault. Accordingly, his treaty exploits an already
existent corruption o f the law.

W here the word honur appears, shame is

understood; where service to one’s lord and protection o f one’s dependents
are promised, betrayal is implied. The following verses disclose the outlines
o f his proposal:
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“En ceste tere ad asez osteiet
En France, ad Ais, s en deit ben repairer.
Vos le sivrez a la feste seint Michel,
Si recevrez la lei de chrestiens,
Serez ses hom par honur e par ben.
S’en volt ostages, e vos Ten enveiez,
U dis u vint, pur lui afiancer.
Enveiuns i les filz de noz muillers:
Par num d’ocire i enveierai le men.
Asez est meiz qu’il i perdent 16 chefs
Que nus perduns I’onur ne la deintet,
Ne nus seiuns cunduiz a mendeier!”

(II. 35 - 46)

(‘[Say that] He has campaigned long enough in this country.
That he ought to repair to Aix, in France.
Tell him you will follow him there at the feast of S t Michael,
That you will receive the law of the Christians,
Be his man through lands and through goods.
Send him hostages, if he should demand surety.
Ten or twenty of them, by way of guarantee.
Let us send him the sons of our wives:
Though it means that he will be killed, I will send him my own son.
Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we should loose our honor and our offices,
Grant that we may never be brought to beggary!’)

W hat is striking about this treaty is that it replicates the error it pretends to
correct. A t lines 36 - 39, Blancandrin merely proposes a transfer o f allegiance
from one long absent lord, Baligant, to another; Charlemagne, who resides in
far away Aix, will prove ju st as absent and in that absence ju st as ineffectual
with respect to the Saracen community in Spain.1 W hat is more, in lieu o f the
Saracens who have already perished as a result o f Baliganfs failure, a failure
o f their gods and laws to protect them, Blancandrin proposes to set aside his
own host o f martyrs in the persons o f the ‘sons of our wives’ (II. 40 - 43). He
offers their lives not in witness to an emerging order or to unity between
Christian and Saracen under Charlemagne and the ‘law o f the Christians’...
(la le i de chrestiens), but as final proof that the existing order has become
wholly bankrupt. In this opening scene o f the Roland, Blancandrin alerts the

38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reader to the failure o f honur, to the conditions in which the promise o f
allegiance between vassal and lord has already lapsed into meaninglessness.
That the treaty put forth by Blancandrin should seem credible, that for
practical considerations, for the protection o f ‘state,’ it could possibly effect an
en masse transfer o f allegiance from Baligant to Charlemagne already signals
to the reader how slight are the differences o f the social and political
structures between the realm o f the Saracen and the realm o f the Frank. The
logic of Blancandrin’s proposal demonstrates an appreciation o f this very
powerful truth: as ‘bon chevalier' ( - De vasselage fut asez chevaler, line 25)—
we can see that Blancandrin, and so the Saracens at large, are only one
remove from being ‘bon chr6tien’ as well; the ‘law of the Christian’ and the ‘law
of the feudal lord’ are spoken of here as one and the same. When first the
reader encounters lines 38 and 39, nothing suggests that these verses should
be read in any other way than in paratactic relation to one another; in other
words, that line 38 and line 39 present two distinct and independent
propositions. Line 38 states plainly that the Saracens should convert to the
law o f the Christians; line 39 that they should

swear allegiance to

Charlemagne. Notwithstanding, the subsequent text supplies ample evidence
to argue in favor o f a hypotactic reading o f these lines with the result that
honur—the observance o f vassal obligations (cf.: I. 39)— and the adherence to
la le i de chrestiens (I. 38) are found to represent one and the same thing.
Thus, we can infer a certain ethic from these verses when read hypotactically:
conversion to ‘Christianity’ entails an obligation to service in arms. I cite three
examples prom inent in their support o f such a reading.
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The first is taken from a passage that we will examine in greater detail
later in this paper. Roland, at lines 1854 - 59, eulogizing the French who have
lost their lives at Roncevaux, comes as close as a mortal can in granting these
‘martyrs’ paradise in recompense fo r their loyal service to lord (Charlemagne)
and peer (Roland).

In fighting bravely, so goes the logic o f Roland’s

reasoning, the French chevalier have earned their heavenly reward and the
good chevalier is thus granted a ‘fie f in heaven.’ W e see this again in a
promise made by the archbishop Turpin at the commencement of battle when
he exhorts the French: Confess your sins, ask God’s m ercy!/................/ ‘You
will find your places in the great paradise’

(“Clamez vos culpes, s i preiez

Deu m e rc it!/............... JSieges avrez e l greignor p a rei's” II. 1132 and 1135).
Here too the ‘law of the Christians’ and the ‘law of the chevalier’ inter-reflect
so as to become scarcely distinguishable one from the other.
In a separate incident Turpin bids farewell to the fallen at Roncevaux
even while contemplating the significance of his own approaching death; here
the juxtaposition of the sacred and the profane are seen in still greater
contrast.

Below Turpin addresses a ‘prayer1 to the lifeless bodies that a

diligent Roland has gathered round him:
Apr&s ad dit “Mare fustes, seignurs!
Tutes voz anmes ait Deus li Glorius!
En pareTs les metet en sentes flurs!
La meie mort me rent si anguissus!
Ja ne verrai le riche empereQr.”

(II. 2195 - 99)

(Afterward he said: ‘Lords, it was your great misfortune!
May the glorious God have all your souls!
In paradise, may he place them on holy flowers!
My own death causes me such anguish!
I will never again see the powerful emperor!’)
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Turpin’s response admits to a certain reticence o f belief; he conceives of
death principally, if not exclusively, in terms o f an irrecoverable loss. In the
utterance ‘Lords, it was your great misfortune!’ { ‘Mare fustes, seignursf),
hardly the suitable beginning fo r a prayer commending to God the souls o f the
dead, Turpin courts blasphemy.

Similarly, faced with his own moment of

dying, Turpin all but declares him self a non-believer. In the final moments of
life in place of a union with the almighty he is concerned with only the
perpetual absence of his protecting lord, the absence o f ’the powerful
emperor1 (7e riche em pereur).

As the ‘le i de chrestiens' and the ‘le i de

chevalier* seem to collapse into one another Turpin is seen vacillating
between two perpetually absent masters, Deus li Glorius and Charlemagne;
neither will be able to secure either him or the French from the death
impending at Roncevaux.
Events in the Saracen camp provide yet a third example o f the
intertwining of divine and worldly authorities, again with particular regard to
their failures.

A t lines 2580 - 2604, the Saracens are seen cursing their

godheads, their idols, casting them into a pit and swearing that Baligant
him self is a coward if he does not return to avenge the humiliations suffered at
Roncevaux. By these actions, placing blame indiscriminately on Baligant and
the gods alike, the Saracens demonstrate a virtual synonymy between the
‘law o f the Christians’ and the ‘law o f the Chevaliers;’ neither has afforded the
protection implicitly promised. W ith this we are now only a small step away
from recognizing that the same judgement passed by the Saracens upon
Baligant and the ‘pagan’ gods can now be turned in judgement upon
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Charlemagne and the ‘le i de crestiens.’ W ithout distinction o f allegiance to
whatever lord or whatever law, all will die at Roncevaux. The failure of both
laws in both realms, as pointed out by Blancandrin at lines 38 - 39, is seen
sim ply and ultim ately as a failure o f honur.
Blancandrin’s proposition takes honur into account as the dynamics of
a law operating on two intersecting social planes. On the one hand, there
exists the obligation between vassal and lord characterized a t lines 38 - 39 as
that service which the Saracen pretend to offer Charlemagne; on the other
hand, there are the obligations of mutual aid among peers —blatantly violated
by the tenor o f Blancandrin’s proposal at lines 40 - 46.

By the spurious

promise o f allegiance to Charlemagne at lines 38 - 39 and the abandonment
o f kin at lines 44 - 46, it is made plain that honur is held to be wholly in default.
The sense o f Biancandrin’s proposition within these latter verses, that fathers
should purchase lost honur with the blood of their sons, dem onstrates that the
very concept o f honur has been turned on its head. The obligation to protect
one’s peers gives way to the decision that will allow for th e destruction of
one’s closest dependents ‘the sons o f our w ives...’ ( ‘es filz de noz m uillers).
And yet this seemingly nonsensical proposition is better understood if we
compare lines 44 - 45 with a close variant that crops up a fe w lines on within
the text:
“Asez est melz qu’il i perdent 16 chefs
Que nus perduns I’onur ne la deintet..."

(II. 44 - 45)

(‘Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we should loose our lands and our offices’)
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‘Asez est mielz qu'il i perdent les testes
Que nus perduns clere Espaigne, la bele...’

(II. 58 - 59)

('Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we should loose fair Spain, the beautiful.')

The very evident syntactical symmetry o f these lines, so proximate one
another within the text, would seem to suggest a kinship of both form and
sense, that the quest fo r personal honur and Blancandrins’ ‘pursuit o f shining
‘Espaigne, la bele’ m ight be considered as readily interchangeable goals. In
case o f point, this is not a defensible reading.

Conceptually, honur and

deintet are shown to function within the text in relation to an intricate
interdependency o f mutual obligations and responsibilities among individual
subjects. This stands squarely in opposition to the notion o f ‘clere Espaigne,
la bele,’ or o f ‘France dulce’ fo r that matter, as political constructs whose
coming into existence necessitates the eradication o f the very principles of
mutual support tha t form the underpinnings o f feudal social organization.
Blancandrin proposes not an equivalency between honur and ‘state’ but an
exchange: individual honur will be replaced by an all-encompassing law to
which the subject will be solely and directly responsible.

Blancandrin has

foreseen that obligations between vassal and lord and among peers have
been reduced to a m atter o f only secondary importance. He aims to sweep
aside the old and weakened order based on feudal ties.2 Still, those who
engage with him in this, engage in outlawry, in a general repudiation o f the
standing law, an act that will soon bring about a violence o f cataclysmic
proportion.
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Blancandrin’s proposal offers to bring together Saracen and Frank by
creating a single position of authority at the pinnacle o f their combined worlds
(cf.: II. 38 - 39), a position, for the moment at least, marked only by traces of
the variously absent Baligant, Charlemagne and Deus. A danger lies in the
fact that during the transition to this newly fabricated structure of social and
political organization their world remains essentially lawless. As he presents
Biancandrin's treaty to the Frankish chevaliers for deliberation in council,
Charlemagne reiterates the conditions o f ‘conversion,’ while at the same time
cautiously raising the specter of an undisclosed anarchy:
“II me sivrat ad Ais, a mun estage,
Si recevrat la nostre lei plus salve;
Chrestiens ert, de mei tendrat ses marches;
Mais jo ne sai quels en est sis curages.”
Dient Franceis: “II nus i cuvent guarde!”

(II. 188 -1 9 2)

('He will follow me to Aix, to my residence,
There he will receive our law most salutary;
He will become Christian, from me he will hold his marches as fiefs.
But I do not know what is in his heart’
Say the French: 'We should be cautious!')

Though a cursory review of the above lines may suggest that the pending
conversion to Christianity (line 190) and the promise o f fealty to Charlemagne
(line 189) might still be considered as separate events, a closer examination
reveals that, as with Blancandrin before him, the em peror likewise proffers a
fusion of the worldly and the divine.

If, as we have seen (II. 38 - 39),

acceptance of /a le i de chrestiens leads to a service in arms, here acceptance
o f the emperor’s law —nostre lei— renders the oath taker ‘Christian’ - e r t
chrestiens. Thus there appears to be only one law though it goes by several
names: la le i de chrestiens; la le i de chevalier; or, what amounts to the same
thing, simply honur.

Beyond the mere acceptance or refusal o f a Saracen
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conversion, the council o f Franks w ill be called upon to determine its own
willingness to redefine itself according to a new law —nostre le i plus salve—;
one that will bring together not ju s t two worlds but the m ultiplicity o f feudal
communities under the aegis o f a single master.
Concluding the treaty’s summary with a focus on questions of intent —
mais jo ne sai quels ert est sis curages— the em peror prompts vague
suspicion among the Franks (I. 192). They reply chorus-like -D ie n t Francois:
il nus i cuvent guardel— as though struck by some foreboding that reaches fa r
beyond a simple mistrust o f Marsile.

Taking his cue from their response,

Roland instructs the Franks on the nature o f their own fears.

More

threatening than the failure o f the Saracens to abide by the terms o f their
guileful treaty would be for the common discourse among the Franks to lapse
into complete meaninglessness. Roland translates this absence of truth from
the language of common discourse into a call for unbridled violence:
II dist al rei: “Ja mar crerez Marsilie!
Set anz ad pleins qu’en Espaigne venimes;
Je vos cunquis e Noples e Commibles,
Pris ai Vaiteme e la tere de Pine
E Balasgued e Tuele e Sezilie:
Li reis Marsilie i fist mult que traltre.
De ses paiens enveiat quinze,
Chascuns portout une branche d’olive;
Nuncerent vos cez paroles meTsme.
A voz Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie;
Dous de voz cuntes al paien tramesistes,
L'un fut Basan e li altres Basilies;
Les chef en prist es puis desuz Haltilie.
Faites la guer cum vos I’avez enprise,
En Sarraguce menez vostre ost banie,
Metez le sege a tute vostre vie,
Si vengez cels que li feis fist ocire!”

(II. 196 - 213)

(He said to the king: ‘Believe Marsile at your peril!
It has been seven full years since we first came to Spain;
For you I have conquered both Noples and Commibles,
I have captured Vaiteme and the land of Pine
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And Balaguer and Tudela and Sezille:
King Marsile was every bit the traitor.
He sent fifteen of his pagans.
Each bearing an olive branch;
They spoke to you these same words.
You took council of your French,
They counseled you foolishly.
You sent two of your nobles to the pagan.
One was Basan and the other Basilie;
He took their heads on the hill by Haltille.
Make war as you have begun it
Lead your army you have summoned to Saragossa,
Lay siege there for all your life, if need be.
Avenge those whom the felon has killed!')

Roland rebukes the French, reminding them that Marsile's is a discourse with
which they are already fam iliar (I. 204), one in which they have already made
inscription (I. 205). Bad faith on the part o f the Saracens conspiring with the
im perfect judgem ent o f the French has produced the bankruptcy o f language
endemic to both camps. From this point onward, in Roland’s estimation, the
council of chevaliers can lead to nothing good. To discover the path from a
universal failure o f language to universal vengeance in arms, the reader m ust
follow Roland in the inherently cyclical structure o f his argument.
Roland’s narration, from conquest (II. 198-200) to negotiations (II. 201 204) to betrayal (II. 205 - 206) to vengeance (II. 210 - 213), has the semblance
of a reconstruction of events following the logic o f a straightforward,
uncomplicated chronological order. Likewise, it would appear as though, from
the beginning, the motivation fo r warfare against the Saracens has remained
constant and without change or interruption. This illusion o f linear chronology
serves to obscure two important facts. Firstly, that this passage (II. 1 9 6 -2 1 3 )
accounts for not one but two cycles o f events, one past and one future, that
turn on betrayal and vengeance— the past cycle terminating in the deaths o f
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Basan and Basilie, the future cycle to end in the death o f Roland and the
French at Roncevaux. Secondly, that from at least as early as the betrayal of
Basan and Basilie, a logic different from

that of the Franks under

Charlemagne has motivated the actions of Roland and those Franks under his
own command.

From the account given at lines 196 - 213 we can in all

reconstruct three possible sequences of events.
If we choose to read lines 197 - 213 as the representation o f events in
strict linear succession, then it follows that Marsile had been pressured to sue
fo r peace (II. 201 - 204) only as a direct consequence o f Roland’s numerous
successes in battle (II. 198 - 200). There are obstacles to an acceptance of
this sequence o f events. From textual evidence, we determine that Roland’s
conquests listed at lines 198 - 200, at least in so far as they are motivated by
vengeance, do not precede but postdate Marsile’s initial betrayal. A t line 197
Roland signals to the reader: ‘It has been seven full years since we first
arrived in Spain.’ Hence within the ongoing struggle between Saracens and
French the conquests listed at lines 197 - 200 do not culminate in Marsile’s
first petition for peace, rather, the petition serves as an interruption within the
otherwise continuous series o f events. That interruption takes on an enduring
reality as the French under Roland become infused with an augmented sense
o f vengeance as a result o f the betrayal of Basan and Basilie. If at line 210
Roland urges the French to ‘Make war as you have begun it’ he concludes the
period at line 213 now instructing them to ‘avenge those [Basan and Basilie]
whom the felon [Marsile] has killed,’ as though from the outset the conflict
between Saracen and French had its origins in a vengeance justifiable in

47
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

terms of Marsile’s treachery. In this way Roland revisits the ‘beginnings’ of
conflict between Saracen and French, supplanting, anachronistically, the
original drive to impose the ‘law o f the Christians’ upon Saracen Spain with a
desire for ‘meritorious’ vengeance.
The apparent linear chronology of events as they are lain out at lines
197 - 213 gives way under examination to the cyclical narration that can be
recounted as follows: A t some unspecified moment Marsile sees fit to sue for
peace (II. 201 - 203); the French consider his proposal and acquiesce (II. 204 205); as a result, Charlemagne sends the emissaries Basan and Basilie to the
Saracens, who murder them (II. 207 - 209); only then do Roland and the
French seek vengeance against the Saracens as reported at lines 198 - 200.
The list of conquests with which Roland begins his oration, assuming that
they, too, have been motivated by vengeance (cf.: II. 210 - 13), stands in last
place among events as they actually occur -th is premise is anachronous.
Hence, the conclusion o f this first ‘narrative round’ (II. 197 - 200) takes us
back to the beginning, to the return o f Marsile attempting for a second time to
negotiate, treacherously, o f course, an end to hostilities.

Unlike the

circumstances surrounding his prior mission for peace, the process is now
encumbered by a contingent, Roland and his Franks, charged with the desire
to avenge. Roland, we remember, urges Charlemagne to disband council and
to bring vengeance swiftly home to Saragossa.

But Charlemagne remains

hesitant; unlike Roland and his followers, the forces under the emperor as yet
remain ‘innocent’ o f the desire for vengeance.

When the Franks under

Charlemagne finally do embrace vengeance as a motivation fo r warfare, it will
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not be for the sake o f Basan and Basilie, but in remembrance o f those who
are soon to die at Roncevaux.

Thus, Roland displaces the m otive of

vengeance onto both a reconstructed past -th e initial arrival o f the Franks in
Spain— and a fiction o f future events -th e coming massacre o f the Franks at
Roncevaux.3
We might now postulate yet a second future’ narrative cycle, one that
proleptically ‘converts’ the Franks under Charlemagne to Roland's m anner o f
warfare as act-of-vengeance. To paraphrase Roland at line 210, they, too,
[Charlemagne and the Franks who return to Roncevaux from Cize] m ust
‘continue the war as they [Roland and the Franks] have begun it.’

This

proleptic narrative arrangement follows the same order as the chronologically
first (past) cycle of warfare; only this tim e in the present and future tense.
Marsile's present messengers are none other than Blancandrin with his
current suite o f retainers (II. 201 - 03). For a second time, Charlem agne’s
‘French’ —vos Franceis— will consider and ultimately acquiesce to M arsile’s
proposal (I. 204 - 05); at Roncevaux, the Franks under Roland w ill com e to
stand proxy in slaughter fo r Basan and Basilie (207 - 09; also, cf.: 3016 - 17).
The final conquest o f Saragossa will now be led not by Roland, but by
Charlemagne and ‘his French’ (vos Franceis), who by this time are imbued
with the Rolandian spirit o f vengeance -h e re one could say that lines 197 200 and 2 1 0 - 2 1 3 overlap in such a way as to suggest that the chronology of
the narrative cycle has attained a certain textual materiality). W hereas a t the
end o f the first cycle, the motivation fo r violence adheres to the names Basan
and Basilie, during the second cycle —that in which Charlemagne and his
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Franks repurchase ‘France dulce’ after the loss at Roncevaux— the spirit of
vengeance attaches to the name Roland.
A t line 277, Ganelon is the first to rebuff Roland’s sermon o f vengeance
and he does so in a single phrase.

Speaking to Charlemagne, Ganelon

declares: “He does not care by what death we die” ( ‘/S/e li chalt, sire, de quel
m ort nus m u riu n s /1. 277). This is the first sally in a defense that, by council’s
end, will place Ganelon squarely on the side o f the law based on vassal ties o f
mutual obligation, that is to say on the side o f a rapidly failing honur. Unlike
Roland, who operates as something o f a free agent at the head o f a vast
number o f vassal dependents, Ganelon sees his allegiance split between two
vassalic obligations: duty to clan and duty to the larger feudal community.
Chosen as emissary on an almost certainly fatal mission to the Saracens,
Ganelon offers his life for the common good on the provision that
Charlemagne grant assurances regarding the continued safety o f the property
and kin left behind in death:
‘ En Sarraguce sai ben qu’aler m'estoet
Horn ki la vait repairer ne s’en poet
Ensurquetut si ai jo vostre soer,
Sin ai un filz, ja plus bels n'en estoet,
Co est Baldewin,” go dit, ‘ki ert prozdoem.
A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus.
Guadez le ben, ja nel verrai des oilz.”
Cartes respunt “Tro avez tendre coer.
Puis quel comant, aler vus en estoet”

(II. 310-318)

(‘ I know well that I must hasten to Saraguce.
The man who goes there will not return.
To be sure, remember that your sister is my wife,
And that I have a son, there is none more beautiful
Than Baldewin,” he said, ‘he will be a noble vassal.
To him I leave my ‘honors’ and fiefs.
Care for him well, I will not see him again with these eyes.”
Charles responds: ‘Your heart is too tender.
Since it is commanded, go as you are supposed to.”
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Staging this scene in the m anner he does, Ganelon forces Charlemagne to
deliberate publicly concerning an otherwise private matter; everyone present
suddenly finds he has a personal interest in the outcome.

By this

determination, all will recognize either the potency or the impuissance o f the
emperor's power and authority. Should Charlemagne deny Ganelon outright
the protection he rightly demands this would be tantamount to announcing to
all the Franks present that the very law thought to protect them no longer
obtains.4
Ganelon’s request to Charlemagne comes on the heels of his offering
himself up -u n to d e a th - as a paragon of public duty; he gives his life fo r the
sake o f his liege lord (II. 310 - 311).

In the probable event o f his death,

Ganelon petitions Charlemagne to guarantee the security o f his son and heir,
Baldewin. The emperor's response, or lack thereof, will determine Ganelon’s
actions from this point onward. Charlemagne demurs in silence to acquiesce
to Ganelon’s petition.

Interpreting this silence -Charlem agne deigns no

answer— as a sign of the em peror’s own social/political impotence, Ganelon
does not delay in taking upon him self what would otherwise have been the
emperor’s responsibilities.

When his men offer to accompany him to

Saragossa, Ganelon has them instead turn back toward Aix to protect
Baldewin and, in the case o f Ganelon’s death, to swear oaths o f fealty to his
sole remaining heir.
By the end o f council we see Ganelon’s honur in complete antithesis to
the perversion of honor represented in Blancandrin’s proposal at lines 38 - 39
and 4 4 - 4 6 ; Ganelon is both exemplary in service to his lord (Charlemagne)
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and loyal in his duty to kin.

Vengeance, however, enters like a virus and

destroys not only Ganelon, but also the order o f law that has been the support
and protection o f all feudal vassals.

‘His name is Baldewin' (I. 314); ‘I w ill

never again see him with these eyes’ (I. 316); ‘You have too tender a heart’ (I.
317) —already this passage hints at the future reward o f Ganelon’s virtues —
Tendre coer (evisceration); oilz -(blinding); Baldewin [baudoin - the male
member] (dismemberment). The fact th a t by the end o f this council Ganelon
comes to be seen as the outlaw and Roland emblematic o f virtue in arms is
the surest sign that Blancandrin’s proposal, the original engine for vengeance
at II. 38 - 39, has taken hold among the Franks.
Dismissing Ganelon, denying him safeguard o f honor, property, and kin
(II. 314 - 318), Charlemagne initiates the dissolution o f legal obligations
between vassal and lord. Yet at the moment o f Roland’s departure at the
head o f the rear guard en route to Roncevaux, Charlemagne seems to recant
this vicious evolution in polity and offers to Roland the protection he had
earlier withheld from Ganelon:
Li empereres apelet ses nigs Rollant
“Bel sire nigs, or savez veirement
Demi mun host vos lerrai en present
Retenez les, go est vostre salvement”
Qo dit li quens: “Jo n’en ferai nient”

(II. 783 - 87)

(The emperor calls to his nephew Roland:
“O gentle sir and nephew, know this truly
I will now give over to you half my army.
Accept them, this will be your salvation.”
The count replied: “I will do no such thing.”

In his response, Roland again underscores the already dissolving ties o f
feudal allegiance; no longer will Charlemagne enjoy the service-in-arms o f
Roland and the Franks. Much o f the ideological struggle among the Franks at
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Roncevaux turns on the issue o f whether Charlemagne and his ‘host1 should
be called into the fray; whether or not, finally, the French should accept
Charlemagne’s offer o f salvem ent Oliver, in vain, urges Roland to call fo r the
emperor’s return. When his efforts fail to persuade, O liver reproaches Roland
with severity, summarizing many o f the same complaints Ganelon has
elsewhere raised against Roland.

Roland, however, refuses to seek the

emperor’s return until the m oment when it is clear that all is fost. In the larger
scheme o f things, Roland and the Franks replicate the circum stances under
which Basan and Basile die, only this tim e as victim s o f a second and infinitely
greater round o f sacrifice.

As such, they are to become the material

witnesses' to and the motivating factor spurring on the narrative’s second
round o f violence.
W hen Charlemagne finally returns to Roncevaux, he w ill return as the
avenger.

Meanwhile, as the Saracens appear on the horizon with obvious

hostile intent, Oliver sees an opportunity to remind Roland of the emperor’s
prior ‘offer o f salvation.’ Hearing o f the coming Saracen onslaught, however,
Roland welcomes the news: ‘This should be good fo r out king’ (“Ben devums
ce estre p u r nostre re i,” I. 1009). A few lines down, Oliver makes a second
attem pt and perhaps with the thought that pride stands as an obstacle, Oliver
offers Roland this face saving measure:
“Guenes le sout, li fel, li traltur,
Ki nus jugat devant I’emperereOr."

(II. 1024 - 25)

(‘Ganelon knew it the felon traitor,
He condemned us before the Emperor.’)
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It is not his own fault, so O liver explains to Roland, if the Franks find
themselves in this fatal predicament, but the fault o f a treacherous Ganelon.
Roland rejects outright the compromising solution o f a call fo r aid and
reinforcements.

An increasingly insistent Oliver, undeterred by Roland’s

stubborn refusal o f his advice, now resorts to other means o f persuasion; to
counting (I. 1040), and to underscoring the numerical im possibility o f survival
without the Emperor's return (I. 1061). To this Roland responds by revealing,
albeit obliquely, his true purposes in this a ffa ir
“Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt jugez a mort*

(1.1058)

(‘I swear to you, all are judged to die.’)
“Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt a mort livrez."

(1.1069)

(‘I swear to you, all will be delivered into death.’)

These lines evince erasure of all distinction between Saracens and Franks —
a ll are judged, a ll will die, indiscriminately so, before the conflict has ended.
This only corroborates Ganelon’s warning o f line 227: ‘He does not care what
manner o f death we die’

(“Ne li chalt, sire, de quel m ort nus murjuns.")

Finally, despite Oliver’s seeming incomprehensibility Roland spells out clearly
his purposes:
Respunt Rollant “Mis talenz en est graigne.
“Ne placet Damnedeu ne ses angles
Que ja pur mei perdet sa valur France!
Melz voeill murir que huntage me venget
Pur ben ferir I’emperere plus nos aimet“

(II. 1088 - 91)

(Roland replies: ‘Because of it my desire is all the greater.
’May it not please Our Lord God nor his angels
That through/for/because of me France should loose her value!
I would rather die (than) that he should avenge my shame.
The Emperor loves us all the more when we strike well.’)

Roland’s wishes will soon come to fruition: from death and shame suffered at
Roncevaux arise the avenging deeds of the Emperor.
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When finally it is certain that the French will meet their doom then and
only then, over Oliver’s objections, Roland sounds the olifant calling for
Charlemagne’s return.

It thus becomes clear that the harshest term s of

Blancandrin’s contract, at least with respect to the ‘sons o f the Franks,' will
soon be met.

Evoking honur as it is defined within the context of

Blancandrin’s proposal at line 39 Oliver announces that service to the
Emperor is now in permanent default: ‘Charles the great w ill have no further
aid from us’ (“Karfes li magnes, de nos n’avrat are,” I. 1732). Furthermore,
Roland’s

declaration

at line

1863

- “Noble

French,

I see

you

die

for/through/because o f me” ( ‘Barons franceis, p u r m ei vos vie munY)—
resembles the perverse sacrifice prescribed by Blancandrin at lines 42 - 46,
namely, that the ‘sons of our wives’ should be forfeited for the cause.

In

pendant orations, appropriately situated within the narrative, one to either side
of the passage that describes the Emperor’s return, Oliver and Roland
pronounce upon the meaning of the impending death of the Franks at
Roncevaux. Oliver judges their death in terms o f the massive loss o f vassal
allegiance to be suffered by Charlemagne; Roland, on the other hand, views
these deaths in terms of an occasion of glorious commemoration.

Despite

their divergent view points, one thing Roland and Oliver offer in common is the
means by which Charlemagne will ultimately translate the violent world o f
feudal allegiance into a world where there exists an infinitely more stable
system o f social and political organization.
Oliver’s words inadvertently foreshadow the emergence of the ‘future’
divine justice, one under which Charlemagne will enjoy a flourishing renewal:
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Qo dist Roilant “Porquei me portez ire?"
E ii respont “Cumpainz, voz le felstes,
Kar vasselage par sens nen est folie;
Mielz valt mesure que ne fait estultie.
Franceis sunt morz par vostre legerie.
Jamais Karlon de nus n'avrat servise.
Sem creTsez, venuz i fust mi sire;
Ceste bataille oQsum [faite u prise];
U pris u mort i fust li reis Marsilie.
Vostre proecce, Roilant, mar la velmes!
Karies le Magnes de nos n’avrat ale.
N’ert mais tel home d6s qu’a Deu julse.
Vos i murrez e France en ert hunie.
Oi nus defalt la leial cumpaignie:
Einz le vespre mult ert gref la departie.”

(II. 1722 - 36)

(Thus says Roland: “Why are you so angry with me?’
And he answers: “Friend, you have done ii
For vassalage by reason is not folly;
Just measure is better than foolishness.
The French are dead because of your senselessness.
Charles will never again have us in service.
Had you trusted me, my lord would have come by now;
We would have had this battle and won against the enemy;
He would have king Marsile either captured or dead.
Your prowess, Roland, it is our curse!
Charies-the-great will have no further aid from us.
Never will there be such a man until God has His justice.
You will die here and France will be shamed.
Here we have failed the loyal company:
He will witness great sorrow before the evening.’)

Though he is not mentioned by name, G anelon’s presence haunts this
harangue leveled at Roland. Through a series o f intra-textual allusions, Oliver
has successfully tapped into Ganelon’s com plaint.

The words

“Vos

f(orsf)ei'stes” at line 1723 anticipates what w ill become Ganelon’s key defense
during his trial: “Roland has forfeited our allegiance in both gold and in
chattel”...... (Roilant me forfist en o r e en aveir, ” I. 3758).

But this same

accusation o f forfeiture has additional resonance in that it carries Roland’s
name back to an earlier event that marks rupture within the community o f
Franks, namely, the Emperor’s original failure to guarantee protection to the
property and heirs o f Ganelon (cf.: II. 310 - 22). There Ganelon declares to
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Charlemagne: ‘Sir...R oland has done all these things’ (“Sire

go ad tut fait

Roilant,” I. 322). Roland’s forfeiture reflects the social instability tha t derives
from his condition o f being without father, and so to being without claim to his
own legitimate inheritance.

It is only natural that Ganelon should suspect

Roland, his own stepson who is also nephew to the emperor, at the moment
when Charlemagne sends Ganelon on that deadly mission to negotiate with
the Saracens.

W hat other reasons could the em peror have to refuse

assurances concerning the wealth and the safety o f his only heir except to
favor Roland to the detrim ent o f Baldewin. There is a sense in which this very
personal forfeiture, one o f birth, causes Roland to become a threat to Ganelon
and a general menace among the Franks.5
A t lines 1724-25, by mention of the words folie and estultie, Oliver
implicates Roland in the sam e dangers of excess as did Ganelon in an earlier
passage. We recall line 228 where Ganelon warns o f Roland: ‘It is not right
that pridefui counsel should increase.’ (“cunseill d ’orguill n ’est dreiz que a plus
m unt.)

But it is in bringing this resume o f blame to a close that Oliver

conjures up the word legerie, a word that is, within the Roland, consistently
associated with violence and reprisals.

W e compare with the legerie of

Olivier’s oration these earlier verses:
“A vos Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie..."

(II. 205 - 206)

(‘You took counsel of your French about this,
They counseled you foolishly.')

We infer from these lines spoken by Roland to Charlemagne that the
breakdown in the code o f honor, particularly as an agreement o f mutual
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protection, has become systemic.

It accuses not just Marsile and the

Saracens but, in point of fact, Roland traces the first infraction o f the law to
the French themselves: they offered Charlemagne suspicious counsel,
“Something that smacks o f foolishness” {‘alques de legerie’) and he accepted.
In this way, neither Charlemagne nor the French themselves are innocent of
the original act o f violence —that o f the murder o f Basan and Basile—that has
led to the breakdown o f social order.
In an even more prominent use o f the word legerie, Ganelon,
announcing at line 300 his defiance of Roland and the French - “I will play my
own bit o f foolishness” (E inz i frai un poi de legerie)— indicates a serious rift in
the social fabric. Technically, Ganelon exculpates him self from the recurrent
charge o f treason by stating his defiance o f Roland plainly and before all.
Nonetheless, he, too, unsuspectingly contributes to the rapid erosion of the
ties binding peers to peers and vassal to lord by adducing ju st one more
instance -betw een Roland and him self- of how the feudal allegiance has
begun to loose all value. Ironically, this collapse o f feudal order will give rise
to a new and, to Ganelon at least, unfamiliar law; one that will, ultimately,
allow fo r the charge of treason to be brought against him. Lastly, the charge
made by O liver against Roland - “The French are dead by your foolishness”
( ‘Franceis sunt m ort par vostre legerie) — is far more serious than any charge
that could legitimately be brought against Ganelon under the dictates o f feudal
law. Roland has acted furtively6 in bringing about the death of the Franks, and
murder by ruse is, under feudal law, a more heinous crime, one branding the
perpetrator as outlaw. In his accusation o f Roland, Oliver then places upon
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him a measure o f blame surpassing that o f all others who m ight likewise have
been culpable o f legerie.
Having thoroughly fixed blame, O liver next details the consequences of
Roland’s ‘forfeiture’, and it reads like a checklist for the fulfillm ent o f
Blancandrin’s contractual bargain. The Franks at Roncevaux cease to provide
Charles (Kariun) with service in arms (cf: II. 38 - 39), and the ‘loyal company’
(la leial cumpainie), those who stand ready to give their lives in service to their
ford, have been abandoned to sacrifice (cf.: II. 40 - 46). The edifice o f the old
law, sen/ice to one’s lord and mutual protection among peers, crumbles. And
yet, within the gloom o f Oliver’s judgement, we spy this unexpected and
auspicious prophecy.

When, with apparent resignation, O liver states that

T here won’t be another such man [Charlemagne] until the last (God’s)
judgement’

(N’ert mais te l home des qu’a Deu ju ise ), his lament only

foretells o f the Emperor's coming ‘rebirth’.

At the trial o f Ganelon, God’s

judgem ent turns in the Emperor’s favor, returning power and authority to
Charlemagne so that he might become ‘the new man.’
Cryptically, at I. 1733, Oliver has given a preview o f what will become
perhaps the most significant development o f the post-Roncevaux narration:
the fact that God’s judgem ent will not only supersede the judgm ent o f men, it
will also determine the success or failure o f those deeds, Roland’s own, that
through combat in arms have been productive o f the geste . Meanwhile, in a
subsequent laisse, Roland lays the groundwork fo r the establishm ent o f a new
relation between subject and lord, and between subject and law:
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Roilant reguardet es munz e es lariz;
De cels de France i veit tanz morz gesir,
E il les pluret cum chevaler gentill:
“Seignors barons, de vos ait Deus mercit!
Tutes voz anmes otreit il pareTs!
En saintes flurs il les facet gesir!
Meillors vassals de vos unkes ne vi.
Si lungement tuz tens m'avez servit,
A oes Carton si granz paTs cunquis!
Li empereres tant mare vos nurrit!
Tere de France, mult estes dulz pars,
Oi desertet [a tant rubostl exill].
Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir
Jo ne vos pois tenser ne guarantir;
Alt vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!
Oliver, frere, vos ne dei jo faillir.
De doel murra, s'aitre ne m'i ocit
Sire cumpainz, alum i referir!”

(II. 1851 - 68)

(Roland looks toward the mountains and hills.
There he sees lying dead so many of the French,
And he laments them with the tears of a gentle lord:
‘Noble barons, may God grant you mercy!
May He grant all your souls paradise!
May He cause them to lie among holy flowers!
Better vassals than you I have never seen.
You have for so long served me at all times.
Through you Charles has conquered such great countries!
The emperor has nourished you for nothing!
Land of France, it is a sweet country,
You are deserted [by such a terrible exile]
Noble Frenchmen, for me I see you dying:
I cannot give you protection;
May God, who never did lie, should help/have you!
Oliver, brother, I should not fail you.
I will die of grief, if another does not kill me.
My noble companion, let us go and strike again!')

Roland does not dispute the blame; rather, he resigns him self to the center o f
crisis, though without going so fa r as to accept the opprobrium implied from
Oliver’s harangue at lines 1722 - 36.

Roland begins his address precisely

where Oliver’s left off, with the death o f the French, with the default o f ‘la le ia l
cum paignie.’ Roland’s eulogy fo r the fallen, like that o f Turpin (II. 2195 - 99),
shows a strange mixture o f the sacred and the profane.

Roland allots

heavenly fiefs, -pa(re)fs— fo r the conquest o f earthly kingdoms -pars. In so
doing, he usurps one o f the Emperor’s greatest sources o f power and
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authority, the privilege o f awarding lands and movable wealth to those o f his
vassals who are successful in arms. The absurdity o f this claim to reward
(after all the French are dead) finds its logic in the fact that Roland now has
the opportunity to demonstrate that the French die Tor his sake’...(up u r m ei
vos vei m u rir” I. 1863). The Emperor will have his own reasons for making
sim ilar assertions when, at line 2937, he will effectively contest Roland’s claim
to the final allegiance o f the Franks w ho die at Roncevaux.
The logic o f Roland's claim at line 1863 rests with the fact that
Charlemagne, absent from Roncevaux, has failed to protect his chevalier from
death (II. 1860 - 67) and, thus, fails to maintain their allegiance. But in this
regard, the Emperor is not alone, and at line 1864 we see Roland
acknowledge his own failure to defend (tenser) or save (guarantir) the Franks
at Roncevaux. This double default, that of Roland and Charlemagne, leads to
a peculiar succession o f vassal allegiance. We see first (II. 1860 - 63) an
im plicit transfer o f allegiance from Charlemagne to Roland. Then, because o f
Roland’s own inadequacies (cf: I. 1864), the safety and protection of the
Franks, and so their ties o f allegiance, devolve from Roland to God the father
May God, who never lies, help/have you!’— “A it vos Deus, k i unkes ne m entitl’
The ‘loss’ o f the Franks at Roncevaux will ultimately be compensated through
a divine grant permitting Charlemagne to pursue his enemies with vengeance
(cf: II. 2454-56); the ultim ate failure o f council will be compensated through
divine justice during the trial of Ganelon. In the post-Roncevaux world, though
Charlemagne will no longer enjoy the aid o f his vassal lords —"Karies li
magnes, de nos n ’avrat a te ” (I. 1732)— he will have something greater in the
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leveling of divine judgem ent against his enemies.

Furthermore, though

Roland might have claimed the French as his own— ‘Noble French, I see you
die for me’...(“Barons franceis, p u rm e i vos vie m u rir" \. 1863;— Charlemagne
will be seen to reclaim them through divine favor in the judgement against
Ganelon. This passage foretells the transfer of authority from Charlemagne,
to Roland, to God, and then to Charlemagne again in what amounts to a
pattern o f events that, in its circularity, is not unlike that seen in the previously
examined lines 197 - 213.
The rejuvenation o f the Franks in the post-Roncevaux world is first
prefaced by a sudden ‘decline’ in the emperor’s honor.

The following

citations, commented briefly, demonstrate the precipitousness with which this
occurs. These passages mix an undercurrent o f sexual impotency with an
implied loss o f military/political power and authority.

At lines 2890 - 91

Charlemagne states honor’s denouement without ambiguity in such a way as
to elicit a sympathy between verbal and bodily expression:
“La meie honor est tumet en declin.”
Carles se pasmet, ne s'en pout astenir.

(II. 2890 - 91)

(‘...My honor has turned in decline'
Charles faints, he is unable to stand up.)

Soon afterward, the same passage employs the metaphors —force; baldur;
sustienget— thereby translating ‘virtue’ into ‘sexual virtue’:
‘Jamais n’ert jum de tei n’aie dulur.
Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur!
N’en avrai ja ki sustienget m'onur.
Suz ciel ne quid aveir ami un sul;
Se jo ai parenz, n'en i ad nul si proz.”

(II. 2901 - 05)

(‘Never will there be a day when I do not sorrow for you.
How my force and my strength (baldur) will fail!
I will no longer have one to sustain my onur.
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I will not have a single friend under the heavens;
Though I have kinsmen, I have none of such prowess.’)

The loss o f Roland becomes a loss o f sexual potency.

There is a distinct

parallel to be drawn with the case of Ganelon (cf: II. 310-18), which likewise
ties the loss o f sexual potency -o ilz , coer, Baldewin—to the collapse o f fam ily
structure.

Ganelon’s loss o f Baldewin is more than the loss of a fam ily

member; it signifies the crumbling of an identity, the destruction o f an
inheritance sustained in continuity. Likewise, Charlemagne’s loss o f Roland,
his loss o f baldur, signifies the collapse o f an entire social and political order.
The loss o f honor ends with the loss o f the feudal community structured
on principles o f a close protective interdependence. The scene that charts
honor's decline is the same in which Charlemagne vents his abundant grief
over the death of Roland; it concludes with an odd tw ist by interring, literally,
honor in a common grave alongside those Franks fallen at Roncevaux:
Gaillardement tuz les unt encensez;
A grant honor pois les unt enterrez.
Sis unt laisez, qu'en fereient il el?

(II. 2959 - 61)

(With zeal they covered them all in incense;
With great honor they have interred them,
They left them, what else could they to do?)

From this moment on, we can recognize that honor is permanently lost to the
Emperor; and yet in spite o f this, after having carefully preserved the bodies o f
Turpin, O liver and Roland for eventual enshrinement, Charlemagne proceeds
to a swift reorganization o f the French under his command.
Before battle actually begins, the Saracen admiral Baligant adds this
last comment upon the fallen honor o f Charlemagne, where again m etaphor
mixes sexual potency, or the loss thereof, with valor in arms:
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Dist Baligant “Oil, car mult est proz.
En plusurs gestes de lui sunt granz honors.
II n’en at mie de Roilant, sun nevoid:
N’avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus.*

(II. 3180 - 83)

(Baligant says: ‘Indeed, he is very noble.
In several gestes there is great honor concerning him
Now he will not have the aid of Roland, his nephew:
He will have no virtue that he can sustain against us.’)

‘N’avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus’ -F o r all his insight, seeing with perfect
clarity that Roland, and not Charlemagne, sustains honor w ithin the geste,
Baligant remains blind to the emperor's coming resurgence o f power. Like
Ganelon before him, who at line 1773 has referred to Charlemagne as ‘infant,’
Baligant vastly underestimates the scope of events at Roncevaux, confusing
the cataclysmic fall o f a great social and political order with the fa ll o f a merely
great man.

W ithout any apparent realization o f the profound implications,

Baligant puts his finger on the essential by equating the fall o f Roland with the
fall of the geste(s) (II. 3181-82). In the ensuing battle, defeat comes not to
Charlemagne, but to a mode o f narrative production; the introduction to this
chapter cites Roland’s words at lines 1013 - 14 to devise the axiom from
sword-blow to song...{O r guart chascuns que granz coips i empleit/Male
cangun de nus chantetne seit!). Beyond Roncevaux, narration can no longer
be produced by the force o f the individual combatant, sword in hand; rather, it
is dictated according to the term s o f a new law, supported by the writing of
‘witnesses,’ who will go on to give even textual support to Charlem agne’s call
to dreiture.
Upon his return to Roncevaux, Charlemagne seeks a renovation o f his
powers and o f his authority in appealing directly to God:
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‘Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur
De France dulce m’unt tolue la flur.*

(II. 2430- 31)

('Counsel me in both dreiture and honur,
They have taken from me the flower of sweet France.')

Through the agency o f an angel, God grants him neither dreiture nor honor
but the vengeance originally prescribed by Roland; vengeance becomes the
instrument by which the losses o f Roncevaux are made good:
‘ La flur de France as perdut, go set Deus.
Venger te poez de la gent criminef.*

(II. 2455- 56)

(‘You have lost the flower of France, this God knows.
You can avenge this criminal race.’)

Charlemagne attempts to place blame with the Saracens fo r the losses at
Roncevaux.

God’s messenger promptly corrects him, however, countering

the emperor by stating what God already knows ‘You have lost the flow er o f
France, God knows this.’ (“La flu r de France as perdut, go se t Deus’). God
holds none other than Charlemagne responsible fo r the losses suffered at
Roncevaux.

Charlemagne uses the occasion of the subsequent battle to

regain the allegiance o f the French, though the terms of that allegiance w ill be
differently defined.

Because he is at fault, authority can no longer be

reestablished in terms o f honor, in the person o f the emperor, but only through
recognition of the newly abstracted law, through a recognition o f the
approaching validity o f a soon-to-appear dreiture.
It is therefore no coincidence that the emperor’s attack on the pagans
should begin with an attack on their laws.

Before joining the Saracens in

battle Charlemagne addresses his men:
“Veez, paien felun sunt e cuart
Tute lor leis un dener ne lur valt
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S’il unt grant gent, d’igo, seignurs, qui calt?
Ki or ne voelt a mei venir s’en alt!”

(li. 3337 - 40)

(‘You see, the pagans are outlaws and cowards.
All their laws are not worth small change.
If they are a great race, my lords, what does it matter?
He who doesn’t wish to come with me leave at once!’)

‘Their law* (for lei) is not worth ‘small change’ (un dener) for its power to
protect a great host. With these words, the responsibility for the protection o f
one’s dependents shifts from vassal lord to the law itself —lo r leis.
Charlemagne's

pronouncement contrasts

sharply with

B aliganfs

own

assessment of the strength o f the Franks whom he deems vulnerable to
defeat in battle in consequence o f the death of Roland (II. 3180 - 83).
However, ascribing the imminent defeat o f the Saracens to the inadequacies
of their ‘pagan law* leads to damning implications following the defeat o f the
Franks at Roncevaux.

Not the machinations nor the failings o f any one

person or group of persons is responsible for that slaughter of 7a flu r de
France’ but the complete dysfunction o f a social order based on the guarantee
of mutual protection...which is to say la le i de chrestiens (cf.: I. 38).

The

defeat at Roncevaux signals the defeat o f a law that no longer obtains, the
defeat o f lo r leis, which, one would now suppose, should have guaranteed the
safety of the Franks at Roncevaux, but did not.
immediately following Charlemagne’s judgement on the failure o f
‘pagan law;’ the French declare in favor o f the law that will sustain them,
calling on God’s aid (a/e) and God’s justice (jufse):
Dient Franceis: “Icist reis est vassals!
Chevalchez, bers! Nul de nus ne vus fait’

(II. 3343 - 44)

(The French say: “This king is mighty!
Ride on, nobles! None of us will fail you)
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Dient Franceis : “Damnedeus nos aTt!
Carles ad dreit, ne li devom faillir.”

(II. 3358-59)

(The French say: ‘May the Lord God help us!
Charles is in the right we must not tail him.')
A icest colp cil de France s’escrient
“Ferez, baron, ne vos targez mie!
Carles ad dreit vers la gent..........
Deus nus ad mis al plus verai juTse.”

(II. 3365 - 68)

(With this blow those from France cry out
Strike, nobles, do no hesitate for an instant!
Charles is in the right against this race......
God has placed within us the most true judgement')

They begin with an expression o f renewed solidarity: Nul de nus ne vus fa it (I.
3344); ne le devom fa illir (I. 3359). Unquestionably they turn to God as the
guarantor o f their safety and

of th e ir success

against the

enemy.

Charlemagne, meanwhile, comes to serve only as the intermediary o f that
guarantee.
An affinity between these passages and the earlier examined orations
of Olivier (II. 1723 - 36) and o f Roland (II. 1851 - 68) suggest a useful
comparison. Where Oliver cites rupture: ‘Charles will never again have us in
service’...(“Jamais Karion de nus n ’a vra t servise,” I. 1727); ‘Here we have
failed the loyal company’...(“O/ nus d e fa lt la leia l cum paigne,” I. 1735), the
French announce the mending o f a break ‘None o f us will fail you’...(“N ul de
nus ne vus fait,” I. 3344). Be that as it may, the renewed relations between
Charlemagne and the French bear w itness to certain changes effected by
Roland at lines 1864 - 65. There, we recall, because both Charlemagne and
Roland had failed to uphold the basic responsibilities o f a lord to his vassals,
the French were removed from the protection o f mere mortals and placed
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directly into ‘God’s service’: ‘I was not able to give you protection,'/That God,
who never lies, should help/have you!’...(“Jo ne vos pois tenser ne
guarantir/Art vos Deus, k i unkes ne mentit!, " II. 1864-65).

The French

promulgate this fine though highly significant difference as they continue to
cite God, and not Charlemagne, as their protector in battle. The French say:
'Lord

God

help

us!/Charles

is

in

the

right,

we

him.'...("Dam nedeus nus ait/Caries ad d re it...,n 3358-59).

must

not

fail

The direct and

personal bond between vassal and lord, the signature o f feudal relations, is
compromised as the French look not to Charlemagne, but to a ‘God given’
attribute o f his person, namely dreiture, as their beacon of authority,
protection, and strength. Finally, those lines in which the French proclaim the
advent o f God’s justice upon earth - ‘Charles is in the right against this
race

/God has placed within us the most true judgem enf (“Cades ad

dreit vers fa gent

JDeus nus ad m is a l plus verai ju is e ,” II. 3367 - 68)—

lead to a decipherment o f the sibylline verse spoken by Oliver at 1733: ‘Never
again until God’s judgem ent will there be such a man’

(N’ert mais tel home

des qu’a Deu juise, II. 3367-68). O liver is proved prophetic in having tied the
rejuvenation o f the emperor to an ultim ate demonstration o f God’s justice. But
there is a further subtlety to Oliver’s message: that Roncevaux represents a
permanent and irredeemable break with the past -d e s qu’a Deu ju ise (until
the last judgem ent..., I. 1733). The French make this manifest as again they
attribute their success in arms only indirectly to the Emperor; they proclaim not
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Charlemagne’s valor but God’s justice is the guarantee o f their pending
success against Baligant.
When fo r a third time in the narrative covering the battle against
Baligant the word dreit appears, we find Charlemagne, as opposed to the
French, ascribing this attribute to his person:
Li emperere recleimet ses Franceis:
“Seignors barons, jo vos aim, si vos crei.
Tantes batailles avez faites pur mei,
Regnes cunquis e desordenet reis!
Ben le conuis que gueredun vos en dei
E de mun cors, de teres e d’aveir.
Vengez vos fils, voz freres e voz hiers,
Qu’en Rencesvals furent morz I’altre seir!
Ja savez vos cuntre paiens ai dreit”
Respondent Franc: ‘Sire, vos dites veir.”

(II. 3405 - 14)

(The Emperor reclaims his French:
'Noble lords, I care for you, I trust in you.
You have fought so many battles for me,
You have conquered kingdoms and dethroned kings!
I know well what reward I owe you,
Both of my body and my lands and belongings.
Avenge your sons, your brothers and your heirs
Who died last night at Roncevaux!
You know that I am in the right against the pagans.’
The Franks respond: ‘Lord, what you say is true.')

Charlemagne’s talk of past conquests conjures up memories of the name
Roland; we recall that during the council of Franks,

Roland began

deliberations by reciting a catalogue o f those victories he claimed as his own.
But Roland has shown him self to have been covetous o f something far
greater than a simple recognition as the first among peers.

During the

oratorical dispute with Oliver cited earlier, he declares in lament to the French
already fallen:
‘Meillors vassals de vos unkes ne vi.
Si lungement tuz tens m’avez servit... ’
(‘Better vassals than you I have never seen.
You have for so long served me at all times.')
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(II.1857 - 58)

And again:
“Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir..."

(1.1863)

(‘Noble Frenchmen, for me I see you dying.’)

Only following the death o f Roland could Charlemagne have presumed to
appropriate to him self such a manner o f discourse.

It is as though

Charlemagne revisits the past glories o f the French in an attem pt to elim inate
the memory o f his persistent absence and to further re-ascribe to his own
person an authority that had otherwise been attached exclusively to Roland.
We discover, however, this difference in the ir claims: whereas Roland puts
forth a list of fabulous conquests over foreign cities and foreign lands —
Ireland, England, Poland, Bulgaria, to name ju st a few (cf: II. 198 - 200; II.
2321 - 32; passim)— Charlemagne remains vague in his summarization o f
past victories ‘You have fought so many battles for me’...(uTantes batailles
aves faites p u r mei,” I. 3407).

Unlike Roland, he credits the French

themselves for the gains they have made and, more importantly, he points
them in the direction of a victory that is ultim ately internal to their own realm.
When at line 3411 he declares Avenge your sons, your brothers, your
he irs...\ uVengez vos fils, vos freres, vos flie rs.”), he exhorts the French to
reclaim a lost inheritance that is nothing other than France dulce itself.
As the conflict comes to a close the Saracens w ill see Baligant’s
pennant fall and Mohammed’s staff -th e staff o f their law (lo r leis)— brought
low (II. 3551 - 52). By contrast the French will be resurrected in what we now
recognize as surprisingly fam iliar terms:
Qo dist li reis: “Seignurs, vengez vos doels,
Si esclargiez voz talents e voz coers,
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Kar hoi matin vos vi plurer des oilz.”
Respondent Franc: *Sire, go nus estoet’

(II. 3627

- 30)

(This said the King: My lords, avenge your grief,
Let loose your desires and your hearts.
For this morning I saw your eyes crying.’
The Franks respond: ‘Lord, we will do so.’)

Hearts (coers), eyes (oilz)

it appears as though, through a pursuit o f

vengeance, Charlemagne restores to the French that which he had taken from
Ganelon at an earlier departure (cf.: 316 - 38).

The list o f tender and

vulnerable organs (cf.: II. 314 - 17) is made com plete in these last words on
the Spanish campaign, words which coincide with the return o f the French to
Aix:
Muntet li reis e si hume trestuz
E Bramidonie, qu’il meinet en sa prisun;
Mais n’ad talent que li facet se bien nun.
Repairez sunt a joie e a baldur.

(II. 3679

- 82)

(The King and all his men mount up
And Bramidonie, whom he lead away as his prisoner;
But he had no desire to do her harm, but only good.
His joy and his baldur are now repaired.)

Charlemagne’s lament during the mourning of Roland and the burial o f the
dead: ‘How my force and my strength (baldur [connected etym ologically to
balddin - the male member) perishes!/l will no longer have one to sustain my
onurJ

(“Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur! / N ’en avrai ja k i sustienget

m ’onur,” II. 2902 - 23) has now been brought full circle in what m ight be
described as a resurrection o f the dead. Charlemagne and the French have
been able to resurrect their baldur even in the absence o f Roland; Ganelon, to
the contrary, has no future, no continuation in Bald-ewin. Charlemagne and
the French have taken to themselves that which Ganelon held most dear, and
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in place o f honor they have aligned themselves under the auspicies o f the
emperor’s right, his dneiture.
Charlemagne has utterly crushed the Saracens by the end o f his
Spanish campaign, and yet we find that, in its own right Blancandrin’s
proposal, lines 38 - ff., has proved hugely successful. This should come as
no surprise to our readers, since from the beginning o f this essay I have
recounted numerous ways in which Blancandrin’s proposal is something fa r
more than a mere subterfuge aimed at quickly ridding Spain o f the invading
Franks. For one, we recall from the initial segment examined in this essay
how the shift from the immediate allegiance to the em ir Baligant to a
pretended allegiance the Charlemagne results in a significant innovation in the
structure o f interpersonal, political, and social relations. I indicated then that
in this new socio-political configuration the subject finds him self not so much
obliged to a particular lord as to a figurative authority positioned at the sum m it
of a newly abstracted law.

As we have ju st seen, the post-Roncevaux

narration provides evidence o f this socio-political realignment as the French
turn not to the person of Charlemagne but to dreiture, to the divine attribute
attached to his name for strength and protection in their final battle against the
Saracens.

The final passages make clear through demonstration the

distinction between the abstracted law to which the French give their ultim ate
allegiance and Charlemagne who serves as mediator between the French and
their new law.
The other component o f Blancandrin's proposal, remarked upon earlier,
regards the non-observance o f the obligation to protect even one’s closest
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dependents. For Blancandrin this meant turning over ‘the sons of our wives’
(“les filz de noz muillers,” I. 42) as hostages to the Franks; fo r Roland and
Charlemagne this meant the abandonment o f the French at Roncevaux (see:
Roland’s admission o f the same II. 1857 - 65). It seems hardly a coincidence
that the hostages promised by Marsilie miss their final destination. Somehow
at Aix we find that Ganelon and kin appear in their stead. In this we have the
surest indicator that Blancandrin’s proposal is not merely an expedient and
momentary

ruse

for

the

Saracens

to

disembarrass

themselves

of

Charlemagne and the Franks, but a contract for social and political revolution.
Before proceeding to an examination o f the trial o f Ganelon, I wish to cite
Blancandrin at the very cruel and violent core of his proposal:
“Asez est mielz qu'il i perdent les testes
Que nus perduns clere Espaigne, la bele..."

(II. 58 - 59)

('Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we loose fair Spain, the beautiful.’)

Already we have allowed fo r the substitution o f Ganelon and kin for the ‘sons
of the Saracen’; it only remains for us in the above lines to find France dulce
where the text gives us clere Espaigne, la bele.
The gradual recognition by the French during the battle with Baligant o f
the renewed authority o f the emperor (see: II. 3359; 3367; 3413) leads to a
brief interlude, the trial o f Ganelon, in which the ‘state’ hangs suspended
between two orders of law.

The duration of this interruption is further

lengthened by the inefficacy o f Charlemagne’s command. He opens ‘council’
addressing the baron Franks in the very discourse newly won during the battle
with Baligant:
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“Seignors barons," dis Carlemagnes li reis,
“De Guenelun car me juget le dreit!"

(II. 3750 - 51)

(‘Noble lords’, says Charlemagne the King,
‘Judge me the right (dreit) against Ganelon!’)

Concurrent to the act o f claiming judgment against Ganelon, Charlemagne
seeks to appropriate what one might have assumed to be the prerogatives o f
the recently acclaimed dreiture.

However, what follows will give a clear

indication that at the moment o f this pronouncement, neither Charlemagne
nor the Franks have an adequate understanding o f the new law, nor are they
able to make effective use o f the new law or to operate within its structure.
The trial o f Ganelon begins with an absurdity: the Emperor ‘com m ands’
in a language unintelligible to his subjects. In their ‘deafness’ to the very law
they help usher in while recognizing the dreit o f Charlemagne against the
Saracens, the Franks revert to the prior law and to those o f its institutions with
which they are still m ost fam iliar. They revert to council and to judging the
merits o f Ganelon’s case according to the law to which Charlemagne now
stands firm ly opposed.

This is the law that was to have vouchsafed the

protection o f Ganelon's property and kin during his absence among the
Saracens, a law that Charlemagne has already purposefully ignored.

Now

Ganelon turns to the French in a sim ilar cause, asking that they grant him
protection where Charlemagne had previously denied it.
Ganelon’s second ‘cause’ is not dissim ilar from the first in that he
bases his demands on a rigorous interpretation of the rights o f vassals and
peers according to the tenets o f feudal law. The French retreat to council (II.
3761; and 3779), and when they return, they find in favor o f Ganelon.
Charlemagne’s response, though severe and immediately forthcom ing,
remains marvelously equivocal:
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■Qo dist li reis: “Vos estes mi felun.'

(1.3814)

(The King said this: ‘You are my felons.’)

This single line, im portant in that it alone announces the advent o f the new
law, provides us with three possible variant readings. The most immediate
and least ambiguous sense o f these words can be summed up in saying that
the French have rendered a judgem ent displeasing to the emperor. But this is
a weak reading in tha t it grossly inflates the value o f the word felun. After all,
in this reading the French have not transgressed the law, they have simply
found in favor o f Ganelon albeit against the obvious personal wishes o f the
Emperor. A second possible reading is one in which Charlemagne castigates
the Franks not only fo r defying his wishes, but especially for overturning his
prior judgem ent concerning Ganelon.

W here Charlemagne has denied

Ganelon and those closest to him protection under the law (cf.: II. 313 - 318),
the Franks in council have reinvested him with those same rights previously
denied. This reading is not without m erit in so far as it suggests the inability of
the French to take cognizance of the very processes o f transformation in
which, all along, they have been participants.

Nonetheless, it falls short in

failing to take into account that this line in the text in and o f itself marks the
culminating

point

transformation.

of

these

very

processes

of

social

and

political

Only our third interpretation measures this verse as the

proper cardinal point, which it is, within the text’s narrative development. Here
Charlemagne declares to the French that together and without exception they
are all accomplices in transgressing the law.7 Vos estes m i felun -You and I
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are equally felons in having first broken, then abandoned the law through
which Ganelon now makes his appeal.
The announcement of general outlawry does not simply spring forth
from a propitious narrative juncture, but has been prepared from the first
moments o f the first Frankish council. There Roland points a blaming finger at
both Charlemagne and the French, faulting them fo r that determination from
which stems the spiraling violence o f successive conflicts as well as the
damaging beyond repair of feudal society’s most basic institutions: namely,
cunseiU and ate. W e recall Roland’s invective as he freshens the memory of
Charlemagne and his attendant Franks (vos Francois) to a past replete with
shame:
“A voz Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie;
Dous de vos cuntes al paien tramesistes,
L’un fut Basan e li altres Basilie;
Les chefs en prist es puis desuz Haltilie.”

(II. 205 - 209)

(‘You consulted your French barons about this.
They gave you some bad advice.
You sent two of your counts to the pagan,
One was Basan and the other Basile;
He cut off their heads in the hills below Haltilie.')

From the vantage o f narrative hindsight, we recognize in these words the first
declaration o f a barrier having been crossed, that the twin institutions of
auxilium (are) and consilium (conseill) have become ineffectual at best, and at
worst a perversion o f their intended offices. Roland is quick to remedy the
failures of auxilium with another sort o f call to arms, namely, vengeance ‘Thus
avenge those whom the felons have killed. (“S i vengez cels que li fels fist
o cire !” I. 213). W hen at Roncevaux auxilium fails fo r a second time, now on a
global scale, Roland relegates to God the care and protection o f the French
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(cf.: II. 1860 - 65); appropriately, God fulfills this office with a grant o f divine
vengeance —Venger te poez de la gent crim inal (I. 2456).

When consilium

has led to internal harm and disruption within the community we find O liver
naively prophesying the coming arrival o f divine justice -N ’ert mais te l home
des qu’a Deu ju ise (1733). Now when Charlemagne demands o f his French
“De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit!” this is the first call fo r that divine
judgement and that divine justice won a t Roncevaux to be turned against one
o f their own number.
Momentarily, Charlemagne and the Franks find themselves at an
impasse.

The Emperor, in the face of this new law that he is unable to

implement by command, expresses helplessness:
Quant Cartes veit que tuz li sunt faillid,
Mult I’enbrunchit e la chere e le vis,
Al doel qu’il ad si se cleimet caitifs.

(II. 3815 -17)

(When Charles sees that all have failed him.
He bends down his head and his face.
And for the grief he feels, he bemoans his miserable lot)

Frequently within the Roland we see the Franks suffer the consequences of
the emperor's lapse o f command. The earliest and most salient case is that
of Ganelon, who at the end o f the first Frankish council solicits Charlemagne’s
guarantee for the safety o f his heir and fortune; the Emperor, o f course,
declines in silence. Now, in the course o f their second council, it is the Franks
who fall silent.

These two incidents m irror one another though with a

difference. In the first, Charlemagne threatens Ganelon’s existence passively;
the failure to act upon his vassal’s legitimate request sends a signal that the
law has lost its value.

During this, the second council, Charlemagne
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articulates a life-threatening m enace against Ganelon and kin though
seem ingly in a law which the French as yet find incomprehensible. It will take
someone to translate this new law into existence, someone who can
comprehend its nature and dem onstrate its effects before this ‘council’ o f all
the emperor’s baron subjects.
Tierry, whose diminutive stature marks him as someone more apt to
persuade than to command, arrives a t a solution to this impasse between
Charlemagne and the French.

He proceeds with a subtle, pliant and even

deceitful manipulation o f language in making a case against Ganelon:
“Que que Rollant a Guenelun forsfesist,
Vostre servise I’en doQst bien guarir.
Guenes est fefs d’igo qu’il le trait;
Vers vos s’en est parjurez e malmis."

(II. 3827 - 30)

(‘Though Roland may have forfeited his allegiance to Ganelon
Your service obliged him nonetheless to secure Roland's safety.
Ganelon is the felon for acting treacherously against him;
He has perjured and mishandled himself against you.')

Tierry craftily dismisses Roland’s forfeiture against Ganelon as a matter fo r
personal rather than communal concern.

But this not only occludes the

significant difference in the m anner in which each has contributed to the
breakdown of vassal ties and so to the dissolution of feudal organization, it
also inverts the order of magnitude o f their respective blame. Firstly, Ganelon
declares openly his defiance o f Roland and the French, and so he acts
according to the prescriptions o f feudal custom, (II. 322 - 26); Roland, on the
other hand, acts in a decidedly m ore furtive manner, knowingly and willingly
leading the French to a death they do not anticipate.

In refusing

Charlemagne’s offer o f salvem ent and repeatedly refusing to call for the
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Emperor’s aid, Roland provokes Oliver’s express condemnation: "Cumpainz,
vos forfeistes” (1723). Thus, it is Qanelon’s defiance that takes its aim at the
individual Roland, but Roland who, through a significant chain o f omissions,
forfeits his obligations to the entire feudal community. Line 3828 stands in
clear reference to those twenty thousand Franks lost in battle; taking T ie rr/s
words at the letter they are said to die not because of what Ganelon has done
but because o f what Roland and Charlemagne have failed to do.

Tierry

flatters neither Charlemagne nor the memory o f Roland when he says: “Your
service should have been sufficient to save them”. In these few lines Tierry
pins on Ganelon those charges that would have more aptly been leveled
against Charlemagne and Roland.
Tierry is careful to maintain the ambivalence of his accusations; an
undercurrent o f blame continues to circulate freely among Ganelon, Roland
and Charlemagne.

In a final je st before joining Ganelon's ‘man,’ Pinabel,

Tierry lets slip just how tenuous are these charges pressed against Ganelon:
“Pur go le juz jo a pendre e a murir
E sun cors metre......
Si cume fel ki felonie fist”

(II. 3831 - 3833)

(‘For this I judge that he should hang and die
And let his body be placed......
Like a felon who has committed felonie.’)

Ganelon is condemned to die not because he is a felon but because he is like
-h a s the appearance of— a felon who has committed felony.

Tierry

determines the outcome o f conflict not by bodily strength nor even by proof o f
guilt, but by conjuring blame and, through the skillful manipulation of
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language, focusing that blame away from Charlemagne and onto the person
of Ganelon.
Tierry sets out to perform the task that Charlemagne has not been able
to accomplish either by sword or by express command. The true difficulty o f
the task is measured less in terms o f bodily strength than in terms o f subtlety
of spirit. To illuminate the point we regress to a moment at the height o f battle
when the baron Oger dares chastise the em peror
“Veez paien cum ocient vos humes!
Ja Deu ne placet qu'el chef portez corone,
S’or n’i ferez pur venger vostre hunte!"

(II. 3537 - 39)

('See how the pagans are killing your men!
May it never please God that you should wear the crown on your head
If you do not strike blows to avenge your shame!')

His instructions are exact and precise; Charlemagne is called upon not to
reclaim his honor -h is honor, as we have seen, having been forever lost— but
to avenge an abiding shame.

By the blows he strikes, the violence he

perpetrates, he is able to exculpate him self from guilt, to transfer shame from
his own person onto the bodies o f a slaughtered enemy. Tierry has removed
all obstacles but one preventing Charlemagne from making the same transfer
of shame, finally, onto the bodies o f Ganelon and kin. Pinabel stands alone
as the last bar separating Charlemagne and the Franks from the new law.
Circumspection

marks the

Franks’ response

to

Tierry’s

subtle

casuistries:
Respundent Franc: "Or avez vos ben dit"

(1.3837)

(The Franks answered: ‘You have spoken well.’)

This is fitting. A t risk is something far greater than the defense o f a single
judgment. Tierry has demonstrated the perversion of the discourse (cunseill)
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that had once kept the balance o f vassal relations intact, the discourse to
which Ganelon, now as previously (cf.: II. 310 - ff.), vainly appeals.
Next, as the text inform s us, 30 hostages are taken in gage o f
Charlemagne’s ‘d r e it:
Fait cels guarder tresque li dreiz en serat

(I. 3849)

(He keep s them well guarded until the dreiz is accomplished.)

And the Emperor him self declares that from this trial the dreit will be made
resplendent:
“E! Deus", dist Carles, ‘le dreit en esclargiez!"

(1.3891)

('Oh! God’, say Charles, 'make known the dreit!)

The trial by combat in which Tierry and Pinabel are poised to engage will
settle a question o f guilt: if Ganelon proves the culprit fo r the losses at
Roncevaux then, by default, Roland and Charlemagne are innocent. But what
is this trial if not the final episode in the conflict first plotted by Blancandrin at
lines 27 - 60?8

These hostages held “...tresque li dreiz en s e ra t are

innocents, anti-types to those “...filz de noz m uillers” (I. 42) promised, though
never sent, by Blancandrin. These are the final few upon whom Charlemagne
will at last avenge his shame.
As combat begins Pinabel offers Tierry terms rem iniscent o f those o f
Blancandrin’s proposal:
Dist Pinabel: ‘Tierri, car te recreiz!
Tes horn serai par amur e par feid,
A tun plaisir te durrai mun aveir,
Mais Guenelun fai accorder al rei!”
(Pinabel said: ‘Tierry, concede defeat!
‘I will be your man by friendship and by faith,
I will give you my belongings to do with as you please,
But reconcile Ganelon with the king.')
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(II. 3892 - 95)

The fatal difference lies in the last line: ‘But reconcile Ganelon with the king’—
Mats Guenelun fa i accorderal rei. This is a peace that would take us back to
the prior order, one that would continue to value the bond between vassal and
lord above the newly created nexus between subject and state. By not only
omitting but even contradicting the innovative elem ent o f Blancandrin’s
proposal, Pinabel reveals his innocence of all that has transpired between
then and now. The faisse continues:
Respont Terri: “Ja n’en tendrai cunseill.
Tut seie fel, se jo mie I’otrei!
Deus facet hoi entre nus dous te dreit!”

(II. 3896 - 98)

(Tierry responds: ‘I will not hold council about this,
I would be a sheer felon, should I agree to that!
Let God himself decide the dreit between the two of us!’)

Tierry’s refusal o f Pinabel’s vassal submission, striking enough in and o f itself,
is framed in terms o f a rejection o f cunseill in favor o f dreit. The demission is
radical. A t the end of this contest the Franks concede the prim acy of the new
order by placing the judgment o f God, the first principle o f dreiture, above the
judgm ent o f men:
Escrient Franc: “Deus i ad fait vertut!
Asez est dreiz que Guenes seit pendut
E si parent ki plaidet unt pur lui.”

(II. 3931 - 33)

(The Franks shout ‘God has done a thing of great virtue!
It is just that Ganelon should be hanged
Along with kinsmen, who stood pledge for him.’)

When Charlemagne asks, pro forma, in what manner the hostages are
to be disposed of, the Franks answer in chorus, swiftly and as though in
response to a fam iliar litany:
Carles apelet ses cuntes e ses dux:
“Que me loez de cels qu’ai retenuz?”
Respundent Franc: “Ja mar en vivrat uns!”

(II. 3947 - 48; 3951)
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(Charles calls his counts and his dukes:
'Advise, what should I do with those who are guarded?
The Franks reply: ‘A curse if so much as one should live!’)

Formulaic thought it may be, their message is not lacking in potency; they
command that not one follower o f the old law, lo r Ib is , be spared oblivion.9 The
moment arrives when

Charlemagne and the

French achieve

mutual

intelligibility in observing the dictates o f the law governing the social order,
newly established at the trial of Ganelon.
Where then, finally, is this new dreit that Charlemagne calls upon God
to make resplendent? There can be no other place than Juliane herself of
whom the text tells us;
Chrestiene est par veire conoisance.

(I. 3987)

(She is Christian by pure knowledge.)

Here is fulfillm ent o f Blancandrin’s greatest promise:
"Si recevrez la lei de chrestiens,
Serez ses hom par honor e par ben.''

(II. 38 - 39)

(‘Receive the law of the Christians,
And become his man by honor and in goods.’)

Only this conversion is one taken on by ordeal in the epic scope o f the battle
at Ronceveaux and the scope o f tragedy at the trial o f Ganelon, as though the
great distance between these two events are telescoped into a single work.
Juliane, who knows the law 'par veire conoisance' departs for Spain as
Charlemagne departs fo r some mythical kingdom outside the confines o f
France dulce.

His great anguish bears witness to the terrible separation

between the em peror and the law that now dictates not only subject relations,
but the order o f events. If a new discourse has been created, its makers, the
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heroes o f Roncevaux, are now but a dim historical memory. The illusion, if
ever there was an illusion, that Charlemagne could command in the language,
could effect changes that radically alter the order o f state, are dispelled.
Charlemagne’s only power is in knowing when to remain silent and to obey.
The gestes, the creation of new language, have ceased living with the death
of Roland as Baligant astutely recognized:
Dist Baligant “Oil, car mult est proz.
En plusurs gestes de lui sunt granz honurs.
II n'en at mie de Rollant, sun nevoid:
N’avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus.”

(II. 3180 - 83)

(Baligant said: ‘Indeed, because he is most valiant
In several gestes he is given great honurs.
He will no longer have the aid of his nephew Roland:
He will not be able to sustain his virtue against us.’)

Baligant, of course, is right; though how could he have anticipated a Tierry
who, in an unforeseen way, does that which Chariemange cannot him self do?
The power o f state no longer lies in the hands o f those whose deeds are
transformed into geste, but in the hands of those, like Tierry, who seem more
cleric than soldier, who are more skilled in the manipulation o f this new
language than in creating the geste directly from sword-blows, as did Roland
and the Franks at Roncevaux.
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HONUR E DREITURE

Ma grant honur taveie retenude
Ed anpur tei mais n’en aveies cure
(Euphemien to an absent Alexis)
An icesft] secte nen ad parfit amor
La vithe est fraile; n’i ad durable honur
Cesta lethece revert a grant tristur.
(Alexis to his virgin bride)

A t a pivotal moment, immediately following the death o f Roland, while
seeking to restore the equilibrium lost to his world and to his state Charles
asks that God grant him both honur e dreiture:
“E! Deus!", dist Carles, “ja sunt li ja si luinz!
Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur.’

(II. 2429 - 30)

(‘Oh, God!’ said Charles, They are already so far removed from us!
Grant me my right and my honur...')

Here the word ‘honur* proves sufficiently labile that in successive editions of
the Roland B6dier translates it variously as ‘honneur’ (ed. 1922) and as a
service’ rendered by God (ed. 1931: “Accordez-moi mon droit, faites-moi
quelque grace”). The beauty of B&Jier’s successive interpretive offerings is
that the reader need not feel compelled to choose between the one and the
other, rather, he would do well to combine the two in order to arrive at a fuller
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appreciation o f the import o f this verse. In this instance, ‘honor* and ‘service’
are reciprocal values in that it is through the ‘service’ rendered o f avenging
shame that ‘honor1is restored.
Here, as elsewhere within the text of the Roland, the word ‘honur1is not
so much equivocal as it is polyvalent in its acceptation; it typically demands
that the reader entertain not one but two or more interpretive meanings at
once.

In the passage in which Ganelon, confronted with probable death,

solicits from Charlemagne security for his son and heir, Baldwin, ‘honur'
indicates principally land-holdings:
“En Sarraguce sai ben qu’aler m’estoet,
Horn ki ia vait repairer ne s’en poet
Ensurquetut si a jo vostre soer,
Sin ai un filz, ja plus bels nen estoet,
Qo est Baldewin,’ 9 0 dit, ‘ki ert prozdoem.
A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus.”

(II. 3 1 0 -1 5 )

(‘I know well that I must hasten to Saraguce.
The man who goes there will not return.
To be sure, remember that your sister is my wife,
And that I have a son, there is none more beautiful
Than Baldewin,’ he said, ‘he will be a noble vassal.
To him I leave my ‘honors’ and fiefs.’)

The notion of ‘service’ is certainly implied here, at least to the extent that
particular obligations accrue to Charlemagne as the guarantor of Baldwin’s
‘inheritance.’

But the idea of service to Charles is also diminished in that

Ganelon, in legating property directly to Baldwin (T o him I leave m y lands and
m y fiefs’), effectively supersedes the Emperor’s privilege o f demanding
service in exchange for land. Though the Roland continues to ‘speak’ of
‘honurs’ and fiefs it is a matter of historical record that fiefs and ‘honurs’ had
become all but hereditary by the end o f the eleventh century and that the
distinction between the two terms was, by that tim e, all but lo s t.1
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Let us, fo r the moment, compare the two passages beginning with
those words spoken by Ganelon. The circumstances are such that Ganelon
speaks with the acknowledgement o f his own alm ost certain death... (“Horn k i
la vait repairer ne s ’en poet.”) In preparation fo r this looming eventuality he
states clearly that all his holdings together with all the attendant prestige
(honurs) are to be passed on to his wife’s son; the one whom he has sired. If,
on the other hand, we ascribe to the legend that indicates Charles as the sire
o f Roland, through incestuous relations with his sister, Ganelon’s wife, then
we find in Charles words at lines 2429 - 30 the obverse situation, namely, that
Charles is preparing to become inheritor to his own son. As emperor no one,
not even Roland, can logically bequeath to Charlemagne ‘lands and fiefs,’
Roland’s g ift to Charles, however, is the restoration o f service (honur) and the
establishment o f a previously unknown right (dreiture).
The word dreiture remains largely undefined until the last moments o f
the text, and it is only there, at the scene of judgem ent against Ganelon, that
the text finally illustrates to the reader something o f the meaning o f this term
so critical to understanding the transformative powers of the Roland.

The

reader might, nonetheless, turn to the dictionary not so much fo r a set
definition o f this term as for a indication o f its approximate meaning. Under
droit we find: 1. Q ui suit la ligne droite; 2. Qui est du cote droit; 4. Vrai, digne
de foi, v&ridique; 5. Entier, qui atteint la norme.2

Certainly, all o f these

definitions serve more or less well. By the end o f the Roland it is clear that
the Emperor’s dreit pretends to a norm (5); makes its claim to veraciousness
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(4); is prescriptive o f a ‘right* way (1). But, perhaps surprisingly, it is the least
‘precise’ of these rather simple and straightforward definitions, the one which
finds its meaning only in reference to its negated opposite, which comes
closest to discovering the sense o f the Emperor’s dreit, namely, Q ui est du
cdt6 d ro it Dreiture, in the final analysis, is the instrum ent by which ‘right1 is
separated from left, by which those who side with the Emperor continue to
exist and those who side with Ganelon undergo total annihilation. The radical
break within the historical continuum which is effected by the establishm ent o f
the Emperor’s dreit w ill be the subject o f exploration in the subsequent pages
of this chapter.

An Immodest Proposal
The Roland opens in the middle o f things, among the Saracens army
that is ‘enemy’ to the Franks. It is there that the reader firs t encounters the
noble Blancandrin, chosen as emissary to negotiate peace with the Franks;
and it is here that the reader finds him engaged in the process o f introducing
treachery into the heart o f his own camp. In a previous attem pt to negotiate
peace, a peace presum ably initiated by the Franks, king Marsile, th e leader of
the Saracen forces, had, for the sake o f presumed advantage, slaughtered
the Frankish emissaries sent by Charles. Now, in a perverse and ironic twist,
it is Blancandrin who suggests that Saracens sacrifice their own closest kin as
a means o f maintaining a hold on their possessions (onur) and the usufruct
(deintet) of them:
“Enveiuns i les filz de noz muillers:
Par num d’ocire i enveierai le men.
Asez est melz qu'il i perdent 16 chefs
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Que nus perduns I’onur ne la deintet,
Ne nus seiuns cunduiz a mendeier!’

(II. 42 - 45)

(‘Let us send to him the sons of our wives:
And though he should be killed, I will send my own son.
Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we should loose our lands and offices.
That we should be reduced to beggary.’)

In a moment o f blackest irony, under the pretext o f preserving onur (land and
privilege), Blancandrin threatens to disrupts the chain o f patrilineal succession
by offering to kill off his own son (I. 43) and patrimony.

Onur’s m ost

fundamental premise, the guarantee o f inheritance and the protection o f one’s
young, no longer obtains where the ties that bind father and son, lord and
vassal are abrogated for the purpose o f calculated advantage.
Though the term onur may at first appear to be set in a largely private,
fam ilial context, (Let us send to him the sons of our wives // ...T hat we should
(not) be reduced to beggary) Blancandrin very deftly relates this seemingly
private m atter to a concern o f state:
“Asez est mielz qu’il i perdent fes testes
Que nus perduns clere Espaigne, la bele..."

(II. 58 - 59)

( ‘Far better that they should loose their heads,
Than that we should loose fair Spain, .the beautiful.’)

The immediate relation between affairs o f state and affairs o f ‘fam ily’ (cf. line
3766 : ‘de ses parenz X X X ) is underscored throughout the text, though
invariably the text portrays the relation as a source o f deep-seated conflict.
Much o f the violence both within the opposing camps and between them can
be traced directly to this same conflict between the private and the public
spheres. That the devastation wrought by Blancandrin’s terrible bargain o f
lines 42 - 45 is general and comprehensive to concerns both public and
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private is attested by a later passage in which Marsile confesses to loosing
both the possession o f state and all possibility hereditary succession:
Qo dist Marsilie: "Sire reis, amiralz,
Teres tutes ici.........
E Sarraguce e I’onur qu'i apent
Mei ai perdut e tute ma gent*

(II. 2831 - 34)

(This Marsilie says: ‘My lord king, Emir,
All these lands..........
Both Saragossa and the onor that is connected with it
I myself am lost and the whole of my kin.’)

Though Marsile solicits his men for the means o f escaping death (morf) and
shame (hunte) (‘And save me from death and shame...uS i me guarisez e de
m ort e de hunte!," line 21) Blancandrin’s proposal will have precisely the
opposite effect.
The reckless murder o f Basan and Basile had already disrupted any
presumption of good faith in the negotiations between Saracens and Franks.
The underlying violence o f Blancandrin’s proposal demonstrates that this
same disruption had become internalized, at least within the Saracen camp.
The air of mistrust and suspicion soon arises within the Frankish camp as
Roland cautions Charlemagne against the advice o f even his own barons:
“A voz Franceis un conseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de iegerie;
Dous de voz cuntes al paien tramesistes,
L’un fut Basan e li altres Basilies;
Les chefs en prist es puis desuz Haltilie.*

(II. 205 - 209)

(‘You have taken counsel of your French about this.
They offered you foolish advice.
You sent two of your counts to the pagan:
One was Basan and the other Basile;
He took their heads in the hills below Haltilie.’)

Roland senses that counsel, even that o f the French barons, has become a
treacherous affair leading to deception and misfortune; thus, he urges
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Charlemagne to leave counsel aside and go directly into battle. Ganelon, on
the other hand, strongly favors the privileges and obligations o f counsel, and
with good reason. Ganelon turns to counsel when seeking protection o f
property and the safeguard o f kin (cf.: II. 310 - ff.); and he will appeal to
counsel as a defense against the arbitrary judgement o f the Emperor (cf.:
3747 - ff.)

Paradoxically, by urging Charlemagne to accept Blancandrin’s

spurious offer o f peace he places into jeopardy the very institution (concilium )
he would otherwise seek to conserve. In the realm o f the Saracens and the
Franks, through the ‘cooperative’ effort of Blancandrin and Ganelon,
concilium, the safeguard of honur, is irreparably broken.
The text clearly indicates to the reader that mistrust among the Franks
begins as a ‘family’ problem. To be sure, Ganelon has every reason to
mistrust Roland, who is something o f a ‘coucou’ in the fam ily nest. The son o f
his wife (Ganelon’s wife is Charlemagne’s sister) by some unnamed sire,
Roland is a potential threat to Ganelon’s own first bom, Baldewin.

Roland

becomes all the more menacing in that he has no claim to any legitim ate
inheritance of his own. A later passage demonstrates how the creation o f
Roland’s inheritance ‘ex nihilo' is parlayed into a cause for deep resentm ent
not only for Ganelon, but for his Saracen counterpart as well:
“Demi Espaigne vus durat il en fiet,
L’altre meitet avrat Rollant, sis ntes:
Mult orguillos p artn er i avrez!"

(II. 472 • 74)

(‘Half of Spain he [Charles] will give you in fief,
The other half will be given to Roland his nephew:
In him you will have a most proud partitioner!')
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W ith these words, Ganelon creates fo r Marsile a relation to Roland
comparable to his own.

For Marsile, the implications are clear and his

subsequent actions interpret Ganelon’s ‘message’ accordingly; he cannot
allow Spain, the inheritance o f his own son, ‘Jurfaleu le blund, ’ to be divided
between him self and Roland. Either M arsile destroys Roland in ambush, or
Roland and his twelve peers, all insatiable o f conquest, will soon ravage his
own portion o f Spain -heritors, inheritance, onur and all. Ganelon could not
fail to see the difficulties of his own ‘fam ily affair1 reflected in the competitive
circumstances o f Marsile and Roland in Spain.
Volatility within the complex web o f fam ily relations is on full display in
the scene where Ganelon is chosen as emissary to the Saracens.

There

Charles declares emphatically (II. 261 - 262) that none o f the twelve peers are
eligible fo r the simple reason, understood, that that their loss would be too
great.

This having been said, Roland proceeds to nominate Ganelon, his

stepfather, fo r the dangerous if not impossible mission:
“Car m’eslisez un barun de ma marche,
Qu a Marsiliun me portast mun message.’
Qo dist Rollant “<?o ert Guenes, mis parastre.’

(II. 275 - 77)

(‘Choose for me a baron from my march
Who will carry my message to Marsile.
Roland replied: ‘It will be Ganelon, my stepfather.')

Ganelon responds:
Dist a Rollant “Tut fol, pur quei f esrages?
Qo set horn ben que jo sui tis parastres.
Si as juget qu’a Marsiliun en alge.”

(II. 286 - 8 8 )

(He said to Roland: ‘You fool, why this rage?
They know very well that I am your stepfather,
Yet you judge that I should go to Marsile.’)
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Unlike the conditions o f Blancandrin’s proposal here it is not fathers offering
sons but the son who offers the ‘father’ in sacrifice. Yet even this reading is
complicated by the word parastre.
father?

Who, the reader may ask, is Roland’s

W hy this conspiracy between Roland and Charlemagne to snare

Ganelon in a perilous trap? The answer may lie buried in the following line
spoken by Ganelon to Roland:
“Tu n'ies mes horn ne Jo ne sui tis sire.'

(I. 297)

(‘Neither are you my man nor am I your lord/sire.’)

Firstly, Ganelon makes clear the absence of obligation between them.

But

also, by his very choice o f words, Ganelon subtly underscores the ‘flaw ’ in
their ties of kinship: “jo ne sui tis sire” -m eaning either ‘I am not your vassal
lord’ o r I am not your progenitor.’ Could it be that the close proxim ity o f nOies
and sire also camouflages scandal: “Tu n O ie s
nephew

o f your sire.’

tis sire” (‘You are the

In any case, there is ample further evidence

within the text to suggests a ‘conspiratorial’ link between Roland and Charles
against Ganelon.
Personal betrayals notwithstanding, Ganelon still shows him self not
only reliant upon, but also skillful in the manipulation o f the protocol o f the
feudal relations.

Having accepted the almost certainly deadly mission to

negotiate with the Saracens, Ganelon turns to Charlemagne fo r the expected
guarantee of protection fo r those matters o f greatest personal concern:
“En Sarraguce sai ben qu’aler m’estoet
Horn ki la vait repairer ne s’en poet
Ensurquetut si ai jo vostre soer,
Sin ai un filz, ja plus bels n'en estoet
Qo est Baldewin,” go dit 'ki ert prozdoem.
A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus.
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Guadez le ben, ja nel verrai des oilz."
Caries respunt “Tro avez tendre coer.
Puis quel comant, aler vus en estoet*

(II. 310 - 318)

(‘I know well that I must go to Saragossa:
The man who goes there does not return.
Indeed, your sister is mine in marriage,
And I have a son, there is none more beautiful:
It’s Baldwin,’ he said, ‘ who will be a noble vassal;
To him I leave my fiefis and my honors.
Guard him well, I will never see him again with these eyes.’
Charles responds: ‘You have too tender a heart
Because it is commanded, you must go.’)

In this relatively stylized speech Ganelon succeeds at placing ‘fam ily’
concerns within the context of a highly visible public forum; and his request fo r
‘protection’ is not nearly so naive as it may at first seem. Before acceding to
Charles’ demands that he go to the Saracen Ganelon seeks public recognition
for the personal sacrifice he is about to suffer. In doing so all the French host
are witness to the guarantee of protection, or lack thereof, that a liege lord will
acknowledge to his vassal subject. Ganelon offers his life in anticipation o f a
public declaration by Charles that his (Ganelon’s) continued ‘existence’ after
death will be assured by virtue of protection for his honur, namely, property
and Kin: ‘It’s Baldwin... / To him I leave my fiefs and my honors / Guard him
well.“
le ben

(‘Q> est Baldewin
).

JA lu i lais jo mes honurs e mes fieusJGuadez

But with a show of flagrant indifference Charles declines him

protection. Ganelon’s fears and suspicions are confirmed; tender is his heart’
(“ Tro avez tendre coer”), vulnerable are his eyes (oilz) and the life o f his first
bom.
Half way across the text, in a scene that mirrors the confrontation
between Charlemagne and Ganelon at lines 310 - 318, king Marsile speaks
to the Emir Baligant o f lost onor.
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Qo dist Marsilie: ‘Sire reis, amiratz,
Teres tutes ici..........
E Sarraguce e I’onur qu’i apent
Mei ai perdut e tute ma gent’
E cil respunt “Tant sui jo plus dolent
Ne pois a vos tenir lung parlement...'

(II. 2831 - 36)

This Marsile said: ‘My lord king, Emir
All these lands..........
Both Saragossa and the onor that is connected with it;
And myself am lost and the whole of my kin.
And he [Baligant] replies: ‘I am deeply grieved,
But I am not able to speak with you for long.’

This scene, and Baliganfs response in particular, ‘I am not able to speak with
you for long...’ (“Ne pois a vos tenir lung parlem ent), indicate that a failure of
the institution o f concilium lies at the heart o f the breakdown o f feudal social
order. Roland insinuates as much when warning Charles: ‘You have taken
counsel of your French about this, // They offered you foolish advice...’ (“A voz
Franceis un conseill en presistes, / / Loerent vos alques de legerie...’)

The

significant difference between these two respective scenes is that in the latter,
in the confrontation between Marsile and Baligant, consilium ends following
‘honor’s’ loss, whereas in the earlier scene the loss o f lhonur> is the result of
the dissolution o f the office o f consilium. Ganelon’s voice is the first casualty
in the ultimate defeat o f feudal order.
Before departing, Ganelon turns down the offer o f protection even from
his closest allies.

The danger in going into the Saracen camp remain

undisputed, but Ganelon turns his attention to another danger, one that lies
deep within the realm:
‘ En duice France, seignurs, vus en irez:
De meie part ma muiller saluez
E Pinabel, mun ami e mun per,
E Baldewin, mun filz que vos savez,
E lui aidez e pur seignur tenez."

(II. 360 - 64)
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(To sweet France, my lords, you will go:
Greet my wife for me.
Along with Pinabel my friend and my peer,
And Baldewin my son, as you know;
And aid him and take him as your lord.’)

In many respects Roland has been the truest observer o f the general state of
the institution of concilium.

Tainted by mistrust, the office o f consilium will

deliver nothing but disaster fo r those who seek out justice and protection from
it. W e have already seen how, long into the text, Baligant will dismiss counsel
freely and out-of-hand —'"I am not able to speak with you fo r long...”

(We

pois a vos tenir lung parlem ent). These remarks respond directly to M arsile’s
statement that he

has

news

for

Baligant concerning

Charlemagne:

‘Concerning Charlemagne I should give you good counsel

’ (“ Vers

Carlemagne li durrai bon cunseill,” I. 2750). Baligant does not have the time,
does not feel the necessity, to take counsel from one who has lost everything;
Charlemagne’s

dism issal

of

Ganelon’s

request

speaks

to

sim ilar

circumstances.
From the beginning the text spells out plainly Ganelon’s culpability for
the global disaster that is to befall the French at Roncevaux.:
Guenes i vint, ki la traTsun fist
D6 s ore cumencet ie cunseill que mal prist

(II. 178 - 79)

(Ganelon, who has committed treason, arrives.
From that point on begins the council begins that went wrong.)

Yet, the reader may question the verity of the following line, spoken in
reference to Ganelon at the conclusion o f his ‘trial’:
Ki hume traTst sei ocit e altroi.

(I. 3959)

(Who betrays a man kills himself and others too.)
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Is Charlemagne not guilty o f gross betrayal when, in the probable eventuality
o f Ganelon’s death, he deigns not offer protection for his vassal’s proper heir?
Or, on a more all-encompassing scale, does Charlemagne not instigate great
harm at lines 180 - ff. by privileging the advice of Roland above the counsel
o f all his barons?
Immediately preceding the convocation o f all the barons to decide upon
Blancandrin’s proposal, and indirectly upon the fate o f Ganelon and kin, the
text describes the Emperor in repose beneath a pine:
Desuz un pin en est li reis alez,
Ses baruns mandet pur sun cunseill finer
Par cels de France voelt il del tut errer.
Li empereres s en vait desuz un pin,
Sis baruns mandet pur sun cunseill fenir...

(II. 165 -169)

(The King went beneath a pine tree,
He calls his nobles in order to finish council:
He wishes to lead into error (errer) those from France.
The Emperor goes beneath a pine,
He calls his nobles in order to finish council.)

W hat could the reader infer from these words: ‘He calls his nobles in order to
finish counsel...’ (“Ses baruns m andet p u r sun conseill fe n ir...”)? One could
begin by observing that this is the council that finishes all councils, that
reduces the very institution of concilium to rubble. The fact that Charlemagne
sits by passively during the highly volatile exchanges between Roland and
Ganelon hardly results from an impuissance of authority or from a failure to
recognize the dangers posed by such verbal excess.3 On this count the text
informs us: “He wishes to lead into error those from France” (‘P ar cels de
France voelt il del tu t errer"). (errer -se comporter, s ’Ogarer, se tromper, m ener
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en erreur.) Charlemagne is seen from the beginning as putting an end to both
concilium and that part of vassalic honor it serves to protect.
Though Charlemagne does not contest the choice of Ganelon fo r the
presumably fatal mission to the Saracen, his response to Ganelon’s demand
that Roland be relegated to the equally dangerous position as head o f the
rearguard is altogether different. Charlemagne cries out to Ganelon:
Si li ad dit “Vos estes vifs dTabtes.”

(1.746)

(He said to him: ‘You are the living devil.')

And yet, though Charlemagne is keenly aware o f the vicious intent o f
Ganelon’s counsel (“Vos estes vifs diables. ") he does nothing to prevent it
from having the intended fatal effect. Charles’ betrayal o f Ganelon reads very
much ‘on the surface o f things;’ the betrayal of Roland and the French at
Roncevaux, however, though deftly obscured is no less evident among the
many textual ‘accidents’ all of which point to betrayal.

Vengeance
From the outset of the council of barons (II. 180 - ff.) Roland is seen to
be straddling two worlds, one represented by the old order, the other
represented by the new. On the one hand, he plays a critical role in bringing
about the destruction of the social order based upon vassal allegiance. This
he does, firstly, by proclaiming a profound if unspoken truth. Pointing to the
dramatic example of Basan and Basile, Roland effectively accuses the feudal
system of vassal allegiance o f acquiescing to an endless round o f systemic
violence.

Underscoring the system’s fatal flaw, he recommends that

Charlemagne dispense forthwith with that institution, consilium, which is one
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of, if not the pillar o f feudal social order. On the other hand, Roland him self
slips back into the old pattern o f deception and violence, not the least instance
o f which is his recommendation o f Ganelon for the perilous mission to the
Saracen.

In the interim o f change, Roland is content to play at the

advantages offered by both worlds.
In a bold move that w ill define the first step into a new social and
political order Roland responds to Blancandrin’s proposal fo r reconciliation
between Saracens and Franks with a call for vengeance4:
“Faites la guer cum vos I’avez enprise,
En Sarraguce menez vostre ost banie,
Metez le sege a tute vostre vie.
Si vengez cels que li fels fist ocire!”

(II. 210 - 213)

(‘Continue to make war as you set out to do:
Lead your summoned men to Saragossa,
Lay siege for all your life,
Avenge those whom the felon had killed!’)

In these lines Roland fairly defines ‘vengeance’ as it operates within the first
half (through line 2396) o f the text.

Vengeance w ill pursue the Saracens,

those ostensibly responsible fo r the m urder of Basan and Basile. But, if the
reader were to give a broader interpretation to line 213, ‘Avenge those whom
the felon had killed!’ (“S i vengez cels que li fels fis t ocire!’), then he would
recognize that vengeance does indeed cast a much wider net within the text.
The felon, the outlaw, the one who kills by deception and betrayal would
include many within the Frankish camp, the most obvious exam ple of whom
would be Ganelon. And is it not true that the Emperor wreaks his own brand
of vengeance upon Ganelon under the rubric ‘ju is e ’ during the ‘trial’ of the
same?

And are the French and Roland not the victim s o f this same
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vengeance in repaym ent for the passive role they played in the betrayal of
Basan and Basile? Vengeance, it would seem, unleashes its destructive force
without discrimination, through the camps o f the Saracens and the Franks
alike.
Ganelon, who appears to sense the inherent potential fo r unleashed
violence that harbors in Roland’s proposal, speaks prophetically when he
declares:
“Ki go vos lodet que cest plait degetuns,
Ne li chalt, sire, de quel mort nus muriuns.
Cunseill d’orguill n’est dreiz que a plus munt;
Laissun les fols, as sages nus tenuns!*

(II. 226 - 29)

(‘Anyone who advises that you reject this offer
He does not care, sire, from which death we should die.
Counsel of pride, it is not right that this should increase:
Leave this to fools, and with the wise let us be one!’)

These words ring true considering that Roland, the “K i go vos lodet” of
Ganelon’s accusation, w ill do little to circumvent the com ing slaughter.

But

beyond this point o f m inor prophecy, Ganelon also carefully culls out just
those epithets that describe all that is dangerous about the character o f
Roland.5 Cunseill d ’orguill, echoing the words of advice given by Roland at II.
205 - 06, is the advice which urges that no advice be taken; Roland, as has
already been stated, invokes instead an immediate call to arms with
vengeance as its m otivation (II. 210 - 13).

Additionally, Ganelon places

him self on the side o f Les sages, those who would take counsel, providing the
foil that identifies Roland as chief among les fols. Between les sages and les
fols it is clear that fate casts its lot with the ’foolish,’ those who would launch
into immediate warfare.
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But Ganelon’s words reveal to us, the readers o f this text, a quality o f
character immanent to Yes fols' that is fa r more dangerous than mere personal
recklessness; namely, they (les fols) do not care “w hat kind o f death we
should d ie ...' (“de quel m ort nus muriuns”). Replacing the second hemistich
of line 228 with the post-ceasural -de quel mort nus muriuns o f line 227 we
arrive at the following construct:
............................ // de quel mort nus muriuns
Consill d’orguill //

......................................

(................................... // from which death we should die)
(Counsel of pride / / .................................................. )

The collapse o f the institution of council (cunseill) brings down with it the
social institution upon which all feudal allegiance is premised, the institution of
mutual protection and aid which, in old French, goes by the name aie, in Latin:
auxilium. The ‘fools’ o f Ganelon’s reproach are more than foolish, they are
the agents who will cause ruin to the social and political order upon which
Ganelon depends for both protection and advantage.
Ganelon’s ‘judgem ent concerning Roland acquires validity at laisse 63,
in the scene where Charlemagne offers Roland the opportunity to integrate his
forces with those of the other Franks. There, sensing that Roland and his
men are vulnerable to attack and devastation, Charlemagne offers sturdy
reinforcement:
“Bel sire nigs, or savez veirement
Demi mun host vos lerrai en present
Retenez les, 9 0 est vostre salvement."
Qo dit li quens: “Jo n’en ferai nient
Deus me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!
.XX. milie Francs retendrai ben vaillanz."

(II. 784 - 89)
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(‘My dear lord nephew, know this truly,
I leave to you presently half my men.
Retain them, it is your salvation!’
Said the count ‘I will do no such thing;
May God confound me, if I so disgrace the geste!
Twenty thousand very valiant Franks shall I keep.’

Roland refuses reinforcements out o f a sense o f ‘honor,’ this he states
explicitly at line 788: ‘May God confound me, if I so disgrace the geste!’ (‘Deus
me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!”)

In this situation, however,

Charlemagne would be no less aware than Roland of the blatant affront that
this proposition represents to honur.

Charles’ offer o f ‘salvement,’ then, is

calculated to misfire, to be summarily refused. Nonetheless, the refusal of
Charles’ ‘sensible’ counsel and aid at this critical moment certainly does speak
to the accusation that Roland is among les fols.
Furthermore, Roland’s refusal of Charles’ aid has equally to do with his
desire to maintain autonomous authority over the geste, whether one
understand by geste the narrative product o f Roncevaux, or the Frankish
nobles who will author the geste in Roland’s name. Evidence of this comes
only a few lines down as Roland proceeds to gather forces drawing from T he
Franks of France, our land.’ (Francs de France, nostre tere).

He instructs

Gautier de I’Hum to be particularly selective in choosing those who are to
serve under him in the rearguard at Roncevaux:
Li quens Rollant Gualter de I’Hum apelet
“Pemez mil Francs de France, nostre tere...

(II. 803 - 04)

Respunt Gualter “Pur vos le dei ben faire."
Od mil Franceis de France, la lur tere,
Gualter desrenget les destreiz e les tertres.)

(II. 808 - 1 0 )

(The Count Roland calls to Gautier de I'Hum:
Take a thousand Franks from France, our land.’
Gautier responds: 'For you I should do it well.’
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He takes a thousand Frenchmen of France, their land,
Gautier leads through the mountain passes and the elevations.)

It is fitting, and in accord with feudal custom that a lord, going into battle,
should gather around him men from ‘his own land;’ fo r one, the ties o f
obligation are more immediate, hence, the opportunities for something to go
wrong more remote.

The text, however, does something m ost subtly

subversive with a switch from one highly overdetermined word to another:
Roland asks that a thousand men be chosen from among the Franks o f
France; G autier complies with diligence.

The text, however, contradicts

Roland’s express wishes by granting him not a thousand Fanks but in their
place a thousand Frenchmen.

Roland has no claim to authority over the

larger political body that is to become France, nor does he have authority over
its subjects, who will be Frenchmen; Frenchmen are subjects to the Emperor,
and not Roland.

From this we surmise that the text supplants Roland’s

wishes (the Franks) with the wishes o f Charlemagne.

Though Roland

staunchly refuses the Emperor’s men (II. 787 - 88), he gets them anyway;
only in far lesser number.
All the same, the reader would be in error to suppose that Roland
adheres strictly to the allegiances determined by the complex web o f feudal
obligations, or, that Charlemagne seeks sim ply to destroy them. The jealousy
with which Roland hews to his own, the Franks o f France, only tells half the
story.

And, it is neither Roland nor Charlemagne but Ganelon, who, in

response to Blancandrin’s questioning, first reveals to the reader the ‘true’
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nature o f the relationship between Roland and those to whom the text prefers
to call the Franceis de France, la lu rte re6:
Dist Blancandrins: ‘Mult est pesmes Rollant,
Ki tute gent voelt faire recreant
E tutes teres met en chalengement!
Par quele gent quiet il espleiter tant?"
Guenes respunt “Par la franceise gent
II I’aiment tant ne li faldrunt nTent.."

(II. 392 - 97)

(Said Blancandrin: “Roland is of the very worst sort
Who wishes to subdue all peoples
And to place claim on all lands'
With what people does count on to accomplish such exploits?'
Ganelon responds: ‘The French people:
They love him so, they will never abandon him.’)

Blancandrin begins by noting that Roland is ‘o f the very worst sort.’ Then he
says something which m ust surely have struck a chord with Ganelon;
Blancandrin observes that Roland ‘wishes to subdue all peoples II And to
place claim on all lands!’ (...tu te gent voelt faire recreant / / E tutes teres met
en chalengement!') Who, to paraphrase Blancandrin, are those who would
help him in these exploits? Ganelon has ready answer: ‘The French people: //
They love him so, they will never abandon him!’ (“.../a franceise gent. / / II
I’aim ent tant ne li faldrunt nient.") From Ganelon’s account, it would seem that
Roland has already laid claim to ‘all peoples...[from ] all lands’ within the realm
o f France. The question, however, is not ‘Is this tru e ...,’ but, rather, ‘In what
way is this true of the relation between Roland and the ‘Franceis de France?’
The text itself is hagiographic in its treatment o f Roland, and the ‘many
peoples’ under Charlemagne’s command are led to ‘sanctify’ him in that scene
(II. 2962 - 73) ju st prior to the gathering up o f forces fo r a final battle against
Baligant.

But Roland’s claim to the ‘Frenchmen o f France’ is based solely

upon personal prestige, solely upon a concept o f onor that has more in
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common with the 17th century concept o f gloire than with the complex web o f
feudal relations which onor largely determines.

More than any other thing

within the text it is Roland’s willingness to sacrifice all for the sake o f prestige
that merits him the epithets orguillos (I. 474) and folie (1.1724).
W hereas Roland covets that measure of prestige which effectively
demands that all Frenchmen grant him recognition, Charlemange seeks to
bring together the 'Frenchmen of France’ in a far more practical, political way.
This is shown by the manner in which the Emperor integrates his forces in
preparation for the battle against Baligant.

At laisses 218 - 225, the text

shows Charlemagne assimilating his host into units which draw their leader
from one region, their fighting men from another. Here ‘Ogier the Dane’ is
assigned to lead ‘the brave men of Bavaria,’ ‘Herman, duke o f Thrace’ is
allotted the “Allemans who come from ‘Germany,’” 'Tedbald of Reims’
receives under his command the ‘Bretons,’ ‘Hamon and Rembald o f Galicia’
receive the ‘Flemings and the brave lords of Frisia,’ and ‘Tierry, the duke of
Argonne’ will lead into battle both the ‘Men of Lorraine’ and those of
‘Burgundy.’ Allegiance is created not according to proximity o f geography or
of blood relation but by the ‘word’ of the Emperor. Here, for the first time, the
reader sees a truly unified picture of the ‘Frenchmen o f France.’
For Roland, death does not bar the path leading to onor and to the
production of the geste (cf.: I. 788); quite the contrary. Though he is far less
forthright about his willingness to sacrifice any and all others to attain this
same end, his ‘secret’ is revealed, obliquely nonetheless, in the following
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lines.

Here he conceives o f death at Roncevaux as a ‘totality1 from which

none will escape:
“Felun paien mar i vindrent as porz:
Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt jugez a mort”

(IL 1057 - 58)

(‘These felon pagans shall rue the day they came to the pass:
I swear to you, all are judged to die.')
‘Felun paien mar i sunt asemblez:
Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt a mort livrez.”

(II. 1068 - 69)

(These felon pagans shall rue the day they assembled,
I swear to you, all will be delivered into death.')

Roland holds unequivocally to the point that ‘a ll are judged to die, ’ ‘a ll w ill be
delivered into death’ signaling that his own Franks are being prepared to die
into the all consuming idea o f pure prestige. How different this idea o f deathas-totality from the death fo r which Ganelon prepares at lines 310 - 318.
There, Ganelon offers his life on the condition o f a continuum: tha t his onor
(property, privileges, prestige) be maintained in and through the continued
existence o f his son and heritor, Baldwin. Death as radical annihilation is a
revolutionary concept introduced by Roland under the rubric o f ‘vengeance’
(cf.: II. 196 - 213); it is a concept which Charlemagne will put into practice
during the trial of Ganelon as a means o f establishing his dreit among the
French. Those to whom Roland refers as the felun paien in line 1068 will be
contrasted with another group o f ‘felons’, those who survive the ordeal o f the
trial o f Ganelon and to whom Charlemagne refers as his own.

There, in

claiming fo r him self those French who have acquiesced to judgem ent against
Ganelon, Charlemagne will cry out: ‘You are my felo ns...!’ (“Vos estes m i
felun").
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The manner in with the French are led into death by Roland is the topic
of a rhetorical exposition in which O liver harshly criticizes his companion.
Oliver explains death in term s of a loss to community, and faults Roland for
the act o f recklessness that he name proGcce:
Qo dist Rollant ‘Porquei me portez ire?”
E il respont “Cumpainz, vos le feTstes,
Kar vasselage par sens nen est folie;
Mielz valt mesure que ne fait estultie.
Franceis sunt morz par vostre legerie.
Jamais Karion de nus n'avrat servise.
Sem creisez, venuz I fust mi sire,
Ceste bataille ousum faite u prise,
U pris u mort I fust li reis Marsilie.
Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la veimes!
Karies li magnes de nos n’avrat aie."

(II. 1722 - 32)

(Roland spoke: ‘Why do you bear this anger toward me?’
And Oliver responds: ‘Friend, you did it yourself.
For vassalage is through reason and not folly:
Good measure is better than stupidity.
The French are dead because of your senselessness.
Charles will never again have us in his service.
If you had believed me, my lord would have come,
We would have had and won this battle,
And King Marsile would be either captured or killed.
Would that we had never been witness to your prowess, Roland!
Charlemagne will have no help from us.’)

Roland’s prowess in battle is laudatory, memorable, but also destructive. It
flows out o f his decision to spurn counsel, and this sets Roland, along with the
entire contingency o f la franceise gent, apart from the remainder of the
Franks. A fatal, hence, non-reparable rift is thereby created within the
Frankish camp. Roland's prowess demands the acknowledgment o f his own
personal prestige at the expense o f that o f all others; hence, it corrodes
communal bonds by fostering a notion o f Roland as the absolute presence o f
the ‘One.’ It is this, Roland’s ‘auto-deictic’ pro-Scce —‘behold, here I am!’- ,
that lies at the bottom o f all the coming woes.
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The excesses o f Roland’s prodcce are cause for only half the blame
leveled against him by Oliver; words like estultie, folie and legerie round out
the ledger in this lengthy testam ent o f censure.

And yet, here within this

passage, it is only on the m ost superficial level that the words folie (folly) and
estultie (stupidity) bear a meaning sim ilar to that o f legerie. The reader would
be naive to assume, along with Oliver, that it was only ‘folly’, ‘stupidity1 and
’senselessness’ that led Roland into the fatal error that was Roncevaux.
Roland seems, all along, too aware of the risks (cf.: II. 787 - 88) too
determined to continue in the face o f all the direst consequences (supra:
comments on lines 1057 - 58; 1068 - 69) fo r the reader to ascribe his ‘error’
to anything like ‘folly,’ ‘stupidity,’ or ‘senselessness.’ To affirm this hypothesis
I simply turn to the three other passages o f the Roland in which the word
legerie is employed.
The first is that passage where Roland urges Charlemagne to abandon
council and proceed directly into war against the Saracen:
“A voz Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie."

(II. 205 - 206)

('You have taken counsel of your French about this,
They offered you foolish advice.')

Here Roland is seemingly content not to impugn the intentions o f the French
council that sent Basan and Basile to their deaths as emissaries to the
Saracen.

However, those two remaining passages o f the Roland which

employ the word legerie do so by skewing its meaning toward the cynical.
Below, Ganelon accepts the role o f ‘emissary’ to which he has been
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nominated’ by Roland; but in doing so, he forewarns his stepson of a bit o f
foolishness’ that is about to be sent his way:
“En Sarraguce en irai a Marsilie.
Einz I frai un poi de legerie
Que jo n’esclair ceste meie grant ire."

(II. 299 - 301)

('I will go to Marsile in Saragossa.
But I’ll do something a bit 'foolish'
Before I clear this great anger of mine.’)

By the phrase “something a bit ‘foolish’” (un p o i de legerie) it is eminently clear
that Ganelon means to communicate ‘something a b it tricky.’ Legerie, within
this context, indicates a menace that will arrive only at the unexpected
moment. In the fourth, and only other passage within the Roland to employ
the word legerie the term is clearly associated with intentional violence.
Marsile chooses the word legerie to describe the action whereby he nearly
runs Ganelon through with his ‘gold-feathered’ spear:
"Bel sire Guenes," go li ad dit Marsilie,
"Jo vos ai fait alques de legerie,
Quant por ferir vus demustrai grant ire."

(II. 512 - 514)

('Dear Sir Ganelon,’ thus spoke Marsile,
‘I did something a bit foolish to you.
When I vented my great anger and made as if to strike you.’)

In a general way, the reader can note that this ‘foolishness,’ which is legerie,
always, within the Roland, results in a dire outcome, and that it has at least
the suspicion o f underhandedness about it.

Having said this, we can only

remark that Roland is in default with regards to his obligations to his liege
vassals, and that he has acted surreptitiously by having disclosing nothing to
the franceise gent with regards to the fact that ‘all are judged to die,’ ‘all will be
delivered into death.'
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E x ill
In the preceding discussion, referring to lines 1731 — 32 in particular, I
remarked that ‘O liver explains death in term s o f a loss to community.’ The
loss at Roncevaux, however, is of an especially peculiar kind, in that all
members o f the ‘specific’ warrior community who were allied with Roland
through feudal/fam ilial obligation perish in battle.

Virtually all the fighting

nobles o f that particular kinship are annihilated, and so, it is noteworthy about
the death o f the Franks at Roncevaux that, when shame comes circling home,
no one among them is left to seek honor’s restitution through vengeance. It is
appropriate, then, tha t ‘death,’ ‘honur,’ ‘sham e,’ and ‘vengeance’ should all be
defined in a new way, as they will be in the couplet subsequent to lines 1731 32. Let us continue our reading from line 1731 and following:
“Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la veTmes!
Karles li Magnes de nos n’avrat are.
N’ert mais tel home d6 s qu’a Oeu juTse.
Vos i murrez e France en ert hunie.
Oi nus defalt la leial cumpaignie:
Einz le vespre mult ert gref la departie."

(II. 1731 - 36)

('Your prowess, Roland, better never to have been witness to it!
Charles the great will no longer have us in his service.
Never more will such a man exist until God's judgement
You will die here, and France will be shamed.
Today our loyal (legal) companionage comes to an end
Before dusk, our parting will be most sad.’)

First, let us exam ine line 1736, specifically the phrase ‘/a le ia l cumpaignie;’ we
might translate ‘le ia l’ as ‘loyal,’ but also as ‘legal,’ cum paignie’ might be
translated as ‘companionage,’ but also as ‘com m unity.’ The reader is, then,
left with the choice o f interpreting line 1736 as a separation through death o f
one ‘loyal friend’ from another o r as the separation through death o f one ‘legal
community’ from another ‘legal community.’ To shed light on the question we
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appeal to the preceding couplet where the reader is again faced with choices
in meaning. W ho is ‘such a man’ (tel home)? Charlemagne o r the man who
stood always ready to provide him aid (a/"e)? When is the ‘divine judgem ent1
(Deu jui'se) to occur? Is this the last judgement o f heaven and o f earth? O r is
it the last judgem ent o f the text, that o f the trial o f Ganelon? W ill there be no
other such man as Charlemagne until the time o f the last judgement? O r w ill
there never again be such men as those who died a t Roncevaux from the tim e
that Ganelon and kin, men ‘loyal’ to the order determined by the force o f
honur, die in the outcome o f a trial that is decided by God’s judgem ent alone?
O f all the verses in this one speech by O liver none presents more
compelling evidence in favor o f our reading than that o f line 1734.

The

mechanism whereby honur, through an act of retaliation, is repurchased from
shame is typically earned out by one member, or members, of a community
for another member, or members, o f the same community. Here, however,
the text speaks o f all o f ‘France’ being shamed (e France en ert hunie) so that
‘vengeance’ w ill be carried out not by members o f the community o f which
Roland was a part, but by members o f all communities which now come
together to constitute the political entity which will be called ‘France.’

It is

God’s judgem ent (Deu juTse), striking final vengeance against Ganelon and
kin, which w ill usher this new political entity into existence. Here is where, in
the couplet at II. 1732 - 33, Oliver makes the sublime connection between are
and jui'se —Karles li magnes de nos n ’avrat are / / N ’ert mais tel home desqu’a
jui'se. W ith the demise of auxilium -K a rle s li magnes de nos n ’avrat are—
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Charles turns to divine judgem ent - N ’ert mais tel home entrequ’a l Deu ju ise —
as the means by which to continue the new realm.
Death, as Oliver defines it at II. 1735 - 36, is death in the feudal mode,
it is a disruption within the communal continuum -O / nus defalt la leial
cumpaignie— a continuum that could always be re-established through a
subsequent act o f vengeance. Following Roncevaux, however, the cycle is
broken and honur becomes the casualty when ‘worldly’ vengeance is replaced
with divine judgement.

That judgem ent (juise) pertains not ju st to the

Saracen, who, by the end o f the epic, have either been ‘converted’ or swept
from the Iberian peninsula, but also to the Franks who, at the trial o f Ganelon,
either accept Charlemagne’s new order or will be eradicated from France
dulce, from the ‘sweet real o f France.’ One of the tenets of the old, feudal
social order was that as one’s death was avenged, so was one’s honur
restored; vengeance was, in a sense, a process o f ‘memorialization.’ In the
new order under Charlemagne, however, vengeance is replaced with divine
judgem ent (Deu juise ) and the one who is thereby condemned to die will
never be avenged; all memory of him will be eradicated from existence.
In the Roland ‘death’ - Vos i m urrez- and ‘shame’ - e France en ert
hunie— are affinitive aspects of honur. To begin with, we remark that Roland
understands honur strictly in terms o f shame averted or shame postponed (cf.:
II. 1091; 1701; 1710; 1927); not once within the text does Roland speak o f
honur other than in reference to its negation ‘shame’.

Similarly, shame

(hunie) is again and again redeemed as honur through a cycle o f deadly
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vengeance, so that honur is restituted, and shame averted, only when,
through vengeance, ‘death is paid with death.’
There is a passage within the text where Roland seems to be at work
preparing fo r the demise o f auxilium (aie) and fo r the advent o f divine
judgement. Just subsequent to having assigned a place in paradise to the
souls of the fallen at Roncevaux, Roland proceeds to interpret their death in
terms o f a series o f transfers o f allegiance:
‘Meillors vassals de vos unkes ne vi.
Si lungement tuz tens m’avez servit,
A oes Carton si granz pals cunquis!
Li empereres tant mare vos nurrit!
Tere de France, mult estes dulz pals,
Oi desertet [a tant rubosti exill].
Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murrir
Je ne vos pois tenser ne guarantor;
Alt vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!
Oliver, ffere, vos ne dei jo faillir.
De doel murrai, s'altre ne m’i ocit
Sire cumpainz, alum i referir!"

(II. 1857 - 68)

('Better vassals than you I have never seen:
For so long a tome you have constantly served me,
You have conquered such great countries for Charles!
But the Emperor nourished you for naught!
Land of France, you are most sweet.
Today made desolate by a most terrible disaster!
Noble Frenchmen, I see you dying for me,
I cannot protect or save you.
May God, who never did lie, have/help you!
Oliver, brother, I must not fail you,
I will die of grief, if someone does not kill me first
Companion, sir, let us go and strike blows once more!’)

Roland begins by distinguishing between what he considers as rightfully his
from that which belongs to Charles. Thus, in the process o f ‘freeing’ his men
from service to the Emperor (auxilium) Roland claim s them exclusively fo r his
own - Barons franceis, p u r m ei vos vei m urrir (1.1863). Lines 1860 - 62 center
on the etymologically am bivalent exill - exilium (exile); excidium (excision,
causing to disappear)-- adding significantly to O liver’s previous definition of
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death at lines 1735 - 36. For Roland death is exile, but exile is m ore...exile is
total annihilation. It is in refusing counsel and in choosing to depart from the
community that Roland is forsfiet. W hereas Roland abandons counsel during
the early dispute with Ganelon (cf.: II. 205 - ff.) at Roncevaux, he likewise
abandons auxilium by lifting the obligatory ties that bind vassal to lord (cf.: II.
1863 - 65).

Roland seeks to supersede Charlemagne in declaring that the

latter has nourished the chevaliers to no purpose, that at Roncevaux they die
not to Charlemagne’s glory but to the glory o f Roland exclusively (I. 1863).
Next, in conceding a failure to protect and to guarantee the honur o f those
fallen at Roncevaux (1.1864), Roland makes one last transference o f auxilium,
and o f a/'e, I. 1865.

Service (auxilium), in this passage, has shifted from

Charles to Roland (I. 1860), then from Roland to God (I. 1865).

But this

covenant between God and the chevaliers established by Roland is a
covenant between the Divine and dead men. Roland envisions no future fo r
France beyond the apogee o f his own glory.

A t lines 1866 - 68, Roland

announces his death not as a departure, but as one being struck down (ocit),
as one who ceases to exist in absolute terms. Roland’s legacy will be one not
o f existential continuity, but of preserved memory -B a ro n s franceis, p u r m ei
vos vei murir— and fo r the sake of commemoration, Roland seeks total
annihilation rather than the reclamation o f honur.

Roland goes into death

urging that death be m et with death, that one killing blow - o c it- be met with
another and another —alum i referir.
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Upon his return, Charlemagne imm ediately works to distance him self
from those fallen at Roncevaux. In a form ally structured ubi sunt (laisse 177),
elaborating on the same basic procedure used by Roland at laisse 140,
Charlemagne proceeds to ask counsel directly from God:
“E! Deus!" dist Carles, "ja sunt il ja si luinz!
Cunsentez [Cunseiliez 1922] mei e dreiture e honur
De France dulce m’unt tolue la flur."

(II. 2429-31)

('Oh, God!’ said Charles, ‘They are already so far removed from us!
Grant me my right and my honur
From me they have taken the flower of France.')

As if in fulfillm ent o f the prophecy im plicit in the prosodic connections made in
Oliver’s speech between ale and jui'se, an angel of God appears to
Charlemagne whereby the ‘right’ to vengeance supplants the office of
counsel:
“La flur de France as perdut, go set Deus.
Venger te poez de la gent criminel.”

(II. 2455- 56)

('You have lost the flower of France, God knows this;
You are able to wreak vengeance on the criminal race.')

As a consequence to the elimination o f concilium and auxilium, honur can only
fall into precipitous decline. Charles will accept vengeance and jui'se, in place
o f auxilium and cunseill, as the instruments by which to establish his ‘right1
(dreiture).
As was the case with Roland, Charles, too, sees honur in terms of its
negativity; yet whereas Roland persistently referenced honur as the protection
and guarantee against hunte (1091; 1701; 1707; 1927; 2337), Charles (II.
1867 - 68) conceives of honur as a settling o f the score against the Saracens.
He deals them a measure of shame (hunte) equal to that suffered by the
Franks at Roncevaux; thus begins the emperor’s quest for dreiture. Whereas
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Roland has essentially abandoned honur the moment he concedes a failure to
provide protection and guarantee for his Franks, Charlemagne forsakes honur
in a calculation that replaces the obligations o f protection with a desire for
vengeance.
Returning from the foray against those Saracens who managed to
survive Roncevaux, Charlemagne announces honor’s end:
“La meie honor est tumet en declin.”

(1.2890)

(‘My honor has turned in decline.’)

The elimination o f the last remaining chevaliers from Roncevaux marks an
absolute end o f honor for Charles.

He reaffirms and elaborates on this

assessment in a passage in proximity to the above:
“Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur!
N'en avrai ja ki sustienget m’onur;
Suz ciel ne quid aveir ami un sui;
Se jo ai parenz, n’en i ad nul si proz.”

(II. 2902 - 05)

(‘How my power and my strength will fall!
I shall have no one to sustain my honur;
I don’t think I have a sole friend under the heavens:
Though I have kinsmen, none are so courageous as he.’)

These lines detail with greatest economy the dissolution o f all honur, the
interdependence of honor's two aspects, auxilium and concilium, have
dissolved. Charlemagne’s reference to parenz is telling in that the material
expanse of empire has overcome the prerogatives o f the individual authority
common to feudal organization.

Hence, at laisse 208 not individual

chevaliers, but the anonymous heads o f state arrive asking for Roland.
Charles responds to these inquiring heads o f state by saying that
Roland is dead, that fo r the moment the empire stands headless, and that the
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need fo r a substitute is pressing. W ithin his own em pire as well there w ill be
revolt, and Charles will again answ er
“Morz est mis nigs, ki tant me fist cunquere.”

(1.2920)

('My nephew, who conquered so much for me, is dead.’)

Internally as well as externally, Charles creates by means o f this locution the
need fo r a strongly unifying force in replacement o f Roland. W ith lines 2904 05, the text bounds forward to a solution. Charles laments the loss o f his sole
friend (am i un sul, II. 2909;2916;2933),7 Roland, who has extended his powers
of auxilium to the extent that, in offering protection to the entire realm, he was
no longer able to guarantee the protection o f the honur o f his own chevaliers.
Charles no longer has the likes o f such a confederate in arms as was Roland,
and so he turns to another sort o f subject, one described obliquely in line 2905
as the prototype of Tierry -H e in gre out le cors e graisle e schewid— who will
rise as the mediator o f divine juTse during the trial o f Ganelon.
Auxilium, the force previously used to fend o ff shame, is replaced by
vengeance, the instrument o f divine retribution greater than any individual,
which is used to crush anyone who stands in defiance o f the newly
established law. Honor is first put to rest in the grave o f the three chevaliers
memorialized by Charlemagne:
A grant honor pois les unt enterrez...

(i. 2960)

(They were able to inter them with great honor)

Then again, and with finality, a t the burial of Aide:
Lunc un alter belement I’enterrerent
Muit grant honur i ad Ii reis dunee.

(II. 3732 - 33)

(Beside an altar, in noble fashion she was interred;
The King had given her great honor.)

117

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

W hen at line 2430, Charlemagne begs o f God: ‘Cunseillez m ei e dreiture e
h o n u r/ and God responds with a call to vengeance, God’s im plicit ’counsel’ is
that Charles should begin the transition whereby honur will be replaced by
dreiture and aTe will be replaced by vengeance. The text affords a detailed
comparison of dreiture and honur as an alternative opposition.
Whereas the opposition between honur and hunte is a constant, the
opposition between dreiture and honur is a historic variable that, unlike the
first pair, cuts the text diachronicalfy, marking a historical disjunction that
defines the dynamics o f conflict within the text. This dynamic opposition is
illuminated by comparing two passages, one incipient to the conflict at
Roncevaux, the other setting in motion the post-Roncevaux confrontation
between Saracens and Franks. As already mentioned, Charlemagne begins
the movement against the Saracens by consultation not with his chevaliers,
but with God:
“Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur.”

(I. 2430)

('Counsel me in right and in honor.')

Marsile, by contrast, requests the counsel o f his barons:
“Cunseilez mei // cume mi saive hume.
Si me guarisez // e de mort e de hunte!”

(II. 2 0 -2 1 )

(‘Counsel me // like wise men
Protect me // from death and from shame!’)

Through the use o f chiasmus we find in this couplet a truth bom e out by the
text, namely, that from Blancandrin’s counsel, Marsile will visit shame and
death upon both camps at Roncevaux:
“Si m' guarisez // cume mi saive hume,
Cunseilez mei // e de mort e de hunte."
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(‘Protect me // like wise men
Counsel me // from death and from shame.’)

Now in placing Charlemagne’s call to counsel in superimposition over that of
Marsiie’s call to counsel, we find this significant difference, not between
Saracen and Frank, but between king and emperor:
Cunseillez mei // e dreiture e honur.
Cunseilez mei // e de mort e de hunte.
(Counsel me // in right and in honor)
(Counsel me // in death and in shame)

A comparison o f these reconstructed hemistiches reveals two parallel
progressions within the text, one synchronic and the other diachronic. The
synchronic, ‘vertical’ axis is brought into definition at the moment o f Roland’s
death. Up until that moment, the opposition between the term honur and the
term hunte had been a narrative constant.

Following Roland’s death,

however, the opposition between honur and hunte lapses and is replaced by
the opposition between m ort and dreiture.

Hence, the opposition between

honur and hunte, which defines the them atic opposition in the first narrative
half o f the Roland, is exchanged for the opposition between m ort and dreiture
which defines the thematic opposition in the second narrative half of the
Roland.

This exchange of oppositional terms honur/hunte for mort/dreiture

occurs ju st at the moment of Roland's death and so causes rupture in the
narrative linearity of the text. For this reason the axis that is defined at the
moment o f the exchange between honur/hunte :: mort/dreiture defines an axis
that is ‘vertical’ in that it divides the text into two semi-autonomous narrative
segments.
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The shift from one of these two oppositional dyads to the other
inaugurates a shift from the social and political order circumscribed by the
dynamics o f the oppositional pair honor/hunte to a social and political order
that is circumscribed by the oppositional pair mort/dreiture. Roland, author of
the text’s first narrative, is ‘exemplary’ o f the order governed by the opposition
honor/hunte; Charlemagne, author o f the second narrative panel, is exemplary
o f the order governed by mort/dreiture.

There is, however, a diachronic,

‘horizontal’ axis whose progression tends to erase all evidence o f narrative
rupture coincident with the death o f Roland. That axis can be described in
this way: though the shift from the pairing of honor/hunte to the pairing of
mort/dreiture points up difference, the translation o f the term honor into the
term dreiture, and the translation o f the term hunte into the term m ort places a
decided emphasis on narrative continuity as the text crosses over into the
post-Roncevaux narrative.

Hence, whereas it can be said that Roland

purchases honor by avenging shame (his own for the failure to protect the
Franks at Roncevaux [cf.: “Jo ne vos pois tenser ne guarantor,” I. 1864]),
Charlemagne purchases dreiture at the expense o f the lives not just of
Qanelon and kin, but especially at the cost of the lives o f Roland and o f the
Franks who die at Roncevaux.
D e u ju i's e
The struggle within the text from the beginning through the battle at
Roncevaux is determined by an opposition between honur and hunte, but not
in such sim plistic terms. Honur, in fact, is the chief concern o f Ganelon, and it
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is through the exercise o f concilium tha t honur is preserved. Hunte, on the
other hand, is the chief concern o f Roland, and it is through the skillful
exercise o f auxilium that shame is warded o ff from the Frankish camp. Death,
the com plete cessation o f existence, is more properly a post- Roncevaux
concern, because it is only in the conflict between Charlemagne and Baligant
that the possibility o f nothingness is confronted. As the reader crosses over
the text’s central divide marked by the death of Roland, in the place of
concilium we find ju ise and in place o f honur we find dreiture, for it is the
judgem ent o f God rather than the counsel o f Charlemagne's barons that will
solidify post-Roncevaux power. In place o f auxilium we find vengeance and in
place o f hunte we find mort; for whereas Roland’s chief concern, at least
going into the battle at Roncevaux, was to guard the French and France
against shame (1091; 1701; 1707; 1927; 2337), this shifts to a deliberate
pursuit of visiting shame upon the enemy, beginning with Roland’s instructive
oration on death and in particular verses 1867 - 68, with the prosodic point
and counterpoint o f their respective verb endings (ocit -die by sword blowreferir the progressive form of ferir) suggesting repeated death blows in return.
These double axes which divide the text both

‘vertically’ and

‘horizontally’ can be represented in the form o f a semiotic square:
Dreiture

\

honur

hunte

|

mort

This paradigm carries radical im plications as to the division between truth and
falsehood within the text, a division that is not so simple as the implied ‘moral’
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division between Saracen and Frank, Christian and Pagan. This divide, which
cuts the text into four ontological quadrants, finds representation in a series o f
verses that thread through the rich tapestry o f this text:
Quant co veit Guenes qu'ore s'en rit Rollant
Dune ad tel doel pur poi d’ire ne fent..

(II. 303 - 04)

(When Ganelon sees how Roland is laughing at him,
He was so pained that he nearly split from rage)
Li quens Rollant tint s’espee sanglente.
Ben ad olt que Franceis se Dementent;
Si grant doel ad que par mi quiet fendre...

(II. 1629 - 31)

(Count Roland held his bloody sword.
Well had he heard the French crying out their distress;
He was so sorrowful that he nearly split from grief.)
Si grant doel out que mais ne pout ester.

(I. 2219)

(He was so grief stricken that he was no longer able to exist)
“Si grant doel ai que jo ne vuldreie estre!"

(I. 2929)

(‘I am so greatly grieved that I would rather not exist!’)
“Si grant dot ai que ne voldreie v

i v

r e

. ( 1

. 2936)

(‘I am so greatly grieved that I no longer wish to live. )
Si grant doel ad sempres quiad murir...

(I. 3506)

(He was so sorrowful, that he thought he would die on the spot)
“Veez paien cum ocient voz humes!
Ja Deu ne placet qu’el chef portez corone,
S’or n’i ferez pur venger vostre hunte!”

(II. 3537 - 39)

(’See how the pagans are slaughtering your men!
May it never please God that you should wear a crown on your head
If you do not strike forthwith to avenge your dishonor!’)
Qo dist li reis: “Seignurs, vengez voz doels,
Si esclargiez voz talenz e voz coers,
Kar hoi matin vos vi plurer des oilz.”
Respondent Franc: “Sire, go nus estoet!”

(II. 3627 - 30)
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(Then said the King: ‘Lords, avenge your grief.
Make clear your desires and that which your heart wishes to do.
For this morning I saw your eyes crying.’)
The Franks respond: ‘Lord, this we should do!’)
Morz est de doel, si cum pecchet I’encumbret

(I. 3646)

(He is dead from sorrow, as though encumbered by a great sin.)

The cardinal moment within the text is that of Charles’ return framed, as we
have seen, by the orations given by Roland (laisse 140) and by Charles
(laisse 178) on death. On the one side o f the divide effected by Roland's
death we find death defined as non-existence and on the other as non-being.
Roland suffers a separation from community, whereas Charlemagne speaks
in absolute terms o f a 'ceasing to be’ (“jo ne vutdreie estre ).

Let us now

examine each of the above passages in context. A t II. 303 - 04 Roland’s
laugh causes such pain that Ganelon would split —"p u r p o i d ’ire ne fe n t”
Indeed, Ganelon perceives that Roland has placed him into a kind o f exile
(exilium; excidium), that his defiant laughter signals to Ganelon and to all
present that Ganelon has lost his position of honur among the Franks. To
qualify this observation, I turn to the passage that makes clear that the
selectionfor this mission to the Saracens and the approval o f this selection by
Charlemagne come as something disgraceful and particularly odious for
Ganelon:
“Par ceste barbe que veez blancheier,
Li duze per mar i serunt jugez!”

(II. 261 - 62)

(‘By this beard which you see is white,
No one of the twelve peers will be judged to lead this mission!’)

Charles has made clear the primary criterion for selecting an emissary to
Marsile: the chosen must be someone o f secondary rank. Roland’s irreverent
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laughter sets Ganelon dram atically apart.

Here, already Ganeion blames

Roland fo r his coming death:
“Sur mei avez tumet fals jugement’

(I. 307)

(‘You have turned false judgement against me.’)

Ganelon recognizes that the election to this mission to the Saracens indicates
a purposeful and perm anent separation from community.
A t lines 1586 - 88 the anguish that overcomes Roland causes him also
to ‘split.’ This separation reflected in the ‘split’ o f Roland is, in a sense, far
more serious and richer in implication. Roland responds to a recognition that
the French have arrived at the end of their existence:
DTent Franceis: “Mult decheent li nostre!’

(1.1628)

(The French say: ‘Many of ours are falling!’)

This death as separation marks a critical moment in that the historical cycle
has been broken; not the individual, but the entire com m unity loses existence.
From this point, logically, death can only be defined in absolute terms as a
cessation o f being; Roland follows through this transition:
Si grant doel out que mais ne pout ester...

(1.2219)

(He was so grief stricken that he was no longer able to stand.)

Ironically, Turpin never goes so far, never makes this passage into the
complete cessation o f his own existence. Furthermore, the depiction o f his
death is tinged with blasphemy:
‘ La meie mort me rent si anguissus!
Ja ne verrai le riche empereur.”

(II. 2198 - 99)

(‘My death leaves me in such anguish:
I shall never see the rich/mighty Emperor!’)
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Among the three chevaliers buried at S aint Romain, only Roland has seen
death apart from its communal im plications as a ceasing altogether of being.
In rendering service (are) to God alone (I. 1865), Roland has interpreted death
not m erely as a cessation o f being, but as the culm ination o f all existence, of
all community, o f la franceise gent finally and foreverm ore in his own person.8
Charles, however, has other plans.
Before examining II. 2929 and 2 9 3 6 ,1 turn to those passages in which
the

Saracens give pellucid

example

o f death

as the

alternative to

Charlemagne’s dreiture. Death for the Saracens is seen as a failure to justify
their very being. When at verse 3506 the text inform s the reader of Baliganfs
condition (He was so sorrowful, that he would die at once [S i grant doel ad,
sempres quiad murir\), this is in response to news o f the loss of his son
Malprimes.

For Baligant who has been given dreiture over Espaigne (Li

am iraill ad Espaigne droit [I. 2747]) with the loss o f his heir there is no
continuance fo r him, and hence fo r the Saracen, in Spain.

Baligant’s

messenger, Jangleu d’Outremer, spells out the finality o f this loss:
E cil respunt “Morz estes, Baligant!
Ja vostre deu ne vos erent guarant”

(II. 3513 -14)

(And he responded: ‘You are dead, Baligant!
Your gods will not grant you protection.’)

This passage acquires meaning as the reader recollects Roland’s own
description o f death, the first to portray death in term s o f Being and
Nothingness:
“Jo ne vos pois tenser ne guarantor;
Alt vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!"

(II. 1864 - 65)
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(‘I can not protect or save you.
May God, who never did lie, have/help you!')

The failure of one’s God to provide help (a/'e), as in the case of the Saracen
Baligant, leads ultimately to an absence o f judgement; ju ise without the
authoritative signature o f a protecting godhead leads to the eradication of
being. Hence the textual assertion that concludes this passage:
Li amiralz alques s’en aperceit
Que il ad tort e Cariemagnes dreit

(II. 3553 - 54)

(The Emir begins to realize
That he is in the wrong and that Charlemagne is in the right)

The absence o f dreiture henceforth equates with a new and absolute
cessation o f being. Marsile’s death at line 3646 (he is the only Saracen or
Frank to die of grief) shows him to be the last remnant o f the Saracen
community in Spain save Bramimunde; she will be spared by Charles for
religious instruction and conversion.

The remaining anonymous multitude

either embraces Christianity or perishes by the sword, not for defiance o f God,
but for defiance of Charles (II. 3666 - 3670).
W ith the death o f Marsile comes the text’s last mention o f hunte (I.
3643); honur finds only one subsequent mention, when Aide is buried with
honur. A call to vengeance motivates the push to kill the last o f the patens.
At the trial of Ganelon, Charles asks not fo r vengeance but fo r his d re it
‘ De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit!
II fut en I’ost tresqu’en Espaigne od mei,
Si me tolit .XX. milie de mes Franceis...0

(II. 3751 - 53)

(‘From Ganelon judge for me the right!
He was with me among the warriors all the way to Spain,
And he took from me twenty thousand of my Frenchmen.’)

Ganelon uses the term treason, which Charles is careful to avoid in reference
to the Franks9:
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“Venget m’en sui, mais n’i ad traTsun.*

(I. 3778)

(‘I took vengeance against him, but there is no treason here.')

The text pretends to a separation between the human vengeance meted out
against the Saracens and the divine vengeance meted out against Ganelon
and his kin, as though the destruction o f the latter needed the distance o f
divine mediation to ensure exculpation. The counsel o f the barons who urge
that Charlemagne should reconcile differences with Ganelon has been
rejected, and Tierry steps in as the agent o f divine justice which the text
designates as li dreiz:
Dist li empereres: “Bons pleges en demant"
.XXX. parenz I'i plevissent leial.
Qo dist li reis: “E jol vos recrerai.”
Fait cels guarder tresque li dreiz en serat"

(II. 3846 - 49)

(The Emperor said: 'I will have good pledges.'
Thirty kinsmen offer themselves to him as pledge.
This said the King: 'With this I will place him [Ganelon} in your custody.'
And he placed the hostages under guard until he had his right)

Just as in the prior conflict between Charlemagne and Baligant, Tierry
prevails, though only by the grace o f God.

Thus, the power o f God is

demonstrated among men; but also, in this delicate m atter o f Christians
destroying Christians, divine mediation disinculpates those who participate in
this mortal judgem ent.

The reader is shown that both Charles and Tierry

begin the judgem ent by ordeal in assigning to God responsibility for its
outcome:
“E! Deus," dist Carles, “le dreit en esclargiez!”

(I. 3891)

('Oh, God’, said Charles, ‘make clear the right!’)
Deus facet hoi entre nus dous le dreit!'

(I. 3898)

(‘May God establish between us two the right!’)
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The conflict having been ‘m iraculously’ decided in Tierry’s favor allows the
Franks to concur with Charles and Tierry that this is indeed the work o f God:
Escrient Franc: "Deus i ad fait vertut!
Asez est dreiz que Guenes seit pendut
E si parent, ki plaidet unt pur lui."

(II. 3931 - 34)

(The Franks cry out Through God virtue has prevailed!
It is fitting that Ganelon should be hanged
Together with his kinsmen, who pledged themselves for him.')

The Franks themselves give precision to Charles’ demand made at line 3751.
Charles’ dreit prescribes that Ganelon and all his kinsmen should undergo
complete destruction. The Franks respond: ‘It is wrong that a single one o f
them should live!’ (Respundent Franc: “Ja m aren vivrat uns!, ” I. 3951). This is
a broad extension o f God’s ‘judgem ent’ used to sanction the slaughter o f an
entire group, whose only fault is that they continue to recognize and abide by
the old law. There is something suspicious about this justice, which in the text
works progressively toward the profane. At line 1733, O liver uses the word
jui'se to refer directly to the last judgem ent; at line 3368 jufse, which occurs
here fo r only the second tim e within the text, refers to a divine grant o f
authority to wreak destruction upon the enemy. When the text uses the word
for a third and final time, it is used to sanction the destruction of Christian by
Christian. The last two laisse begin with the strangely proprietary use o f both
vengeance and justise:
Quant li empeceres ad faite sa venjance...

(I. 3975)

(When the Emperor had made his vengeance...)
Quant I’emperere ad faite sa justise...

(I. 3988)

(When the Emperor had made his justice...)
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Vengeance and justice correspond to and translate the prior institutions o f afe
and counseill. These institutions (a/e and counseill), which had served to bind
the feudal peers one to another, now give way to Charlemagne’s own
vengeance and justice.
In both title and function, the distinction is made between Marsile li reis
and Baligant I’amiralz, and the distinction is maintained throughout the text.
The same cannot be said, however, fo r Charlemagne, to whom the reader is
introduced as both m is and empemms at once10:
Cartes ii reis, nostre emperere magnes...

(1.1)

(Charles the King, our great Emperor...)

As king Charles is wholly ineffectual, hollow, failing completely to guarantee
honur among his men or to protect them from shame (hunte). On the other
hand, Charlemagne, the emperor, gains vitality in the pursuit of vengeance
and power in the justice granted him by God. W hereas the Saracen king and
the Frankish chevaliers divert all their energies to the maintenance of a state
of homeostasis between honor and hunte, m aintaining the one and averting
the other, the emperor distinguishes him self by turning from the external
conflict between Saracens and Franks to one that is internal.

Ending the

ongoing cycle o f violence that kept the balance between honor and hunte
always in play Charlemagne instead finds authority and power, even the
power o f destruction, in the word —'De Guenelun c a r me jugez le d m itl" In a
single occurrence the trial of Ganelon demonstrates before all the chevaliers
o f the realm the power o f the word and that le dm it belongs solely to the
emperor.
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Some comfort can be taken at the moment o f death with the knowledge
that a continuum o f one’s existence will be maintained. The refusal to pursue
that continuum is a choice Charles makes in turning a deaf ear to Ganelon’s
plea fo r the guarantee of property and family, ju st as the latter departs on
what promised to be a fatal mission to the Saracens (II. 310-18).

In

consequence, the cyclical alternation between living and dying, between
honor and hunte has been replaced by a being that knows no respite. When
Charles laments at Roland’s death:
“Si grant doel ai que jo ne vuldreie estre!"

(I. 2929)

(‘So great is my sorrow that I do not wish to exist!')
“Si grant dol ai que ne vuldreie vivre...”

(1.2936)

(‘My sorrow is so great that I do not wish to live!’)

Charles expresses a wish for a cessation o f being, a wish that will not be
granted.

For Roland, Oliver and Turpin, death means, among other things,

liberation from the never ending struggle to balance honor and hunte.
Charlemagne never attains that respite.11 Though he has put to rest the
dynamics o f the opposition between honur and hunte, he has replaced them
with a balance between death and his own right juTse. Charlemagne envelops
within his single person the authority to determine both life and death.
Though he has silenced the external conflict, he has done so by incorporating
it into his own person and at the cost of great and irremediable anguish:
“Deus,” dist li reis, “si penuse est ma vie!”

(1.4000)

(‘God!’, cried the King, 'how painful is my life!’)
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\/EIRE PATE(R)NE
Circumcision is of the heart, in the spirit, not the letter...
Romans 2:29

The topics o f this chapter’s two previous essays have indicated a
particular approach, one that privileged reading the Roland in the fashion o f a
linear narrative. In the first o f these essays —”M-Monjoie”~ we followed the
progress o f Monjoie, the ‘sign’ o f Charlemagne, from general war cry to
material emblem o f state.

O ur inquiry examined scenes from across the

length of the text from beginning to end, demonstrating the linear progression
that was involved in transform ing this war cry into the material sign o f
Charlemagne's political authority.

In the second essay —"Outlaws”— we

discovered in the text’s earliest moments a paradigm that would radically alter
social and political relations. O ur argum ent went the way o f this paradigm’s
progress as it permuted through successive scenes until, at last, a realization
o f Blancandrin’s grand scheme, the adoption o f the paradigm altering social
and political reality fo r Saracen and Frank, is achieved at the conclusion o f the
Roland. Yet these essays were constrained to take notice o f the text’s central
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gap; the break between laisse CLXXVI and laisse CLXXVII, where two
im perfectly connected narrative movements are deftly sewn together.

The

gap between the text’s two principal narratives takes on profound importance
as a void at the center o f the story, a void across which one social and
political order is translated into another. In the chapter’s third and final essay
we set out to explore this same central gap in terms of both its structural and
its substantive aspects.
The compositional arrangement o f the arguments o f the two prior
essays conforms to the supposed linear narrativity o f the text they critique; the
argument o f those essays follows the ‘progression’ of the narrative from
beginning to end. The following essay, however, attempts an examination o f
the text’s material center -th e void between laisse CLXXVI and laisse
CLXXVII— and, to the extent to which such considerations can be termed
relevant, attempts to provide the reader with another place o f beginning and
ending fo r the Roland.

Initially, we examine two ‘prayers’, one delivered by

Roland and the other by Charlemagne, each treating the them e o f
resurrection. At the moment o f his death, a moment coterminous with the
ending o f the first and the beginning o f the second narration, Roland prepares
his own apotheosis, evoking the Biblical examples of resurrection given in the
stories o f Daniel and Lazarus.

But, as we shall see, Roland encodes his

personal resurrection with mundane signs, signs that mark his death as the
end of the geste. In this way, Charlemagne’s prayer, borrowing from Roland’s
own in both form and in content, seeks a resurrection not only of personal
authority and of the strength o f his forces, but o f a lapsed narrative as well;
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Charlemagne resurrects the geste in the form o f renewed narrative.

This

leads us to next consider what are ostensibly the text’s two modes o f narrative
production, that o f the geste, the recounting o f ‘actual’ events, and that of
fiction. Roland produces narration with the sword-blow and he chooses Aide,
the unblemished virgin who awaits word o f his exploits in far o ff Aix, as the
destinataire o f the geste.

Charlemagne, somewhat at cross-purposes with

Roland, intervenes with what we m ight call (borrowing the rhymed pair from
the 268*h laisse) an estrange eschange; the substitution o f one mode of
narrative production for another. Outwardly, the estrange eschange occurs as
Charlemagne proposes to replace the dead Roland with his (living) son
Loewis as the groom in a marriage arranged prior to Roncevaux. Be that as it
may, the true strange exchange has not to do with altered marriage plans, but
with the transformation o f the ‘historical’ geste into a fiction, a transformation
with significant social and political import. Finally, we return to the center of
the text as that place at which the text’s two narratives join. It is in the space
of this absence, in the operations o f the textual hiatus, that Roland and
Charlemagne, and so the narratives they produce, stand as figures of
competing authority.

W e shall see how the geste and the fiction run like

countercurrents from one end o f the Roland to the other, and how, fa r from
being mutually exclusive, they overlap to create, at the center o f the text, a
negative presence that functions as both beginning and ending.
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Pate(R)ne
From the moment within the narrative tha t it becomes clear that no Frank will
escape the surrounding slaughter at Roncevaux, Roland begins to prepare for
‘resurrection’ in a style that is as studied as it is methodical.

Firstly, he

prepares fo r the resurrection o f li franceis in the recitation o f their eulogy (I.
1854 - ff.), before preparing fo r his own resurrection in a last act that consists
in placing the bodies of the fallen Franks in a symbolically arranged order.1
Although the term resurrection applies to each of these instances, the
intended results o f the resurrection o f fi franceis and that o f Roland are widely
at variance with one another.

W e can adduce as much by recalling that

whereas Roland’s mortal remains, along with those o f Olivier and Turpin, are
deposited at Blaye in the church o f Saint Romain, the remains o f li franceis, as
we have already noted, are laid to rest in the fields of Roncevaux at the
bottom of a nameless pit (cf.: II. 2953-61). In a later passage, somewhere well
into the second narrative o f the Roland, Charlemagne plots yet a third
resurrection, a resurrection o f personal authority, o f the order o f armed forces,
and a resurrection of state drawn up from the ruins of defeat. W e shall see in
this third act o f resurrection how Charlemagne completely subverts those
earlier ‘acts' o f resurrection as they have been carried out by Roland.
Together, the three resurrection passages alluded to above form a loosely
articulated whole. Their cohesion, the interlacing of a common theme of
resurrection, can be made evident by citing three verses o f remarkable
similarity, one verse from each o f the three passages in question:
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‘Alt vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!”

(1.1865)

(‘May God, who never lied, have/help you!')
'Veire Patene, ki unkes ne mentis...

(I. 2384)

(True Father, who never lied.')
“Veire Pateme, hoi cest jor me defend...

(I. 3100)

(True Father, defend me on this day...’)

In a purely form al sense these lines provide us with a thematic imbrication.
The second hemistich of verse 1865 is repeated with near exactitude in the
second hemistich o f verse 2384; the first hemistich o f verse 2384 reappears,
again with near exactitude, as the first hemistich o f verse 3100; and finally,
coming full circle, the second hemistich o f verse 3100 re-presents itself as a
‘translation’ o f line 1865, as Charlemagne is able to ‘p ro fif from Roland’s
having consigned the French to God { ‘A it vos Deus) by, in turn, soliciting
God’s help in defending the French that have now become God’s own {‘hoi
cest jo r me defend).

Stylistic affinities join these three moments of

resurrection by the similarities and the slight, though highly significant,
variance o f their syntagmatic structures. The near perfect circularity o f these
lines, as the ‘tail end’ of verse 3100 rejoins the beginning of verse 1865 and
so forth, is in itself suggestive o f the process o f resurrection and cyclical
rebirth that will be the focus o f inquiry o f the opening segment of this essay.
W e will continue to refer to these three verses as textual signposts that will
guide us as we enter into a discussion o f strategies of resurrection employed
by Roland and Charlemagne and, as will be made clear, as signs o f a strategy
o f resurrection utilized by the text itself.
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These three verses bear this further peculiarity, that only here and
nowhere else within the Roland do their syntagmes ‘k i unkes ne m ent-is/-it
and ‘Veire Pate(r)ne' appear. This fact o f coincidence, which may at first seem
a mere textual accident, lends yet another reason in favor o f treating these
three lines and the passages o f which they are a part as though they were
pieces o f a single though loosely articulated cohesive structure. In examining
and comparing these three passages, it may surprise the reader to discover
that the difference o f a single letter -a s the text moves from ‘mentit (I. 1865)
to ‘mentis ’ (I. 2384) or from ‘Pate()ne’ (I. 2384) to ‘Pate(r)ne‘ (I. 3100)— signals
a shift within the narrative which bears profound political import.
With the words ‘May God have/help you. He who never lie s ...' {“A it vos Deus,
ki unkes ne m e n tit) Roland loosens the feudal bond between Charlemagne
and the French by consecrating the latter into a direct service to God. In the
previous section we have seen how in Roland’s oration, beginning with line
1854, the vassal allegiance of the French devolves from Charlemagne (I.
1860), to Roland (I. 1863) an finally to God him self (II. 1864 - 65). This, as
Roland tells it, was all in consequence of the fact that neither he nor
Charlemagne have been either willing or able to fulfill the principle obligations
of vassal allegiance: [Roland speaks] ‘I am neither able to protect nor to
defend you’

(“Jo ne vos pois tenser ne guarantir,” I. 1864) - i t being

understood that the Emperor is and has been no less culpable in this regard.
Is Roland admitting failure in these lines?

Is he placing the French in the

hands o f a ‘lord’ who can meet the obligations to which both he and
Charlemagne have proved inadequate, or is he simply liberating him self o f a
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certain culpability?

W e can reasonably suspect the disingenuousness o f a

Roland pretending to this moment o f piety and humility, especially where the
lament concerns the loss o f the French at Roncevaux and he is pretending as
though that event were sadly beyond his control.
The irony o f Roland’s im plicit claim to innocence for the slaughter o f his men
is redoubled by Olivier’s assignation o f blame just ‘moments’ p rio r
‘ Franceis sunt morz par vostre legerie.
Jamais Karfon de nus n’avrat servise.”

(ii. 1726 - 27)

“Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la velmes!
Kartes li Magnes de nos n'avrat ale.’

(II. 1731 - 32)

(The French are dead because of your senselessness.
Charles will never again have us at his service.’
'Your prowess, Roland, would that we had never been witness to it!
Charles-the-great will never again have our service.')

Nowhere does Roland, either directly or indirectly, refute Oliver’s accusations
of blame.

To the contrary, from the very first he responds to O liver by

restating his com plicity -a lb e it somewhat cryptically- in the dismal outcome of
events even, as those events are about to unfold. At line 1058, ju st prior to
the joining o f the Saracens and the French in battle, Roland states: ‘I swear to
you, all are judged to die

’ ("Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt jugez a m ort); and just

a few lines further (I. 1069), he makes the same pronouncement using
virtually the same words ‘I swear to you, all will be delivered into death’
vos plevis, tuz sunt a morz livrez).

(Je

If by ‘ail’ (tuz) the reader has cause to

understand not ju st Saracen but Saracen and French alike, then the words A it
vos Deus o f line 1865 become the signal for an act o f abandonment.
Following the lines o f this argument, we find the verbal ‘act’ whereby Roland
abandons all responsibility for the protection of the French at Roncevaux has
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occurred in yet an earlier passage,2 in laisse 63, at the moment in which he
out and out refuses the emperor’s offer o f ‘salvem ent:
‘Demi mun host vos lerrai en present
Retenez !es, ?o est vostre salvement’
Go dit li quens: ‘Jo n'en ferai nient
Deus me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!”

(1.785 - 88)

(‘I will leave you at present with half of my men.
Keep them, it will be your salvation.’
Roland then said: ‘I will do no such thing.
May God confound me, if I so betray the geste.)

This passage presents evidence that both Roland and the Em peror are to
blame for the impending tragedy: Roland fo r his action in refusing aid where
aid is needed, Charlemagne for passively allowing what he recognizes as a
disaster-in-the-making to move unimpeded toward its terrible realization.
How, then, is the reader to make sense o f this ‘legerie’ - imprudence, folly,
ruse- as Oliver calls it? How could Roland and Charlemagne have possible
wished fo r the demise o f the French a t Roncevaux?
Roland and Charlemagne each sketches out a response to our query
that are both pithy and remarkably sim ilar in form.

First we have it from

Roland:
‘Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir...”

(1.1863)

(‘Noble Frenchmen, I see you dying for me.')

Roland describes himself watching the French as they die (murir) p u r m ei —
’fo r me/because o f me.’

There is little, if any, evidence coming from the

French themselves to suggest that they die fo r Roland; however, we have
already seen Oliver make the plain accusation that they die because o f w hat
Roland has done —p a r vostre legerie (I. 1726). Roland deftly turns failure to
his advantage, as the magnitude o f the combined sacrifice o f the French
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serves only to enhance the glory o f his name. Then there is another, not
altogether different, logic supporting the idea o f the ‘willed’ sacrifice o f the
French: that by their deaths the French, and so the geste itself, should come
to be seen as Roland’s creation and his possession. Already the text has
provided us with signals to indicate that Roland and Charlemagne compete for
the allegiance o f the French: [Roland] T h e em peror has nourished you for
naught!’

(Li empereres tant mare vos nurrit!/ I. 1860); [Roland] ‘Charles

will never again have us in his service....’ (“Jamais Karlon de nus n ’avrat
s e rv is e ...” 1.1727); there will be yet more such signs of calculated betrayal.3
W e might compare the destruction of the Franks at Roncevaux with
Roland’s attempt to destroy Durendal, the sword given him by God. Clearly,
Roland is at pains to ensure that Durendai's destruction is coincident with the
end of his own existence. The comparison becomes all the more valid once
we recognize that Durendal is the metonymic representation not only o f
Roland but o f the Franks themselves. In his recitation o f the catalogue o f his
conquests, line 2316 ff., Roland attributes powers to Durendal that m ight ju s t
as easily have been attributed to the Franks. They, after all, were as much
responsible for the successes to which Roland attaches his name as was
Durendal for not ju st the divine powers attributed to his sword, but also the
sturdy if mundane service o f the Franks, served loyally as the instrum ent of
his will.

When Roland claims that, by its destruction, he would remove

Durendal from the hands o f the Saracens, there is something not quite right
about the circumstances in which this assertion is made. The Saracens, after

139

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

all, have fled and will certainly not return before the arrival of a quickly
advancing Charlemagne. It is the emperor him self from whom Roland wishes
to ‘save’ Durendal, just as Roland has, likewise, ‘saved’ the Franks from
further service to their emperor.

Roland fails in the attem pt to destroy the

sword, Durendal, so that it might remain singly his. In a like vein, so will he fail
in the attem pt to secure the Franks for the glory o f his own name, though as
he gazes upon the Franks dead and dying on the field o f Roncevaux, he
states: ‘p e r m ei vos vei muriY (I see you dying fo r me).
The Emperor’s claim to the Franks is of a slightly different nature from
that of Roland, as in the scene below Charlemagne laments those who have
fallen and whom he is about to bury:
‘Si grant dol ai que ne voldreie vivre,
De ma maisnee, ki pur mei est ocise!”

(II. 2936 • 37)

('So great is my anguish, I no longer wish to live.
Because of my household, who have been killed for me!')

Comparing the syntagme taken from Roland’s oration (‘I see you dying for
me

’ [“p u r m ei vos vei murir”]) with that from Charlemagne’s (‘who have

been killed fo r m e...’ [ki pu r m ei est ocise]), we detect a nuanced difference
signaled by the choice o f verb: m urir (to die) or occire (to kill). The implied
difference is one of volition, or the absence thereof, a difference Roland
him self will play upon at line 1867:
‘ De doel murra, s'altre ne m’i ocit"

(1.1867)

('I will die of grief, if another does not kill me first’)

Addressing O liver Roland declares that with the death o f this, his closest
companion, he him self will loose the will to live -de doel murra- unless, by
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chance, some other should kill him (ocit) first. W e are now in a position to
revisit line 1863 and to appreciate that Roland, by the choice of the word murir,
communicates through insinuation something he dare not speak forthrightly:
that the French have ‘willingly’ given to him their lives. We need not search
long or far to find evidence to the contrary: at lines 1515 - ff., Turpin must
literally shame the French back into battle once they realize that there is no
hope o f leaving the field o f battle alive and victorious. The Franks m eet their
end not as a matter of deliberate choice, but as the victims o f a trip le ’ legerie that of Roland (I. 1726), of Ganelon (I. 300) and, as will be made clear, that of
the Emperor himself. In declaring: “I have seen you die for me” (

’p u r m ei

vos vei murir), Roland attempts to claim the Franks for himself, to usurp
Charlemagne’s position within the feudal hierarchy as ‘first among peers’.
Although Charlemagne will find a way of turning things to his own advantage,
Roland, at least at the conclusion o f the first narration, does succeed in ‘taking’
the lives of the Franks as his own.
Charlemagne’s interest in the death o f the Franks is related to,
although distinguished from, Roland’s own interests. As Roland tells it, the
Franks willingly die (murir) for him; in the Emperor’s words, however, these
men, whose allegiance has meanwhile fallen to another, are plainly killed
(ocis). It is not altogether impossible to divine Charlemagne’s intent in this
matter. When the Emperor presides over the burial o f the French, throwing
their corpses into the anonymity o f a common pit (“A d un earner sempres les
unt po rte t), he effectively evacuates the body for the sake of retaining the
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name. W e w ill see the French o f the post-Roncevaux text taking th e ir place in
the first ranks o f the Emperor’s command, as Charlemagne arranges his
forces in preparation fo r the upcoming battle against Baligant (II. 3026 - ff.)
There a new body o f men, the French, will be assembled under the rubric o f
an old and now glorious name, that o f Roland.
“AH (avoir) vos Deus” (‘God have you’); with these words Roland gives
the French over to death. But, also, we have not neglected to point out th a t
the one who affords to another the guarantee o f protection can, by rights,
have the other as his man. Certainly this anticipates the new order, the new
dispensation, in which the French, preceding the trial o f Ganelon, are saved
solely by means o f a divine intercession (cf: Naimes in com bat with
Canabeus, I. 3439; Tierry in com bat with Pinabel, I. 3923; and Charlem agne in
combat with Baligant, I. 3609).

As Charlemagne puts it, the law itself will

ultimately determ ine who will survive the final confrontation between ‘pagan’
and ‘Christian’:
“Tutes (or leis un dener ne iur valt
S'ii unt grant gent, d’igo, seignurs, qui calt?”

(II. 3338 - 39)

(All their laws are not worth a penny.
Though they are a great race, what, my lords, does it matter?')

Death or survival in this conflict ceases to be a matter of human effort rather
survival is a sign that reflects judgem ent on the validity o f competing laws.
The law that fails to protect the Franks at Roncevaux cannot be the same law
that will cause Charlemagne to triumph over a ll his enemies. Although Roland
might consign the French to God’s keeping, Charlemagne, over the course o f
the second narrative, is certain to resurrect them as his own.
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W e proceed from the passage in which Roland effects the ‘resurrection
o f the Franks’ to that passage in which Roland enacts his own resurrection.
There, with an eye for the cynical, we noted that in ‘delivering’ the French from
the ties o f human (feudal) obligation and into the protecting hands o f God,
Roland does little more than to wash his hands in an act o f treachery and
abandonment. When at lines 2384 - ff. Roland administers his own passage
into the nether world, he does so while undercutting still further the system o f
obligatory ties that characterizes the feudal social organization. W e remark
the considerable progress in this direction by comparing the last line in his
obsequies for the French (‘May God, who never lies, have/help you’

[“A rt

vos Deus, k i unkes ne m entit..."]) with the first line o f the prayer in which
Roland recommends him self directly to God (‘True Father, who never lie s ...’
[“ Veire PateQne, ki unkes ne m entis..."]).

There is little doubt that Roland

refers to the One God o f heaven and earth, when at line 1865 he confers on
Him the ‘future’ care o f the Franks; the epithet k i unkes ne m entit only
underscores the fallibility o f the previous guarantors (both Roland and
Charlemagne) of French safety. The noun phrase Veire PateQne, by contrast,
proves significantly less exact. W hereas at line 1865 Roland distinguishes
God (who never lies) from men (who presumably do), at line 2384 Roland
makes his appeal to that father among all possible fathers who is True. The
rejection of Charlemagne as unworthy o f his office is now furtively remarked.
Even more disturbing than the veiled accusations against the Emperor
are the implications calling into doubt the validity of existing feudal law. W e
have noted with open parentheses the absence of the ‘R’ from PateQne; by

143

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the abstraction of this single letter Roland is removed from the now
emasculated name o f the father.
‘R ’(oland),

It is none other than his own name,

that has been withdrawn.4 PateQne, literally ‘an open space’, no

longer designates the figure o f authority, 'father', who either embodies or is
positioned as authority within the law; rather, PateQne indicates an absence of
law, a void in the sphere o f public authority. PateQne is an open field, cleared
by the evacuation o f the Franks, le ft open by Roland’s desire that the geste
should end with the end o f his own existence; a gaping wound in the fabric of
a society,5 the fabric of a geste, that have seemed the direct creation o f his
own proGcce.

W hatever may follow, Roland has effectively demonstrated,

and to Charlemagne above all others, the far reaching power o f his name.
Roland departs from life with telling reference to Biblical figures of
resurrection, his is a self appointed apotheosis. He weaves into the final lines
o f his dying prayer a rebuke against the emperor, evidence o f the widening
gulf of disagreement rising up between them:
“Veire Patene, ki unkes ne mentis,
Seint Lazaron de mort resurrexis
E Daniel des leons guraresis,
Guaris de mei I'anme de tuz perilz
Pur les pecchez que en ma vie fis!"

(II. 2384 - 88)

(True father (PateQne), who never lied,
Who raised Saint Lazarus from the dead
And protected Daniel from the lions,
Keep my soul from all perils
Due to the sins which in my life I have committed!’)

We can summarily conclude that God’s judgm ent has been harsh; unlike
Lazarus, Roland w ill not be returned to the living; unlike Daniel, Roland will not
be rescued from death’s jaws. O f the two Biblical references, that o f Lazarus
is, within this context, by far the more problematical (For the moment we
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reserve consideration of the reference to Daniel until its reappearance in the
prayer of Charlemagne, lines 3100 - ff., the text’s third and final ‘resurrection
passage’).

Lazarus brought back to life from death is out o f John, 11:1-4.

This is the more renowned o f the two Biblical stories concerning one named
Lazarus, though not necessarily the one most appropriate to Roland’s
situation at the moment of his death.

W e have ju st mentioned the irony

im plicit in this evocation: there is no one, neither Charlemagne returned to
Roncevaux nor God through divine intercession, who w ill return Roland to the
living. W e do not dismiss the all too obvious reference to Lazarus as symbol
of spiritual resurrection and life everlasting; in fact we insist upon it.
Nonetheless, this story of Lazarus from the gospel o f John merely serves as a
cover fo r the story taken from Luke; the other Biblical tale involving one
named Lazarus.
In the Lazarus of lesser renown, that taken from the parable spoken by
Jesus in Luke, 16:19 - 31, we find a more suitable analogue to Roland at the
conclusion o f the ‘first1 narration.

The text does not fail to im itate the tale

related by Luke in having Roland borne into heaven in the arms o f angels.
Compare:
When the poor man (Lazarus) died, he was carried away by angels
to the bosom of Abraham.
Deus tramist sun angle Cherubin
E seint Michel del Peril;
Ensembl’ od els sent Gabriel i vint
L’anme del cunte portent en pareis.

Luke 16:22

(II. 2393 - 96)

(God sent His angel Cherubim
and Saint Michael of the Peril,
And together with him came Gabriel.
They carry the soul of the count (Roland) into heaven)
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The importance o f this parable from Luke to the recounting o f Roland’s death
at Roncevaux is hardly obscure.

A rich’ man, because o f his neglect, is

blamed fo r the death o f Lazarus. W hen he too dies and is then cast into hell
he turns to Abraham begging that Lazarus should descend to help alleviate
his torments.

Abraham responds by noting the unbridgeable distance

between them:
“Moreover, between us and you a great chasm is established to prevent
any one from crossing who might wish to go from our side to yours or from
your side to ours."
Luke, 16:26®

Nothing comes closer to illustrating the desires implied in so many o f Roland’s
actions, both overt and clandestine, than this tale from Luke. From his refusal
o f Charlemagne’s offer o f ‘salvem enf (I. 784 - ff.) to the invalidation o f the
name o f the father by the extraction o f the letter ‘R’ {Veire PateQne), Roland
has fixed ’a great g u lf between Charlemagne and himself.

By this gap

marking Roland’s death, Roland attem pts to create an unbridgeable narrative
void that would effectively exclude Charlemagne from the geste; Roland's final
actions before dying threaten the continuance of narrative.

Roland will be

disappointed, posthumously, in this avenging wish; not only will Charlemagne
find the means to revive and to prolong narrative, he will do so, ironically, by
returning Roland to its center.
There exists no better proof o f Roland’s ‘avenging wish’ than its remedy
attended to by Charlemagne beginning at line 3100.

There, Charlemagne

undertakes a resurrection that is at once worldly and divine, a hypostatic union
that is signaled in the opening words o f his prayer: T rue father, protect me on
this day1

{Veire Pate{R)ne, hoi cest jo r me defend).
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As Charlemagne

recovers the missing letter ‘R’ {Pate(R)ne), all the potential force and latent
violence from the massacre o f Roncevaux is again imparted to the name o f
the father.

But we should recall that the revival o f the emperor’s potency

depends upon a mingling o f divine and human will; Charlemagne goes on to
avenge the losses at Roncevaux only after having been given permission to
do so by an angel from God (cf.: II. 2454 - 56).
Solely by the use o f the words he speaks the emperor accomplishes
the form idable task o f ferrying Roland’s presence across the gap separating
the firs t narration of the Roland from the second.

W e also find that

Charlemagne is able to ‘speak’ his new-found potency into existence through
a continuation o f and an elaboration upon Roland’s earlier prayer
“Veire Pateme, hoi cest jor me defend,
Ki guaresis Jonas tut veirement
De la baleine ki en sun cors I’aveit
E esparignas le rei de Niniven
E Daniel del merveillus turment
Enz en la fosse des leons o fuz enz,
Les .III. enfanz tuten un fou ardant!
La tue amurs me seit hoi en present!
Par ta mercit, se tei plaist, me cunsent
Que mun nevoid poisse venger Rollant!"

(II. 3100 - 09)

(True father, protect me on this day.
You who, indeed, kept Jonah from
the whale that took him into his body,
And you who spared the King of Nineveh
And Daniel from the terrible torment
When he was thrown into the den of lions,
And the three children burning in a fire so hot!
May your love be present with me today!
Through your mercy, if it pleases you, grant
That I may avenge my nephew Roland!’)

Charlemagne chooses the story o f Jonah and the King of Nineveh to begin his
prayer; it is a variation on the theme o f the ‘beggar and the rich man’
introduced by the parable of Lazarus from Luke. But in this biblical account,
Charlemagne seems to turn the tables on Roland; fo r it is Jonah the
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beggar/prophet who rebels against the word of God (1:13) and the ‘rich m an,’
the king of Nineyeh, who is shown as heedful and repentant:
When the news reached the king of Nineveh, he rose from his throne, laid aside his
robe, covered himself with sackcloth, and sat in the ashes.
Jonah 3:6
When God saw by their actions how they turned from their evil way, he repented of the
evil that he had threatened to do to them; he did not carry it out
Jonah 3:10

Though Jonah’s resurrection, being rescued from the belly o f the whale, was
the more dazzling and hence the more commemorative o f the two acts of
divine salvation, we should recall that this was only a first step on the road
leading to the conversion o f the king and of the whole nation o f pagans whom
Jonah was told to admonish, instructing them the right course o f the law. Too
apt to be merely accidental, the story proves an informative analogue to the
struggle between the em peror and Roland.
“It displeased Jonah exceedingly" that the King o f Nineveh and the
people under him should go unpunished, though they strayed from the course
o f the law; so much so that, in willful protest against God’s wishes, Jonah asks
that his own life be taken (4:1 - 3) rather than he should have to witness the
salvation of the pagan Ninevites. Once the law has been abrogated, Jonah
insists that Nineveh and its king be brought low. The restoration of city under
the new law will call for a humility singularly lacking in Jonah, though found in
abundance in the repentant king o f Nineveh. In the Biblical story, the king of
Nineveh acknowledges his sin with the outward signs o f sackcloth and ashes;
in the Roland the Emperor recognizes his sin, his peccez, through an outward
sign, namely, circumcision. The loss o f a ‘palm and more o f flesh’ is a sign of
the Emperor’s conversion/submission to the new law:
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Prent de la cam grant pleine palme e plus:
lloec endrert remeint li os tut nut

(II. 3606 - 07)

(He took a piece of flesh as large as the palm and more:
at this spot the bone of his skull was altogether exposed.)

This occasion o f physical marking, o f personal humility, contrasts with Roland
who dies intact without broken bone, without violation of his body’s outer
covering.
The story o f Jonah and the king o f Nineveh concludes with the
following verse where God speaks to a chastised Jonah:
And should I not be concerned over Nineveh, the great city, in which there are
more than a hundred and twenty thousand persons who cannot distinguish their
right hand from their left, not to mention the many cattle?
Jonah4:11

Unable to ‘discern between their right hand and their left,’ the Ninevites are
destined to continue in a narrative o f deeds that are both lawful and unlawful.
The image o f blind imperfection is apt to the resurrection o f state under
Charlemagne. Not only is the Emperor unable to escape the shame o f having
failed to protect the Franks at Roncevaux, this shame carries over into the
post Roncevaux narration. The work o f the right hand and o f the left is the
work of betrayal and repentance; the continuation o f narrative depends upon
the integration o f these two modes o f narration, which is to say, the integration
of these two narratives into one text.
The second Biblical story to which Charlemagne alludes is that of
Daniel and the .III. enfanz who are, in fact, Daniel’s brothers Shadrach,
Meshach and Abednego.

The story of Daniel proves an exceedingly rich

quarry fo r the post-Roncevaux narrative; it introduces a resurrection m otif that
is announced by Roland and then greatly exploited to Charlemagne’s own
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advantage.

The book o f Daniel provides not one, but two, tales generally

analogous to that of Jonah and the King o f Nineveh. W hen the three infants
(les .III. enfanz) undergo trial by fire, they escape unscathed, with the result
that Nebuchadnezzar, ‘King unto all people, nations, and languages’ (4:1),
converts to the law o f Daniel’s God. W e m ight then say that the three infants
{.III. enfanz) were given over to danger by God for the sake o f redeeming the
King and his people.

Let us examine, fo r the moment, the differences

between death and resurrection in the Roland and in this Biblical analogue,
the story o f the ‘three infants’ to which Charlemagne alludes. Firstly, though
Charlemagne prays that God deliver him from the danger to which he is
exposed, in going into battle against Baligant it is not Charlemagne, but the
Franks at Roncevaux, who were most in need o f miraculous salvation.
Furthermore, a puzzling irony arises from the fact that the role of God in the
Biblical account, to rescue the three infants from im m inent death, is the same
role to which we assign Charlemagne in the episode at Roncevaux. However,
the difference in outcome is obvious: God carries the infants unharmed
through the fire; the Emperor, fo r whatever reason we m ight wish to assign,
leaves the French to die at Roncevaux.
Similarly, there is the case o f Daniel and the lions. Darius, ruler over
‘all people, nations and languages’, sends Daniel into the den o f lions,
knowing full well that he would not perish, but would be saved by his God.
Darius will use the event o f Daniel’s salvation to augment his power and to
crush those who are in opposition to his rule. I cite extensively from the book
o f Daniel:
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The king was deeply grieved at this news and he made up his mind to save Daniel;
he worked till sunset to rescue him. But these men insisted. “Keep in mind,
O King,’ they said, “that under the Mede and Persian law every royal prohibition
or decree is irrevocable.” So the King ordered Daniel to be brought and cast into
the (ions' den. To Daniel he said, “May your God, whom you serve so constantly,
save you.”
Daniel 6:15-17
The King rose very early the next morning and hastened to the lions’ den. As he
drew near, he cried out to Daniel sorrowfully, “O Daniel, servant of the living
God, has the God whom you serve so constantly been able to save you from the
lion?” Daniel answered the king: “O King, live forever!”
Daniel 6:20 - 22
The King then ordered the men who had accused Daniel, along with their children
and their wives, to be cast into the lions’ den. Before they reached the bottom of the
den, the lions overpowered them and crushed all their bones.
Then King Darius wrote to the nations and peoples of every language, wherever
they dwell on the earth: “All peace to you! I decree that throughout my royal domain
the God of Daniel is to be reverenced and feared:
“For he is the living God, enduring forever;
his kingdom shall not be destroyed,
and his dominion shall be without end.
He is a deliverer and savior,
working signs and wonders in heaven and on earth,
and he delivered Daniel from the lions’ power.”

Daniel 6:25 - 28

Three things are accomplished for Darius as a result of Daniel’s ordeal: 1.
The ‘law of the Medes and the Persians' is supplanted by the law o f Daniel,
servant of the living God; 2. Darius achieves unity among ‘all people, nations
and languages’ under the banner of this new law; 3. Darius is able to identify,
isolate, and destroy those who prove themselves to be enemies to the new
law and so enemies of his rule. Again we note the dissim ilarities between
Daniel's rescue and the fact that Roland is left to die at Roncevaux.
Those Biblical tales (Lazarus, Jonah, Daniel, les III enfanz) become a
point of accusation against the emperor; nevertheless, the em peror turns to
these tales precisely to justify those otherwise unjust actions against Roland
and the Franks at Roncevaux.

Charlemagne, like Darius with Daniel,

purposely places Roland and the Franks in harm’s way 1) fo r the revival o f his
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authority (now fully coincident with the authority of the law),

2) fo r an

integration and unification o f state, 3) for the destruction o f old enemies and
the threat of destruction against any new enemies that may arise.

Darius

recognizes Daniel as the law giver Charlemagne, however, would prefer to
obscure any direct link between Roland and the ‘justice’ (jui'se) he will
ultimately attain upon his return to Aix.
Comparing the struggle between Roland and Charlemagne with that
between Darius and Daniel, we recognize that the Roland provides a more
elegant and comparatively more stable solution to internal conflict.

Despite

Daniel’s ‘generous’ blessings to Darius (’O King, live forever*), the account
ends with the Biblical prophet distancing him self from the power o f Babylon,
as the state is seen splintering into the fragments o f smaller semi-autonomous
kingdoms. Daniel and his brothers retain for themselves the power o f God’s
law; divine law, however, does not succeed in bringing harmony and
endurance to the secular state.

The Roland, however, successfully melds

divine and mundane law and it does so by collapsing one into the other at the
point where the text's two narratives meet.
Unlike the account in the book of Daniel, where the reforming law
comes to the state from the outside, from the ‘stranger1 Daniel, the
transformational struggle within the Roland is internal. Matters are resolved
by the subsumption o f one law by the other. When Roland and the Franks
perish at Roncevaux, this becomes a judgement not on them but on the old
law (one based on auxilium and concilium) that fails to protect them.

The

Emperor’s judgment upon the law o f the Saracens might well have been
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applied, in retrospect, to the Franks at Roncevaux: ‘The whole o f their law is
not worth a penny...’ (“tute lo r leis un denier ne lu r valt,” I. 3338). Though the
old (feudal) law can not save Roland’s person, his spirit continues in that his
name will find a place at the heart o f the new law governing the state. In the
very last verse o f the Emperor’s prayer o f resurrection, he pleads with God
that in the course o f battle against the Saracens Roland m ight be avenged:
“That I might avenge m y nephew Roland”

(uQue m un nevoid poisse

venger, Rollant!, ” I. 3109). Venger has the sense o f ‘to avenge’ but it might
also mean ‘to repurchase’, or ‘to redeem’.

Above all else, the emperor’s

mission upon his return is to reclaim the force lost to him at Roncevaux, to
recuperate the fallen letter, and to graft it once again onto the momentarily
impuissant body of the law o f the Veire Pate(R)ne.

Eschange estrange
It

is

necessary

to

acknowledge

one

im portant

im plication

of

Charlemagne’s re-appropriation and reinsertion o f the letter ‘R’ into V eire
Pate(R)ne.' Not only is it the act of a reclaimed potency fo r both Em peror and
geste, it is also a dissemination o f that potency from the center outward, from
the central gap marked by Roland’s death to all parts o f the narration. In this
way not only is Charlemagne able to redeem the French, and so the postRoncevaux narrative, but also to give cause for a return to the text’s first
narrative. This journey back through the narrative leads to new insights into
the role o f the Emperor in the first half o f the text. In retrospect, we find that in
his apparent passivity, Charlemagne is, to the contrary, calculating and every
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bit as ‘ambitious’ as Roland in his attem pts to manipulate the ultimate political
and social implications o f the geste.

Roland and the Emperor both strive

toward a common destination though with singularly different intent.

The

separate trajectories o f their respective ambitions coincide briefly at the
moment where Aide, Roland’s betrothed, enters the text. The second part o f
this essay traces the parallel quests o f both Roland and Charlemagne in
pursuit o f Aide, the feminine ‘destinataire’ and the ultim ate site o f inscription
for the geste.
It is instructive to compare Roland with Charlemagne as the text first
presents them in the opening scene o f the Frankish council. The portrait o f
Roland at lines 196-213 derives from his response to Blancandrin's proposal
(II. 38 - ff.) Earlier we demonstrated how in this passage Roland effectively
dismisses all notion of the institution of council (consilium, II. 205 - 09), and
that he supplants the life protecting social equilibrium inherent to the institution
o f vassal aid and protection (auxilium) with the urgings of a relentless pursuit
o f vengeance (II. 210 - 13). He does not deign to calculate the price o f his
proposed bargain in terms o f its cost in loss o f life or in human suffering.
Roland, in these lines, augurs a new alignm ent of the relations between
subject and state, one where the authority o f an abstracted and all
encompassing law is enhanced at the expense o f individual protections. From
its first moment we detect in Roland’s speech at II. 205 - 213 the outline of a
mode o f narrative production that soon become recognizably his own. Roland
spurns Blancandrin’s offer of a negotiated settlement, choosing instead to
proceed against the Saracens with the sword-blow by which the geste comes
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into being; in a manner o f speaking, it is a choice to give precedence to the
deed over the word.
The Emperor, on the other hand, dearly prefers word over deed, and
as such he operates within the first half o f the text in the mode o f master
signifier. The following passage illustrates the considerably greater value of
the word, as opposed to the deed,

in the text’s determination

of

Charlemagne’s ‘identity’:
Sur palies blancs siedent cil cevaler.
As tables juent pur els esbaneier
E as eschecs li plus saive e li veill,
E escremissent cil bacheler leger.
Desuz un pin, delez un eglenter,
Un faldestoed i unt, fait tut d’or men
La siet li reis ki dulce France tienL
Blanche ad la barbe e tut flurit le chef,
Gent ad le cors e le cuntenant fier
S'est kil demandet ne I’estoet enseigner.

(II. 110-19)

(The chevaliers are seated upon carpets of white silk,
They are playing at table games for their amusement
The most wise and elderly at chess,
The agile youth are at swordplay.
Beneath a pine, beside an eglantine.
There is a throne made of pure gold:
There sits the King who holds sway over sweet France
His beard is white and his hair a flowering mass,
His body well formed his countenance proud:
If anyone comes asking, there is no need to point him out)

An analysis o f this scene produces surprising incongruities.

The game of

chess serves as a readily apparent metaphor for the placement and
manipulation o f young warriors on the field o f battle; the ground coverings of
white silk —S ur palies blancs—are so many squares of an expansive open- air
chess board upon which they move and are moved. The agile young men

—

cil bacheler leger— busily engaged in fencing are pieces in play; the old and
wise men —li plus saive e li veill— are the strategoi contemplating the
positioning o f forces and the plan o f attack.

This image o f warfare as an
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orderly and contemplative affair w ill soon be disrupted by the surprise o f
Roland’s rude and wholly unconventional urgings to vengeance (II. 196 - 213).
Roland is about to alter the rules o f the game in such a way that they become
virtually indecipherable to all except him, o f course...and the emperor. The
text illustrates this sudden ‘incomprehensibility’ in the example of Oliver, who
will fail to grasp, much less to act, in accordance with the logic motivating
Roland’s actions at Roncevaux. Or, an even better example might be found in
the failured communication between the Em peror and Ganelon, as the latter
sets o ff on his mission to the Saracens; G anelon’s demands, perfectly in
accordance with feudal law,7 are put forward and subsequently dismissed as
though he and the emperor were enmeshed in what had all too gradually
become two distinct and mutually incommunicable structures o f discourse.
Charlemagne, as we first encounter him, is presented to the reader as
an auto-nym ous (self-naming) sign, one that both defies interpretation and
renders it superfluous —S ’est k il demandet, ne I’estoet enseigner.

Like

Roland, neither does he have a place a t the board (cf.: I. 111) among th e old
and the w ise.’ Here Charlemagne is situated in a discourse apart from that in
which his erstwhile ‘peers’ are busily engaged, the scope o f his intellectual
imagination ranging far beyond the parameters o f those placed before him in
this scene.

In a later passage, Bramimunde, the Saracen queen who

converts to the ‘law o f the Christians,’ makes this observation concerning
Charlemagne: ‘Under the heavens there isn’t a king whom he does not regard
as anything more than a child ...’ (“Suz d e l n ’a d re i qu'il prist a un enfant...,” I.
2739); this holds true in relation to ‘kings’ that are both external and internal to
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the realm o f the Franks. Nonetheless, over the course o f the first narrative,
Charlemagne continues to signify from a position o f absence, while Roland
maintains an active presence, writing the geste with blows struck with
Durendal.

A t the m oment o f Roland’s death, these positions will reverse

themselves: Charlemagne will ‘revive’ the lapsed narrative by taking charge of
his forces against the Saracens; Roland, in turn, replaces Charlemagne as the
‘sign’ o f textual authority with the reassertion o f the letter ‘R’ into the center of
Veire Pate{R)ne. In the remainder o f this brief segment, I want to point out
the ways in which this reversal o f roles is earned out in the process o f an
exchange.
Our characterization

of Roland

has until

now been especially

dependent upon the m anner in which he has ‘executed’ narrative; I return to
these lines, referred to earlier, for their description o f the geste as an economy
of narrative that translates the deed (o f warfare) into narrative:
“Or guart chascuns que granz colps i empleit,
Que malvaise can?un de nus chantet ne seit!
Paien unt tort e chrestiens unt dreit
Malvaise essemple n’en serat ja de mei."

(II. 1013-16)

‘“For everyone take good care to strike hardy blows,
That no one will be able to sing an unflattering song about us!
Pagans are in the wrong, Christians in the right
There will be no bad example from me.')

Remarkably, these lines already hint at the subsumption o f all the actions of
the Franks at Roncevaux to the sign under the inscription ‘R’(oland);
remarkable, because until the post-Roncevaux world, until the restitution of
authority under the Veire Pate(R)ne, there is no sign ‘R’ under which their
actions might be subsumed. When Roland exhorts the Franks to strike hardy
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blows ‘that no one will be able to sing an unflattering song about us!,’ he
immediately reminds them that their deeds and their sacrifice will ultim ately be
reflected back into his own name: T here will be no bad example from m e ...’
(°Malvaise essample n'en serat ja de m ei...") So, in this sense, we can say
that an ‘exchange’ has already been initiated prior to Roland’s death; the
Franks have given their lives in order that the name Roland might augment in
value.
The text demonstrates that the Franks are clearly less interested in this
ultimate sacrifice than is Roland. When for a second tim e they are reminded
that the production o f ‘song’ (geste, narrative) depends upon the loyal
execution of their vassal duties, we see patently that this notion of a pending
ultimate sacrifice comes to the Franks as something unexpected and new to
their understanding.

There is nothing to indicate that Turpin is having

anything but a hard time of it, as he coaxes the French to remain steady in the
choice between certain death and shameful desertion:
“Seignors barons, n’en alez mespensant!
Pur Deu vos pri que ne seiez fuiant,
Que nuls prozdom malvaisement n’en chant
Asez est mielz que moerium cumbatant
Pramis nus est fin prendrum a itant,
Ultre cest jum ne serum plus vivant;
Mais d’une chose vos soi jo ben guarant
Seint parels vos est abandunant;
As Innocent vos en serez seant”

(II. 1515 - 23)

(‘Noble lords, don’t go thinking wrong thoughts!
For God’s sake I pray that you don’t go fleeing,
So that no worthy fellow sing anything bad about it
It is far better that we should die in battle.
Our end is near, we have been promised that,
By the end of this day we shall no longer be alive;
But of one thing you can be certain:
Blessed paradise now stands open before you;
You will be seated there among the innocents.’)
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Apparently the French do not share In Roland's unadulterated enthusiasm for
approaching death (cf.: 1008 - ff.; 1088 - ff.; 1712 and passim). One could
argue that intuition serves them well and they stand ready to bolt; as fortune
prepares to bring renown to Roland, the Franks w ill reap only oblivion. Turpin
manages to hold them in check not with the promise o f glory, which is
reserved for Roland, but with the threat o f infamy (I. 1517) and the rather
weak palliative that though forgotten on earth, they w ill at least be
remembered in heaven. The French will be seated among the innocent. But
innocence, in this case, connotes ignorance, an inability to perceive the
manipulations that have led, for them at least, to the disasters o f Roncevaux.
IV

In terms of earthly remembrance, their innocence w ill not serve them well.
As he lists all conquests from Constantinople to Scotland as his work
and the work of the divine instrument Durendal, Roland reveals to us the truth
o f the matter. Significantly, as he calls up these victories one by one, Roland
is in the middle o f two separate attempts to make the destruction of Durendal
coincident with the end of his life. Chagrined that he is unable to take down
the sword, to be, in effect, the author o f his own castration, Roland must
realize, finally, that deed and word, body and name, signifier and signified do
not occupy the same textual space. If they did, no further ‘exchange’ would
be possible, or even necessary.

We had earlier determined that both the

‘French’ and Durendal are metonymic representations that join in the name
Roland; however, as Roland proves unable to make the destruction of
Durendal coincident with his own death, we now see them as distinct and
separable entities. ‘Possession’ of Durendal allows fo r a position o f privilege.
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This privilege survives Roncevaux as Durendal is transferred back to the
‘French’, that is to say, the post-Roncevaux French as that ‘body1 o f men
reconstituted by the em peror prior to the battle with Baligant (II. 3015 - 17).
But even as Charlemagne reclaims Durendal as an instrum ent by which w ar is
waged, and hence narrative is written, the validity of that narrative will
henceforth derive from another source.
An exchange takes place between the em peror and Roland a t the
event of the tatter’s death.

As Charlemagne becomes engaged in battle

following the death o f Roland, he effectively continues the narration that had
been left off; from that m om ent onward, Roland assumes within the narrative
the position of absent signifier. The transition from first to second narrative
effects a reversal in positions, whereby Roland is now the passive, absent
signifier, and Charlemagne the agent o f an ongoing narrative. W ith this we
are not abandoning our prior observation that Roland’s mode o f operation is
from deed to word, from sword-blow to geste, or that Charlemagne operates
primarily through the word.

To the contrary, Charlemagne’s narrative is

dependent upon Roland’s creation of the geste, upon the narrative hammered
out by sword-blows; Charlemagne’s narration is merely the continuation o f
what has already been written.

If Charlemagne has, in the meanwhile,

become an agent in the production of a continuing fiction, the geste is both
that fiction’s source and place o f final inscription. The first chosen destinataire
o f the geste, the one who waits in anticipation o f the ‘word’ o f Roland’s
exploits is Aide, Roland’s designated bride and the sister o f Olivier.
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W ell

before the conclusion o f the battle at Roncevaux, however, O livier makes
clear that Roland will never live to receive Aide’s embrace:
Dist Oliver ‘ Par ceste meie barbe,
Se puis veeir ma gente sorur Aide,
Ne jerreiez ja mais entre sa brace!’

(II. 1719 - 21)

('Oliver said: ‘By this beard of mine,
If I am able to every see my dear sister Aide,
I swear, you will never lie in her embrace!')

Given the numerous passages in which Roland recognizes the inevitability of
death at Roncevaux, this threat would, on the face o f it, appear to carry little
weight; and yet Oliver’s threat is not without pertinence or force. If Roland
must relinquish the instrument of inscription, the sword Durendal, to
Charlemagne, he also forfeits to the Emperor the designated ‘receptrice’ of
the geste. The destinataire of the narrative created by sword-blows is Aide (Aide

-white; blanc; virg in a l)- and it is her lot to perish upon the news o f

Roland’s death.
Arriving at Aix, the Emperor immediately seeks out Aide who inquires
after Roland:
Qo dist al rei: “O est Rollant le catanie,
Ki me jurat cume sa per a prendre?"

(II. 3709-10)

(This she says to the King: ‘Where is the captain Roland,
who promised to make me his wife?')

To this the em peror responds:
“Soer, cher* amie, d'hume mort me demandes.
Jo ten durai mult esforcet eschange:
Qo est Loewis, mielz ne sai a parler
II est mes filz e si tendrat mes marches.’
(Sister, dear friend, you ask me for a man who is dead.
I will offer you a very worthy exchange:
Here is Louis, I don’t know what else to say;
He is my son and will hold my marches.')
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(II. 3713 -16)

Then Aide again:
Aide respunt “Cest mot mei est estrange.
Ne place Deu ne ses seinz ne ses angles
Apr6s Rollant que jo vive remaigne!”
Pert la culor, chet as piez Cartemagne,
Sempres est morte. Deus ait mercit de I’anme!
Franceis barons en plurent e si la pleignent

(II. 3717 - 21)

(Alda replies: ‘This word seems strange to me.
May it not be pleasing to God, his angels and his saints
That I should remain alive after Roland!’
She loses her color she falls at Charlemagne’s feet,
She died on the spot, may God have mercy on her soul!
The brave French barons weep over this and lament her.)

Eschange/estrange - it is this word (cest mot) eschange that strikes Aide as so
foreign, strange, un-interpretable.8

Aide finds this word strange, in part,

because she anticipates the word o f Roland, word o f the geste for which there
can be no true substitute. The proposed exchange o f one ‘lord’ for another,
as though they were commodities of near equal value, is alien to feudal
sensibilities, though not without precedent within the text.

We recall

Blancandrin’s proposal of an equally facile substitution of one long absent
lord, Baligant, fo r another, Charlemagne (II. 38 - 39). That exchange, like this
one, comes only after a tremendous bloodletting marking not merely the
transition from one figure of authority to another, but from one political, social
and narrative structure to another. In Blancandrin’s proposal we saw that the
exchange o f Baligant for Charlemagne implied a profound alteration in the
nature of subject allegiance: from a subjectivity to an individual lord -w hether
Roland, Charlemagne, Baligant, or Ganelon—to a subjectivity to an abstracted
law (dreiture). A definitive exchange occurs as the allegiance o f the Franks
shifts from the person o f Roland to a metonymic representation in the guise o f
the letter ‘R’ found at the heart o f the name of the father. This exchange
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signals a first step in the constitution of state. A second exchange occurs as
Charlemagne offers Aide real estate in place o f narrative.

Louis is

recommended to her as the future inheritor o f the Emperor’s land holdings —“II
est m es filz e s i tendrat mes m arches.” Roland, to the contrary, came
recommended as providing a lasting synonymy between his name and the
geste - “Que malvaise changun de nus chantet ne seit.” (I. 1014); “Male
changun n ’en deit estre cantee” (1.1466).
Charlemagne arrives at Aix to intercept the Geste at precisely its
intended point o f destination. A t news o f the loss o f Roland, the loss o f the
attended word, Aide looses her color -p e rt la culor— thus signaling the effect
of erasure. Intercepting the geste ‘intact’, prior to inscription, the Emperor can
now direct the geste to another awaiting destinataire. Charlemagne, in fact,
carries out the exchange o f Bramimunde fo r Aide. Bramimunde becomes a
receptacle fo r the new law:
Quant I'emperere ad faite sa justise
E esclargiez est la sue grant ire,
En Bramidonie ad chrestientet mise...

(II. 3988 - 90)

(When the Emperor had procured his justice
And his great anger dissipated
He has Bramidonie made a Christian.)

Here Aide is exchanged for Bramidonie and the geste, created by Roland, is
exchanged fo r the emperor’s fiction. The geste, then, is no longer simply an
historical accounting of the events at Roncevaux, but a new structure of
discourse.

This most clearly defines the opposition between Roland and

Charlemagne in terms o f their relation to writing. Roland creates the geste by
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means o f the deed, sword-blow by sword-blow, Charlemagne creates the
narrative engine whereby word gives rise to deed.

Li ber Gilie
Charlemagne has intercepted the geste, directing it to
destination, a destination unintended by Roland.

a new

And yet Roland is not

altogether the loser in the Emperor’s exchange o f destinataires. Charlemagne
transform s the name Roland into a symbol o f power and authority tha t goes
infinitely beyond anything that m ight have been commanded by Roland the
person. Just as the name Roland has been made an integral part and central
elem ent o f the new law governing the resurrected state - Veire Pate(R)ne~, it
will also be made central to the production and diffusion of the narrative now
presided over by Charlemagne.

W e begin by turning to that paradoxical

moment within the text where the reader is informed that in this battle
(Roncevaux) without survivors, a scribe appears to record the action o f the
geste from the perspective o f direct eye-witness:
Qo dist la Geste e cil ki el camp fut
Li ber Gilie, por qui Deus fait vertuz,
E fist la chartre el muster de LoQm.
Ki tant ne set ne I’ad prod entendut

(II. 2095 - 98)

(Thus says the geste and he who was on the field:
The noble Giles, whom God has made virtuous,
He set it down in the charter for the monastery at Laon.
Who does not know this has understood little.)

There is a circular nonsensicality to the proposition that, though Roncevaux
left no survivors, we can be assured o f the authenticity of the geste because it
is written from an eye-witness’ point o f view. Though the text im plicitly credits
the survival of the geste, in other words its own sun/ival, to an act o f
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miraculous intervention, that is to the appearance o f a reliable witness out o f
nowhere, it also holds out the prospect o f another less preternatural
explanation fo r how the geste might have been recorded and preserved.8 The
developing conundrum explains itself in the pun on the phrase L i ber Gilie (the
noble 'G ilie’) which, however, may also be read as libe r ‘gilie’ or ‘the cunning
o r guileful book’ cunning in that, among other things, it does not, as it pretends
to do, directly witness the events that transpire at Roncevaux.9 The writing of
the geste necessarily entails transcription, a transcription o f events as they are
both seen and recounted in speech by those who have seen. Designating Li
ber Gilie as the recording witness o f events as they unfold at Roncevaux
effectively creates a direct linkage between deed and the written text. This, of
course, means that the author of the geste passes directly from the swordbearer to the bearer o f the pen.10
From this passage, the reader can infer that a distinction is being made
between two types o f narrative: the first, a narrative that is the direct creation
o f the deed, or o f the granz colps spoken of by Roland at line 1013, and the
second, a narrative that finds its genesis in a prior narrative. This accounts for
the writing of L i b e r Gilie, which amounts to a fictionalizing of the geste. The
extraordinary power of this authorial tour de force lies in the fact that the
Roland claims for its fiction a validity and a truthfulness that reaches beyond
the scope o f mere historical narrative.11 The geste (histories) is the result of
the deed made word, and its greatest claim to truthfulness would come from
the fact that a direct witness speaks o f events seen. L i ber Gilie (fiction), on
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the other hand, is derivative, being once removed from the deed and
dependent not upon oral accounts, but upon another writing.

The text as

much as acknowledges the absence o f the oral witness who knows because
he has seen by appealing to God as its author who gives fiction its validity, its
virtue —L i ber Gilie, p o rq u i Deus fa it vertuz.
But the relation between fiction and history, that is to say between L i
b e r Gilie and la Geste, is one o f interdependence and mutual reinforcem ent
Fiction reports to an exterior reality by ‘resurrecting’ the name Roland within
the charter o f the monastery o f Laon - la chartre e l m uster de Loum.

For

without Roland, without the ‘R’ placed once again at the center o f the text, the
cha(R)tre of the monastery o f Laon would be nothing more than the open
field, the virginal space, the absolute absence that Roland attempts to impose
at the moment of his death.

L i b e r Gilie heals that wound, implants the

missing member at the center o f the body, redeems the inanity o f castration
applying the force of the letter ‘R’ to the cha(R)tre.
In the first segment o f this essay we examined how fiction —
Charlemagne’s evocation o f Jonah and the king of Nineveh, are Daniel and
the .III. enfanz, -a s well as Roland’s evocation of Lazarus and Daniel issues
forth from fiction, accordingly, we have considered ‘resurrection’ in term s o f a
continuance of narrative.

For Roland, resurrection emphasizes closure,

coinciding with the termination o f the geste; all deeds having been done, all
conquests having been made, Roland turns to Holy Scripture fo r examples o f
figures

who

demonstrate

a

need

to

transcend

earthly
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concerns.

Subsequently, Charlemagne also draws from the same o r sim ilar Biblical
allusions to rewrite Roland’s resurrection not as an ending, but as a beginning
again. The resurrection theme, then, shows writing (the ‘resurrection prayer1
o f Charlemagne) emanating out o f writing (the ‘resurrection prayer* o f Roland)
emanating out o f writing (the Biblical sources from which they each draw
examples).

But even this succession o f narrative derived from narrative

ultim ately arrives at the historical deed; who, a t the tim e tha t the Roland was
written, would have questioned the historical existence o f Daniel or Jonah,
much less the trials they underwent and from which they were rescued
through the grace and the will o f God? The assumption that these stories are
based on historical fact lends validity to these Biblical accounts. One appeals
to God to perform again and again the same miracle or a sim ilar m iracle o f
resurrection. Certainly this is the prem ise upon which the fiction o f the Roland
is fashioned; in the beginning is the deed (Roland’s) from which all
subsequent narrative derives.
In the second segment, we examined two narrative axes: one leading
from

Roland to Aide that we termed geste, the other leading from

Charlemagne to Bramimunde which we can now term the axis of fiction. W e
concluded with a passage that differentiates, covertly, between geste and
fiction (L i b e r Gilie).

In the concluding segment, we look to the text fo r

evidence that demonstrates the crossing o f these two axes fo r the intersection
o f the geste and of the fictional narrative.
The writing o f the Roland ultim ately reveals its origin in what the text
indicates (obliquely) are ‘pagan sources’, in what Charlemagne refers to at
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verse 3338 as ‘lo r le is’. To pursue this topic, we turn our attention fo r the
remainder o f this essay to the exploration o f the text’s two narrative
beginnings, the beginning o f narrative at the opening o f the text and the
narrative in recrudescence immediately following the death o f Roland. Each
o f these beginnings, we shall see, is marked by crisis.

Significantly, the

Roland opens not with the council o f Franks but the council o f the Saracens.
Here, in the form o f Blancandrin’s proposal, is provided a paradigm for the
‘work’ to be carried out over the course o f the text, namely, the sacrifice o f the
sons o f our wives, a harsh dictum which proves equally applicable to Frank
and

Saracen alike,

and the transfer o f allegiance

to the

Emperor.

Blancandrin’s proposal has as its aim to lead the Saracens out o f desperate, if
not impossible, circumstances. We recall that they 1) have lost all o f Spain
excepting Saragossa, 2) their forces are so greatly diminished that they can
no longer go head to head with the forces under Charlemagne, and 3) their
one hope fo r driving the Franks out o f th e ir land, a plea to the em ir Baligant fo r
re-enforcements, has gone wholly unanswered. The Saracens have recourse
to no other means o f ‘salvation’ than that which can be provided by the
workings o f their own imaginations. And though, ultimately, the Saracens fail
in their attem pt to ward off the invading Franks, their imaginations,
nonetheless, will prove to be a collective resource of extraordinary power. It is
under these uncertain circumstances, during the first council of the Saracens,
that Blancandrin responds to Marsile’s desperate appeal fo r help. Marsile’s
appeal is given as follows:
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“Cunseilez mei cume mi saive hume.
Si me guarisez e de mort e de hunte!"

(II. 20 - 21)

(‘Counsel me like wise men.
Keep me from death and from shame!’)

Though at first it may seem somewhat unwarranted, a wealth o f evidence
gleaned from the text will be introduced to justify a rearrangement of these
lines through chiasmus.

Exchanging the first with the second hemistich of

lines 20 - 21 we arrive at these lines:
Si me gurarisez / cume mi saive hume,
Cunseilez mei / e de mort e de hunte
(If you can protect me / like wise men.
Counsel me / in death and in shame)

This seemingly absurd formulation suddenly becomes less baffling as the
reader takes into account that the first narration delivers ju st that: ‘death’ and
‘shame’ in uncertain terms for both Marsile and Baligant. Death and shame
will be visited upon the Franks as well, though not with such great severity; for
the Saracens, this judgem ent will be as sw ift as it is unmitigated.
We have already encountered a vatic Bramimonde, as she senses the
coming ‘revival’ and supreme dominance o f the post-Roncevaux Charlemagne
(‘Under the heavens there is not a king that he does not treat like a child......
[aSuz d e l n’ad re qu’it prist a un enfant ” I. 2739]). It is likewise fitting that she
should indicate the moment when Marsile’s sibylline ‘request’ attains its full
realization, that is, the demise o f both Marsile and Baligant in a peculiar
marriage o f death and shame. Firstly, she declares o f Marsile:
E Bramidonie vient curant cuntre lui.
Si li ad dit “Dolente, si mare fui!
A itel hunte, sire, mon seignor ai perdut!”
Chet li as piez, li amiralz la regut;
Sus en la chambre ad doel en sunt venut

(II. 2822 - 24)
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(And Bramidonie comes running to him.
She said to him: ‘Oh, sorrow, such grief!
Such shame, sir, I have lost my lord!’
She falls at his feet the Emir caught her
They went up to the room grief-stricken.)

Hunte and perdut {mort) - M arsilie is fallen victim to his own narration. In a
subsequent passage

Bramimonde —now

Bramidonie— delivers

a

like

judgem ent upon the now fallen Baligant:
A halte voiz s’escrie: “Aiez nos, Mahum!
E! gentilz reis. ja sunt vencuz noz humes,
Li amiralz ocis a si grant hunte!”

(It. 3641 - 43)

(She cries out in a loud voice: ‘Help us, Mohammed!
Ah! gentle King, our men are vanquished,
The Emir has been killed in such great shame!')

There is a circular irony that even goes beyond sim ilarity o f content in joining
these two passages.

A t lines 2822-24, Bramidonie announces M arsile’s

death {perdut) and shame {hunte) to the arriving Baligant, although at that
very instant Marsile is not yet dead, but only dying. He will live long enough,
though not a moment longer, to have Bramidonie recount to him the death
{ocis) and shame {hunte) that are to be Baliganfs own eventual lot (II. 3641 47). The narrative sleight of hand that goes into having announced to Marsile
the death and shame of Baligant and in announcing to Baligant the death and
shame of Marsile underscores the degree o f thoroughness with which the
conditions of the ‘request’ at lines 20 - 21 have been earned out. Death and
shame are end products o f the first narration; we will see shame projected
well into the second half o f the text.
Mention has already been made o f the fact that, strictly speaking, death
and shame come not only to the Saracens but to the French as well. Death
has its own certain finality. Shame, on the other hand, becomes the principle
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legacy left to the post-Roncevaux narration, a legacy with which Charlemagne
m ust im m ediately contend. The em peror does this in a highly paradoxical
fashion, remembering that he is destined to first contend prim arily with shame,
by im m ediately setting out honur and dreiture as the goals o f the second
narration. He does so by the use o f phrasing that is a virtual caique o f the
verse by which Marsile has opened the council of Saracen:
‘Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur;
De France dulce m’unt tolue la flur.”

(II. 2430 - 31)

(‘Counsel me both my right and honor
They have taken from me the flower of sweet France.’)

W hereas M arsile has launched the action o f the first narrative in the pursuit o f
death and shame, Charlemagne launches that o f the second in pursuit o f
dreiture and honur. Now if we place lines-20 and 2430 one above the other a
certain syntactical symmetry plainly emerges:
Cunseilez mei e de mort e de hunte
Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honor
(Counsel me in death and in shame
Counsel me in my right and in honor)

W e have already established (in the previous segment o f this chapter) that
honur and hunte are in functional opposition to one another, an opposition
that drives the action o f the geste, so that the pursuit o f honor, particularly
within the second half o f the Roland m ight easily be defined as the repulsion
o f shame. The geste itself is ‘situated’ on the axis that runs between these
two terms; which can be explained in this way: each ‘song-generating’ swordblow -th e g ra m colps o f line 1014— brings honor while repelling at least
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potential shame. Yet, when an account of the events at Roncevaux is brought
to a close, ‘death is on the ledger1 and ‘shame* carries over into the second
narration like a spill o f indelible ink.
When Charlemagne conjures up dreiture and honur as the long-range
goals o f the second narration, in mirrored antithesis to M arsile’s conjuration
„

of m ort and hunte (I. 20/21), the second term, honur, proves especially
elusive. This is because the em peror him self has been personally shamed
by events that have transpired at Roncevaux. Yet in his plea at lines 2430 31, the Emperor feigns virtual innocence, his words suggesting that blame fall
wholly to the Saracens, and that it would be sufficient to wreak vengeance
upon them in order to secure the desired dreiture and h o n o r
UE! Deus!” dist Carles, “ja sunt il (Saracen) ja si luinz!
Cunsentez [Cunseillez 1921] mei e dreiture e honur;
De France dulce m’unt tolue la flur.”

(II. 2429 - 31)

(‘Oh, God!” said Charles, ‘they are indeed so faraway!
Counsel me in my right and in honor;
They have taken from me the flower of sweet France.’)

It isn't long before Charlemagne receives God’s word through the disposition
of angels;
‘Charle, chevalche, car tei ne fait ciartet
La flur de France as perdut, go set Deus.
Verger te poez de la gent criminel.”
A icel mot est I’emperere muntet

(II. 2454 - 56)

(‘Charles, ride, for the light has not left you.
You have lost the flower of France, God knows this.
You may wreak vengeance on that criminal race
At this word the Emperor mounted up.')

This gives the first indication that vengeance must be waged against more
than just the Saracens before order and authority will be returned to the realm.
In response to Charlemagne’s facile accusation o f blame against the
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Saracens (De France dulce m'unt tolue la flur), God speaks to the Emperor,
reminding him o f the part he has played in the massacre at Roncevaux -L a
flu r de France as perdut, go set Deus ( You have lost the flow er o f France,
God knows this). Numerous signs appear throughoutthe remainder o f the
text that will substantiate this charge against the Emperor.
Charlemagne will not speak out directly concerning his own shame, but
speaks instead o f a loss o f honor.
“La mei honor est tumet en declin."

(I. 2890)

('My honor has turned in decline.')
“N’en avrai ja ki sustienget m’onur."

(I. 2903)

(‘I will have no one who can sustain my honor.’)

Likewise, Baligant connects the loss o f Roland with the diminution of
Charlemagne’s honor:
Dist Baligant 'Oil, car mult est proz.
“En plusurs gestes de lui (Charlemagne) sunt granz honurs.
II n’en at mie de Rollant, sun nevoid:
N’avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus.°
(II. 3180 - 83)
(Baligant said: ‘Indeed, for he is most worthy.
'Several gestes attribute great honors to him.
But he no longer has his nephew, Roland:
He will not have the strength to hold up against us.')

W e have already noted in an earlier segm ent that the maintenance o f honor is
contingent upon the presence o f Roland, and that his loss has not only the
practical effect of weakening the Emperor’s strength in arms, but also
impinges upon the merit o f the geste: those reports in several (plusurs) gestes
o f Charlemagne’s ‘honor' loose validity in the absence o f Roland. W e find the
most overt, if not to say caustic, accusation o f blame, however, in the
unequivocal words o f Ogier, which are ail the more potent in that they are
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mere paraphrases o f that insinuation o f blame spoken by God through an
angel (of.: II. 2454 - 56):
Mult fierement Carlun en araisunet
“Veez paien cum ocient vos humes!
Ja Deu ne placet qu’el chef portez corone,
S'or n'i ferez par venger vostre hunte!”

(II. 3536 - 39)

(He spoke to Charles most forthrightly:
‘You see how the pagans are killing our men!
May it never please God that your head should wear a crown,
If you do not strike to avenge your shame!’)

These are very strong words, suggesting that the Emperor has acted in a
m anner deserving of censure.

Oddly, there is nothing we know o f the

Emperor’s conduct in the battle against Baligant that would m erit sham e
(vostre hunte).

Certainly it does not appear that he has been cowardly o r

even unenthusiastic, so as to m erit this rebuke. His shame must then apply to
that earlier event, to Roncevaux, when the Saracens killed his men, while he
did nothing to protect them. We recall his own self-reproach from lines 2936 37: ‘My grief is so great that I do not wish to live / It is my household tha t is
killed fo r m e...’ (aS i grant dot a i que ne voldreie vivre /D e ma maisnee, k i p u r
m ei est ocise!” ) There is no act o f vengeance that will allow the Em peror to
regain honor following his shameful absence at Roncevaux.
Shame is visited upon Charlemagne and the Franks through their
principals o f authority during three engagements o f hand-to-hand combat,
scenes that distinctly recall the ritual o f circumcision. W e list them in order o f
succession, the first involving a struggle between Naimes and the Saracen
Canabeus:
Trenchet (Canabeus) la coife (de Naimes) entresque a la char,
Jus a la tere une piece en abat
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Granz fut li colps, It dux en estonat
Sempres calst, se Deus ne li aidast

(II. 3436 - 39)

(He cuts through the coif down to the skin.
He knocks a piece of it down to the earth.
The blow was great the Duke was stunned by it
He would have fallen had not God come to his aid.)

We note the piece o f flesh excised from the scalp and the revival of Naimes
through an act o f God; Charlemagne submits to a rem arkably sim ilar ritual
during combat with Baligant:
Prent (Baligant) de (a cam grant pleine palme e plus:
lloec endreit remeint li os tut nut
Carles cancelet, por poi qu’il n'est caut;
Mais deus ne volt qu’il seit mort ne vencut

(II. 3606 - 09)

(He took from his flesh a piece the size of your palm and more:
At the spot the bone was fully naked.
Charles wavers, and he almost fell;
But God did not want him either vanquished or dead.)

This is a clear example of the truth o f Charlemagne’s earlier observation
concerning the Saracen:
“Tutes lor leis un dener ne lur valt
S’il unt grant gent d’igo, seignurs, qui calt?"

(II. 3338 - 39)

(‘All their laws are not worth a penny.
My lords, even if they have a great army what does it matter?’)

Neither the strength nor the prowess o f the individual com batant determines
the outcome o f battle, simply the validity o f the law. This applies not only to
the Saracens, but also to the contention between Frank and Frank with which
the struggle concludes, the internal factious conflict that was determined from
the moment the emperor deigned not to safeguard the inheritance and the
heritor o f Ganelon’s legacy (cf.: II. 310 - ff.).
The final ’circumcision’ is that o f Tierry who has taken up the sword in
defense o f Charlemagne’s cause; he is the third in succession to have the
marks o f honor’s demise inscribed in the scalp:
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Desur le faint li ad faite descendre.
Em mi le vis ............................
La destre joe en ad tute sanglente,
L’osberc del dos josque par sum le ventre.
Deus le guarit, que mort ne I’acraventet

(II. 3919 - 23)

(He brought is down upon his forehead.
in the middle of his face........................
His right cheek is all bloody now.
His hauberk to, from his back to the top of his stomach.
God protected him that he should not succumb to death.)

Shame (hunte) is written into the new order side by side with dreiture. When
Charlemagne demands o f his barons, “Judge me my right against Ganelon”
(’De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit), shame or full submission o f individual
volition to the dictates o f the law is the price exacted by this exchange, the
exchange o f the old law for a new dispensation.

W e can now see that

whereas the Emperor sought ‘both right and honor1 (e dreiture e honor) he
receives ‘both right and shame’ (e dreiture e hunte) in its stead (a piece of
Marsile’s legacy -h u n te - having been implanted in the second narrative).
Conversely, if there is any sense in which it can be said that honor has been
reclaimed, it is in having resuscitated, posthumously, the honor o f Roland and,
at least nominally, o f all those who met their death at Roncevaux.

Their

honor, supreme irony, derives from Roland’s rejecting Charlemagne’s offer of
salvement (cf.: II. 784 - ff ), as blindly they follow after Roland’s insatiable
hunger for vengeance. Taking Roland’s death as the event dividing the text
into two narrative panels, we now submit that on the one side o f this gap is the
narrative marked by death (mort) and honor (honor), and on the other side a
narrative marked by right (dreiture) and shame (hunte). Now the workings of
this inter-reflection o f the text, the mirroring into one another o f the text’s two
narative panels, should be discernible to a greater degree. Finally, we can
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say that the text operates on two axes that cross one another just at the
moment o f Roland’s death, at the text’s dehiscent center. One o f these is the
axis of fiction (dreiture~(^n9erB)-m o rf); the other, the axis o f the Geste
(,honor-(9ererB)-h u n te ). W e end our study with a brief examination o f their
overlap, which we lay out in graphic representation.
These axes have already been discussed in a previous segment: 1)
honor-hunte as the binary opposition that propels the spiral o f violence driving
the action o f the first narrative; and 2) m ort-dreiture as the polarity that
establishes the social order and political stability that becomes the impress o f
the second narrative. That the geste plays out along the axis honor-hunte
can be inferred from verses 1013 - 14:
“Or guart chascuns que granz colps i empleit,
Que malvaise cangun de nus chantet ne seit!"

(II. 1013-14)

('Now let each see to it that he employ great blows.
So that no taunting song be sung about us!’)
(‘Each one take care to strike great blows,
That no bad song will they know to sing against us!’)

Though neither word is mentioned here we can nonetheless deduce from
other passages within the text that the opposition honor-hunte is critical to our
understanding of these verses. We again call to mind the words spoken by
Baligant o f Charlemagne:
Dist Baligant 'Oil, car mult est proz.
En plusurs gestes de lui sunt granz honurs.
II n’en at mie de Rollant sun nevoid:
N'avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus."

(II. 3180 - 83)

(Baligant said: ’Indeed, for he is most worthy.
‘Several gestes attribute great honors to him.
But he no longer has the service of his nephew, Roland:
He will not have the strength to hold up against us.’)
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Honurs equates with vertut in these lines, and virtue is at once the ability to
prevail in battle and the marks that transport the presence o f Roland into the
second narrative. Though many gestes ascribe honurs to Charlemagne, they
do so not because o f his own qualities, but because o f those qualities which,
properly speaking, belong to Roland alone. Now that Roland is absent, so,
too, is honor absent. Needless to say, these words spoken by Baligant could
not be more accurate in his assessment.

And yet the French under

Charlemagne's command w ill prevail, despite the absence o f honur, due not
to the prowess o f particular combatants, but rather because o f divine will. But
these post-Roncevaux circumstances are found only after the making of the
geste. In the first narration, the deed (the sword-blow) guarantees honor and
wards off shame, and it is in terms of the continuous struggle between honor
and hunte that the creation o f the Geste is best described - “Que malvaise
cangun (read geste) de nus chan te tn e seit!”
The case for the polarity dreiture-m ort as the axis o f fiction can be
determined from more general evidence. The first thing to be noted is that by
the end of the trial o f Ganelon, dreiture has been defined in the negative; all
those, whether they be Saracen or Frank, who have refused the preeminence
of dreiture, which is the preeminence of the new law, meet with death. They
are the Saracens who refuse conversion at the conclusion o f the battle (II.
3669 - 70) and the clan obstinately supporting Ganelon against the Emperor’s
call for dreit against him (I. 3751). Death is then defined as the wages of
those who do not know or recognize dreiture. There is ultim ately no narration
of struggle, at least no ongoing and overt struggle, in the polarity dreituremort; either one is in conform ity with the law or one is eradicated, by
‘universal’ consent, from the new social and political order. But we can go one
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step further in saying that this eradication has already begun at the slaughter
o f Roncevaux. Yet we find that Roland, dying intact without the puncture o f a
single wound or the breaking o f a single bone, suffers no submission to
dreiture, to the new law offered him by Charlemagne (I. 786); Roland remains
free of the marks of circumcision cut onto the crowns of Naimes, Tierry and
Charlemagne. For Roland (II. 787 - 88), safety in the strength o f numbers was
repugnant, devoid of honor and tantam ount a betrayal o f the geste.

T h is

says the count: ‘I will do no such thing / may God confound me, it I betray the
geste!’

(£o dit li quens: ‘Jo n'en ferai nient / Deus me cunfunde, se la

geste en desm ent!"). Roland refuses the emperor’s salvem ent for his own
person and fo r all the Franks under his command.

The price of honor is

death, and Roland pays the price in full awareness of the choice he has
made; that he is less than candid with the Franks, leading them uninformed
into oblivion, is a matter already taken up elsewhere in this chapter.
We can now draw out the two axes. Upon one is located the creation
o f the Geste:
H onur

Hunte
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The other designates the locus o f fiction:
H Iunte
____

M o rt
(of Roland)
Let us now take briefly into consideration those things that, as Marsile and
Charlemagne have indicated, the first and the second narratives seek, namely,
e de mort e de hunte and e dreiture e honor. Death {mort), especially now that
we have defined death as the absence of dreiture, is clearly to the left of the
textual gap signaling the absence of Roland, dreiture is to the right. This in
accordance with the prescriptions set out by M arsile and the Emperor.

By

contrast, honor, insofar as it has been recuperated by the actions of the
second narrative, is a quality that has been returned to Roland and to the first
narrative through the actions of the second. In avenging Roland, the Emperor
recuperates Roland’s honor, though he fall short of repurchasing his own.
Honor, as does death, belongs to the first narrative; the Emperor’s lot, to the
contrary, is continuing shame. Thus honor and hunte switch ‘narrative fields’
so that 'honor and mort become the hallmark of the first narration, dreiture and
hunte that o f the second. Again, we can represent this graphically in fixing the
death of Roland at the point of intersection between the axis of the Geste and
the axis of fiction:
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Honur

Honur

o
CO

<1)

Q

D re iture

D re itu re

In addition to representing mort by dreiture and hunte by honor this graph
draws new ‘letters’ onto the axes: R = presence, R = absence o f Roland; Ch =
presence, Ch = absence o f the Emperor. By this we wish to recall that in the
first narration Roland’s ‘kinetic’ presence contrasts w ith the emperor’s fatal
passivity; he is absent from Roncevaux, and absent from his role as executor
of the law (in particular, during the frequently noted exchange with Ganelon, II.
310 - ff.). Likewise, whereas Roland is now ‘absent’ from the post-Roncevaux
text, in other words absent from the second narration, Charlemagne takes on
presence as an agent and executor o f the (new) law.
One surprising and seemingly contradictory surmise can be drawn from this
diagram: fiction and geste are no longer divided by th e text’s open center.
Taken separately, the action of the first narration is governed by the axis
honor-hunte, the second by the axis dreiture-m ort; but as these two narratives
join hunte is projected into the second narrative m ort into the first; the two
narratives, that is the “historicar and the “fictive’’, overlap at every p o in t This
is the work of Charlemagne, who places R(oland), reduced (by his own doing)
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to the ‘marrow1 of the geste, back into the center of fiction, to the open,
uncultivated fields o f the blank page -Pate(R)ne. Likewise, we have seen the
‘cunning book’ fill up the center of the open wound that is the cha(R)tre o f Laon
with the re-found presence of R(oland). Although they are no longer separate,
the

first

and

second

presence/absence

of

narratives

still

remain

Roland/Charlemagne.

distinguishable
In

the

first

by

the

narrative,

Charlemagne, whom we now designate as the author of fiction, is present as a
noted absence; in the second narrative, Roland, author of the geste, is made
present as the commemoration of loss. The absence of Roland is dedicated
as the gap separating the text’s two narratives. This is also the space wherein
'lor /e/s', that is, the failed law, accuses both Saracen and Frank alike;
something ‘pagan’ disseminates from the center throughout all passages o f the
text.

The third diagram illustrates this in what is recognizably the full

elaboration of a semeiotic square:
H onur

verite

D re itu re

Chrestientet

Liber
Gilie
D re itu re

lo r leis

H o nu r

faussete
The first divide, that between first and second narrative is vertical, an open field
[PateQne] cleaving the Roland into two narratives. The divide itself, this gap, is *
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the scar marks (eft from the incision where geste and fiction cross. So it is that
in taking the text as ‘two parts joined’ we are now able to see how in the first
narrative the opposition honor-hunte (the axis upon which the Geste is
produced -gerere) is replaced by the non-operative pairing honor/dreiture or
honor/death. This I have given representation in the initialing letters RCh -th e
presence o f Roland being the guarantor o f honor within the geste (cf: Baligant
at II. 3181 - 83), the absence o f Charlemagne assuring that death will be the
order o f the day at Ronceveaux (cf.: Roland’s refusal o f Charlemagne’s
salvement at II. 783 - 91).

Roland is the law (honor) of the first narrative;

measuring the catastrophic events at Roncevaux against Charlemagne’s
observations at lines 3338 - 39, we can now say that Roland’s law (honur) is
none other than tor leis, that is, the law from which the second narration
attempts to distance itself. Charlemagne is not eclipsed by Roland, and in
particular not eclipsed by Roland’s honur, rather his is the occulted presence of
a new and emerging socio-political order, in short, the emergence o f a new
law. Thus, tor leis (honur) becomes the mirroring pendant of the ‘true law1
(dreiture) with this difference: whereas to r leis (honur) depends upon the
presence o f the man, i.e. the deed, for its validity (virtut -cf: again Baligant at
lines 381 - 83), the validity of the ‘true law* (dreiture) is, contrariwise,
independent o f man’s deeds, being determined solely by its consonance with
the word o f God.
In the second narrative, the polarity dreiture-m ort is replaced by the
pairing dreiture/honor that is, by dreiture/hunte.

This we represent with the

initialing letters C h R - the presence of Charlemagne invoking the advent of
dreiture, the absence of Roland a reminder o f the shame that becomes a
permenant fixture of the post-Roncevaux order. Unlike Roland, who is honor,
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who carves honor out with the sword, Charlemagne is at best a semblance o f
dreiture; he can call for le dreit to be judged against Ganelon (cf.: I. 3751), but
only the hand o f God, using Tierry as its instrument, can execute that order.
We now have this understanding of the text’s two narratives as they transverse
its open center: in the workings of the first narrative (RCh), death subtends
honor -th e absence of Charlemagne serves only to prove the invalidity o f /o r
leis; in the workings o f the second narrative (ChR), shame is the constant
undercurrent of dreiture. But what does this reveal about the interrelation o f
the text’s two narratives, if not the fact that they interpenetrate one another?
The axis o f the geste is thrust into the second narration as Charlemagne
becomes the inheritor of shame, and the axis o f ‘fiction’ projects into the first
narrative

as death,

understood

as the

absence o f dreiture,

comes,

retrospectively, to illuminate the true nature o f the events that have unfolded at
Roncevaux.
We can now call attention to a second narrational divide, one that bisects the
Roland laterally.

We can see from the third graph (p. 160) that the pair

Honor/Dreiture defines the upper field which we have named the field o f
Chrestientet;

similarly,

the

field

below

center,

Dreiture/Honor, is designated as the field o f lo r leis.

defined

by

the

pair

To put this in term s

perhaps more easily intelligible to the reader, one could argue that there are
two currents, hence two distinct approaches that one might take in reading the
Roland.

One reading associates christientet strictly with the Franks, lo r leis

strictly with the Saracens; here the Frankish presence is represented by
Roland in the first narration and by Charlemagne in the second.

In another

kind of reading, we place emphasis on the absence o f Roland and
Charlemagne; this is the dark undercurrent o f death and shame which
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indicates to us that the difference between lo r leis and christientet (read:
dreiture) is really a difference internal to the Frankish camp. L o r leis, then, is
not the law o f the Saracens, rather it is a substratum o f the text defined by
death and shame. There is not a moment within the text where, either in a
positive or in a negative representation, chretientet (dreiture/dreiture) and lo r
leis (honor/honor) are not inextricably intertwined. There is also a single
instance at the m om ent o f the death o f Roland, at the gap between the text’s
two narratives, where lo r leis and chrestientet merge. The text's center, we
may recall, is the locus where Charlemagne refills the void left by Roland’s
death -Pate(R)ne- where L i b e r Gilie heals the wound found in the Cha(R)tre.
The notion th a t ‘factual’ narrative, one that recounts the deed or the geste,
and ‘fictional’ narrative, one where word motivates word, m ight ever exist
wholly apart is an illusion, though one necessary to the process o f writing. The
geste, here the first narrative of the Roland, refers to something exterior to
itself, something from which, putatively, it takes its origin.

Looking to the

second narrative o f the Roland, we see that ‘fiction,’ on the other hand, finds its
origin not in the deed -w e recall that neither Tierry nor Naimes nor even
Charlemagne vanquishes the enemy but only the hand o f God— but in the
already written word. The source o f the second narrative o f the Chanson de
Roland is the first narrative of the Chanson de Roland. There is something
paradoxical in the relation between the two. Once the geste has been created,
there is need o f no other, and Roland, in desuetude, can find a well-merited
rest in death; this is how the seemingly interminable cycle o f violence finally
ends.

On the contrary, the second narration though it brings the spiral of

violence to conclusion calls fo r an endless repetition, an endless reenactment
in similitude o f the violence original to the geste. Thus, at the conclusion, of
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the Roland, the em peror is sent out very much against his will, in fact in
obedience to the will o f Another, to continue in an interminable narrative o f
battle against the enemy.
W hy the anguish? W hy do we find Charlemagne crying and pulling at his
beard? Because the narration begun with the geste will never find its ending;
and the glory o f conquest will no longer in any way, either directly or indirectly,
reflect back upon the honor o f the Emperor.

Charlemagne has vacated his

role as the embodiment o f authority, he is no longer the law m erely the law's
chief agent.
transgression.

The law is silent, a hidden text, known only through acts o f
The text concludes with the illusion o f ‘wholeness,’ i.e.,

existence without the presence o f shame, shattered.

Charlemagne cannot

escape the loss: the loss o f Roland, the loss o f his own position o f authority at
the center of the text.

The endless repetition o f unwilled narration is a

concession to writing. The w riter (author) must write interminably in his futile
attempt to cover the gap at the center o f the text, to fill in the open space o f the
Veire Pate(R)ne, and to heal the wound o f castration that strikes the Cha(R)tre
at its center.
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PART II

VIRGIL
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ICH-VERLUfST
L’gcrivain appartient d I’oeuvre, mais ce qui lui appartient, c'est
seulement un livre, un amas muet de mots steriles, ce qu'ii y a
de plus insignifiant au monde.
(Blanchot L'espace Iitt6raire)

The story o f the last day in Virgil’s life seems perfectly suited to
Hermann Broch's near lifelong literary project. The poet Virgil had, after all,
lived on the cusp o f two ages and his work on a grand scale, the Aeneid, is
arguably the principal literary pathway through which antiquity attains to the
modern age. Broch, in a sim ilar fashion, situates his own writings at what he
perceived to be the end o f an age. His writings describe the W est in decline
from the Romantics through the first half o f the twentieth century, and they
characterize w hat Broch perceives to be an era o f social and political anomie.
Some o f his works, such as The Sleepwalkers (Die Schlafwandler), chronicle
the decline in detail, attempting to comprehend the mechanisms by which an
age unravels toward its end. The Death o f Virgil (hereafter cited as T.D.V.),
on the other hand, sets itself apart as the only one o f Broch’s works that
indicates a way out o f the chaos by its attem pt to supplant an old ‘reality’ with
one newly recreated.
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Though Broch had revised and rewritten the basic story repeatedly
from Spring 1936 to Spring 1945, we attribute the ultim ate shape o f the novel
published as The Death o f Virgil to an event that occurred in the life o f the
author in mid-March, 1938.

During the tim e at which the politics and the

m ilitary force of Nazi Germany were spreading their way into neighboring
Austria, Hermann Broch, under circum stances which remain obscure, was
taken into custody in the provincial town o f Alt-Aussee. It is not d e a r that his
captors knew of his Jewish identity. S till in all, Broch had every reason to
believe that he would probably not escape this imprisonment alive.

For a

period o f two and a half weeks, from the thirteenth to the thirty-first o f March,
1938, expecting that these were the last days and hours o f his life, Broch
wrote obsessively and with a singular concentration upon the story o f Virgil’s
last day.

Consistent with these circumstances, he later describes these

writings, the basis for what was to become T.D.V., as a “literary w ill.”
How odd, indeed, that Broch, who exercised his talents in such diverse
literary form s as the philosophical treatise and the cultural, social and political
essay, should choose to write his way toward death through a medium o f
fiction. The choice, however, reveals a great deal concerning the value Broch
places upon fiction as a purveyor o f ‘truth’1 and the ‘real’ (W ahrheit und
W irklichkeit), terms that claim an im portant place in the philosophical thought
with which his works are infused. In a letter to Aldoux Huxley, dated May 10,
1945, Broch implies that the T.D.V. was written as a form o f ‘witness;’ he
suggests that the event o f death could itse lf be made present to the reader
through the medium o f the text:
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For mich gait es, mein Material, mein Erkenntnismaterial dem Leser zu
Obermitteln. Ich muBte den Leser nachleben lassen. wie man sich der
Erkenntnis des Todes durch Zerknirschung und SelbstauslOschung annahert2
(For me it was important to convey my material, my cognition-material, to the
reader. I had to have the reader to live through the experience of how one
approaches the knowledge (cognition) of death through a process of contrition
and of self-dissolution).

Here Broch finds it necessary that the reader should not simply know
something about his, Broch’s, experience but that each reader should be
'made to live through' (nachleben lassen) a confrontation with death not unlike
his own. Extending the ‘death experience’ to the reader becomes the express
purpose fo r writing T.D.V., and in this light we can say that Broch does ‘w ill’ to
the reader not just the description o f his encounter with death, but death itself;
he wills to the reader, through fiction, the immediate experience of death3.
Furthermore, death and fiction stand together in a relation of mediated
exchange. The death experience and the reading experience translate one
into the other through the pages o f T.D.V.

Broch make this clear in the

following excerpt taken again from the letter to Huxley:
wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch Zerknirschung und
SelbstauslOschung annahert (mag man sie auch als noch Lebender niemals
erreichen). Mit bloft rationalen Mitteilungen ist dies nicht zu bewerkstelligen, vielmehr muBte der Leser dazu gebracht werden, genau den
gleichen Prozess, den ich durchgemacht habe, nun seinerseits genau so
durchzugehen.
(
how one approaches a knowledge (cognition) of death through a process
of contrition and of self-dissolution (may one who is yet alive never reach
this experience). This cannot be brought about through purely rational means,
rather the reader must be brought to this cognition (of death) through exactly
the same process that I myself worked through (durchgemacht habe), only
the reader must go through it on his/her own).

Broch attempts to realize in fiction the experience o f ‘death-approaching’ so
that what happened

in Alt-Aussee, what realty happened, might be
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experienced again and again, and not just by Broch, but by any reader able to
enter into the process o f the unfolding fiction of T.D.V.
The experience at Alt-Aussee changed in a fundamental way what
Broch had earlier intended as a mere sketch o f the last hours o f Virgil’s life. In
the text, as it is reshaped following that death experience, Broch conflates the
death o f an age with the death of the subject, the anguish o f a particular
individual with the anguish of a world in the maelstrom o f political and social
chaos.

Virgil’s death (unless otherwise noted Virgil w ill hereafter refer to

Broch’s Virgil) and Broch’s death and the death o f the reader all join in a
temporal simultaneity within the pages o f this lengthy and stylistically arduous
novel.
T.D.V. is offered to the reader as a crucible into which the subject might
enter in order that the subject and the age in which he lives should undergo
significant transformation.

No matter how ambitious o r unrealistic the idea,

Broch pursues a commonality between T.D.V. and V irgil’s Aeneid. Emulating
what had apparently been the transformative effects o f the AeneidL Broch
wishes that his T.D.V. should serve as the portal into a ‘real’ beyond his then
present reality, a ‘real’ that will likewise be constructed from a work of fiction.
Broch sensed that his world was in a state o f moral, political and cultural
collapse. Through the T.D. V., Broch attempts to allow his reader to fall to an
absolute nadir from where the new ‘real’ o f his fiction would well up,
supplanting an old, corrupt and fallen state of human existence. The following
takes account of the Brochean subject as situated in the cleft between those
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two opposing realities: the one emergent, the other in a state o f precipitous
decline.

A Child’s Name
Broch opens the T.D.V. with a description o f the sea upon which glide
the squadron o f Roman ships carrying Virgil home to the Italian shore. The
Adriatic is a glistening surface, stahlblau und licht:(steel-blue and light), its
m irror-like waters reflecting the story o f life a t the heel o f the Italian peninsula.
At the approach o f Brindisi the once ‘death-like loneliness o f the [barren] sea’
is transformed into a picture of bustling human a c tiv ity :
und jetzt, da die sonnige, dennoch so todesahnende Einsamkeit der See
sich ins friedvoll Freudige menschlicherTatigkeitwandelte, da die
Fluten, sanft Obergianzt von der Nahe menschlichen Seins und Hausens,
sich mitvielerlei Schiffen bevdlkerten
(p. 11)
(.......and now, here the sunny yet death-like loneliness of the sea had
transformed itself into the peaceful joy of human activity, here the
floods, softly shimmering with the reflection of nearby human existence
and of human shelter, the sea teeming with many kinds of ships
)

Broch describes Brindisi’s coastal waters, teeming (bevdlkerten) with the
various sorts o f seagoing vessels, as ‘softly shimmering in the nearness to
human beings and human habitations’. Broch, moreover, further elaborates
upon the imagery of the sea as a shimmering reflective surface in calling the
water ‘m irror-like’ (spiegelglatt) and capturing in its reflected surface an idyllic
picture o f Roman life:
da war das Wasser beinahe spiegelglatt geworden; perlmuttem war
darOber die Muschel des Himmels geOffnet, es wurde Abend, und man
roch das Holzfeuer der Herdstatten, so oft die TOne des Lebens, ein
Hammem oder ein Ruf von dort hergeweht und herangetragen wurden.
(p H )
(
here the water had become nearly as smooth as a mirror's surface;
the arching muscle-shell of the heavens had opened and it was mother-ofpearl, it became evening and there was wood fire smoking in the hearth
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place, so often the life-sound a hammer or a call being wafted here, borne
here from afar.)

Here is Rome in its Golden Age, much as it is described in Virgil’s own
Georgies. The problem with this picture, as with V irgil’s depiction o f Roman
life in the Georgies themselves, is that this representation o f the ’Golden Age’
is true to an age already removed fa r into the past, at least as fa r removed as
the now defunct Republic for which it was both exam ple and inspiration. The
Rome contemporaneous with Virgil no longer resembles the idyllic past
described in the Georgies. The significance of this opening passage, then, is
two-fold: firstly, it introduces the reader to a Rome which, as a figm ent o f the
Virgilian im agination, is untrue to the circumstances o f V irgil’s later life;
secondly, the reader o f T.D.V. is first introduced to Virgil not as person but as
text; that is to say, we first encounter Virgil not addressed in name, but in the
form of a fiction that is identifiably his by its style.
The above scene taken from T.D.V,ls first page, bears V irgil’s signature
only in that from the style o f the passage we can recognize Virgil within it. As
Virgil’s ‘name’ is so recognizably inscribed into the above fictional idyll, so the
‘truth’ or untruth o f the name finds itself implicated in the veracity o f the
fiction. As the squadron o f ships nears shore and Virgil sees at first hand the
squalor o f the city and the repulsive habits and the nauseating physical
appearance o f its population (pp. 28 - ff.), the incongruity between the idyll
and the actuality o f state calls into question the veracity o f V irgil’s very name.
Hence, the fiction portrayed in the above citation bears no resemblance to the
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truth of Brindisi as Virgil witnesses it; and the truth o f the fiction and the truth
of the name appear to Virgil to be sadly and inextricably intertwined.
The idea o f the interchangeability o f the name-of-the-author fo r the
fiction itself is brought into play throughout that lengthy passage which
describes Virgil’s movement toward the state palace in Brindisi, the palace
that will be Virgil’s residence during the final hours of his life. Virgil is earned
ashore to find him self at the center o f a procession that is about to wind its
way through the city’s narrow streets. Leading the procession is Lysanias the
imaginary boy-com panion whom the reader finds carrying the cloak and the
manuscript; two highly significant aspects Virgil’s material being:
Dad der Knabe mitgekommen war, erwies sich da als unverhoffte
Erleichterung; als ware ihm, und dies war auOerst seltsam, von
irgendwoher Kenntnis um die Wicktigkeit des Manuscriptkoffiers
geworden, achtete er darauf, da& dessen Trager sich stets knapp neben
der Sanfte hieften, und wahrend er, immerzu selber daneben und den
Mantel Qber die Schulter geworfen, keineiiei Abdrangung zulieft,
blinzelte er manchmal mit helldurchsichtigen Augen belustigt und
verehrungsvoll herauf.
(pp. 29 - 30)
(That the boy had come along proved to be an un-hoped for lightening of
Virgil's burden, as though from some indeterminate source the boy, and
this was exceedingly strange, was apprised about the importance of the
manuscript chest he was attentive to see to it that the manuscript's earner
held it close against the litter and while he is constantly near, the cloak
thrown over his shoulder did not allow himself to be driven aside, he
now and again winked impishly and reverently upon the manuscript chest
with his clear bright eyes.

Appropriate to this passage, Lysanias is the creature o f Virgil’s imagination
who strives to reconcile conflicting aspects of Virgil’s being. In later passages
(p. 179 e t passim), he w ill call Virgil ‘name-giver,’ implying that all things
Roman have been named anew through the writing o f the Aeneid; and
throughout T.D.V., Lysanias will assiduously defend the Aeneid against all
attempts by Virgil to destroy it. Lysanias carries the manuscript in his hands
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and the cloak over his shoulder, protecting them not only from inadvertent
loss.

The rough handling o f the surrounding crowd, but also from Virgil’s

intent to destroy two outward aspects o f his own identity, namely, name and
text.
The T.D.V. invents an ingenious m etaphorical device for bringing name
and text under close critical observation. As the procession that has Virgil at
its center wends its way upward toward the state palace that is a last ‘resting
place’ fo r the dying author, a night moth suddenly lights on the handle o f the
bier upon which he is being earned:
ein Nachtfalter verirrte sich auf die Sanftenlehne und blieb daran
haften; sachte wollte sich neuerlich MQdigkeit und Schlaf melden, sechs
Beine hatte der Falter und sehr viele, wenn nicht gar unbestimmbar viele
das Tragergespann
(p. 39)
(
an errant night moth lighted upon the litter handles and remained
clinging there, softly sleep and weariness called anew; the moth had six
legs and the porters of the litter had a great many if not a countless number
of legs
)

This is the same procession which has Lysanias carrying in his hands the
manuscript o f the Aeneid and, over his shoulder, Virgil’s cloak; it is also a
procession marching inexorably toward fire.
Fire is the element which lends its name to the subsequent Book o f
T.D.V. (Book II); fire also surrounds the palace toward which Virgil is being
bome as though he, along with the moth on the handle of his bier, were being
transported to a funerary pyre (p. 39). W hat is remarkable about this passage
is that the night moth so perfectly epitom izes the circumstances of Virgil’s
physical position within the procession.

The six legs of the night moth

replicate the legs o f the nameless servants bearing the litter upon which he
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rests. The texture o f the m oth’s wings recall the textuality o f cloak and o f
manuscript. The image o f the moth, which is little other than a soft, shapeless
body buried in a magnificent fold o f wings, is the very image o f Virgil as he lies
apart from the enfolding cloak and manuscript earned by Lysanias. As if to
hide the ‘naked body* beneath the cloth, the reader is given no physical
description o f Virgil whatsoever; he is present only in name and in ‘text;’ and
the legs tha t carry him forward remain without identity as though these
invisible servants truly were torsoless.
W ith a recognition that the procession is moving toward fire, there is
another significance to which the night moth alludes; like V irg il threatened with
the loss o f name and text, the night moth, too, is drawn toward a fire that will
consume it whole.

As Virgil seems to be steadily m oving toward some

unnamed and unknowable destruction the correlative image o f the moth
drawn to the flame adds something that immeasurably enriches the
significance o f this scene. The moth whose body is covered with a fold o f
wings and from which innumerable legs protrude “a great many when not a
countless number” (sehr viele, wenn nicht unbestimmbar viele), projects, in
this context, the image o f the body o f state enveloped by the m ateriality o f the
text. This is to say, Rome is wrapped in a fiction that, one way o r another,
depending on whether the manuscript is preserved or consumed by fire, will
have significant bearing upon the fate o f state. The fiction o f the Aeneid and
so Rome’s probable history, as well as its imaginary past, come together at
the precarious moment o f V irgil’s ascent to the palace o f Brindisi, which is an
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ascent into fire. Here Virgil’s text and Virgil’s name become synecdochically
Rome; and the text, the name, and the state become inextricably one.
As if to emphasize the historico-fictional aspects o f the Aeneid^ Virgil
progresses through the streets o f Brindisi, moving backward through the
chronology of his fiction; it is as though he were realizing in the brief moment
o f this procession all the events of his own fiction only in reverse order.
Brindisi, first glimpsed Trom the sea (p. 11), conjures up scenes from the
Georgies and the Golden Age o f Rome; Virgil’s climb through the steep and
narrow passageways o f the city distinctly recalls Aeneas’ travails during his
journey toward Italia. More to the point, Virgil’s encounter with the shrill and
howling voices o f the women of Brindisi recalls Aeneas’ passage through
narrow straits o f the Scylla and Charybdis. Here is the scene that describes
Virgil’s progress as he moves toward the state palace of Brindisi:
und wenn auch langsam, man kam trotzdem vorwSrts -Stufe um Stufe
ging es die Elendsgasse hinan—, nein, nicht diese Behelligungen waren arg,
sondem die Weiber waren es, sie waren das Argste, sie, diese aus den
Fenstem herausgeiehnten Weiber, brustzerquetscht auf den BrQstungen,
herabbaumelnd schlangengleich ihre nackten Arme mit den zQngelnden
Handen daran, und waren es auch nur irr keifende Schimpfworte, in die
ihr Geschwatz umkippte, sowie sie des Zuges ansichtig wurden, es war
zugieich ein keifendes Irresein, groR wie jedes Irresein, Qbersteigert zur
Anklage, Qbersteigert zur Wahrheit da es Schimpf war.
(p. 40)
(
and even though slowly they still came forward -one step after the other
the procession climbed the misery-streets—, no, these vexations were not so
bad, it was the wenches, they were the worst they were, these wenches leaning
overhead from the windows, breasts squashed against the railings, their naked
arms swaying like branches, serpent-like, with their hands flickering like
signing tongues and though their chatter toppled into mere piping blame-words
so soon as the procession was sighted it was nonetheless a carping insanity,
great was that insanity which did swell to reproach, which did swell to truth
since it was disgrace.)

The women (W eiber -wenches) lean downward toward the procession, their
breasts quashed against balconies, their arms swinging like branches
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(herabbaumelnd), that transmogrify into serpents (schlangengleich), their
hands flickering like serpents’ tongues. This aural attack proclaims loudly the
anxieties associated with the perceived threat o f annihilation. Additionally, the
multitude o f breasts and swaying arms make claim to Virgil; touching him with
their voices, signing him with their hands (zungelnden Heinden). Their words
strike hard.

Their ravings well up into a cacophony of accusation, and

accusation wells up into pitiless truth (Qbersteigert zu r Wahrheit). These shrill
accusations blame Virgil for the untruth of his text and for the lies of his fiction,
and they ultimately make the demand that the texts be destroyed and that
Virgil, if only in name, be destroyed along with them.
The voices of the women o f Brindisi continue to fly at Virgil as the
accusations, however incomprehensible they may be, proceed to attain their
effect.

They are cries from the ‘heart which tear into the text, which is

branded factitious and untrue. The women’s voices strip away at the integrity
of the author as well as at the falsity o f the cloth of his fiction:
-rsinnlos war der Hagel der Schimpfworte, der auf ihn niederprasselte,
sinnlos, sinnlos, sinnlos, dennoch berechtigt, dennoch Mahnung, dennoch
Wahrheit, dennoch zur Wahrheit ubersteigerter Irrsinn, und jede
Schmahung rift ein Stock Gberheblichkeit von seiner Seele, so da& sie
nackt wurde, so nackt wie die Sduglinge, so nackt wie die Greise auf ihren
Lumpen, nackt vor Finstemis, nackt vor Erinnerungslosigkeit, nackt vor
Schuld, eingegangen in dieflutende Nacktheitdes Ununterscheidbaren— (p. 41)
(—:senseless was the hail of blame-words that drizzled upon him, senseless,
senseless, senseless yet justified, yet warning, yet truth, yet insanity welling
up into truth, and every shameful insult tore a piece of arrogance from his soul,
so that the soul became naked, as naked as a suckling babe, as naked as
the grizzled old men laying on their rags, naked with darkness, naked with
the absence of memory, naked with guilt, moving into the spreading nakedness
of the realm void of all differentiation—)

Though ‘nonsense’ (Irrsinn), the voices are nonetheless ‘true,’ and they rip at
the arrogance of Virgil's soul (n'R ein StQck Oberbeblichkeit von seiner Seele).
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But Virgil’s arrogance is nothing other than an attem pt at attaining, through
fiction, an alternate reality, a ‘real’ unlike the one into which he was bom. Like
the night moth, the texture o f whose wings w ill be consumed in fire, Virgil’s
own body is to be stripped o f its covering, rendering him ‘

naked as the

newborn, so naked as those who in grizzled old age lie bare on their rags.......
The movement is toward ‘truth revealed’, one that would lie on the nether side
o f death, a truth that would be revealed as the cloth o f fiction is stripped from
the body like flesh from the bone.

But this attem pt at an immediately

perceptible truth comes at the sacrifice o f clear memory and at the price o f a
lapse into an undifferentiated reality: ‘

naked before darkness, naked

before the loss o f all memory, naked before guilt, entered into the spreading
nakedness o f the undifferentiated-’ (so da& sie nackt wurde, so nackt wie die
Sauglinge, so nackt wie die Greise a u f ihren Lumpen).4 This is Virgil’s first
encounter with death within

T.D.V. and the encounter demands that

everything bearing the signature o f recognition and o f individual identity —
name and text— be dissolved from his being.
For the moment, Virgil succumbs to the dissolution o f identity, to a
mode o f death that entails a stripping away o f name and o f text:
eraber, entkleidet des Namens, entkleidet seiner Seele, entkleidet
jeglichen Liedes, entkleidet der liedhaften Zeitlosigkeit seines Herzens,
zurQckfalle ins nachtlich Unsagbare und in den Humus des Seins,
emiedrigt zu jener bittersten Scham, die der letzte Rest eines
erloschenen Geddchtnisses ist—iwissende Stimmen der Zeit, ihr Wissen
um die Unentrinnbarkeit und um die unentrinnbaren Fange des
Schicksals!
(p. 43)
(
he, however, stripped of the name, stripped of his soul, stripped of the least
song, stripped of the song-filled timelessness of his heart, he falls back into
the nightly-ineffable and into the humus of being, brought low to that most
bitter shame which is the fast remnant of an extinguishing consciousness
-iknowing voices of time, their knowledge of the ineluctability and of the
inescapable clutches of fate!)
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Virgil 'falls back into the ineffable night and into the humus o f being.’ He is
stripped o f name (Namen), o f soul (Seele) and o f song (Lied), the last
remnants of memory dissolving (erloschen), so that death becomes a
dissolution o f self, an Ich-Veriu&t.

We have a hint from Broch’s letter to

Aldoux Huxley dated October 5, 1945, that this is precisely the kind of death
from which he has attempted to deliver both him self and his reader through
the w riting o f T.D.V.: a death that so completely extinguishes memory, that the
memory o f dying is itself lost to a hoped fo r later readership.

For Broch

relates explicitly to Huxley that while in prison in Alt-Aussee, the writing of
T.D.V. becomes a m anner of remembering death, o f relaying the encounter
with death to the future reader, so that death can be experienced again and
again. Rather than revealing some truth about the death experience, writing
enfolds the phenomenon o f death within itself, preserving its memory, death’s
memory, side by side with the memory, in name, o f the author.
Especially relevant to Virgil’s struggle (—which, we should be reminded,
is Broch's struggle—) in the face o f death is the notion, expressed in the last
words o f the above citation, o f being snared by fate (—die unentrinnbaren
Fange des S chicksals!). Here Broch’s Virgil is faced with the choice of either
being ‘snared by fate,’ o f being extinguished from existence by fate's dictum,
or o f escaping the snares of this fate by means of inscribing his name into the
text o f the Aeneid.

Elsewhere, this active resistance to becoming fate’s

captive and victim is expressed in the phrase Schicksal-auf~sich-nehmen (to
take fate upon oneself) (p. 144). This Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen refers to the
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author’s ability, through fiction, to reshape fate by altering the ‘real’ by which
fate itself is determined. A glimpse o f this power comes as Virgil returns to his
own fiction, reclaiming the role o f Anchises and writing into his personal
‘fiction’ a fiction o f the struggles o f Rome:
und es warTroja, das um ihn brannte, es warder niemals verkischende
Weltenbrand, doch er, derOberden Branden schwebte, er war Anchises,
blind und sehend in einem, Kind und Greis gleichzeitig kraft unsdglicher
Erinnerung, getragen von den Schultem des Sohnes, er selber Wettengegenwart, getragen von des Atlas Schultem, von den Schultem des
Riesen. Und so ging es Schritt for Schritt dem Paiaste zu.
(p. 50)
(
and it was Troy burning around him it was the never extinguishing world
conflagration, yet he who floated above the flames, he was Anchises, blind and
seeing in one, simultaneously child and grizzled old man thanks to the
unutterable recollection, borne on the shoulders of his son, he himself
was ‘world-presence’ borne on the shoulders of Atlas, on the shoulders
of the giant And so it went one step after the other right up to the
palace.)

Here, in contradistinction to the passage from page 41, Kind und Greis do not
relinquish but reclaim the cloth of fiction. Here it might be asked, “Who is the
child, and who is the wizened old man?” Is Virgil the child o f Anchises or is
Anchises the child of Virgil?

The question, at least, suggests an ongoing

circularity between ‘text’ and ‘name’, between author and authored whereby
Kind und Greis, like the ‘last’ link in a chain, are merely tangent extremities.
Virgil’s death and his name are already memorialized in the death o f
Anchises; Broch's death and name are, likewise, memorialized in this
fictionalized account of the death of Virgil. One fiction envelops the other so
that the names Broch, Virgil, and Anchises become tangent links in a textual
chain of self referencing circularity.
Name, death and text exist in a circularity that is relevant to the
fundamentally circular relation between father, child and name during the act
o f name-giving.

The name is borrowed and, as Virgil proclaims in the

subsequent passage, it covers the nakedness of our being:
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‘ Der Name ist wie ein Kleid, das uns nicht gehdrt; nackt sind wir unter
unserem Namen, nackter noch ais das Kind, das derVatervom Boden
aufgehoben hat, um ihm den Namen zu geben. Und je mehr wir den Namen
mit Sein erfoilen, desto fremder wird er uns, desto unabhangigerwird er
von uns, desto verlassener werden wir selber. Erborgt ist der Name, den
wir tragen, erborgt das Brot, das wir essen, erborgt sind wir selber, nackt
hineingehalten ins Fremde, und nur derjenige, der alien erborgten Flitter
von sich abgetan hat der wird des Zieles ansichtig, der wird zum Ziele
gerufen, auf daft er sich mit seinem Namen endgQItigvereinige*.
(pp. 59 - 60)
(“The name is like a cloth that does not belong to us; naked are we under our
names, more naked than the child that the father has lifted from the floor in
order to give it the name. And the more we fill the name with being the more
foreign it becomes to us. the greater its independence from us, the greater
our abandonment Borrowed is the name we carry, borrowed the bread we eat
we ourselves ‘borrowed’, held out naked in an alien realm, and only the one
who had taken from himself all the borrowed clutter, only he will come into
sight of the goal, he is called to the goal so that he might finally come
to unite with the name.)

The name is a sort of l/r-text, that primal fictive cloth with which our otherwise
naked being is draped; and it is a cloth that serves as the ultim ate veil o f
separation between ourselves and death. Here it is said not that we are ‘as
naked as’ but that we are ‘more naked than’ (nackter noch) the child whom
the father lifts from the floor to give it its name. Placing the child in his lap the
father ‘claims’ the child and it is the name that carries that claim forward. The
name, therefore, is not a covering o f the body, not a sign tha t points to some
visible presence, but something that is draped over the uncertainty of
something unknown, over the void that continues to exist at the center o f our
beings. A t the same time, the name is the only remnant o f the father that we
have fo r certain as our own. That void at the center of our being becomes an
ever present death within us, under the wrap of the name, waiting always to
be revealed; it is that vast ‘nightly ineffable’ (das nSchtlich Unsagbare; p. 43)
which, during the course o f our lives, we attempt, hopelessly, to fill with being.
In giving the child his name, the father tears a piece o f the cloth from which
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the fiction o f his own life has been fabricated, in order that a new fiction m ight
begin, one that w ill play itself out through the existence o f the child

or, in

the case o f the author, through the existence o f the text. But even the act o f
continued regeneration will not fill the void covered by the name. The claim to
full authorship, authorship of one’s own name, is infinitely deferred as the
name is handed o ff from one generation to the next. In T.D.V., Virgil clearly
seeks a means whereby he, the author o f the Aeneid, might become at once
author o f and authored by the name, a Virgil that m ight become the ‘author’
not just o f the text but of Anchises as he in turn is authored by him.
Virgil, whom the wenches o f Brindisi would render nameless (cf.: pp. 43
- ff.), is him self repeatedly referred to as a giver o f names (cf.:

du gabst

den Dingen ihre Namen; sie sind in deinem Gedicht p. 179 et passim). It is
Virgil who has given a ‘name’ —name in the broader sense o f a memorialized
fic tio n - to Anchises; and yet Anchises stands to Virgil in a relation of forebear.
Such is the circularity of fiction and o f the given name, that fathers become
the sons o f their sons, and so Anchises the ‘offspring’ of Virgil. This is the
fiction to which the women of Brindisi in pages 39 and following object; the
fiction from which yet additional fiction is bom. It is an affront to the ‘truth’
(Wahrheit) that we hold at the center o f our being, that truth which fiction
obscures and which the voices of the women promise ever to reveal as they
promise, likewise, to reveal the nakedness that is ‘more naked than the naked
child.’
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In Paternal Succession
The issue o f Ich-VeriuBt (dissolution o f self) in T.D.V. touches directly on
Virgil’s decision to destroy not ju s t die manuscript o f the Aeneidt but to destroy
all his writings, hence, to destroy his name:
oh, es war das Gebot alies Getane zu vemichten, alles, was er je
geschrieben und gedichtet hatte, zu verbrennen, oh, alle seine Schriflen
muftten verbranntwerden
(p. 166)
(oh, it was the command to obliterate all that had been done, to bum
all that he had ever written, had ever put into verse, oh, all his writings
had to be burned
)

Destruction o f the writings would disrupt the circularity that places Virgil in the
position o f being ‘father o f fathers,' of being author to the narrative that most
powerfully relates the story which makes present to Rome its forebears.
Augustus’ own authority as name-giver is menaced by V irgil’s decision to
essentially break the circle tying the present to a fictional past, a fiction that
otherwise greatly enhances Caesar’s own ‘authorship’ o f state. A t the close o f
this section, I will address in greater detail the role that Augustus himself
plays, surreptitiously, in the circulation of the name o f ‘father.’ He, too, has a
part in granting validity and bringing into the present the name of Rome’s
fictional forebears.5
V irgil seeks out a position within the ‘unending succession o f fathers'
(cf.: p. 178) by revisiting the Anchises of his Aeneid (cf: p. 50). He seeks to
recover from within his own fiction the prophetic future that is revealed when,
at the close o f book VI, Aeneas descends into Hades to confer with Anchises.
Instead, the ‘recovery’ fails, Anchises reveals nothing, and Virgil finds that in
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place o f a glimpse into the future, he is left only gazing ever further into the
past:
er war Anchises, blind und sehend in einem, Kind und Greis
gleichzeitig kraft unsdglicher Erinnerung. getragen von den Schultem
des Sohnes, er selber Weltengegenwart, getragen von des Atlas Schultem,
von den Schultem des Riesen.
(p. 50)
(he was Anchises, blind and seeing in one, simultaneously child and grizzled
old man thanks to the unutterable recollection, borne on the shoulders of his son,
he himself was *worid-presence’ borne on the shoulders of Atlas, on the
shoulders of the giant)

The Age o f Giants here mentioned is an Ur-zeit belonging, metaphorically
speaking, to the reign o f Chronos, ante-dating the new order established by a
rebellious Zeus, whether we understand ‘Zeus’ to be Augustus or Virgil
himself. It appears that Virgil's foray into the Aeneid leads him only further
away from the possibility of a newly established order for Augustan Rome.
The order of paternal succession into which Augustus and Virgil would find
their places shifts into a mode o f regress, receding into an ‘historical/fictional’
distance away from the otherwise inevitable devolution o f the name ‘father1
upon Augustus.
There are many indications within the T.D.V. o f Virgil’s mistrust of
Augustan authority, primarily, though not exclusively, in Book III, which
represents the imaginary encounter between Virgil and Augustus.

The

mistrust that Virgil harbors toward Augustus, and so the initial reluctance to
yield to Augustus the manuscript, lead Virgil to consider an action, destruction,
whereby the Aeneid would begin and end only with himself, would bear his
‘name’ and no one else’s. The manner in which Virgil ‘visits’ Anchises (cited
from page 50) suggests a certain exclusivity of proprietorship; the fictional
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chronology described in that passage seems to begin w ith the Age of the
Giants and to end with the name Virgil.

An oddly incestuous relation is

suggested by this passage, in which Virgil is both father and son, Anchises
and Aeneas, creator and created.

The desire o f the author to completely

possess his work, to find a place for his own name to the exclusion of any
other is a jealous claim, rooted in mistrust, aimed at securing control over and
the manipulation o f the fictional events recorded. Virgil would guarantee his
own complete authority over the text by the act o f destroying it. In a sense,
Virgil is in accord with the women of Brindisi, who see the ‘outer garments’ o f
the text as personal appendages (Lumpen, p. 41); Windeln, p. 42) that might
easily be stripped from the body at the moment o f death. Already authorship
is framed in terms o f an ethical question: does any fiction belong to a single
creator? or does the text, like the name given by the father, circulate so as to
continue to be reclaimed by others: others within positions o f authority, the
authors and the political forces o f succeeding generations?
There are moments within T.D.V. where V irgil’s reveries on childhood
speak, albeit with great ambiguity, to the above question.

In the following,

Virgil revisits not Anchises but another paternal forebear o f his fiction, the here
unnamed father of his childhood:
und er erinnerte sich des Vaters, der erst mit der Heiratzum
richtigen Bauem hatte werden kOnnen und dessen einstmaliger
Tdpferberuf dem Sohn gering gedeucht hatte, obwohl es sehr schdn
gewesen war den abendlichen Erzahlungen von der Arbeit an den
bauchigen Weinfdssem und edelgeschwungenen OlkrOgen, die der Vater
verfertigt hatte, zu lauschen, den Erzdhlungen von dem lehm-fbrmenden
Daumen, von den Spachteln und von der surrenden Drehscheibe, und von
der Kunst des Brennens, schOnen Erzahlungen, unterbrochen von manchen
alten TOpferlied.
(pp. 37 - 38)
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(
and he remembered his father who at the time of his marriage first had
been able to become a genuine farmer and whose earlier potter’s trade had
little impressed the son, although he, the son, was very pleased to attend
the telling of the work stories in the evening, stories of the large-bellied
wine urns and of nobly fashioned vessels for holding oil, works that the
father had done, he was pleased to listen intently to the stories of the clayfashioning thumb
beautiful stories interspersed with many an old potter’s
song.)

Even this father, like Anchises, is portrayed as author and authored. Virgil’s
own gifts are the stories which are themselves passed down from anonymous
father to anonymous son until arriving at his own, Virgil’s, gift. The anonymity
o f the father allows a place fo r Virgil to enter into a tradition without time so
that the web o f fiction that Virgil weaves again into the Aeneid is the work of
the countless unnamed fathers that precede him. The namelessness o f the
father works as an act o f authorial suppression which allows only V irgil’s name
to be

inscribed into the m anuscript o f the Aeneid. But then even Virgil is in

turn threatened with namelessness as it seems that Augustus is only waiting
for V irgil’s death as an occasion to lay claim to the Aeneid.
Each o f these threats are alternately alive in the single passage within
T.D.V. that speaks explicitly o f the ‘unending line o f fathers’:
Denn Opfer und Begnadung sind eines, sie folgen nicht aufeinander,
sondem gehen auseinander hervor, und nur derjenige ist wGrdig Vater
genannt zu werden, der begnadet ist hinabzusteigen in den Schattenabgrund, damit er, selber zum Opfer gebracht, die Priesterweihe seines
opfemden Amtes empfange, damit ereingegliedert werde in die erhaben
unendliche Reihe der Vater, die zu der ertiabenen Unzugdnglichkeit des
Anfangs fOhrt.
unabiassig die Kraft unendlichen Neubeginns erhait,
den Segen des menschlichen Seins fOr immer, segenspendend der Ur-Ahn,
der StadtegrQnder jenseits der Erstarrung, der Namengeber, der das
Gesetz gehoben hat, enthoben jeglichem Anfang und jeglichem Ende,
enthoben der Geburi ewig enthoben dem Ablauf.
(p. 178)
(For sacrifice and absolution are one, they do not follow one another but, to the
contrary, come forth out of one another and only he is worthy to be named father
who has the given gift which allows him to climb down into the shadowy abyss
in order that he himself, who has made of himself a sacrifice, should receive
the priestly consecration of his own sacrificial office, so that he might
become ‘membered’ into the exalted unending line of fathers, the line that
leads to the sublime inaccessibility of the beginning.......the indefatigable might
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of unending new-beginnings, the blessing from mortal beings forever, the
benefice of the first forebear, of the founders of cities beyond petrifaction,
the name-givers, he who has raised high the law, exempted every beginning
and every ending, exempted birth, eternally exempt from the concluding
moment)

The names o f both Virgil and Augustus, fathers of state and o f fiction, are
lurking in this multivalenced passage. Only he who is worthy of the name
'father1 has the power, the talent, the gift (is t begnadet) to descend into the
shadowy abyss (der Schattenabgrund) o f the past. Antiquity’s most prominent
examples of figures who had made the descent and returned from the past
(death) are Orpheus and Aeneas, who, are like V irgil and Augustus,
respectively, are poet and founder of state.

But as forebear not only is

Aeneas, like Anchises before him, the author o f both Augustus and Virgil, he
has also, again like Anchises, been authored by them.

He is largely the

creation o f Virgil’s fictive imagination, but he is also in some measure
Augustus’ creation. Anchises' prophesies o f conquest and o f monument, like
all the deeds o f Aeneas, serve only to point the way toward the Augustan age.
W ithout Augustus' trium phs and his role in the creation o f the Roman state,
Aeneas would be rendered an ‘inconsequential’ figure.

Virgil's, and so

Aeneas,’ ultimate mandate was, after all is said and done, to glorify the reign
of Augustus.
The phrase hinabgesteigen in den Schattengrund (to climb down into
the shadowy abyss) ostensibly refer to the journey into Hades but it could ju st
as well refer to the author -Aeneas/Virgil/Broch— as he recedes from the
memory o f authorship, as he falls out o f authorship and into namelessness.
Virgil fears the prospect o f relinquishing to Augustus the title o f father o f Rome
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and of placing in him all the power and the authority which that title confers.
Equally unsettling, perhaps even more so, would be the prospect o f leaving
behind the name and the text, Virgil’s mortal remains, leaving them to be
claimed by some as yet unnamed other. Should he not elect to destroy the
Aeneid at the moment o f his death, thereby leaving behind the name and the
text, Virgil would in effect bequeath to posterity an enduring, material sign o f
his own incompleteness, his own inability to complete the circle, to become
both father and son o f his own life’s work.

Virgil is inclined to take the text

with him, to immolate the name so that he and all his works might go out
whole, consumed in full, like the night moth, into death’s consuming flame. To
destroy the Aeneid would be a way o f claiming exclusivity for this work in the
same way that authors will sometimes claim exclusivity for their letters by
requesting that all their correspondence and their private journals be
destroyed in a posthumous act. This request is often ignored or denied by the
author’s executors, and Virgil’s request is specifically denied by his old
companions Plotius and Lucius (pp. 224 - ff.), who recognize, and rightly so,
that Virgil’s work no longer belongs to Virgil but to Rome:
[So Lucius]
"Wenn du sterben willst, so ist das deine eigene
Angelegenheit, wirwerden dich nichtdaran hindem, aberdie Aneis ist
schon langst nicht mehr deine eigene Angelegenheit; daft schiag dir also
aus dem Kopf.
”
(p. 225)
(
if you wish to die that’s your own affair and we will not try to hinder you;
but has been a long time since the Aeneid was yours to do with as you will;
so get this idea (of destroying the manuscript) out of your head
)

The otherwise punctilious Lucius states the case with brute clarity: Virgil’s
person is disposable; the work, however, will remain.
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W e can, fo r a moment, revisit the case o f Broch and the circumstances
surrounding the writing o f T.D.V. W e rem em ber not only the circumstances
under which T.D.V. was first written, but those under which it was transformed
into the most significant and the most intim ate w ork o f Broch’s writing career
W hat had been little more than an elaborate sketch o f a story concerning the
final day in Virgil’s life becomes a personal testam ent to death from the time
during which Broch is held prisoner a t Ait-Aussee.

W e have Broch’s own

testim ony regarding the highly personal nature o f that writing, and we can
speculate that Broch was writing with no prospect o f any future reader in mind;
yet this is a work written to and for an age. It would seem probable that had
Broch’s captors executed him, they would have destroyed whatever works
they might have happened to find on his person.

This evident fact did not

deter Broch from inscribing his name furiously and repeatedly into the germ o f
what was to become T.D.V.
Here is a text initially written not fo r others but for an audience of one.
Initially, the purpose o f this writing was to em body what is at one and the
same tim e the m ost intimate and the m ost elusive experience o f one’s person,
the experience o f death.

Death, an exquisitely intim ate experience, is the

thing which in T.D.V. is called only more naked than the child (p. 59). As the
following makes clear it is only after the fact that Broch considers bequeathing
the experience o f death to his readership:
Der Vergil ist aus Zufallsanfdngen gewachsen; ich bin damit in eine
Zeit echter Todesbedrohung (durch die Nazi) geraten, und ich habe ihn
daher ausschliettlich fOr mich -teilweise sogar im GefSngnis—
gewissermaOen als private Todesvorbereitung, sicheriich also nicht for
Publikationszwecke geschrieben
FOr mich gait es, mein Material,
mein Erkenntnismaterial dem Leser zu Qbermitteln. Ich muBte den Leser
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nachleben lassen, wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch
Zerknirschung und Selbstausldschung anndhert (mag man sie auch
als noch Lebender niemals erreichen). Mit blo& rationalen Mitteilungen
ist dies nicht zu bewerkstelligen
(An A. Huxley. 5.10.45)
(..... The Virgil grew out of an accidental occurrence. I had fallen upon a time
where I was genuinely threatened by the menace of death (from the Nazis) and,
under the circumstances, I had written the T.D. V. for myself exclusively -in
part, no less, while in prison—and to a certain extent had written it as
a personal preparation for death; certainly I had not written it for the purpose
of publication
For me it was critical that I should convey my material,
my cognition-material; to the reader (in the same form that circumstances
had dictated). I had to allow the reader to live through the way in which one
approaches this experience of death, namely, through contrition and the
dissolution of self (may no living person ever arrive in such circumstances as
these). This (approach to death) could not be brought about through a merely
rational medium
)

And yet it is significant that Broch spends years with this m anuscript before
finally turning it over fo r publication. He turns the work over fo r publication not
when he deems is finally complete, but in order that he might find tim e to
devote to other projects. To the end o f his life, Broch continues to insist that
given just so many additional months or years, he might have made T.D.V. a
perfect, that is to say, a complete thing6 -som ething that would give complete
expression to the name. Broch stubbornly adheres to the notion that truth can
be revealed through fiction, as if to insist that somehow name and text could
finally be lifted to reveal that state o f being described only as more naked than
the child.
It is interesting to note that Broch senses that there is always
something missing from the text and that this elusive something is always just
about to be found. In a letter to an anonymous correspondent Broch writes;
Ich weitt heute ganz genau, wo das Buch echte Todeserkenntnisse
vermittelt, wo es tatsachlich “nackt” ist, aber ich weiB auch, wo die
hypnotische Konzentration abgerissen ist um wiederdem LiterarischPathetischen Platzzu machen.
(16.8.43)
(......Today I know precisely where the book (i.e., T.D. V.) presents a true
knowledge of death, exactly where it is ‘naked’; but I also know those
places where the hypnotic concentration is broken in order to make room
for literary bathos
)
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Broch him self substitutes the word “naked” fo r the ‘almighty ineffable.’ It is
always ‘there’ but where it is supposed to appear, the reader finds only, from
Broch’s adm ittedly disappointed perspective, ‘literary-bathos;’ where one
would expect to find truth, that is to say death, one finds only fiction. And so
somewhere beneath the wrap o f the text and the cover of the name is that
thing o f which Broch, and that thing o f which the Virgil o f his T.D.V., are
hopelessly in search. Turning back to the pages o f T.D.V. ,we discover as
close an approximation of what Broch and Virgil are looking for as can be
offered. Though they cannot be revealed (rendered ‘naked’), truth, death, and
the ‘real’ can at least, however indirectly, be placed at the reader’s disposal
through the medium o f fiction.
The Augustus who stands before the crowds o f Brindisi receiving their
(self) adulation (cf.: p. 21) presents to the reader an image of death.

In a

passage that borders on the obscene for all its resemblance to events coeval
to the actual writing o f T.D.V., Augustus is shown to present himself to the
crowds at Brindisi in the likeness o f an idol:
da freilich war der Augenblick gekommen, den das dumpf brutende
Massentier erwartet hatte, um sein Jubelgeheul ausstoften zu kdnnen, und
da brach es los, ohne Pause und ohne Ende, sieghaft, erschOttemd,
ungezQgelt, furchteinfldOend, gro&artig, geduckt, sich selbst anbetend in
der Person des Einen.
Dies also war die Masse, fOr die der Casar lebte, for die das Imperium
geschaffen worden war
(p. 21)
(
clearly the moment had arrived, the one for which the dumb brooding
animal masses had been waiting, for the moment when they could let loose
a howl of jubilation, and then it erupted, without pause and without end,
quaking, victorious, unrestrained, fearsome, sublime, cringing, praying in
a mode of self adulation to the ‘Person of the One.’
These, then, were the masses for whom Caesar lived, for whom the Imperium
had been created
)
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The idol represents the lawlessness o f tyranny, the terrible freedom o f
absolute self authoring pow er the image is one o f se lf reflecting into self. The
temptation fo r Augustus, as it was for Virgil, is to allow oneself to be seduced
by the illusion o f a ‘perfect authority’, the illusion o f a perfect ‘name’. The
alternative is to subm it to becoming one in ‘the unending line of fathers’ (p.
178) so that one’s voice, the voice o f authorship, becomes not one’s own, but
the voice o f a succession of others.

Authority so contextualized is as

transitory as life itself, is renewed a t the cost o f a certain degree o f self
alienation, and is given its validity by the transform ing power of death.
The supreme irony o f T.D.V. is that it is Augustus, not Virgil, who
strives to save the manuscript o f the Aeneid.

The motivation for this

seemingly historical fact is not as self evident as it may at first appear. A fter
all, the Aeneid was commissioned by Augustus and does flatter his reign as
the absolute pinnacle o f Roman culture and state. But it also creates a fiction
whereby Augustus’ Rome becomes situated within ancient tradition going
back to the Golden Age. Augustus’ reign is thereby placed within the context
o f an acknowledgeable, ‘legitimate’ law and custom. The law and custom to
which the Aeneid alludes were in the process o f undergoing profound
transformation even as Virgil wrote. Virgil, therefore, stands self-accused o f
playing the role of lawgiver/name-giver to an Augustus flirting with the limits o f
absolute power.
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Plotia
The name is a portal through which every subject enters into language
and so, consequently, into the ‘real’ embodied therein. Thereafter, the name
continues to function as a fram e which over the course of our lives we fill with
being (cf.: p. 59).

And yet, as something that is ‘given,’ the name is and

remains forever foreign to us. On page 59 of T.D.V., we find the enigm atic
statement: T h e more we fill out names with being, the more alien to us it
becomes
wird e r uns

” ( ’Und je m ehr w ir den Namen m it Sein erfullen, desto frem der
') .

That aspect o f the name, which from the beginning is

alien, only becomes more so with the increasing passage o f tim e. W e can
come no closer to explaining this paradox o f the name, that it should remain at
once so intim ate and so alien, than to say that the name initiates us into
language; the name casts us outside ourselves, and causes us to see the
image o f ourselves reflected back to us from the outside.

In the name we

recognize the void of something left behind, something to which, however
much we try, we are never able to return. W ithin T.D.V., the figure o f Plotia
emblematizes that ineffable and never to be attained something left behind.
To the extent to which she is described, Plotia is given to the reader o f
T.D.V. as the outward reflection o f something immanent to Virgil. She is not
representation itself but, as the following passage indicates, that to which
representation alludes, the meaning filled void covered by the name:
Und als sollte diese Unerreichbarkeit sich auch hier widerspiegeln, als
mQ&te allOberall alles zum Bild seines Selbst werden
(p. 36)
(And as though this inapproachableness should mirror itself again here,
as though everything everywhere should become an image of his (sic) self..... )
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Though in this passage the unattainable refers to memories from V irgil’s
youth, in other passages within T.D.V. that same something-left-behind is
identified with a resonance o f the voice o f the mother.

In the following

exchange between Virgil and Lysanias, an imaginary figure who appears to
accompany Virgil on the last day o f his life, the question is asked “For whom
are you searching?”:
[Vergil] *Wen suchst du?“
[Lysanias] “Dich.”
Der Knabe irrte sich. Was wir suchen ist versunken, und wir sollen
es nicht suchen, da es mit seiner Unauffindbarkeit uns nur verhflhnt.
“Nein, mein kleiner FOhrer, du hast mich gefQhrt, doch nicht gesucht*
([V] “Whom are you seeking?"
[L] “You."
The boy was in error. That which we seek is buried deep and we ought not
to search for it, because it together with its inattainability only shames us.
“No, my little guide, you have not led me, you have sought me.")

Lysanias answers “You” as though it were Virgil for whom he is searching.
Virgil observes that his voice and that o f Lysanias appear to be one and the
same, both, curiously, of the mantuan dialect.

Lysanias’ answer carries

Virgil’s question one step further in that the ‘you’ o f his response indicates not
only that it is Virgil that he seeks, it indicates an inter-reflective identification, ‘I
am You,’ Lysanias is Virgil. Lysanias makes known that his voice and V irgil’s
voice are one and the same:
Wiederum Idchelte der Knabe: “Es (meine Sprache) ist deine Sprache."
“Die Sprache meiner Mutter.”
“Zum Gesang wurde die Sprache in deinem Munde.”
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(p. 58)

(Again the boy smiled: "It (my voice) is your voice.”
“The voice of my mother.’
“Her speech turned to song in your mouth.”)

And ju st a bit further within the same passage Virgil muses:
“.....meine Mutter war damals gestorben, nur der Kiang ihrer Stimme war
geblieben
"
(pp. 58 - 59)
(“

my mother died then, only the sound of her voice remains")

The ‘remaining voice of the mother1exists as nothing more than a trace within
the mantuan ‘shared dialect*, spoken by Virgil and echoed by Lysanias. The
voice of the mother is a third ‘unattainable' element floating within the echo of
their speech.

Plotia personifies that voice inflected into language’s double

inscription. The mother (as voice) is said in a later passage to be inevocable -die M utter bleibt unerrufbar (p. 66), hidden beneath the double inscription of
language.

Entering through the name into language, we leave behind

something that can never again be attained and to which language can no
more than indirectly refer, namely, the Teal’; in a sim ilar manner, language
conceals a truth that it cannot represent.
Truth is indicated in T.D.V. as a sort o f Ur-speech, one that precedes
naming; it is a speech forsaken by the subject from the moment he enters into
language. Thus truth is a language from which all other language is set apart.
Virgil speaks of this ‘speech-outside-of-speech’ in a passage where he
explores the Brindisi night from out the window o f his palace room:
ein paar Worte aus dem kehligen Bad des Hinkenden, ein und das
andere Mai seine bellende Lache, zuletzt nur noch ein Dammerfluchen,
beinahe femwehhaft, beinahe zart geworden und eingegangen in die
Qbrigen Gerausche der Nachtfeme, eingesponnen und einsgeworden mit
jedem Ton, mit jedem letzten Tonrest, der sich der Feme entiOst.......zart
auch dies, obwohl es vermutlich zu einem lachenumbrOllten obzOnen
Matrosensang aus weinstinkender Taveme gehOrte, zart und femwehhaft,
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als sei das starr Jenseitige in ihr der Ort, an dem die stumme Sprache des
Lachens und die stumme Sprache der Musik, beides Sprache auQerhalb
der Sprache, unterhalb und oberhalb der Grenze menschlicher Gebundenheit, sich zu neuer Sprache verbtindeten
zurstummen Sprache der
AuGermenschlich-erstarrtesten Feme und Veriassenheit, zur Sprache
auQerhalb jeglicher Muttersprache, zur unerforschlichen Sprache der
vollkommenen UnQbersetzbarkeit, unverstandlich in die Welt
eingegangen, unverstandlich und unerforschlich die Welt mit ihrer
eigenen Feme durchdringend, notwendig in der Welt vorhanden ohne sie
verandertzu haben, und eben darum doppelt unverstandlich, unsagbar
unverstandlich als die notwendige Unwirklichkeit im unverandert
Wirklichen!
(pp. 110-11)
(......a pair of words from the throaty bass of the cripple, here and there
this barking laugh, and finally only a vague cursing, nearly a yearning
for something remote, having become almost tender and then disappearing
among the other sounds of the nocturnal distance, spun into, having become
one with every tone, with every remnant of a tone that dissolves into the
distance
tender also this sound, although probably a sound that (first)
belonged to the bellowing laughter of some obscene sailor's song that pouring
out of the wine-stinking tavern, tender and yearning for the distant as though
the benumbed other world bound in this place, the place to which the mute
language of laughter and the mute language of music, each language
outside all language, a language above the border of human language, had
joined to form a new speech.......to the mute language of the most benumbed
distance and abandonment, unspeakably removed from human kind the voice
outside any mother’s voice, to the inscrutable speech of complete incommunicability, gone inarticulate into the world, penetrating the world inscrutably
and unintelligibly with the sense of its own remoteness, necessarily at hand in
the world without having altered the world and precisely for this reason doubly
incomprehensible, unspeakably unintelligible as the necessary unreality within
the unaltered ’real!’)

This disquisition on language begins as Virgil hears a last remnant ( Tonrest)
o f a single word spoken by a drunkard, a word dissolving into night. Virgil is
able to detect, even in the distant bellowing laugh (seine bellende Lache) o f a
hobbling drunk, a ‘tender1 (zarf) sound that he calls femwehhaft. Femweh is
in oppositional complementarity to the Heimweh, a sort o f longing fo r that
which is at once distant (fern) and fam iliar. Heimweh, like the ‘name given by
the father1evokes that which is at once near (heim) and strange, that which is
at once ours and foreign to us. That which Virgil encounters as fem wehhaft is
described as ‘woven into a tone’ (eingesponnen und einsgeworden m it jedem
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Tone) so that it is perceptible yet not to be deciphered, like the irretrievable
voice o f the m other veiled by language.
The language spoken by the drunk leaves traces that are woven into
and become one with the ‘whispers o f the fa r n ig h t
distance.'

dissolving into the

The speech-sounds receding into the distance resemble Virgil’s

own moment o f dying, as he listens (lauschen) fo r some unattainable truth, a
truth that seem ingly lies ju st beyond death’s threshold. Penetrating death's
veil is Virgil’s singular way of attaining truth; it is the search for an immutable
‘real’ that can only be attained through the experience of death.

Virgil

observes in an earlier passage:
nur wer den Tod auf sich nimmt vemnag den Ring im Irdischen zu
schlieSen.......nur wer zum Tode hinlauscht, der braucht nicht zu
flQchten

(p. 78)

(
only he who takes death upon himself is capable of closing the earthly
cycle
only he who listens intently to death, only he need not flee
)

The voice o f the mother is finally described as unintelligible and inscrutable
(unverst&ndlich und unerforschlich), it is the necessary ‘unreality* in the
unaltered ‘real’ (die notwendige Unwirklichkeit im unverSndert W irklichen!).
This difficult passage, taken from page 111, reminds the reader that the name
continues to bear that something which on page 59 is referred to merely as
more naked than the child. That something ‘more naked than the child’ is a
truth which ‘weaves itself into and makes itself one w ith’ (...eingesponnen und
einsgeworden... p. 110) fiction. In T.D.V., Plotia is the imaginary guarantor o f
the truth; ironically, she is also the figure luring Virgil toward a destruction o f
the Aeneid.
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Plotia urges Virgil to shed the m ateriality o f language, to destroy the
written word in order that only a pure and naked truth should remain. It would
be an attempt at death to dissolve one’s subjectivity, reducing one’s identity to
some essential, if inexpressible, ’truth.’ Through death Plotia seeks a way o f
returning Virgil to that aspect o f self which language has always kept distant.
Language is limited by representation, whereas truth is said to be naked, and
without mediation.

The mirroring effect o f language offers the hope of

reflecting truth onto some visible plane, where truth might at least be
glimpsed, if not attained. A brief passage from page 164 states this explicitly:
von Spiegelung zu Spiegelung, um am Ende alter Enden im Bildlosen sich
zu letzten Nacktheitzu enthOllen
(p. 164)
(
from reflection to reflection in order to unveil itself in ultimate nakedness
at the image-less end
)

Here is a language that strips away language leaving behind only naked truth.
The example of the two drunks (pp. 1 1 0 -1 1 1 ), however, indicates that truth
lacks a credible contextualizing medium.7 The linguistic ’currency’ in which
their voices circulate is described as an ‘obscene sailor’s song that flows from
the wine-stinking tavern.’ Particularly telling is the register o f their expression
when addressing Caesar: “dancing and singing and fucking and whoring can
he, the lord Caesar, but otherwise nothing else” (’tanzen und singen und
huren kann er, der H err Casar, aber sonst kann e r nix

' p. 108). W hat is

missing is a credible medium into which the voice o f the mother, Plotia’s
‘naked truth,’ can be woven.
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In the very last moments o f the second Book o f T.D.V., an ‘angel's'
voice makes itself known to Virgil and instructs him in an oblique way on the
nature of truth in the language o f his (Virgil’s) own text:
dort stand ein Engel vor ihm, fast kein Engel, eher ein Knabe,
trotzdem ein Engel
und seine Stimme war nicht jene, die als
verkQndende Tat sinnbildhaft das All erfoilt, nein, sie war wohl
eher ein ganz femes Echo des darOber schwebenden sinnbildlichen
Urbildes
“Tritt ein zur SchOpfung, die einstmals war und wieder ist;
du aber sei Vergil geheiOen, deine Zeit ist da!” Dies hatte der Engel
gesprochen, furchtbar vor Milde, trOstlich vor Trauer, unerreichbar vor
Sehnsucht, so hatte er es aus dem Munde des Engels vemommen, hatte es
gehOrt als Sprache innerhaib der Sprache in all ihrer irdischen
Einfachheit, und es hOrend, zum Namen gerufen und dem Namen
vereint
(p. 218)
(
there before him stood an angel who was very nearly not an angel, rather
a boy, though nonetheless an angel
and his voice was not one which as
the announcing deed symbolically filled the universe, no, it was much more
the entirely distant echo of the symbolic first-image hovering overhead......
“Step into creation which once was and which again is; you are called Virgil,
your time is come!'' This the angel spoke, fearsome in gentleness, comforting
in sadness, unattainable in its yearning, such at least had he understood from
the mouth of the angel, had heard the language within language in all her
earthly simplicity, and hearing it (was) called to the name and united to
the name
)

The angel is ‘more youth than angel’ (eher ein Knabe) and its voice an
‘entirely distant echo.’ The voice instructs Virgil to enter into creation (Tritt ein
zur Schdpfung), his own creation; the truth and reality Virgil seeks are to be
found within his own work.

Now Virgil attains the unattainable, hears the

‘language within language’ and as such he is called to and united with the
name (

zum Namen gerufen und dem Namen vereint).

Now Virgil has

achieved that which was first announced on page 60 as the final human
destination, to ‘unite with the name’: der wird des Zieles ansichtig, der wird
zum Ziele gerufen, aufdaR e rsich m it seinem Namen endgGltig vereinige” (p.
60). To join with one’s name has here the meaning o f finding Truth’ within the
materiality o f one’s own language, to encounter the voice within one’s own
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voice. The angel in this passage, a youth (ein Knabe), is Lysanias in another
manifestation; the angel’s voice, a distant echo (ein ganz fem es Echo),
echoes Virgil’s own; the call to creation ( Tritt ein zu r SchOpfung) is a call to
infuse the inter-reflective language o f the text w ith the voice o f the mother.
Though Plotia seeks to unveil truth, to reveal the voice o f the mother, this can
be done only in the context o f the lettered manuscript, in context o f the name
o f the father.
For Plotia, death becomes the final refuge from the name, the escape
from the context upon which the subjective relation depends. Plotia attempts
to lure Virgil at the moment o f his death out o f language, out of the chain of
interreflecting images and the thereby created meanings that inhabit the text.
W ithin T.D.V., Plotia embodies for Virgil the urge, at the moment o f his death,
to destroy the Aeneid. Virgil’s confusion and uncertainty regarding the surety
of his o f subjective identity is recorded in the following:
War es noch der eigene Leib, den er fOhlte? oder war es nur mehr
Spiegelbild seines Leibes Oder gar nur Spiegelbild seines FGhlens? wo
war die Wirklichkeit dieses Seienden
schwebend zwischen Urbild
und Abbild, weder das eine noch das andere berGhrend, vielmehr
Sinnbild beider, schwebend zwischen Ehnnertem und Sichtbarem, ihrer
beider Spiegel und friedlich einsgeworden mit beiden, die athergleiche
Gegenwart, und auf dem Grunde des Spiegels, auf dem Grunde des
Friedens, tiefversenkt in Gegenwart und Wirklichkeit
(p. 272)
(Was this still his body that he felt? or was it rather the reflection of his
body or perhaps even only the reflection of his sensibility? where was the
reality of his being
hovering between primal image and representation,
touching upon neither the one nor the other, more the symbol of both; hovering
between the remembered and the visible, both are mirrors and peaceably
reconciled to both, the ether-like present; and on the depth of the mirror, in
the depth of the peace, deeply sunk into the present and into the ‘real’
)

Here the body is not undergoing etherialization; to the contrary, Virgil’s body is
becoming something dense and indecipherable as ‘Urbild’ and ‘A bbild,’
memory and representation, collapse into death’s inalterable present. Plotia
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seeks to retrieve from language and to infuse into Virgil's death that
something (Sinnbild) which arises out o f the inter-reflection between memory
and representation. It is a way o f ‘leaving the world with meaning,’ a way o f
extracting one’s subjectivity from the vagaries and manipulations that are
inherent to the constructions of text.
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SCHICKSAL

The T.D.V. explores two distinct ‘beginnings' that involve its narrative
subject Virgil. One o f these beginnings describes Virgil as he enters through
the ‘name’ (pp. 59 - 60) into a pre-existing symbolic order of language.

A

passage taken from page 59 epitomizes the alienation associated with the
journey o f which naming is merely the first step:
m it Sein erfullen, desto frem der wird e r uns
with being, the more alien it becomes to us

(

.je m e h rw ir den Namen
the more we fill the name
).

The Name signals its

bearer’s acceptance of the unaltered continuity of order into which he or she
has been bom. In the case o f Virgil, however, writing in the political and social
chaos during and immediately following the collapse o f Republican Rome, the
value of the name and hence, the symbolic order which the name continued to
signify had fallen into desuetude, being without effect and without there being
any replacement by way of a new political or social order. Though one might
object that a single name could hardly signify so much, surely, the name
‘Virgil’ could be taken for an exception.
The dissolution o f the name is concurrent in T.D.V. with the destruction
o f the text.

On page 179 and elsewhere the dissolution o f the name is
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described as part and parcel o f Virgil’s intended destruction o f the Aeneid: the
name is enclosed in the sacrifice
place

where

einbeschlo&en
ru ft

the

m other

nameless is the being, nam eless is the
calls

der

Name

ist

im

O pfer

Namenlos wird das Sein, namenlos wird es, wo die M utter

The ‘sacrifice’ of name and text indicate a refusal on the part o f Virgil

to in any way acquiesce to the new order springing into existence during the
reign o f Augustus. Virgil attem pts instead to seek out a state o f pre-existence,
to escape the name and all it signifies, responding to and then retreating to
the place which is called, s im p ly ,

wo die M utter ruft

(where the mother

calls). Ironically, it is while in pursuit o f this first beginning, the beginning that
entails birth and subsequent naming, that Virgil encounters th a t other life
event with which things would commence anew, namely, the event o f his own
death. Death in T.D.V. is a return to a place unknown, to a place referred to
by the text as the ‘unknown fam iliar1(
p. 36).

das ungekannt W iedererkannte.......

When first confronted with death, Virgil, in this novel, attempts to

escape it by drawing so com pletely out o f life as to leave no identifying trace
behind, no trace o f either name or text. Gradually, Virgil discovers the will and
the courage not to escape, but to confront death, and in so doing to embrace
the destiny that he had heretofore fled. In T.D.V., Vergil’s eventual willingness
and ability to embrace death causes a reconfiguration of the relation between
author and text, a phenomenon that in T.D.V. is referred to as Schicksal.
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Feuer
A t the opening o f T.D.V., it is fate (Schicksaf) that is driving Virgil
arbitrarily toward his life’s ending: ‘He had allowed him self to be driven by fate,
and fate drove him to the end

’ (E r hatte sich vom Schicksal treiben

lassen, und das Schicksal trieb ihn dem Ende zu, p. 12).

Fate, in this

instance, is a purely accidental force over which the author o f the Aeneid
exerts neither control nor influence; it is as though the Aeneid itself were some
literary entertainm ent with no prospect o f altering the course o f Roman
culture, politics, o r civilization. In light o f these circumstances, T.D.V. depicts
Virgil as being driven not toward death but toward dying:
da hatte das Schicksal mit seinen Gewalten sich nochmals seiner
bemachtigt
hatte ihn rQckgezwungen zu dem Obel, das sein ganzes Leben
Oberschattet hatte, ja es war als hatte das Schicksal nur noch eine einzige
Schlichtheit for ihn Gbrig - die Schlichtheit des Sterbens.
(p. 13)
(
for fate’s mighty force had once more overpowered him.had forced him
back to the evil, the evil that had overshadowed his whole life; yes, it was
as though fate had just one lone moment of simplicity left for him —the simplicity
of dying.)

Dying (das Steiben) as opposed to death (d e r Tod) is a slipping anonymously,
if not quietly, out o f existence. Death, on the other hand, demands an
encounter o f sorts, a reckoning with and o f one’s life at that moment of
supreme personal crisis.
It is with pointed irony that Virgil muses to himself as if unawares..........
Warum hatte ihn das Schicksal gezwungen, hierher zurOckzukehren?! Hier
war nichts als Tod, nichts als Tod und Abertod!
(p. 23)
(Why had destiny forced him to return here?! There was nothing here
but death, death, and yet again, death.)

Here fate suddenly reveals itself to be something not wantonly arbitrary, but
rather, as something that forces a choosing.

Although Virgil references

Brindisi where he declaims ‘here is nothing but death, death and more death,’
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certainly the reader should consider the reference in its more immediate vein;
namely, that fate has not in this passage forced a return m erely to Brindisi, it
has forced a return (zuruckkehren) to death. In this sense, zuriickkehm n as a
‘return’ to death would indicate not a place revisited, but a confrontation with
something that by definition is unknowable.
W hile death makes its presence fe lt not solely at the moment o f agony,
but can also be evoked by circumstances during various moments o f one's
life, it is during the moment o f dying that the recognition o f death’s presence
becomes most ineluctable. And yet even here, while dying, Virgil would at first
more readily elect to slip out o f life, taking name and text quietly into the
proverbial ‘unknown Familiar1 (ungekannt Wiedererkannte) than to confront
and explore death directly. In T.D.V., it is fate (Schicksal) that positions Virgil
in such a way that the encounter with, or the avoidance of, death becomes a
m atter of personal struggle, a struggle from which issues much o f the
narrative drama.

The narrative o f

T.D.V. follows something o f an

autobiographical script in that Broch faced a sim ilar moment while prisoner
during Nazi occupied Austria.

W hile in a prison cell anticipating imminent

death, Broch recognized and acted upon the unscheduled choice which
circumstances had suddenly thrust upon him.

Acting upon the belief that

death was imminent, Broch chose to write his way into death, rather than to
recede voiceless into the silence o f oblivion. In so doing, Broch reaffirm s the
significance of the name and the power of the text; his death was not to be
one in which he is swept anonymously out of existence; instead, it was to be
an act in which Broch elects to affirm the name boldly.
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The prisoner Broch chooses to embrace death by inscribing it into a
text,1 so that death remains as an entombed eve n t one into which he and a
later reading audience could find themselves reflected.

By way o f contrast,

Virgil, at the very beginning o f T.D.V., finds his te xt is without significance
largely because the Aeneid has failed to assim ilate a ‘true’ experience o f
death into its narrative.

Ironically, the Aeneid at first seems distant and

irrelevant during the process o f his Virgil’s own dying.

As fate drives Virgil

haplessly on to his end, he is able to recognize that the event of death has not
in any way been monumentalized within the manuscript o f the Aeneid:
Er hatte sich vom Schicksal treiben lassen, und das Schicksal trieb ihn
demEndezu.

(p. 12)

(He had allowed himself to be driven by fate and fate drove him to the end.)

A subsequent passage makes plain, however, that the air of seeming
resignation proves only a thin disguise fo r profound inner conflict:
erwar zu einem Ruhelosen geworden, den Tod fliehend, den Tod
suchend, das Werk suchend, das Werk fliehend

(p. 13)

(
he had become one who was restless, fleeing death, seeking death, seeking
his work and fleeing his work
)

The twin impulse o f the search for, and the flight from , death accompanies a
simultaneous search for, and flight from, the text; and death and the text are
intertwined early on in T.D. V. Flight from death and text promises stony and
implacable oblivion, whereas a search for death and text, a search for death
within the text, indicates a potential for eternal renewal. Fate seems fo r the
moment to have overcome Virgil in this regard:
da hatte das Schicksal mitseinen Gewatten sich nochmals seiner
bemachtigt hatte ihm nochmals die Einfachheit und den Ursprung und
das Innen verwehrt, hatte den RQckweg ihm wieder abgebogen
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(p. 13)

(......since fate’s mighty force had once more overpowered him, had once more
barred him from the simplicity and the origin and the inner life, had
again once more deflected him from his back reaching journey.......)

So long as Virgil chooses to flee death and the text, he is condemned to an
ending that holds no promise o f subsequent beginnings.
Virgil first attempts to evade the encounter with death by way o f a
return to earliest memory; he turns away from death to seek the ‘bright eyes
and the always nearly-smiling, slightly sun-blushed face o f the m other.......
(

e r erinnerte sich d e r hellen Augen in dem im m er lachbereiten stets ein

wenig sonnverbrannted Gesicht d e r M utter.

p. 37).

The return to the

m other is physically enacted at the beginning o f Book II, where V irgil curls
him self up ‘

his legs drawn up ju st slightly he had rolled to the side, his

head rested on a cushion, his hips pressed into the mattress, his knees
resting upon one another

(

Die Beine ein wenig hochgezogen, hatte e r

sich zur Seite gerollt, sein K opfruhte a u f den Kissen, die Hufte druckte sich in
die Matratze ein, die Knie waren aufeinander geschicktet

p. 71 ).2 From

this physical re-enactment o f earliest memory, dying seems a passive state o f
remembrance
auscultates

and

the

observation,

world

(p.

a

71).

reclaimed
Soon

state

Virgil

is

from

which

confronted

by

Virgil
the

substancelessness o f the world that he is observing, and remembers,
attempting to look out upon the world without recognizing that the world, past
and present, is gazing back upon him:
Fast schien es unmdglich, mehr, noch, fast schien es unstatthaft daft
unsere letzterreichbare, wirklichste Wirklichkeit sich darauf beschrdnkte
bloGes Erinnerungsbild zu sein!
(p. 72)
(It seemed almost impossible, more than this, it seemed inadmissible that
the realest of the ‘real’, that which lay at our furthest reach should be limited
to a simple image out of memory!)
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Reality exists in a substance that is not immediately sensible. The ‘realest of
the Real’ is not an image in the mind’s eye nor in the eye o f memory, rather,
the ‘real’ exists as an encounter o f self with self.3 This second self, self as
other, is found reflected in memory, in text, or in death.

No m atter how

accurate in detail, the memory (iErinnerungsbild) representation without the
act of inter-reflection is mere phantasm; a discovery o f the ‘real’ demands
something in excess o f even perfect representation.
In dying Virgil initially seeks out the ‘realest of the Real’ (die wirklichste
Wirklichkeit) either through perfect memory or through the agency of
immediate and unobstructed observation. Virgil is soon led to concede that
the ‘real’ is at best something glimpsed only through an experience with death:
nur wer den Tod auf sich nimmt, vermag den Ring im irdischen zu
schlie&en, nur wer des Todes Auge sucht, dem bricht nicht das eigene,
wenn es ins Nichts schauen soil, nur wer zum Tode hinlauscht, der braucht
nicht zu flQchten, der darf bleiben
(p. 78)
(
only the one who takes death upon himself is able to bring the earthly
cycle to its close, only the one who seeks death’s eye, that one does not
shatter his own eye when it is necessary to gaze into the void; only the one
who auscultates death has no need to flee, that one may remain
)

Virgil wishes to attain the elusive ‘real’, particularly during this moment of
dying.

The phrase ‘death’s eye’ (des Todes Auge) illustrates how death

returns the subject’s gaze, and that the ‘real’ exists only in the interplay
between observer and observed. The ‘real’ lies hidded beyond death’s veil,
behind the veil of the text, and is only glimpsed in the reflection o f self peering
into self.
As Virgil tells it: ‘only he who seeks (out) death’s eye

need not

flee, he may remain (der d a rf bleiben): The phrase ‘he may remain’ refers to
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the reality to which Virgil might attain through the encounter with death.
Virgil’s position is such that the ‘real’ to which he attains becomes something
immanent to his own subjectivity; as death is written into the text, so the ‘real’
enters into the name.

The phrase ‘de r darf bleiben’ indicates that the one

about whom it is spoken, ‘the one who may remain’, may do so by having
implicated him-/herself into that same ‘real.’

Reference to a subsequent

passage secures this interpretation:
wem es veriiehen worden ist die flQchtige FIQchtigkeit der
Todesgestait zu erhaschen, wem es im unabiassigen Lauschen und Suchen
gelingt den Tod zur Gestalt zu bringen, der hat mit deren Echtheit auch die
seiner eigenen Gestalt gefunden, er hat seinen eigenen Tod gestaltet und
damit sich selbst zur Gestalt gebracht
(pp. 80 - 81)
(
to the one to whom it has been granted that he should capture the fleeting
phantom of death's form, to the one who through assiduous listening and searching
succeeds in bringing death into form, this same one has by virtue of his own
authenticity found his own form, he has given form to his own death and with
this given even himself form.......)

By capturing (erhaschen) death’s ‘form ’, we capture our own form (seiner
eigener Gestalt), and in the process our own death is ‘form ed’ (sein eigen
Tod gestaltet). From this passage it becomes clear that the subject realizes
itself (sich selbst zur Gestalt bringen) through a process o f inter reflection and
that death is the great m irror into which the subject casts its own reflection.4 It
is in this sense that, in seeking to imbue the text with the ‘real,’ Virgil must
seek to imbue the text with death, a place from which the subject can find him/herself reflected in all o f his or her possible aspects.
The reader begins to recognize that Virgil’s passivity at the beginning of
T.D.V. is grounded in a failure or an unwillingness to choose; fate will dictate
Virgil’s ‘end’ only so long as Virgil fails to act, to choose fo r him self —’fate
drove him to the end’ (

das Schicksal trieb ihn dem Ende zu).
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By the

beginning of the second book, the act o f choosing, o f taking sides, takes on
importance as a central issue:
doch die grofte Linie seines lebens war nicht eigene Wahl nach freiem
Willen, sie war ein MOssen gewesen, ein MQssen
befehlend, da& er
seine eigene Gestalt in der des Todes suche, um hiedurch der Seele Freiheit
zu gewinnen; denn die Freiheit ist ein MQssen der Seele, deren Heil und
Unheil stets auf dem Spiele steht, und er hatte sich dem Befehl gefOgt,
gehorsam seiner Schicksalsaufgabe.
(pp. 81 - 82)
(
yet the great line of his life was not of his own choosing according to
a free will, it had been rather a compulsion, a compulsion.......commanding
that he seek his own form in that of death in order to thereby win the
freedom of his own soul; for freedom is a compulsion of the soul whose
redemption of damnation remains always in play and he had heeded the
command, obedient to the task assigned him by fate.)

Here the text entertains a pair o f contrarieties: Freedom arises out of
constraint; fate is the construct of individual effort (Schicksalsaufgabe). One
recognizes that ‘free w ill' is not, in and o f itself, something o f one’s own
choosing; it simply is, meaning that it exists and is available to us.

The

exercise of free w ill is another matter. To gain freedom for the soul’ (free
will), the individual m ust confront the lim it that death places on all human
movement and action; he is constrained to seek his/her own form in death, he
is compelled to search out reality in the ‘unknown fam iliar1 o f death’s own
province.

W here the text states that Virgil has ‘given him self over to the

command’ -th a t he seek out his own form in death and that he be ‘obedient to
the task set before him by fate’- it is Virgil finally shaping destiny, rather than
the other way around.
For Virgil, the arbitrariness of fate and the arbitrariness o f the text are
simultaneously overcome; the ‘real’ attained by the encounter with death is a
reality that can be situated within an individual subjectivity, as well as a reality
that can be rediscovered within the text:
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die SchOpfung aus der Starke des todeserkennenden Wortes
(

(p. 81)

creation issuing from the strength of the death-recognizing word..... )

W here the individual is able to discover in death an available reality from
which ‘form ’ can be given to one’s life, the word (text) imbued with a
cognizance of death (todeserkennendes Wortes) is one through which reality
itself m ight be reshaped. In the experience with death, as in the experience
with the text, there is a hidden ‘real’ that can be attained, though never
revealed. The Aeneid is one such text that has profoundly transformed the
reality o f the world to which it was introduced.5 The Virgil o f T.D.V. harbored
serious doubts about the effects which ‘his’ text would work upon the world
and so hesitates to accept the responsibility of authorship.

Until the

confrontation with Augustus Caesar in Book III convinces him to do otherwise,
it is Virgil’s intent to go out o f the world leaving behind neither name nor
written word.

Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen
Virgil’s eventual encounter with fate (Schicksal) is not something to
which the mere circumstance o f his dying propels him; rather Virgil
purposefully elects fate as oblivion’s alternative. It would be easier fo r Virgil to
slip quietly into death, taking all trace o f a previous existence with him as he
goes.

Instead, he chooses a return to the ‘unknown Familiar’ and a

confrontation with what T.D.V. refers to as the ‘realest of the Real’ (die
wirklichste Wirklichkeit).

The ‘real’, according to T.D.V., is always with us,

always available to our discovery, though the act o f discovering the ‘real’ is
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seldom exercised.

The following locates the ‘realest o f the Real’ at the

inchoate stage of our existence:
in der Kette der Erinnerung, in die wir geschmiedet sind, die ersten
Glieder die gewichtigsten sein sollten, als waren sie, gerade sie, die
wirklichste Wirklichkeit

(p. 72)

(
in the memory chain into which we are forged the first link should be
the greatest as though it just exactly it were the realest of the ‘Real’
)

This *wirklichste W irklichkeit, this ‘first link’ in the memory chain, actually
precedes memory, suggesting that it, the ‘real’, were a hidden prerequisite
necessary to all existence. To elect one’s fate, in the T.D.V., is nothing less
than to return to memory’s first link, to return to this ‘realest of the Real.’6
It is telling that, when in search of earliest memory Virgil first inclines
toward memory of the song o f the father, the father’s potter’s song ( Tdpferiied)
that the father had once sung while laboring as a potter and later, during
Virgil’s childhood, songs that the father sang as an interlude during long bouts
o f storytelling:
und er erinnerte sich des Vaters, der erst mit der Heirat zum richtigen
Bauem hatte werden kdnnen und dessen einstmaliger TOpferberuf dem
Sohn gering gedeucht hatte, obwohl er sehr schfln gewesen war den
abendlichen Erzahlungen von der Arbeit an den bauchigen weinfassem
und edelgeschwungenen OlkrQgen, die der Vater verfertigt hatte, zu
lauschen, den Erzahlungen, von dem lehmformenden Daumen
schonen
Erzahlungen, unterbrochen von manchem aiten Tdpferiied.
(pp. 37 - 38)
(
and he remembered his father who at the time of his marriage first had
been able to become a genuine farmer and whose earlier potter's trade had
little impressed the son, although he, the son, was very pleased to attend
the telling of the work-stories in the evening, stories of the large-bellied
wine ums and of nobly fashioned vessels for holding oil, works that the
father had done; he was pleased to listen intently to the stories of the clayfashioning thumb.......beautiful stories interspersed with many an old potter's
song.)

Initially, this apparent ‘first link’ in the chain o f memory promises to be the
Urbild

that will grant access to the ‘realest o f the Real’ (die wirklichste

W irklichkeit).

The text implies a continuum o f song from ‘father to son to
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father to son,’ as though the Aeneid were an accumulation of song occurring
at some point in the heretofore mentioned ‘unending line o f fathers' (die
unendiiche Reihe der VSter p.

178).

The Aeneid, however, is the

‘accumulation’ o f song with the addition o f something singularly new; with the
advent of the Aeneid'L all the ‘father's’ stories, o f which it is the ‘composite’,
suddenly undergo a radical alteration of meaning. The change is due to the
replacement o f one Urbifd fo r another; the Aeneid begins with a change in
what from the beginning is real. This new ’elem ent with regenerative force is
the thing which Virgil resists encountering at the time o f his dying; it is an
element that not only has the power to renew a traumatized post-revolutionary
Rome, it also has the potential to reshape the social, cultural and political
configuration of Rome. The Urbild inscribed by Virgil into the Aeneid has the
power to redefine the ‘real’ for Rome.
The chain’s first link is nothing so ‘tangible’ as childhood’s earliest
memory, nor is it traceable to some yet earlier version of the story (the
Aeneid) now being told; rather the transformative elem ent within the Aeneid
appears on the scene as something previously unknown. Here in the passage
taken from pages 3 7 - 3 8 , the Urbild of which Virgil is in search appears in the
guise of Maya, the presence of the unremembered mother (pp. 37 - 38):
er spQrte sein Blut, er spQrte die Erinnerungstiefe seines Kdrpers
er
erinnerte sich der hellen Augen in dem immer lachbereiten stets ein wenig
sonnverbrannten Gesicht der Mutter
(p. 37)
(
he traced his blood, he traced the memory depths of his body
he
remembered the bright eyes and the always nearly-smiling, slightly sun burnt
face of the mother.......)
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Unlike the memory o f the father that is particularized by the representation o f
the remembered Tdpfertied, memory o f the mother remains general and
undefined, by virtue o f the absence o f particular detail. Maja is present in the
form o f this pair o f bright and lucid eyes. The first link in the memory chain is
to be discovered hidden behind the eyes of the mother.

Her eyes, like

‘Death’s eye,’ defer and withhold the moment o f Virgil’s return to death.
Nonetheless, something behind the eyes o f the m other and beyond Death’s
eye remains present, if unseen. W hat remains is that elem ent o f the ‘realest
o f the Real’ which precedes (t/r-bild) and gives meaning to all representation.
Retrieving that elem ent hidden beyond Death’s eye offers Virgil the promise of
an integrated text and an integrated existence at the moment o f his dying:
nur wer den Tod auf sich nimmt, vermag den Ring im Irdischen zu
schlie&en, nur wer des Todes Auge sucht, dem bricht nicht das eigene,
wenn es ins Nichts schauen soil, nur wer zum Tode hinlauscht, der braucht
nicht zu flQchten, der darf bleiben
(p. 78)
(
only the one who takes death upon himself is able to bring the earthly
cycle to its close, only the one who seeks Death's eye, that one does not
shatter his own eye when it is necessary to gaze into the void; only the one
who auscultates death has no need to flee, that one may remain
)

‘Closing the ring’ (der Ring im Irdischen schlie&en) amounts to acheiving
validity for the narrational elem ents within the Aeneid by means o f integrating
those narrative elements into a larger cultural context. The ‘stories’ passed on
from ‘father to son to father to son’ that are woven into the text o f the Aeneid
are made valid by re-embracing those elements in the ‘world’ (im Irdischen)
from which they spring. By closing the circle with those elements from which it
originates, the Aeneid is able, ultimately, to alter the ‘real’ from which it
springs.
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The above passage states somewhat enigm atically ‘only he who takes
death upon him self
allowed to rem ain.'

only he who auscultates death need not flee, is
The act o f taking death upon oneself (Tod-auf-sich-

nehm eri) occurs not ju st at the tim e o f one’s dying, but at any moment that
one is able to ascertain the ‘real.’ The act o f Taking-death-upon-oneself,’ in
the case o f Broch's T.D.V., implies an ethics whereby the author (Virgil/Broch)
recognizes, and thereby accepts, responsibility fo r the power o f the text to
transform the world into which it is written.
hinlauscht

The dictum wer zum Tode

de r d a rf bleiben indicates that a recognition o f the ‘real’ beyond

representation involves one in a subjective relation with the ‘real;’ text alters
subject alters text in such a way that a transform ation in the ‘real’, and hence
the world, is being effected by the relation between subject and text and
between text and the world it represents.
The form ula Tod-auf-sich-nehmen, taken from the above passage, is
synonymous with the formula Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen found on page 144;
each implies a relation of inter-reflection between text and the individual
subject leading to a creation o f the ‘real.’ The ‘real’ is not something absolute
and apart from the subject, rather the ‘real’ exists only in the context o f an
inter-reflective engagement between an individual subject with something
outside itself.

That relation is defined on pages 113 - 114 in terms o f its

antithesis:
dieses Nichtwissen wurde ihm vom ganzen Rund des Erschaubaren
zusammen mit der Schonheit zugestrahlt, zart und dabei fast damonisch als
Verlockung, als die Qberhebliche VerfOhrung der Bedeutungsgleichheit,
damonisch von der auOersten Grenze her zugeflQstert, zur innersten
hindringend ein schimmemdes ozeanisches FIQstem, monddurchstrOmt
ihn durchstrOmend, gleichgewichtig wie die schwebenden Gezeiten des
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Alls, deren flGstemde Gewaltdas Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare
ineinandervertauscht, die Dingvieffalt in die Einheit des Selbst die
Denkvielfalt in die Einheit der Welt bindet beides aber zur
Schonheit entwirklicht Wissenlosigkeit ist das Wissen der SchOnheit
Erkenntnistosigkeit ist ihr Erkennen, jenes ohne Vorsprung von Denken,
dieses ohne OberschuQ von Wirklichkeit und in der Erstarrung ihres
Gleichgewichtes, erstarrt das flutende Gleichgewicht zwischen Denken und
Wirklichkeit
(pp. 113-14)
(
this absence of cognition was radiated to him from the full round of the
visible world together with the beautiful, it was a gentle and therefore almost
demonic temptation, like the arrogant seduction to an indifference to meaning,
the demonic whispered home from the outermost fringes, a whisper of shimmering
ocean penetrating to the most internal self, this whispering shot through with
moonlight a moonlight continuing to stream in, balanced like the floating tides
of the universe whose whispering authority interchanges the visible and the
invisible, binding the multiplicity of the thing in the unity of self, binding
the multiplicity of thought in the unity of the world, each, however, undone
as they are transformed into beauty: the knowledge of beauty is a knowledge
without knowledge, its percipience is without perception, this without an
origin in thought this without the surplus of the 'real' and in the lifelessness
of its balance, stiff is the floating balance between thinking and the ‘real’
)

Here the text describes a state o f beauty (Schdnheit) in which knowledge of
truth (das Wissen) and perception of the real (die Erkenntnis) are vitiated to
the point of being rendered completely ineffectual ‘

a knowledge of beauty

is a knowledge without knowledge, its percipience is without perception......
(

W issenlosigkeit is t das Wissen der Schonheit, Erkenntnistosigkeit ist ih r

Erkennen).

Here the text takes up the argument that Broch makes with

consistency throughout his writing not against beauty p e r se, but against
beauty as it is expressed in the notion of ‘art for art’s sake.’ In terms of the
Virgil o f T.D.V. and o f his relation to the Aeneid, a text devoid of truth and
devoid o f the ‘real’ is at best an idle amusement. The greater threat, however,
is that unless the text should allow its reader to arrive at some notion of truth
and o f the ‘real’, then the text lends itself, as in the case o f Augustan Rome, to
the manipulation of political forces.

Much of the Aeneid’s narrative,

particularly those elements reinforcing the legitimacy o f Augustus’ political
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heritage, could be used to shape the political and cultural reality of Rome
according the wishes and aspirations o f Augustus and his successors.
In T.D.V., Virgil fears that subsequent to his death the text, perversely,
w ill become an instrument by which Augustus will tighten control over the
people and the destiny o f Rome.

W hereas Virgil fears the nightmare,

illustrated on page 21, in which the faceless masses respond in unison to the
will o f a m aster -th e dumb brooding m ass anim al
Person o f the One

(

se lf adulating in the

das dem pf brutende M assentier.

anbetend in der Person des Einen

sich selbst

)— the Aeneid is set out as the antidote

to such numbing obsequiousness. The text attempts to establish the anitdote
through the interchange between thing’ and ‘self,’ between ‘thought1 and
‘world’, binding the m ultiplicity o f the thing with the unity o f self,7 binding the
m ultiplicity o f thought with the unity o f the world die Dingvielfalt in die Einheit
der Selbst, die Denkvielfalt in die Einheit d e r W elt bindet

Dingvielfalt is

the incomprehensible manifold nature o f the real, the manifold nature o f truth
that reaches beyond language’s capacity to represent. The paradox o f a text
such as the Aeneid is that it enables its reader to encounter the impossible,
not perfectly completely, but to the extent that truth can be Known and that the
‘real’ can be perceived.

The process whereby this occurs is one through

which the reader’s subjectivity is defined in relation to the world and the world
in relation to the individual subject.
The idea of the subject defined in relation to the ‘world’ is further
explored in this subsequent passage:
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und so wuGte er auch, daG in soicher Wahrheit die Pficht alien
KQnstlertums liegt, die Pflichtzur selbsterkennenden Wahrtieitsfindung
und WahrheitsauGerung, dem KQnstlerzur Aufgabe gesetzt, damit die
Seele, gewahr des groGen Gleichgewichts zwischen dem Ich und dem All,
sich im All wiederfinde, damit sie das, was dem Ich durch die
Selbsterkenntnis zugewachsen ist wiedererkenne als Seins-Zuwachs im
All, in der W elt ja im Menschentum Qberhaupt
(p. 133)
(and so he also knew that the duty of all artistry lay in such a truth, the duty
to a self enlightening discovery of the truth and of that truth’s expression,
before the artist is set out the task of rediscovering the great balance between
the T and the ‘All,’ so that the soul might recover herself in the ‘All’ recognizing
that what increases in the ‘I’ by virtue of self-cognizance also results in an
augmentation of the ‘All,’ an increase for the world, indeed, an increase
for mankind overall
)

T.D.V. posits the soul (die Seele) as an observer between the 1’ (das Ich) and
the ‘AH’ (das All) something vastly more general than the ego and from within
which ‘truth’ may be perceived. It is significant that the point o f observation is
situated not at the locus o f the ‘I,’ rather it is suspended somewhere between
the ‘I’ and that place in which, fo r all practical considerations, truth is
contextualized. There is nothing new in describing the subject, die Seele in
this case, in terms o f a relation, it is the relation between the ego (das Ich) and
something else that defines individual subjectivity.

Because psychoanalytic

parlance locates that ‘something else’ within the realm of the Unconscious, let
us equate the Unconscious with what T.D.V. refers to as das All. In so doing,
we move to within a step o f understanding what T.D.V. offers as the definition
for ‘truth.’ Truth is a point in the Unconscious to which the ego (das Ich)
connects to form a radically altered subjectivity. The alteration of subjectivity,
described here as ‘Augmentation o f Being’ (Seins-Zuwachs), effects the
introduction of something heretofore unknown. Truth, by this definition, would
be an exceedingly rare thing, a phenomenon that alters the nature o f the
‘real.’ T.D.V. spells out clearly this result in s ta tin g :...... what increases in the
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‘I’ by virtue o f self-cognizance also results in an augmentation o f the
‘AH’

(

was dem Ich dutch die Selbsterkenntnis zugewachsen ist,

wiedererkenne als Seins-Zuwachs im A ll

).8 If the Aeneid should be a

truth bearing text, then it is one that has the potential to alter the ‘real’ for both
the individual reading subject and the world at large. Though Virgil protests
that he wishes to destroy the Aeneid because it is an inane text, his real
reason fo r wishing to take the text with him into Death's oblivion is precisely
because he fears what it might effect upon the world.
One thing is certain to the Virgil o f T.D.V.: that should his text be
allowed to exist subsequent to his death, an alteration o f the ‘real’ would be
effected, a change that would implicate his own person.

That change is

described as one which would transgress already established frontiers, would
redraw the customary boundaries o f being:
wenn es also auch immer nur sinnbildhafte Erkenntnis bleibt, sie ist
gerade infolge solcher Sinnbildhaftigkeit imstande, die unQberschreitbaren innersten und au&ersten Grenzen des Seins trotzdem zu neuen
Wirklichkeiten auszudehnen, eineswegs bloB zu neuen Formen, nein, zu
neuen Inhalten der Wirklichkeit, weil sich eben hierin das tiefste
Wirklichkeitsgeheimnis, das Geheimnis der Entsprechung auftut, die
gegenseitige Entsprechung von Ich-Wirklichkeit und Welt
Wirklichkeit
(p. 133)
(
even if it were to always remain only a symbolic perception, it is by
virtue of such a quality of symbolization capable of expanding to new
realities the infranchisable inner and outer borders of being, in any
case of expanding to new forms, no, even to new content for the 'real'
since herein the deepest secret of the ‘real’, the secret of the correlation
came to the surface, the mutual correlation of T-reality and ‘worid’reality
)

Elsewhere in T.D.V. it is stated that ‘genuine art breaks through boundaries’
(;Echte Kunst durchbricht Grenzen p. 239); in the above passages taken from
page 133 the reader is informed that that transgression is accompanied by an
‘enlargement o f Being’ (Seins-zuwachs) with the addition of new content to the
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‘real’ (zu neuen Inhalten de r W irklichkeit...). Reality’s most profound ‘secret1
(das tiefste Wirklichkeits-geheimnis) is the effective correspondence between
the ‘real’ for the individual subject and the ‘real’ for the world as a whole; a
change for the former has the potential for effecting a change in the latter.
Though he may pretend otherwise the dilemma for Virgil in T.D.V. is not
whether he should find the courage to look ‘beyond death’s eye’ but having
done so, having discovered some terrible truth that has been inscribed into
the text o f the Aeneid does he now, at the moment o f death, have the courage
to bequeath this truth to Rome as part o f a literary legacy.
Virgil seeks to elude the necessity of claiming responsibility fo r his text
by attempting to derisively declare it merely ‘beautiful,’ to call it an amusing
diversion that does little to effect change in the Rome fo r which it was written.
The most obvious refutation of this pretense lies in the fact that the Aeneid
clearly establishes for Augustus a right to political legitimacy; the point is not
lost on Augustus who in Book III will use every means of persuasion to
prevent Virgil from destroying the text critical to the reshaping o f political order
under his rule. Virgil seems intent on self deception in this passage, in which
he all but declares himself incapable o f the sort of virtue necessary to creating
an effective work of art:
denn wer zur Liebe unfShig ist wer unfShig ist zu ihrer Gemeinschaft
der muR aus der BrQckenlosigkeit seiner Vereinsamung sich in die
SchOnheit retten
(p. 143)
(
for whoever is incapable of love, whoever is incapable of love's communion
he must turn to beauty to rescue himself from unbridged aloneness.......)

Beauty (Schdnheif) in this instance, defines the quality of a work that defies
subjective interaction; it is a quality that denotes the absence o f truth as it was
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defined in the above passage taken from page 133.

The one who is

incapable o f love is by definition incapable o f establishing the subjective
interrelation that has the recognition o f truth as its end.
Virgil concludes his musings by assigning to love this somewhat
improbable mission:
[die] Liebe, obwohl zur Schdnheitsschaffung begnadet, nimmermehr auf
Schdnheit, sondem einzig und allein auf ihre ureigenste Aufgabe gerichtet
ist, auf jene menschlichste ailer Aufgaben, die attzeit und ausschieGlich
Schicksal-auf- sich-nehmen heiBt; oh, dies aiiein ist Liebe, doch es hatten
die Toten keinertei Gemeinschaft untereinander, sie haben einander
vergessen—
(p. 144)
(
though graced with the power to create beauty love has never had beauty
as its aim, rather singular and alone the primary task to which love aims is that
of the most human of all tasks, the eternal and exclusive task that is called
taking-fate-upon-oneself; oh, this alone is love, yet the dead have no
communion among one another, the dead have forgotten one another—)

Love leads to the taking-fate-upon-oneself (Shicksal-auf-sich-nehmen) which
we have already seen is analogous to taking death upon oneself ( Tod-aufsich-nehmen)-, either leads to a certain circularity between the individual
subject and the ‘real’ (see: p. 78).

W hen Virgil states that ‘the dead have

forgotten one another1 he speaks with circumspection to imply that the ‘truth1
of the Aeneid will die with him, as though without his presence as guarantor
thereof truth itself would vanish from the text.

O f course, Virgil is not

altogether mistaken in this regard, in that even truth is subject to the grossest
sort of distortions and manipulations.
W ithin the text o f T.D.V., a precise moment occurs where Virgil
enunciates a desire to ‘take fate upon him self.1 There Lysanias, Virgil’s
imaginary boy companion, declares auspiciously:
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*Ewig ist der Widerhall deines Gedichtes”.

(p. 171)

(“Eternal is the echo of your poem’.)

To which Virgil counters:
“Nein, ich will den Widerhall meiner Sb'mme nicht mehr hOren; ich
erwarte die Stimme, die auBerhalb der meinen ist”.

(p. 171)

(“No, I no longer want to hear the echo of my own voice; I await the voice
that is outside my own.”)

Lysanias predicts that through the Aeneid, Virgil's own voice w ill continue to
speak forever. Virgil, on the other hand, awaits a voice that is ‘outside his
own’ (die au&erhalb der meinen ist). This personal declaration on the part of
Virgil carries forward the general theme of Sprache au&erhalb d e r Sprache
(cf: p. 167 et passim) developed systematically over the course o f Book II. It
also points to a duality in language that is shared by both text and subject;
though Virgil has authored the Aeneid it is not his own voice but that o f
another that calls to him from the text; the echo (die W iedertialf) o f which
Lysanias speaks is no longer the voice of its creator.

W e recounted from

page 133 the mirroring relationship between subject and world expressed in
the p h ra se

‘the corresponding opposition between the ‘real’ o f the 1’ and

the ‘real’ of the world (“...d/e gegenseitige Entsprechung von Ich-W irklichkeit
und W elt-Wirklichkeit’) .

Subjectivity is the phenomenon that mediates

between these two realms so that the voice with which one speaks and the
voice which one ‘hears’ as one speaks are not the same; they have differing
points o f origin, so that what is spoken by the subject is ‘spoken twice, once
from a point of origin from within the speaking subject and again from a point
o f origin somewhere else within the world.’ On page 171 it is revealed that
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this second voice, this altered echo, has its origins nowhere else in the world
but in the context of language; the ‘real’ is in language and only within
language; the ‘real’ for Virgil is that point within the text o f the Aeneid from
which he hears his own voice calling back to him. This other voice is not
precisely ‘his own voice’ but something vaguely like it, something that T.D.V.
elsewhere

describes

as

the

‘unknown

Familiar’

(die

ungekannt

Wiedererkannte).

Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit
Virgil’s embrace o f fate (Schicksal) entails a patient waiting and
listening, and at the beginning of Book II, the reader finds him preparing in just
this manner to scrutinize the silence that promises to release its abundance of
hidden truth:
nichts war dringficher als allein zu bleiben, urn nochmals und
nochmals alles Sein in sich zu versammeln

(p. 71)

(
nothing was more pressing that to remain alone and to again and
again gather into oneself all being
)

Although this passage depicts Virgil ‘gathering into him self all being’ while in
pursuit o f truth, suggesting an inward scrutiny, other passages show him
turning outward toward the realm o f the gods.

In this later passage, for

instance, he speaks of an exterior zone that resists his entry and yet beckons
with the fam iliar if not intimate quality o f W iedererkanntheit
die Sterne brannten groB in ihrem gro&en Wandelgang, trOstlich und
stark und ruhefiimmemd vor beruhingender Wiedererkanntheit
als
ware zwischen ihrem Raum und dem der untem Welt mittendurch eine
gleichsam hart-undurchdringliche, gerade noch fOr den Blickdurchlassige, trobkristallene WOlbungeinverspannt.
(p. 91)
(
the stars shone large in their great circuit, comforting and strong and
quietly shimmering with reassuring familiarity
as though between the
realm of the stars and the realm of earth below there were interposed
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a hard-impenetrable, cloud-troubled crystal firmament though which one
could glimpse to the other side
)

Virgil seeks passage here through the ‘hard-impenetrable’ barrier between
him self and what is designated as ‘the already known but forgotten’ (die
W iedererkanntheit). Comparing these two passages taken from pages 71 and
91 respectively we discover that Virgil’s search for truth and his discovery of
the ‘real’ entail an inter-penetration of what is intimate -w h e re all being is
gathered into o n e se lf- and o f w hat is foreign -th a t which exists ‘on the other
side o f the moon’. This zone beyond the firmament, like death itself, yields to
Virgil's scrutiny through a process o f inter-reflection. Recalling the alluded-to
experience o f the gaze into ‘Death’s eye’ (p. 78), the break into the ‘hard
impenetrable’ requires that Virgil observe himself observing.

Introspection

leading to a discovery o f truth and the ‘real’ requires that one turn one’s gaze
outward for the purpose o f scrutinizing what lies within.
The difficulty o f the task faced by Virgil in T.D.V. is not so ‘sim ple’ as to
discover and render into words some ‘divine’ precept called truth; rather
Virgil’s task is to create a text such that those mirroring aspects o f language
which might be called ‘divine and human’, ‘true and real’, ‘self and other1interreflect through the medium o f its words. In this sense, Virgil strives through
the medium o f the text to cause the inter-reflection o f the fate o f man with that
of the gods:
-:oh, es ist das Gottesschicksal des Menschen und es ist das menschlich
Erschaubare im Schicksal der Gdtter, es ist ihrer beider unabdnderiiche
Bestimmung, stets aufs neue zum Wege der Wiedergeburt gelenkt zu
werden, es ist ihrer beider untilgbare Schicksalshoffnung, nochmals den
Kreis ausschreiten zu dQrfen, damit das Nachherzum Vorher werde und
jeder Punkt des Weges alle Vergangenheit und alle Zukunft in sich
vereinige
(pp. 44 - 45)
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(-:oh, it is the divine fate of man and it is what is perceptibly human
in the fate of the gods, it was their mutual unalterable destiny to be
again and again newly placed upon the path of rebirth, it is their
mutual indestructible hope within their fate once again to be able to
break through the cycle, so that what is to follow becomes what has already
been and that at every point in the cycle all past and all future unite
as one
)

The divine and the human, the true and the real are two aspects o f one fate
which are never joined, never form a ‘complementary whole’ but, instead, they
circle one another like points on inter-reflecting, though distinctly separate,
planes. In the scenario suggested by the above passage human perception
(das menschlich Erschaubare) effects powerful and consequential changes,
enough to transgress the limits circumscribed by a given reality. The claim
here is that making truth available to the reader through the text has the effect
o f reshaping the ‘real.’
Virgil describes the relation between truth and reality in terms of an
ongoing dynamic between ‘the expenditure of being’ and death:

denn in

unaufhdrlichem W echselspiel m it dem Seinsablauf steht d e r Tod

(p. 78).

In this dichotomy, the expenditure of being pertains to human death pertains
to the divine.

The instance o f ‘death’ broadens the field of play from the

particular to the general, from an inward gazing to an outward reflecting
subjectivity. Thus, the Virgil o f T.D.V. does not assert that the text ‘reveals’
truth, rather that the text provides the outward medium o f silence through
which truth can be searched:
wem es verliehen worden ist, die flQchtige Fluchtigkeit der Todesgestalt zu erhaschen, wem es im unabldssigen Lauscben und Suchen geiingt
den Tod zur Gestalt zu bringen, der hat mit deren Echtheit auch die seiner
eigenen Gestalt gefunden, er hat seinen eigenen Tod gestaltet und damit
sich selbst zur Gestalt gebracht.
(pp. 80 - 81)
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(
when it has been granted that one should capture the swift fleetness of
death’s form, to the one who succeeds through tireless listening and searching
in bringing death into form, that one has also found the form of his own death,
he has given shape to his own death and therewith realized the form of his own
being
)

Here it is stated that Death’s form can be no more than glimpsed (die fluchtige
Fluchtigkeit der Todesgestalt zu erhaschen), yet this fleeting perception of
Death’s fleeting form results, according to this passage, in the altered
configuration o f an individual subjectivity.9

The altem ance between the

passive and the active mode is significant: wem es im unablassigen Lauschen
und Suchen gelingt den Tod zur Gestalt zu bringen, d e r hat ....... seiner
eigenen Gestalt gefunden, e r hat seinen eigenen Tod gestaltet

To see

‘Death's form ’ is to ‘see’ the echo of one's own (altered) subjectivity peering
from the text; this perception, the perception o f self in the reflection of
death/text, results from a process of change that can be defined as the
working o f the ‘deed’ within the word.
The transformative power o f the word, one o f T.D.V.’s fundamental
themes, is formulated in numerous passages as a process by which truth is
translated into the ‘real’ and the ‘real’ into truth. Broch’s Virgil insists that this
in not a process whereby word is translated into word, representation into
representation; truth and reality in T.D.V. are not indistinguishable, not
indifferently interchangeable.

Virgil specifies that the interchange ‘doubles

world-form’:
das Wechselspiel der verdoppelten Weltgestaltung, Wirklichkeit zur
Wahrheit umgestaltet, Wahrheit zur Wirklichkeit
(p. 95)
(
.the exchange of the doubling world-form, the real transformed into
truth, truth into the real
)
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This process o f exchange between truth and the ‘real’ indicates the general
manner in which one constructs the other. Critical to an understanding o f this
process, as it is defined in T.D.V., o f the exchange between truth and the ‘real’
is the phrase verdoppelten Weltgestaltung (doubled worfd-form). The phrase
obliquely accuses the inanity o f the text that is self-enclosed, that bears
reference to nothing ‘outside’ itself, that effects no exchange between the
human and the divine, between Tod (Death) and Seinsablauf (events as they
unfold in the course o f (human) existence). The inane text does nothing to
translate events as they unfold in one’s life into a larger cultural, social and
political context. The image of the ‘masses

self adulating in the person of

the One (cf.: p. 21)’ is a caution against the existence which has no larger
context in which to observe itself being reflected. The Aeneid succeeds as a
‘doubler o f world-form’ to the extent that it reflects the Roman populace (die
Menschengemeinschaff) not in a mere representation of itself, but in the
fiction of the ‘unending line o f fathers’ (p. 178), translating the intimate truth of
personal existence into a larger historical Teal.’
Virgil analyses the process o f ‘world-doubling’ in a passage that treats
not specifically o f truth and the real, but rather o f ‘Sprachwelf and ‘Dingwelt,’
their respective fields o f play. The passage is cited at length below:
eigentlichster Auftrag der Dichtung ware, die Namen der Dinge zu
heben, ja, selbst wenn es ihr im Aufklang ihrer grO&ten Augenblicke
geiungen ware, einen Blick in das Niemals-Erstarrende der Sprache zu
werfen, unter deren Tiefenlicht unberOhrt und keusch das Wort der
Dinge schwebt, die Keuschheit der Namen auf dem Grunde der Dingwelt
sie vermag im Gedicht wohl die SchOpfung im Worte zu verdoppeln,
hingegen vermag sie nicht das Verdoppelte wiederzur Einheitzusammenzufassen, sie vermag es nicht weil die Scheinumkehrung, weil die Ahnung,
weil die Schdnheit, weil all dies, was sie als Dichtung bestimmt und sie zur
Dichtung macht ausschlie&lich in der Weltverdopplung statthat, es
bleiben Sprachwelt und Dingwelt getrennt zwiefach die Heimat des Wortes,
zwiefach die Heimat des Menschen, zwiefach der Abgrund der Wesenheit
zwiefach aberauch die Keuschheit des Seins und damitverdoppeltzur
Unkeuschheit die gleich einer Wiedergeburt ohne Geburt alle Ahnung wie
alle Schdnheit durchtrdnkt und den Keim der Weitenzersprengung in sich

248

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

tragt, die Ur-Unkeuschheit des Seins, wetche von der Mutter gefQrchtet
wird; unkeusch ist der Mantel der Dichtung

(pp. 179 -80)

(
the truest work of poetry would be to evoke the name of things, yes, even if
when its greatest moment sounds it were able to cast a glance into perpetuallyfluid speech, under whose profound light, untouched and chaste, the word for
things lingered, the chasteness of the name on the grounds of the ‘thing-world’,
speech, through the poem, is well able to double creation through words, although
poetry is never able to refashion unity from the doubled creation, poetry is
not able to do so because the seeming return, because the intuition, because the
beauty, because all these things that are determined by poetry and that are
thus made into poetry take place exclusively in the doubled world; speech-world
and thing-world remain separate, two-fold the sphere of the word, two-fold the
home-place of man, two-fold the abyss of being, two-fold the purity of being and
being thereby becomes impure, like a rebirth without an initial birth it seeped
through all divination and through all beauty and it carries within it the kernel
of all world-splintering, namely the primal impurity of being that had been the
fear of the mother; impure is the mantel of poetry....... )

The initial concept is one seemingly easy to hold in thought: “the proper task
of poetry would be to raise up the name o f the thing” (die Namen der Dingen
zu heberi).

But then the reader discovers that ‘nam ing’ is a process as

complex as it is arcane; the sounding o f the name gives a view (sic) into ‘everfluid' (Niemals-Erstarrende) language where the word (the name) hovers pure
(keusch) and untouched. The shift from sound to sight is not accidental and
elsewhere Virgil states Dein Auge ist Deine Stimme

(p. 253), meaning that

although truth is ‘perceived’ through the ear, we ‘see’ truth’s form by listening
in silence.

In poetry, the audible ‘klang’ o f the word should evoke for the

listener’ something true about the nature o f the thing to which it refers. These
vague precepts give way to something more specific as the passage
develops.
In clear, albeit complex, exposition, Virgil claim s fo r the power of poetry
the ability to double creation through the word (die Schopfung im Worte zu
verdoppein

). Continuing, he states that creation, once doubled, has no

power to reclaim unity; world-doubling leads to a world irrevocably split into
Sprachwelt (Languageworld) and Dingwelt (Thing-world). This irreconcilable
divide emblematizes the original fa ir that is traditionally associated with the
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advent o f language, where language effects a separation from the real and a
distancing from any immediate contact with truth.

And yet this passage

affirms the presence o f both truth and the real, in that creation is doubled into
Sprachwelt and Dingweli, into the domain o f the intim ate and the domain o f
alienating abstraction.
We conclude with reference to the passage on naming found on page
59, specifically the phrase nackt sind w ir unter unserem Namen, nackternoch
als das Kind, das d e r Vater vom Boden aufgehoben hat, um ihm den Namen
zu geben. There Virgil alludes to the helplessness o f the child as its ‘true’
form is forever altered by ‘the gift o f the name’. Through the use o f the word
in poetry {Dichtung), Virgil, who finds him self in the role o f both father and
son, alters the name and, in so doing, alters within him self that intimate
interior space which can only be referred to as the thing ‘more naked than the
child'.

The act o f creation in language (world-doubling) begins with a

recognition o f the split subject negotiating between truth and the real; as he
alters one {Sprachwelt), so the form o f the other {Dingwelt) is also changed.
Lysanias declares to Virgil on page 171: ‘Eternal is the echo o f your poem’
{Ewig ist d e r W iderhall deines Gedichtes). Virgil responds: ‘I no longer want to
hear the echo o f my own voice; I await the voice that is outside my own.'
Virgil auscultates the silence, listening fo r the voice that is ‘not his own,’ the
voice that speaks o f a new reality, o f a new fate fo r both him self and fo r
Rome.
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ROME
La mattrise est toujours le fait de I’autre main, celle qui n’6crit pas,
capable d’intervenir au moment oQ il faut, de saisir le crayon et
de I’gcarter.
(Blanchot L’espace Iitt6raire)

The reader o f T.D.V. is invited to witness the otherwise personal
encounter between Virgil, the novel’s principal protagonist, and imminent
death. From the novel’s earliest scenes until the point at which Virgil is swept
into the confines o f Brindisi palace (p. 51), T.D.V. represents death as an
engine of radical destruction. The experience is necessarily daunting and, so
long as Virgil remains incapable o f directly confronting death, of looking into
‘Death’s eye’ (cf.: p. 78), death remains the uncompromising barrier, the other
side of which promises nothing more than perfect oblivion. W ith the beginning
of the novel’s second book, however, Virgil turns toward the experience of
death in a mode o f searching auscultation:...... nichts war dringlicher als allein
zu bleiben, um nochmals und nochmals alias Sain in sich zu versammeln, urn
lauschen zu konnen; dies w ar das Dringlichtste -(nothing was more urgent
than to remain alone, in order to again and again collect all being into oneself,
in order to be able to listen; this was the thing o f greatest urgency).

This

passage marks the onset o f Virgil’s exploration o f death’s realm; far from
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being the zone o f oblivion initially anticipated, Virgil discovers through keen
listening and subtle observation a realm rich in those elusive and enticing
qualities known as ‘truth’ and the ‘real.’1
Death proves to be a reflecting m irror offering to Virgil a refracted
image of his own subjectivity. Virgil peers into death and death returns the
gaze in a phenomenon which the text refers to as ‘Death’s eye’ (des Todes
Auge p. 78). Through the exploration o f death, Virgil discovers an ongoing
process which is that o f an exchange between ‘truth’ and the ‘real’
(W irklichkeit zu r W ahrheit umgestaltet - the ‘real’ transformed into truth p. 95).
Situating him self on the axis of this exchange, Virgil discovers a potential to
alter the real, an act which T.D.V. labels ‘taking-fate-upon-oneself (Schicksalauf-sich-nehmen p. 144). The ongoing process o f exchange between ‘truth’
and the ‘real’ and the indicated potential to alter the ‘real’ are integrally bound.
Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen is a phenomenon, mediated through language,
whereby in extraordinary instances, the authoring subject is able to alter the
real by an alteration of the subjects relation to truth. Certainly the Aeneid is
one such extraordinary instance; it is a text which irrevocably alters the self
view of its readers, the citizens o f Rome and their subsequent cultural
legatees. The Aenied establishes for its reader a fictional past from which
Rome’s very real future emanates.
Yet, the drama of T.D.V. derives from V irgil’s great struggle to accept
the Aeneid as anything more than an idle fiction.

Virgil’s reluctance to

acknowledge the tremendous cultural and political import of his work is one o f
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the supreme ironies o f this novel. V irgil protests against the possible public
im port o f the Aeneid when stating that it was a work created above all else for
and out o f personal need: ‘

only, I allow m yself to maintain that I wrote it

(T.D.V.) not fo r the reader but, to the contrary, firs t and forem ost fo r m yself
(

allein, ich d a rf behaupten, dad ich es nicht n u rfQ rd e n Laser, sondem

zuerst fu r mich geschrieben habe

p. 292).

One o f the lessons to be

gleaned from T.D.V. is precisely that this work, which would significantly after
the ages, begins within the narrowly restricted confines o f personal drama,
one in which a particular subjectivity discovers the means o f altering its own
relation to truth.

This third and concluding segment in the chapter on The

Death o f Virgil retraces Virgil’s route to the discovery that, through the
intermediary o f the text, a change in the configuration of a individual subject
can, and in the case of the Aeneid does, result in a lasting reconfiguration of
the real.

Gleichnis, Erkenntnis, W irklichkeit
There is little doubt that Virgil is stating the ideal —one o f which he
clearly despairs o f achieving— when on page 74 he declares ‘Denn prall von
W irklichkeit sind die Bilder

' (For the representations are bursting with the

‘real’). The language of poetry (Dichtung) does not m erely represent reality;
rather, it offers to its reader a version o f the ‘real’ open to exploration. W ere
his poetic ideal to be realized, V irgil’s search fo r the ‘real’ through an
auscultation o f death would be not the m ere representation o f experience, but
a repeated contact o f the reader w ith the ‘real’.

The Aeneid’s textual
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representations, ‘bursting with the ‘real’ (prall von W irklichkeit), would carry the
reader into the context o f his or her own fictionalized past and future. The
Aeneid's fictional representations would alter the reader’s memory o f the
‘historical’ past, placing the reader into a newly created context o f the ‘real’. In
T.D.V. , Virgil determ ines to destroy the manuscript o f the Aeneid and o f all
his writing (p. 167) fo r the ostensible reason that these works lack any sense
o f the real. The unfolding o f the story recounted in this novel leads the reader
to the near opposite conclusion, namely, that Virgil fears the ‘real’ that his
works threaten to bring into existence.
Consistently, the Virgil o f T.D.V. speaks o f representation in terms not
o f an object reflected, but in term s o f inter-reflecting subjectivities.

The

following gives an example typical o f the sort o f ‘presentation’ o f the real within
language that Virgil would hope to achieve in his Aeneid:
da es sich ihm nun, wie unter einer zauberhaft piotzlichen zweiten
Beleuchtung, als das Sinnbild seines eigenen Bildes zeigte, bei alter
Uberfeme, so deutlich als ware es von ihm selber geschaffen,
die Versinnbildlichung des Ichs im All, die Versinnbildlichung des Alls
im Ich, das ineinanderverschrankte Doppelsinnbild des irdischen Seins...; (p. 114)
(
because it pointed out to him as though from under a sudden magical
second illumination, the symbolic representation of his own representation,
surpassing all, as clear as though it were he himself who created the symbolic,
it was the symbolization of the 1' in the ‘All,’ the symbolization of the ‘All’
in the ‘I,’ the shrunken into itself double-symbolic representation of earthly
being
)

Contrary to the notion that symbolic representation (Versinnbildlichung)
occurs, in any absolute sense, strictly within the confines o f the text, Virgil
describes the sym bolic representation o f the real as occuring on an axis
limited at one extrem e and the other by das Ich and das All. The reader does
not stand at a distance from the ‘real’ symbolized by the text; rather, the text
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situates the reader within the ‘real’ that it makes present. The text ‘echoes’
back to Virgil, its reader/author, a voice other than his own (cf: p. 171) from a
locus that the passage from page 114

refers to simply as das AH and

elsewhere as wo die M utter ruft. What, then, is das AII, sim ilar to death in all
its aspects, if not a place from which to witness 'the absence of one’s own
presence.’

Das A il is death’s unrestricted range, a place from which the

subject is ‘echoed’ without name. Death, like das AH, is the place o f which it is
said, referring to the apothegm from page 179, ‘
M utter ru ff (

namenlos wird es, wo die

nameless is the place [from] where the mother calls). We

enter into death, and likewise into the real, without name.
This ‘voice of the mother1is Virgil's own altered voice, as it echoes back
to him from the text. It is the voice o f a second inscription, that which rewrites
the ‘real’, an inscription which, oddly, seems to occur only as an aftermath to
the text. Virgil is filled with trepidation by the power of this voice, which is as
much his own as it is the voice of another. W hile discussing with Augustus
the fate o f the Aeneid, whether it is to be kept or destroyed, Virgil indicates
that he wrote largely unawares o f the often-cited ‘second voice’:
“Ungeduldig war ich nach Erkenntnis...und darum wollte ich ailes
aufschreiben...... denn das ist Dichtung: ach, Ungeduld nach Erkenntnis ist
sie, dies ist ihr Wunsch, und darQber hinaus vermag sie nicht zu
dringen
"
(p. 300)
("I was impatient for knowledge (cognition)...and for this reason I wanted to
write down everything...for this, alas, is poetry; poetry is a craving for cognition,
this is poetry's wish, and poetry is not capable of penetrating beyond that point

”)

This passage gives to the reader an instance in which Virgil confuses the real
with a representation o f the real. Virgil tells how, in the effort to fill the text
with ‘meaning’ (Erkenntnis -th e hallmark o f verity-), he attempts to write all:
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[ich] wollte ailes aufschreiben. The irony inherent to this pretended claim
is that even if by some superhuman g ift Virgil were, as he says, able to write
down ‘all’, ‘all’ would always be mere representation and never the
presentation o f the ‘real’ within language. Virgil’s attem pt to attain the Teal’ by
‘writing down everything' (alles aufgeschrieben) betrays the notion that the
‘real’ could somehow be contained within the lim its o f the text. W hereas the
text is representation, die ‘real’ extends beyond th e confines o f the text into
the greater realm o f language.
Because they are the fruit o f the second inscription, o f the echoing
altered voice o f the author, the text is not capable o f revealing ‘truth’ and the
‘real’; the text can only indicate them to its reader. The truth and the real are
rendered by the text through the interchange between das Ich and das All,
through the exchange that occurs between the reading subject and the altered
reflection o f the reading subject’s own voice. Virgil refers to the phenomenon
o f altered reflection as that of the second ‘I’ (das zweite Ich):
wenn mit dem Wunder des zweiten Ichs, das wir durch die BrSnde
tragen, uns die zweite Kindschaft beschieden wird, gewandelt und dem
Vater gehOrend, Erkenntnis, erkennend und erkannt, Zufall, derzum
Wunder geworden ist, da er alle Erkenntnis, alles Geschehen, alles Sein
umfaBt hat, SchicksalsQberwindung, noch nicht und doch schon, oh
Wunder
(p. 200)
(
when with the miracle of the second ‘I’ which we carry through the flames,
and the second childhood is granted us, transformed and belonging to the father,
(cognitive) perception, perceiving and perceived, the accident that have become
the miracle, since it has embraced all cognition, all that occurs, has embraced
all being, it is fate-overcome, not yet and yet at hand, oh, miracle
)

This ‘second I’ traverses tim e and space, travelling from child to father and
father to child und die zweite Kindschaft beschieden wird, gewandelt und dem
Vater gehdrend (and the second childhood is granted us, transformed and
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belonging to the fathe r.

). That the second T should belong to the father

implies that the second inscription has been subsumed by the name, by the
word o f the text.

The sign of the father, as innumerable passages within

T.D.V. dem onstrate (cf.: p. 59 e t passim), is that o f name-giver; to say that the
second ‘I’ belongs to the father is to say that the ‘real’ has been named by the
text. The voice that calls back to us as readers o f the text has displacement in
space, in th e sense that it emanates from the text, and displacement in tim e,
in the sense that it speaks to us from memory, albeit altered memory. But this
‘second I’ also bears the quality o f being without locus in either tim e or space.
This ‘second I’ exists only on the im aginary axis connecting father and son,
where father and son are just other designations fo r the reflecting antipodes at
either extreme o f the imaginary axis upon which subjectivity is constructed.
The significance of these traversing chronological axes, from father to son and
from son to father, is that memory, history, and the ‘real’ within the text are all
made present through the sort o f intrasubjective activity whereby language is
rendered articulate.
The fact o f this ‘second I’ reaffirm s the notion of a ‘real’ that inhabits the
realm o f language which is not lim ited to the confines of the text.

The

following is ju st one example o f the numerous passages within T.D.V. that
im ply or speak directly to an unfolding succession of images that lead to an
unfolding succession o f ‘realities':
Wirklichkeit stets nur wieder durch Wirklichkeit versinnbildlicht
wird—, Bilder und AberbikJer, Wirklichkeiten und Aberwirklichkeiten,
keine wahrhaft wirklich, solange sie alleine steht
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(p. 74)

(
the 'real' always symbolized only through the 'real'-, representations and
representations of representations, the ‘real’ and the ‘real’ reduplicated, none
of them truly real so long as they stood alone (without copy).......)

The reader can begin to understand that the production and replication o f the
real entails something more than the abstract mirroring within language o f one
representation into another.2
introduction

Any production of the ‘real’ implies an

o f the reading subject into the

unending succession

of

representations mirroring within the text. The reader, listening for (lauschen)
and oscultating the echo of its own altered voice, enters into the realm o f the
real.
This introjection of the subject into the representations o f language
(W irklichkeit versinnbildlicht [reality symbolized]) effectuates an action within
the word and causes a translation o f the word into deed. As its story unfolds,
the them atics o f ‘word as deed’ takes on an increasing prominence within
T.D.V. The following gives a particularly rich instance of the workings o f the
deed (Tun) within the mirroring images o f representation as the real is
constructed:
es wird die Sinnbildkette immer wieder geschlossen, so oft das
Unerreichbare sich selber ins Erreichbare verwandelt.
und sie sich
zum Kreise schlie&e, zum Wahrheitskreis, zum ewigen Sinnbildkreis,
wahr in jedem seiner Bilder, wahr durch das immerwdhrende Kreisgleichgewicht, das um die geOffhete Grenze spielt, wahr im ewigen
Austausch der gOttlichen und der menschlichen Tat, wahr in ihrer beider
Sinnbildhaftigkeit und im Sinnbild ihrer gegenseitigen Spiegelung, wahr
weil darin die SchOpfung sich fQr immerdar emeuert, eingegangen in das
Gesetz, in das Gesetz der steten Wiedergeburt
(p. 204)
(
again and again the symbolic chain is closed, closed as often as the
unattainable transposes itself into the attainable
and the chain closes
itself into a circle, to the circle of truth, to the eternal symbolic cycle,
true in each of its representations, true by virtue of the perdurable balance
of the circle that plays along the open border, true in the eternal exchange
between the divine and the human deed, true in both their symbolic quality
and in their mutual, mirroring (symbolic) representation, true because
creation renews itself repeatedly and forever therein, entering into the law,
into the law of eternal rebirth.......)
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The passage cited affirms the possibility o f attaining the real by the
manipulation of symbolic structures (die Sinnbildkettey, the unreachable (das
Unerreichbare) comes within the reader’s grasp by means of subtle perception
(lauschen). Truth folding itself into fiction (wahr in jedem seiner Bilder), the
‘unreachable’ (truth) translating itself into the ‘reachable’ (lettered text), is the
consequence o f an intra-subjective experience involving reader and text. The
passage describes this experience in terms o f an interchange between the
human and the divine ‘deed’: .......truth is the eternal exchange between the
divine and the human deed (
und der menschlichen Tat

wahr im ewigen Austausch der gdttlichen
).3 The deed here referred to is not the simple

act of perception o f an observer looking in, but o f a change effected within the
subject, as it perceives that its own voice reflected back to it from the text has
become something different from itself.

Not all reading implies the act o f

discovering the real; not all texts elicit alteration in the reading subject
engaged.

In point of fact, T.D. V. speaks o f a text that offers the reading

subject a point of entry into the real and the means of effecting change within
i t : .......it is true because creation renews itself repeatedly and forever therein,
entering into the law, into the law o f eternal rebirth
Gesetz, in das Gesetz der steten W iedergeburt

(eingegangen in das
).

That, according the

logic put forward by T.D.V., only the rare text allows for the possibility o f a
reconfiguration o f the real (Wiedergeburt) can be inferred from Virgil’s
decision to destroy the Aeneid precisely because he judged it was untrue,
precisely because, in Virgil’s estimation, it failed to do more than offer up
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images that were devoid o f truth and devoid o f the real (cf: p. 22 et passim
where Virgil laments the inherently false quality o f the Aeneid and o f all of his
writing).

The law (das Gesetz) is the prescription fo r the ordering of the

symbolic structure, fo r a change (Wiedergeburf) in the configuration of the
‘real’.
Virgil seeks within his epic an encounter with death, a death which is
not m erely represented b y the text, but which is im m anent to it. Shortly after
Virgil reveals to Augustus tha t in the writing of the Aeneid he has attempted to
write down all (damm wollte ich alles aufschreiben, p. 300), he amends this
assertion with something that is very nearly the contrary o f writing-all-down
(alles aufschreiben). Below is an exchange begun by Augustus and to which
Virgil responds:
[A] "So mu& ich dich nochmals fragen, Vergil, zu welchem Ziel du mit
deiner Dichtung gestrebt hast nachdem es die Erkenntnis des Lebens
nicht sein sollte".
[V] “Die Erkenntnis des Todes."

(p. 301)

([A] “So I must ask you again, Virgil, toward what goal had you striven with
your poetry if it was not supposed to have been toward a cognition of life.*
[V] ‘The cognition of death.")

The word Erkenntnis (cognition) carries a particular value in Broch’s T.D.V. It
is a form o f knowledge that, while perceptible, remains hidden under the veil
o f language; it is also the only suitable substitute fo r the impossible das All.
Like truth and the real, the reader perceives Erkenntnis through the interplay
o f textual representations; die Erkenntnis des Todes and die Erkenntnis des
Lebens occur within the reader’s field o f perception as two contrary sorts of
‘knowing’ that reflect into one another.

Virgil is not speaking in mysteries

260
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

when he declares that a knowledge o f life and a knowledge o f death operate
in a process o f interchange; one illum inates the other. For the Virgil o f T.D.V.
,die Erkenntnis des Todes, which either may or may not be found within the
text, is that field from which emanate the echo o f the reading subjects altered
voice.
An examination of T.D.V. reveals that ‘death' in the Death o f Virgil is
not so much a terminus as it is a reflecting field. Virgil searches (the verb
lauschen is primarily used to convey the idea o f oscuitating death) his own
Aeneid fo r evidence within it o f that same mirroring quality; that is to say, Virgil
seeks evidence o f the presence o f death within his written work.

By the

presence o f death within the work is m eant the presence o f that quality which
causes the reader’s own voice to echo back from the pages o f the text and to
do so in such a way that the reader is changed, we could say ‘renamed’, by
the experience.

That echoing voice is denoted on page 218 as Sprache

innerhalb der Sprache (voice within the voice) and its discovery, the discovery
o f the “’second I’” (cf: pp. 200, 241), brings one to a confrontation with the
‘unknown familiar* (das ungekannt W iedererkannte p. 36). The encounter with
the ‘unknown familiar’ indeed describes the function of the deed within the
word;4 the ‘deed’ is the occurrence within memory (W iedererkannte) of
something previously unknown (ungekannt).

This encounter with the

‘unknown familiar’ is precisely the encounter with truth, the encounter with
something that is ‘fam iliar’ and yet ‘unknown,’ the encounter with one’s own
voice as it echoes back altered from the text. Truth comes in the guise o f the
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fam iliar presenting itself as irrevocable change. One could thus say o f the
Aeneid, or o f any other work o f art, science, o r fiction that, subsequent to its
introduction, it alters the real in a permanent way. The truth o f the Aeneid, a
fiction in the guise o f a history, can be measured to the degree that the reality
o f Rome, Rome's inhabitants, and Western culture have been altered by its
appearance. As a text, the Aeneid remains a bearer o f truth to the degree to
which it continues to speak to its reader, to the degree to which it continues to
impinge upon the ‘real.’
That the presence o f the real within the text is dependent upon the
concurrent presence and workings of the transforming power of death can be
inferred from this observation made by Virgil to Augustus:
Nur im Gleichnis ist das Leben zu erfassen, nur im Gleichnis ist das
Gleichnis auszudrQcken; endlos ist die Gleichniskette, und gleichnislos
ist bloB der Tod, zu dem sie sich hinspannt, als ware er ihr letztes Glied,
dennoch schon auBerhalb der Kette
(p. 336)
(Life is to be grasped only in the metaphor, only in the metaphor is ‘metaphor’
to be expressed; never ending is the chain of metaphor, and plainly death is
bereft of the metaphor toward which it stretches, as though it were the (chain’s)
last link, yet death lay already outside the chain
)

Virgil describes death as being the last link

therefore, since the chain is

elsewhere described as circular (p. 72), death is the first link in the chain of
representation, the last link in a chain being likewise the chain’s first link.
Thus, Virgil declares that only the representation that encompasses the
presence of death can be a valid representation o f life.

Just prior to this

declaration of the necessary presence o f death in the valid representation of
life, Virgil announces to Augustus:
“Oh, Augustus, das Oberirdische im Irdischen erkennen und Kraft
solchen Erkennens es zu irdischer Gestalt bringen, als geformtes Werk,
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als geformtes Wort und eben auch als geformte Tat, dies ist das Wesen des
echtes Sinnbildes
'
(p. 334)
(‘Oh, Augustus, to recognize the divine (present) in the earthly and by virtue
of such recognition to achieve earthly form for the divine, as formed work,
as formed word and even also as formed deed, this is the essence of the true
symbol
")

Genuine representation (Sinnbild) exists when one takes cognizance o f that
which is beyond the concrete (Irdischen) and, by the force o f this cognition
(Kraft solchen Erkennens), the divine (Uberirdischen) is rendered in visible,
tangible form. This tangible form is the form o f the ‘work’, the form o f the
‘word’, the form o f the ‘deed.’ Virgil makes clear the mark o f the ‘genuine
representation’ (das echte Sinnbild): it is the text where the ‘deed’ is wrought
into the lettered word o f the text.

Togapurpur
In T.D.V., Virgil gradually awakens to the power o f the word to
transform ‘truth into the real and the real into truth’ (W irklichkeit zur W ahrheit
umgestaltet, Wahrheit zur W irklichkeit -th e ‘real’ transformed to truth, the true
to the ‘real’ p. 95); simultaneous to this awakening, Virgil becomes aware o f a
profound malfunction in the 6pist6me of his tim e.5 The recognition o f this
malfunction is iterated in the middle of Book III, just as Augustus is about the
enter the narrative scene. There the reader finds a variation on the verse
sometimes applied as a brief introduction to the Aeneid:
Stille empfing den Geheiligten
und femdrau&en, dort wo die Faune
getanzt batten, blies einer von ihnen weiter sein Lied, als wOrde es ihm
nichts anhaben, dad die Genossen ihn verlassen batten; fireilich, seine
Flote klang zerbrochen.
(p. 284)
(Silence embraced the holy one
and far in the distance, there where the
Fauns had danced, one of them still blew his song, as though it were nothing
to him that his companions had abandoned him, truly his flute gave forth a
broken sound.)
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The original verse emphasizes a harmony between nature and song as
though they were one.

To the contrary, the disharmony indicated by the

verse taken from T.D.V. (seine FI6te klang zerbrochen) reminds the reader o f
the perennial disjunction between art and nature. Notation o f the disjunction
reminds the reader that the ‘real’ is not ‘natural’ and that art is something more
than accuracy in representation. The T.D.V. takes measure o f the art o f the
Aeneid in term s o f its potential to fix what is profoundly broken with the world it
purports to represent.
The novel places Augustus Caesar at the center o f a world disharmony,
a disharmony o f which he is neither the cause nor the solution. The reader’s
first glimpse o f what has been called ‘the flute’s broken clang’ (p. 284) comes
early as swarms gather in adulation around Caesar as he enters Brindisi:
da freilich war der Augenblick gekommen, den das dumpf brOtende
Massentier erwartet hatte, um sein Jubelgeheui ausstoBen zu kfinnen......
sich selbst anbetend in der Person des Einen.
(p. 21)
(
certainly the moment had arrived, the one the dumb brooding mass animal
had awaited in order to be able to belch out its jubilation-howl
self adulating
in the Person of the One.)

By informing the reader o f an absence o f ‘language’ (das dum pf brutende
Massentier), the text indicates a corresponding absence o f the real.

The

formula ‘in adulation o f oneself (sich selbst anbetend) denotes a state of
perception in which the concrete is mistaken for the real; Augustus becomes
the idol o f a deluded people who attem pt to capture in his im age an unaltered
representation o f themselves. In this passage, Augustus and the people and
Rome are perceived as an undifferentiated mass that is ‘the person o f the
One’ (in der Person des Einen).6
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The ‘person of the One’ is an idol to the masses and a barrier to the
discovery o f the ‘real’ in Roman social, cultural, and political life. Communal
identity is the product of narrative fiction, a fiction that provides a context, the
place o f the ‘real,’ into which the subject o f state m ight situate him/herself. As
‘idol’, Augustus is unable to produce the context o f the ‘real’, instead he is
reduced to an ahistorical figure, one that provides security and provisions, but
not communal identity. Inevitably, it is the word that binds a people together,
and as Augustus becomes cognizant o f this fact, he attempts by whatever
available means to save the Aeneid from Virgil’s intent to destroy the work.
Lesser characters, as in the three wastrel drunks from the mid-section o f Book
II, though not immediately aware o f the power o f the word to create social,
cultural and political cohesion, express themselves, nonetheless, in a
language that has lost this re-creative power.

In the citation below, they

express themselves in a language grown sterile, having been reduced to little
more than code. One cries out (p. 107 - ff.): “Heil dem Augustus!
(Hail Augustus

heil ihm”

hail him”), and further along he gives the basis fo r this

praise: “W ein,” schrie er, “kriegst dein Wein, Dicker, Wein fu r alle, Wein aufs
Wohl vom Casar!” (“W ine," he cried, “grab your wine, fa t one, wine for
everyone, wine to toast Caesar with!"). Again, further along in the same
passage, he exclaims “Mehl vom Cesar, hast es selbst gehdrt
(“Flour from Caesar, you heard it yourself.

Heil ihm !”

hail him!") Caesar distributes

provisions o f wine and grain, and fo r this the Roman populace remains at
least nominally beholden; he does not, however, have it within his power to
provide the fictional context in which his subjects might discover and inhabit a

265
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

common ‘real.’ The above passage defines what it means to be Roman in
terms of a relationship o f mutually requited exchange; the distribution o f grain
and wine wins Augustus a commensurate measure o f loyalty. The limited
terms of this relationship o f ‘exchange' affects the tenor o f public life in ways
made evident by the subsequent passage where, once again, the topic is the
form of public largess upon which loyalty to Caesar is based. Below are two
characters assessing the import of Caesar's ‘generosity':
“Jawohl, morgen wird’s ausgeteilt, morgen m iter's austeilen...kostdich
gamix!", da rid ihr die Geduld: “Ein Dreck wird austeilt”, -sie kreischte
“einen Dreck gibt der Casar her...ein Dreck is dein Cdsar, ein Dreck
ist er, der Casar; tanzen und singen und ficken und huren kann er, der
Herr Casar, aber sonst kann er nix, und ein Dreck gibt er her!’’
—“Ficken...ficken
ficken...
(pp. 107 -08)
(“Yes, indeed, it’ll be doled out in the morning, in the morning he’ll see to it
that its distributed
cost you not a damned thing!,” then her patience gave
way: “Garbage will be given out,’ -she shrieked
‘Caesar gives garbage... and
your Caesar is garbage, garbage he is, the Caesar; he can dance and sing and fuck
and whore, the mighty Caesar, but besides that he can’t do a thing, and he hands
out garbage!” —“Fuck
fuck
fuck
)

By the estimation of the second character in this crude verbal parry, Caesar’s
act o f public assistance equates to little more than the likes o f a sterile
copulative grunt.

He ‘fucks...fucks...fucks’ [ficken...ficken...ficken), but has

nothing more than the barren rhythm o f a bankrupt language to show for it.
More directly than any other passage in T.D.V., this one accuses Augustus,
the ‘father o f Rome’, o f ruling over a state without meaning, one in which
social, political and cultural intercourse produces nothing new, in which
nothing is altered by the general medium o f public exchange.
This description o f Augustus, shortly after he enters the narrative o f
T.D.V. toward the middle o f Book ill, emblematizes the arid and unfruitful
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nature o f public life as it threatens to be, should Rome be denied the
rejuvenating powers o f the Aeneid:
[es] wurde zur erkannten Einheit, so dad Mittag und Abend zu einem
einzigen Licht-Sein hatten zusammenflie&en dOrfen, allein nun war
nichts mehr hievon vorhanden, und sogar die in der unendlichen OberFeme ruhenden NachthQgelketten hatten sich zur leerheit
aufgelOst.
stumpfer und stumpfer wurden da die Farben der Blumen,
schwarzviolett wurde des Cdsars Togapurpur in diesem Lichte, das
trocken war wie angesengtes Papier, aufierst unverwoben war dies alles,
geradezu zusammenhanglos und bar jeglicher Gegensicht, unverwoben
infolge der strengen Einseitigkeit, die von der schmalen Gestalt dort am
Fenster ausging, unverwoben vor Strenge, vor Harte, vor Scharfe,
unwirklich schier trotz ihrer sehr handgreifiichen Oberflachenwirkung,
und auch das Menschliche, ach, selbst die menschliche Beziehung schien
dieser Einseitigkeit einer geheimnisvoll freischwebenden, nichts
-Qberdeckenden Oberflache verfallen
(pp. 297 -98)
(
it became a perceived unity, so that mid-day and evening had been
able to flow together into a single light-being, only none of this was any
longer at hand, and even that peaceful chain of night-mountains off in the
remoteness of the never ending distance had dissolved into emptiness......
...there the color of the flowers became more and more faded, Caesar’s
toga-purple became a black-violet color, utterly unraveled was all this,
altogether disjointed and without any counter perspective, unraveled
following the strict one-sidedness that emanated from that small figure
(Caesar) there at the window, unraveled because of the severity, the
harshness, the sharpness, sheerty unreal despite the very palpable yet
superficial efficacy, and even the humanity, alas, even the ties of human
relationships seemed to have fallen subject to the one-sidedness of a
secretive, free-floating superficiality that covered nothing at all
)

This description, which has midday and evening melding into ‘one light-one
being’ (zu einem einzigen Licht-Sein), carries overtones o f the turning o f an
age.

Likewise, the infinite expanse o f ‘evening-hills’ (NachthQgelketten)

dissolving into ‘emptiness’ (Leerheit) signals to the reader that an historically
critical moment is at hand. The description o f Augustus’ toga gives a clue as
to the ways in which the suspense o f the moment m ight ultim ately resolve.
‘Inked’ with the color o f evening (schwarzvioletf), the toga is sim ultaneously
‘as dry as singed paper1(das trocken w ar wie angesen0es Papier). Next, the
passage declares that all of this was ‘unraveling to the utmost1 (SuRerst
unverwoben war dies alles). What was unraveling? These several things: 1)
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Augustus’ attem pt to preserve the m anuscript o f the Aeneid; 2) the political
and social cohesion o f the Roman state; and 3) by dint of proximity, the very
fabric o f the toga worn by Augustus in this scene.
The toga, whether the toga virilis, toga picta, o r toga Candida, is an
emblem o f status, and the ‘purple’ toga is the emblem of supreme authority in
Rome. Hence, the purple toga unraveling signals the dissipation o f Augustus’
authority over Rome.

The above passage com plicates the image o f the

dissolution o f Augustus’ authority by indicating decline by means of a ‘sign’
that is textual. The outward sign o f Augustus’ power, and the loss thereof, is
rendered ‘substantive’ by identification with Caesar’s toga, which is said to be
‘as dry as singed paper.’

Like the light of this scene, which is a meld o f

‘midday and evening,’ Augustus’ toga is at once dry-singed and ink-soaked
(schwarzviolette). The issue of whether Augustus’ authority is either shriveling
or rejuvenescent hinges on what becomes o f the Aeneid, on whether it is
burned in accordance with Virgil’s wishes or published as both a ‘history’ o f
Rome and a directive fo r Rome’s future, as Augustus so desperately would
prefer. The purple that signs Augustus’ toga with authority is the same blackviolet substance with which the Aeneid is inked.
In the dialogue that issues from this encounter Augustus and Virgil
come to agree that Rome itself is a fiction. Virgil at one point spells out to
Augustus that it is ‘his’ state from which is form ed a representation o f the
Roman spirit:
“Dein Werk, Augustus
gewitj, ja, es ist Gleichnis..... es ist dein
Staat
er ist Sinnbiid des rOmischen Geistes
”
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(p. 308)

(“Your work, Augustus
certainly, yes, it is a metaphor.......it is your
state
it is a symbolic representation of the roman spirit
”)

By praising the newly established order o f the Roman state as the true
representation o f the Roman spirit, Virgil moves in the direction o f overtly
recognizing that the ‘real’ resides in fiction.

In discussion with Augustus

concerning the m erit o f the Aeneid, Virgil had previously disparaged the
Aeneid as sheer illusion compared with the ‘real’ and tangible Rome of
Augustus’ own making; now Rome itself is conceded by Virgil to be an order
of fictional representation (Gleichnis).
If Virgil continues to find Augustus’ work, the Roman state, an effective
and admirable fiction, what is it that continues to separate the fictio n ’ o f state
from the fiction o f the text? In fact, Virgil is moving toward the collapse o f one
into the other, toward a recognition that the ‘real,’ whether of state or o f text, is
based in an elaboration of the word into fiction. Virgil transcends the barrier
between political and textual fiction with this observation:
Dort im raumlosen Raum des Wortes erhob sich die Stadt, und sie war
selber nichts als ein Wortgebilde
(p. 323)
(There in the ‘realmless’ realm of the word the city arose and it (the city)
was itself nothing other than a word-image
)

Though the ‘city1referred to in this passage is the quasi-fictional Athens which
comes down to Virgil through the writing of Plato, it is nonetheless a ‘real’ city
that continues to exist both as a geographical location and as a place in the
fictional setting o f the Platonic dialogues. Yet even here, Virgil disparages the
Athens of Plato’s Republic, constructed out of the context o f fiction and which
is ‘nothing but’ a representation in words (nichts als ein Wortgebilde).
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Given that city (o f Rome) and the text (of the Aeneid) are two types o f
fiction each of which represents the body politic (des r&mischen Geistes)
Augustus discovers that which connects them to a common ‘reality.’ Virgil first
addresses Augustus in the passage below:
‘Rom ist das Gleichnis, Rom ist das Sinnbild, das du geschaffen hast,
Casar.”
“Rom ist die Tat der Ahnen, und die Wirklichkeit, die sie setzten, reicht
weit uber das bioB Sinnbiidhafte hinaus.”

(p. 333)

(“Rome is the metaphor, Rome is the symbol that you have created, Caesar.*
“Rome is the deed of the forebears, and the ‘real’ that they have put into
place; it exceeds by a wide margin the simply symbolic.......*)

Virgil remarks that Rome is ‘representation’ (Gleichnis), a symbol created by
Augustus.

Augustus responds by saying that ‘Rome is the deed o f the

forebears (die Tat der Ahnen);’ not his own creation ‘made present through
representation.’ ‘The deed of the forebears,' Augustus continues, ‘puts into
place a reality (die W irklichkeit die sie setzen) that exceeds all form of
representation.’ 7 The paradox inherent to Augustus’ argument that the ‘reality
of the forebears’ exceeds any form of symbolic representation lies in the fact
that the ‘representation’ to which he here refers is that o f the physical state of
Rome.

The tangible works o f Caesar Augustus and the physical state of

Rome are referred to as symbolic representations (das bloR Sinnbiidhafte),
whereas the ‘real’ set in place by Rome’s forebears is something inherent to
Virgil’s fiction. The ‘deeds’ o f the forebears are present in the fiction o f Virgil's
Aeneid; the ‘reality1 ‘set into place’ by these same ‘deeds’ are an inscrutable
element o f that same fiction. The fiction o f the Aeneid continues to make
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present, valid and true the deeds o f the forebears from which Rome's reality
derives.
The deeds o f the forebears can be made ‘present,’ can continue to
‘validate’ the reality o f Rome, precisely because it is a fiction. These deeds
are deeds o f Virgil’s own creation, a fact to which Augustus im plicitly attests
when he states:
“Rom ist die Erkenntnis des Ahnherm gewesen. Rom war die Erkenntnis
des Aneas, und niemand wieS dies besser als du, Vergil.’
(p. 338)
(“Rome has been the cognition of the forebears; Rome was the cognition
of Aeneas, and no-one knows this better than you, Virgil”.)

No one knows better than Virgil that ‘Rome is the mental construct o f Aeneas
precisely because Aeneas is the fictional creation o f Virgil. The Aeneid, then,
is not so much a written account o f things done in the past as it is a rendering
present o f deeds drawn from ‘historical’ memory. Rome is bom o f a fiction, as
Virgil more or less recognizes in this portion o f the exchange with Augustus:
lm Gleichnis der Erkenntnis ist Rom gegrondet worden; es tragt die
Wahrheit in sich, es entfaitet sich zur Wirklichkeit mehr und
mehr
allein im Wachsen und Werden ist die Wirklichkeit’

(p. 338)

(Rome has been founded in the representation (Gleichnis) of the cognition:
this representation of the cognition bears truth within it it unfolds into
the ‘real* more and more
the ‘real’ is only increase and becoming
)

Rome has been founded on the representation o f an imaginary concept (Im
Gleichnis d e r Erkenntnis), the creator o f which is none other than Virgil.
Virgil’s second voice (das zweite Ich) is the Urahn who alone makes possible
the creation o f the Roman state to which Augustus aspires.

Virgil’s

conception, woven into the cloth o f the Aeneid, is the source o f the ‘real’
sought by Augustus.
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The Aeneid, which through the fictionalized ‘deeds o f the forebears’
shares with the Roman state a common reality, becomes not the portrait o f a
people, but a m irror into which Rome is reflected and sees itself reflected:
Der Staat in seiner Doppelwirklichkeit hat nicht nur die GOtter zu
versinnbildlichen, es genOgt nicht, daft er zu der GOtter Verherrlichung
sich die Akropoiis baut, er hat nicht minder dem Voike, das seine zweite
WirklichkeitshOlfte ist das Sinnbild zu setzen, das starke Sinnbild, wie
es das Volk sehen will und begreift, das starke Bild, in dem es sich
selber wiedererkennt das Bild seiner Eigenmacht, unter die es sich
beugen will und beugen darf, ahnend, daB Macht im Irdischen, wie es das
Beispie! des Antonius zeigt stets dem Verbrecherischen zuneigt und daB
bloS ein MachttrSger, der zugleich Sinnbild der ewigwahrenden
Wirklichkeit ist solche Gefahr ausschlieBt
(p. 350)
The state in its double-reality has not only the gods to represent symbolically,
it is not enough that he (Pericles) built the Acropolis in order to honor
the gods, he had no-less to place into the symbolic representation the people
who constitute the other half of the ‘real’, a powerful symbol that the people
will see and understand, a powerful symbol in which the people see them
selves mirrored, an image of their own power to which they may and will bow,
sensing that earthly power forever inclines toward the criminal as in the
example of Antonius, and that only the bearer of might who is at one and the
same time a symbol of the everlasting ‘real* excludes such a danger.)

The T.D.V. here splits the ‘double-reality’ o f state into the divine and the
human.

The medium of this ‘double-reality’ is neither textual, as in the

Aeneid, nor is it some purely abstract notion o f state; rather, it is a reality
expressed in architectural form. The sublime style and design of the Acropolis
reflect back to

the citizens o f Athens something about themselves which,

again, falls into the category o f the ‘unknown fam iliar.’ The divine is not so
alien to the viewer of this state architecture that he or she is unable to
recognize some aspect of his or her own subjectivity reflected back. W hat one
sees is the image o f oneself seeing. ‘The human’ and ‘the divine,’ those two
positions at the extremes of the axis upon which subjectivity is produced, are,
respectively, self and self as other, Roman subjects and their progenitors the
Urahnen. The median plane defined as the locus where the human and the
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divine ‘gazes’ meet constitutes the ‘real’ imbedded in the text o f the Aeneid.
The reader is reminded of the already cited passage taken from page 21 o f
T.D.V. which describes the ‘dumb brooding beast

self adulating in the

Person o f the One;’ with the publication and promulgation o f the Aeneid,
Rome would gaze not into self, not into Caesar as idol, but into Caesar as the
continuing presence o f the forebears.
The passage from page 350 suddenly brings into view the example of
Antonius, and the reader’s line of vision is caused to shift from architecture to
language, from the form of the stone mass to the subtle shape o f the letter.
Unlike the immediacy o f the visually present forms o f the Acropolis, Antonius
can only be present as memory, can only signify within the context of an
articulated past. Antonius is then both a reminder and a warning to Augustus,
the speaker of this passage, of what he might become without the benefit o f
the Aeneid. The Aeneid contextuaiizes Augustus within a fictional ‘historical’
past, and places him into the ‘unending line o f fathers’ (die unendliche Reihe
der Vater p. 178) o f which, ironically, he is the first. This Antonius, the ‘bearer
of naked might1 (der bloR ein M achtrager ist), again recalls for the reader the
image of Augustus where it is said that the people see themselves reflected
and adulate themselves through the medium o f Augustus’ own image (das
dum pf brutende Massentier

sich selbst anbetend in der Person des

Einen -the dumb brooding mass anim al

self adulating in the Person of the

One). The weakness and danger o f the idol, o f the reflection o f oneself as
one wishes to see oneself, as opposed to the reflection of oneself as other, as
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the ‘unknown fam iliar,’ is that it is non-critical representation. This passage
states explicitly that Antonius, like the figure o f Augustus taken from page 21,
is the mere example o f the populace o f Rome gazing into a representation o f
self that is delusional: das starke Sinnbild, wie es das Volk sehen w ill and
begreift, das starke Bild, in dem es sich selber wiedererkennt, das B ild seiner
Eigenmacht, unter die es sich beugen w ill and beugen darf, ahnend, daQ>
M acht im Irdischen, wie es das Beispiel des Antonius zeigt, stets dem
Verbrecherische zuneigt

(a powerful symbol that the people will see and

understand, a powerful symbol in which the people see themselves mirrored,
an image o f their own power to which they may and will bow, sensing that
earthly power forever inclines toward the criminal as in the example o f
Antonius). Augustus longs for a power and an authority that is placed not in
his person, but in fiction of the unending line o f fathers, the stabilizing power
and authority immanent to the structure o f fiction.

Dein Werk ist Rom
In the opening pages of the novel, Virgil imagines him self to be
Anchises, carried along upon the shoulders o f one designated as th e son’:
und es warTroja, das um ihn brannte, es warder niemals verioschende
Weltenbrand, doch er, der Qber den BrSnden schwebte, er war Anchises,
blind und sehend in einem. Kind und Greis Gleichzeitig kraft unsaglicher
Erinnerung, getragen von den Schultem des Sohnes
(p. 50)
(......and it was Troy burning around him, it was the never extinguishing world
conflagration, yet he who floated above the flames, he was Anchises, blind and
seeing in one, simultaneously child and grizzled old man thanks to the
unutterable recollection, borne on the shoulders of his son
)

Although the reader might expect Virgil to opt for a clear identification with
Aeneas, the exemplary hero and model Roman, we instead find here a
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somewhat more complex identification. This figure borne over the flames o f a
burning Troy is at once child and ancient, father and son, Aeneas and
Anchises, by the grace o f the uncanny power o f Virgil’s memory. This self
designation as both father and son places Virgil in the perversely incestuous
position o f naming oneself, of begetting oneself o f oneself - Anchises begets
Aeneas who begets Anchises. As creator o f the Aeneid Virgil is, after all, as
much the Urahn o f Anchises as Anchises is the Urahn o f Virgil.

In a later

passage, the imaginary figure o f a slave issues this warning to Virgil: “W er
selber den Namen sich wShlet, der lehnt gegen das Schicksal sich auf.

”

(p. 250). This act o f self-naming is described as ‘leaning-against-fate’. In the
case o f the individual, it is certainly a re-writing o f oneself, and in the case of
the Aeneid, fo r which Lysanias, the im aginary boy-companion, calls Vergil th e
father who gives all things their names' (p. 179), it is a re-writing o f the ‘real’
for the Roman world.
T.D.V. does not suggest that Virgil has created his epic out o f a will to
restructure an already functional reality; rather, it makes clear that Virgil, only
with great reluctance and apprehension, attem pts to reconfigure a reality that
has fallen into chaos and lacks significance.

(In this way, Virgil's dilemma

mirrors Broch’s own, since he began writing T.D.V. in the political and social
chaos o f mid-twentieth century Europe). Virgil’s project of reconfiguring the
real begins with the personal recognition that his own ‘I,’ like the toga o f
Augustus (cf.: p. 297), is brittle, shrunken and impoverished. In one o f the
several ‘elegies’ to be included in T.D.V., Virgil makes note of this recognized
diminution o f ‘s e lf:
erkenntnisverlustig und verloren in Erkenntnislosigkeit
das emQchterte Ich,
seine Armut—,
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(p. 118)

(destitute of cognition and lost in a cognitionless state
the sobered '1/
its poverty—,)

Consistent with the precept that the ‘real’ is a construct o f language is the
notion that any alteration in the ‘real’ would have its m ost profound
reverberations in the individual subject, which is the sole articulator o f
language. This sense o f the diminishing T is given in the example o f the three
wastrels (cf.: pp. 107 - 108), whose language o f expression is impoverished to
the point of hardly existing as language, borders on code, and whose crude
utterance Virgil characterizes as a disintegration o f the social bond:
es war die Furchtbarkeit des Sachlichen, das sich nicht mehr an
den Menschen wendet, weder an ihn, der es hier am Fenster gesehen
und vemommen hatte, noch sonst an irgendeinen Menschen, gleichsam
eine Sprache, die nicht mehr BrOcke zwischen Menschen ist
(p. 109)
(
it was the fearsome of mater-of-factness that no longer concerned
itself with the human, neither with him here at the window who looked on
and comprehended, did not concern itself with any man like a language
that is no longer a bridge between men
)

The Aeneid is to become a new matrix o f language in which the already
existent ties that bind one subjectivity to another would be re-set; it would
become the medium through which to realign the set o f social, political and
cultural relations from which the ‘real’ is defined.
For Augustus who stands in relation to Virgil as son to father —through
the Aeneid Virgil effectively ‘names’ Augustus into the unendliche Reihe d e r
Vater (p. 179)— and o f father to son —Virgil remains the state’s, hence,
Augustus’ most glorious ‘client’ -th e inter-dependence of their tw o projects o f
text and state remain inextricable. Augustus spells out the m utuality o f their
interests clearly and simply:
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wohibegrQndet in meiner Leistung, in der Wirklichkeit Roms und
seines Geistes, ohne die niemals die Aneis hatte entstehen kOnnen, das
ist zu viel fQr dich
(p. 367)
(
well founded in my works, in the reality of Rome and of her spirit
without which the Aeneid would never have come into existence, that is
too much for you.......)

Augustus in his accusation is certainly right in the implication that his own
works provide the basis upon which Virgil constructs his epic; he is
misleading, however, in suggesting that the reality and the spirit (Geist) of
Rome emanate from the works o f his own hands and not from that o f Virgirs
text; clearly, the deed springs from the word and not, as Augustus would have
it, vice versa. Augustus says as much, contradicting the statement from page
367 in an earlier passage. Here, to the contrary, Virgil would willingly concede
that Rome is the work of Augustus:
‘ Rom ist das Gleichnis, Rom ist das Sinnbild, das du geschaffen hast
Cdsar."
‘ Rom ist die Tat der Ahnen, und die Wirklichkeit die sie setzten, reicht
weit Qber das blofi Sinnbiidhafte hinaus.”
“Und Rom ist auch wiederdeine Tat, Augustus, die rdmische Ordnung
im rOmischen Staat"

(p. 333)

(“Rome is that metaphor, Rome is that Symbol that you have created, Ceasar.'
“Rome is the deed of the forebears and the reality that they put into place
reaches far beyond symbolic representation.”
“And Rome is also your deed, Augustus, the Roman order in the Roman state.’)

It is a peculiarly remarkable exchange, one in which Augustus and Virgil both
insist that the other is the father o f Rome.8 Virgil attributes representation
(Gleichnis) and symbol (Sinnbild) to Augustus, further stating that the order o f
the Roman state is Augustus’ own ’deed’ (Tat). To the contrary, it is the case,
as Augustus clearly states it, that Rome is the ‘deed’ of the forebears (Ahnen)
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and Rome’s reality is a reality ‘set by their deeds’ (die W irklichkeit, die sie
setzten

). The Aeneid does not record, rather it creates, the deeds o f the

forebears; and within the context o f its language, those deeds, the deeds
emanating from V irgil’s imagination, set the reality and the spirit o f Rome as it
exists under Augustus.

The ‘Roman order in the Roman state’ which

Augustus brings into existence has as its source the ‘deeds o f its forebears,’
deeds which spring into existence by means o f Virgil’s stylus.
Virgil’s imaginary companion Lysanias lays out with the greatest
succinctness the paradox of Virgil’s position, the fact o f being at once father
and son, the creator of a reality which in turn creates its creator
“Du sahest den Anfang, Vergil, bist selber noch nicht der Anfang, du
hOrtest die Stimme, Vergil, bist selber noch nicht die Stimme, du ftihltest
das Schdpfungsherz pochen, bist selber noch nicht das Herz, du bist
der ewige FOhrer, der selber das Ziel nicht erreicht; unsterblich wirst du
sein, unsterblich als FOhrer, noch nicht und doch schon, dein Los an
jeder Wende der Zeit. "
(p. 253)
(“You saw the beginning, Virgil, you yourself are not yet the beginning,
you heard the voice, Virgil, you yourself are not yet the voice, you felt
creation’s heart beating, you yourself are not yet the heart, you are the
eternal guide who never himself reaches the goal; immortal will you be,
immortal as guide, not yet and already at hand, your lot is at the turn
of every time.')

This somewhat cryptic message is T.D.V.’s fullest exposition, however
oblique, o f the meaning of the often-cited phrase noch nicht und doch schon
(not yet and yet already past). It proclaims the impossibility o f situating the
subject in an absolute present; it is that unspeakable memory (die unsSgliche
Erinnerung, cf.: p. 50) which constructs the subject in the interstices between
child and father (Kind und Greis, p. 50), creator and created (das Erzeugte
und das Erzeugende, cf.; p. 135), divine and human.9 Elsewhere in T.D.V.,
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Virgil decries as ‘an ti-art (die Unkunsf) that which attempts to substitute the
thing created for the process o f creation:
die [Unkunst] das Erzeugte an die Stelle des Erzeugenden setzt, das
Spiel an die Stelle der Gemeinschaft, das Erstarrte and die Stelle der
lebendig fortwirkenden Schdpfung, das SchOne an die Stelle der
Erkenntnis
(p. 135)
(
denatured art places the created in the place of creating, places the game
in lieu of the society, places the lifeless in the place of living, onward forging
creation, places beauty in place of cognition
)

In term s o f art, this argues against favoring effect over process, the beauty o f
the finished object over engagement on the part o f the viewer/reader leading
to the discovery o f otherwise intangible truths.
In the above paragraph, two phrases are brought together that
explicate the meaning o f one another, noch nicht und doch schon and das
Erzeugte an die Stelle des Erzeugenden.

The form er speaks to the

im possibility of an absolute present, the latter to the (false) illusion o f
mistaking the concrete fo r the ‘real.’ To paraphrase the passage taken from
p. 253, Virgil sees the beginning but is not the beginning, he hears the voice
but is not the voice; Virgil is at once creator (as author o f the Aeneid) and
progeny (as citizen o f Rome) of Anchises (compare once again the passage
from p. 50); he is at once ‘name-giver’ and ‘named’ (cf.: p. 59 - 60).

As

author, the phrase noch nicht und doch schon comes to describe Virgil’s place
in existence, a place o f everlasting process and never-ending incompletion. In
naming all things —Du, mein Vater, du weiRt sie alle, du gabst den Dingen ihre
Nam en

(p.

179)— Virgil loses his own name, succumbs to the

phenomenon o f Ich-Vertu&t, relinquishes his own ‘present’ for a place
somewhere between past and future, and becomes a figm ent o f his own
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prodigious power of imagination, a figm ent o f his own fiction, a figm ent of
memory o f ‘die unsdgliche Ennnerung.’
As the novel moves toward resolution -resolution o f the conflict
between Augustus and Virgil as to whether the Aeneid is to perish or remain
following Virgil’s death, and resolution o f the concurrent conflict as to the
‘origin in fiction’ o f state authority—VirgiTs position and that o f Augustus move
toward a state o f uneasy accommodation.

Speaking to Virgil, Augustus

proclaims:
“Rom ist die Erkenntnis des Ahnherm gewesen; Rom war die Erkenntnis
des Aneas
(P- 338)
(“Rome has been the cognition of the forebears; Rome was the cognition
of Aeneas
)

To which Virgil responds:
“Die Ahnen haben den Keim der Erkenntnis gelegt, da sie die rdmische
Ordnung schufen......."

(p. 338)

(“The Forebears have laid the kernel of cognition thereby creating the Roman
order
)

The deeds o f the forebears of Rome have created the Roman order, have
determined the ‘real’ fo r the Roman state. The reader has only to turn back a
handful of pages, reading ‘forward’ toward the beginning of the text of T.D.V.,
to find Virgil effectively situating the ‘deeds’ of the forebears within the text of
the Aeneid. Virgil observes to Augustus the following regarding the nature of
writing:
“Oh Augustus, das Oberirdische im Irdischen erkennen und kraft
solchen Erkennens es zu irdischer Gestalt bringen, als geformtes
Werk, als geformtes Wort und eben auch als geformte Tat dies ist
das Wesen des echten Sinnbildes; innen und auBen pragt es sein
Urbild aus

(p. 334)

(“Oh, Augustus, to recognize the divine (present) in the earthly and by virtue
of such recognition to achieve earthly form for the divine, as formed work,
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as formed word and even also as formed deed, this is the essence of the true
symbol, inward and outward it forms its original image
*)

Das Qberirdische im irdischen is sim ply the ‘deed o f the forebears’ woven into
a cloth o f fiction; what is designated as divine is simply the ongoing efficacy o f
the deed within the word. True representation (das echte Sinnbild) is power o f
the word within the work o f fiction to continue the exchange between the true
and the real as it is expressed on page 95 o f T.D.V. This translation o f the
truth into the real is the deed o f the Urahn; it is the inherent power o f fiction to
speak back to the reader in altered voice o f the ‘second I.’
Though at one point in his disputation with Augustus V irgil insists that
the writing o f the Aeneid was firstly a personal effort -ic h d a rf behaupten, daB
ich es nicht nur fu r den Leser, sonder zuerst fu r mich geschrieben habe —(I
allow m yself to maintain that I did not write for the reader, but I w rote firstly for
m yself

p. 292)— the public im plications of this work would always

ultim ately come to bear. Virgil more than hints at the inevitable public import:
dumpf fOhlt das Volk, da& eine neue Wahrheit sich vorbereitet, dumpf
fQhlt das Volk, daQ die alten Formen bald sich erweitem werden
(p. 362)
(
the populace vaguely senses that a new truth is being prepared, the
sense vaguely that the old forms will soon be extended
)

Virgil writes to reconstruct firstly fo r him self a ‘real’ to replace that which had
been lost with the collapse of political, social and cultural order; but it is a
given that the ‘real’ acquires validity only insofar as it is a shared ‘real’.
Explaining to Augustus what that ‘real’ entails, Virgil does not m iss the point
that it entails a realignment o f the order o f the Roman state:
“Denn das Reich der Erkenntnis, zu dem dein Staat erbiuhen wird, das
Reich der wahren Wirklichkeit, wird nicht ein Reich der Volksmassen
sein, ja, nicht einmal ein Reich der VOIker, sondem ein Reich der
Menschengemeinschaft, getragen vom Menschen, der sich im Wissen
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befindet, getragen von der menschlichen Einzelseele, von ihrer WOrde
und von ihrer Freiheit, getragen von ihrer gOttlichen Ebenbildhaftigkeit"

(p. 345)

(“For the realm of cognition into which your state will bloom, that is the realm
of the true ‘real’, it will not be the realm of the folk masses, yes. not ever the
realm of the folk but a realm of human community, community supported by
people who are knowing, supported by the unified soul of the people, from
their honor and from their freedom, borne from their divine likeness.")

The

distinction

Virgil

makes

between

die

Voiksmassen

and

die

Menschengemein-schaft is not one that differentiates between qualities innate
to one group o r the other; rather, Voiksmassen and M enschengemeinschaft
refer to a distinction in terms o f the relation o f subject to state.

Die

Voiksmassen have already been presented (page 21) as the “dumb, bellowing
‘mass-animal’ " that ‘self-adulates’ in the ‘Person o f the One,’ ‘the One’ being
Caesar Augustus as idol. Die Menschengemeinschaft, by contradistinction, is
a relation to state in which the subject comes not en masse, but as a
particular member o f a larger group (Menschengemeinschaft), and for whom
the edifice of state offers not a prescriptive representation o f subject, but an
occasion fo r encounter with the ‘unknown fam iliar.’ The passage states that
the subject o f the Massengemeinschaft discovers that the state (der Reich) is,
in fact, an ‘internal realm’ in which knowledge o f one’s own subjectivity is not
prescribed but discovered. Since human subjectivity does not lend itself to
deixis -e x c e p t fo r a symbolic presence through the mediation of the name,
there is no absolute presentation o f ‘s e lf — the subject experiences at most an
illusion o f se lf through an encounter with the ‘real’ language, in fiction.
The subject o f state, like the subject of fiction, is a construct o f
language, and the construct is a set o f relations established between a

282

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fictional past (das Kind) and an imagined future (der Greis). The position of
the subject is well described by the phrase that is often cited as this novel’s
statement on the relation between the author (Virgil/Broch) and his work: noch
nicht und doch schon (p. 253).

The implied ‘non-presence o f being,’ the

asymptotic deferral of subjective presence, applies not only to the author of
the Aeneid and, likewise, the author o f T.D.V.., but to the subjects that are to
be subsequently constructed by that text.
A t the very finish o f that contest between Augustus and Virgil that
determines the continuing existence o f the Aeneid, it is stated that the text is,
in actuality (eigentlich), a coffin:
nachgeschickt dem Manuskriptkoffer, der da zur TGre hingetragen
wurde und eigentlich ein Sarg war, ein Kindersarg, ein Lebenssarg.

(p. 376)

(
sent after the carrying case for the manuscript that was taken there
by the door and was, in fact, a coffin, a child’s coffin, a life coffin.)

In what sense, indeed, is the manuscript holder a sarcophagus, a child’s
sarcophagus and fo r whom? The text o f the Aeneid ‘renames’ the subject,
destroys the old and replaces with the new.

In doing so, the subject is

constructed as part of a fictional relation, a ‘non-presence’ of being that is
situated somewhere along the axis that runs from the point of the fictional
‘forebear’s deed’ and the realm o f the ‘unknown fam iliar’ which is the realm of
death. Firstly, the kindersarg/Lebensarg is Virgil’s in the sense that this is his
death —Ich bin allein

niemand is t fu r mich gestorben” (I am alone

no

one has died for me; p. 188)— but it is also a death that he succeeds in
making present in fiction. In a letter written to Aldoux Huxley, Broch says of
his own encounter with death from which the fiction of T.D.V. stems:
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Der Vergil ist aus Zufallsanfdngen gewachsen; ich bin damit in eine
Zeit echter Todesbedrohung (durch die Nazi) geraten, und ich habe ihn
daher ausschlieBlich fOr mich —teilweise sogar im Gefangnis—
gewissermassen als private Todesvorbereitung, sicherlich also nicht fOr
Publikationszwecke geschrieben. Es war ein Versuch, mich imaginativ
mdglichst an das Todesertebnis heranzutreiben, und da dies in auBerster
psychischer Konzentration vor sich ging, hatte ich das von Ihr diktierte
Material, einschlie&lich der Form und demnach auch der des langen
Satzes zu akzeptieren
Fur mich galtes, mein Material, mein
Erkenntnismaterial dem Leser zu Qbermitteln. Ich muBte den Leser
nachleben lassen, wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch
Zerknirschung und Selbstausldschung annShert (mag man sie auch als
noch Lebender niemals erreichen). Mit bloB rationalen Mitteilungen ist
dies nicht zu bewerkstelligen, vielmehr muBte der Leser dazu gebracht
werden, genau so den gleichen ProzeB, den ich durchgemacht habe, nun
seinerseits genau so durchzugehen.
(.......The Vrgil grew out of an accidental occurrence. I had fallen upon a time
where I was genuinely threatened by the menace of death (from the Nazis) and,
under the circumstances, I had written the T.D.V. for myself exclusively —in
part no less, while in prison—and to a certain extent had written it as
a personal preparation for death; certainly I had not written it for the purpose
of publication. It was an attempt to propel myself through the agency of my
imagination as close to the death experience as possible and because this
effort took place only with the greatest mental concentration I had to accept
the form and even the lengthy sentences that the material for this story dictated
under the given circumstances
For me it was critical that I should convey
my material, my cognition-material to the reader (in the same form that
circumstances had dictated). I had to allow the reader to live through the way
in which one approaches this experience of death, namely, through contrition and
the dissolution of self (may no living person ever arrive in such circumstances as
these). This (approach to death) could not be brought about through a merely
rational medium, rather the reader must be brought to the experience through
exactly the same process that I myself had worked through; the reader would
have to work through precisely the same process only on his or her own terms.
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CONCLUSION

In both the Roland and in the T.D.V., the reader finds that death is the
dark generator of writing. The exam ple in the Roland is seemingly patent:
Roland urges his men to ‘strike hardy blows/that no one would know to sing
bad songs about us!’ (II. 1013 - 14); and at line 2338 Roland is shown using
Durendal to ‘strike at a dark stone.’

In each instance, whether upon the

bodies o f the Saracens and the Franks or upon the surface o f the dark stone,
the battle at Roncevaux is monumentalized in an initial blood w riting.1 The
writing in blood is then translated into a writing in black ink putatively by St.
Giles, the sole remaining witness to the scene o f death at Roncevaux.
Roland’s perfectly preserved body, w ithout a single broken bone o r a cut to
mar the integrity of his outer mortal remains, serves as a vessel from which
flows the dark ink o f narrative (cf.: II. 1763 and 1785); one can alm ost imagine
St. Giles dipping his stylus into the blood-filled mouth, as into a well o f ink.
If in the Roland narrative flows out of death, narrative in the T.D.V.
flows into death. Firstly, there are the already recounted circumstances o f its
genesis; Broch in prison in A lt Aussee using the T.D.V. as a vehicle fo r writing
his way into death.

Truly remarkable is the fact that Broch continues to
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pursue an ever elusive death as the source o f validation for his work.

His

correspondence is filled with prom ise o f soon attaining death, the im possible
goal; and o f course he never does. The relevant passage in the T.D. V. is that
in which Virgil crops the hair to prepare fo r immolation (p. 268); death w ill be
choreographed into a sacred event that will bring validity to his writing. The
validity Broch/Virgil seeks is one premised upon the desire to construct the
subject. The narrative following the death o f Roland and the Franks is one
that largely constructs the subjectivity o f the post-Roncevaux French as in the
example o f Tienry.2 The narrative o f the Aeneid, as a text within the text o f the
T.D.V., is ‘untried’ in the sense that no construction o f any particular subject
had yet been determined. Until the Aeneid has been put to the public, its only
subject is Virgil himself.
A t least one can substantiate this view in reference to specific
passages within the text, namely, at line 89: T he fate o f Aeneas is his own
fate, incomplete’ ( '

das Schicksal d e r Aneis, sein eigenes Schicksal,

unvollendef); and at line 139: T h is was the goal o f the journey, the now
visible goal of the fall, namelessness its e lf (‘

dies w ar das Z iel d e r Fahrt,

das nun sichtbare Ziel des Absturzes, das Namenlose selber). The writing o f
the text remains intensely personal; the subjectivity reflecting back to its
author is its ‘author1 (as other), creator and created are one; the narcissistic
impulse is to integrate with the te xt completely, to fall into the text as one falls
into death.

Recalling that as Aeneas’ fate and Virgil’s fate are one and

incomplete, likewise, Virgil’s fate and Broch’s fate are also one and moving
toward a goal at which they w ill not arrive.

Broch observes in a letter to
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Huxley dated May 10, 1945: ‘I wrote it (i.e.,
myself

to a certain degree as a private preparation for death, certainly it

was not written fo r the purpose o f publication' ( ‘
daher

T.D.V.) exclusively for

ausschlie&lich

fu r

m ich

ich habe ihn (T.D.V.)

gewisserma&en

als

private

Todesvorbereitung, sicheriich also nicht fu r Publicationszwecke geschrieberi).
Broch, in fact, is reluctant to surrender the manuscript, and he delays and
delays its release. Just as rumor from antiquity onward has it about Virgil, so,
too, with Broch there is the assumption that the work remains incomplete and
so never quite ready for the public. Even Broch hawks about this notion. But
the truth o f the m atter is this: incompietion is ju st a round about way of
expressing the author’s impossible urge to merge with his own text.

The

glimmering surface of the text through which Plotia moves with such fluidity (p.
274) will not yield a perfect image o f its author Broch/Virgil.
W e have come across sim ilar ‘authorial’ frustrations in the Roland,
particularly in the first narrative which ends with Roland’s death.

Roland

establishes that sword-blows are fo r the sake o f creating the ‘song’ (II. 1013 1014) and that at Roncevaux all valorous deeds are done in his own name:
‘for me I see you die' (purm ei vos vei murrir, I. 1863). In this way Roland, like
Broch at A lt Aussee, attempts to lay exclusive claim to the narrative ‘written’
while in progression toward the event o f his own death. Roland, it could be
argued, is even less naive than Broch in his desire to possess the text
completely. Just at the moment when death is pending and there isn’t another
Saracen to slay, Roland grabs Durendal and attempts to shatter the
‘instrument o f his writing’ (II. 2338 - ff.). W hat great sadness he expresses,
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that some ‘pagan’ might pick up the divine instrument Durendal to continue
the narrative in Christian blood.

The narrative beyond Roncevaux is, o f

course, continued by none other than Charlemagne.
A paradox of the practice o f writing is that no matter how intim ate the
experience, it can never be wholly, to use Broch’s word, ‘private;’ there is
always another writer, always another reader already in play. Once committed
to the page, Broch’s death, no less than Roland’s death, becomes an affair fo r
the public domain. In the Roland, the example is explicit; the continuation o f
narrative beyond Roland’s death is by the hand of ‘another1 author.

The

author of the ‘continuation,’ however, is also the one to ’transcribe’ Roland’s
geste, and, in the process, manages to integrate the two narratives into one
text.

Roland writes a representation o f self; St. Giles places that

representation within a public context.3
Roland’s inability to shatter Durendal is, in practical terms, his inability
to terminate the geste; completion precludes continuation. Broch’s inability to
bring his own narrative to an end is, similarly, a recognition o f that same mark
o f incompletion. It is as though the author wishes to meet him self in the form
o f two perfectly matched inter-reflecting images; what the author encounters
instead is self disguised as ‘other1.

The ‘other1, that ‘zweite Ich’ to which

T.D.V. refers, is the product o f an un-deliberate second writing.

A t one

passage in the T.D.V. it is stated: ‘The mother remains beyond our call’
(‘

die M utter bleibt unerrufbar’)-, and in another ‘Nameless is the place

from which the mother calls’ ( ‘...nam enlos wird es wo die M utter ru ft...’, page
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153); and in an oth er ‘He is called to the goal, that he might finally be reunited
with the name’ ( ‘

d e r wird zum Ziele gerufen, a u f da& e r sich m it seinem

Namen endgultig vereinige).

Virgil, Broch, Roland are all in search o f the

‘name,’ in search o f perfect union o f self with th a t tantalizing ‘other s e lf that
remains elusive and in circulation within the text.
S elf as ‘other1 is by definition that aspect o f one’s subjectivity that is
reflected back to us out o f the cultural, social and political

that is to say,

out of the public sphere. Roland’s attem pt to destroy Durendal is the attem pt
to be remembered by one’s own unadulterated and so ‘private’ narrative o f
self. Interestingly, this is by and large the position supported by those who
continue to regard the first narrative o f the R oland as a kind o f Ur-text, as a
narrative that hews closest to the ‘original’ story as it had been passed down
through oral tradition.

In this reading, the second narrative, beginning with

Charlemagne’s return to Roncevaux, is a later addition that appends itself to a
original ‘true’ story, that o f the battle o f Roncevaux as it was remembered by
eye witness and commemorated through oral tradition. An opposing view,
one that receives its first great impetus from B&Jier’s editorial decision to
accept the Oxford manuscript as an integrated text, suggests that one
narrative translates into the other, that the Roland of the first and second
narratives are one subjectivity twice inscribed; inscribed once as self and
again as self as other.
The Roland of the first narrative is a Roland remembered as in the
catalogue o f feats in battle and conquest o f countries listed in laisse CLXXII
and elsewhere. The Roland o f the second narrative, to the contrary, is one
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publicly commemorated, his heart veiled in silk in a public ceremony and
placed in the white sarcophagus (II. 1965 - 66). The sarcophagus, literally the
eater o f flesh, consumes the ‘old s e lf leaving the new, public, commemorated
self available, though only through a veil of fiction. The ‘public’ construct o f
Roland’s subjectivity emanating from the second narrative is, o f course,
vulnerable to manipulation. That m anipulation begins where Charlemagne is
able to commemorate Roland in the ‘name’ o f his own cause, as though
Roland had died for the sake o f attaining Charlemagne’s own claim to right
(dreiture). One has only to consider Tierry, the champion in Charlemagne’s
cause, to understand that this proposition is as preposterous as it is
successful.
Unlike the Roland, whose narrative flows out o f death (Roland’s), the
T.D.V. writes its way toward death (the author’s); in this way it remains
intensely ‘private.’ But writing toward his own demise, the author, Broch/Virgil,
is still faced with the same im possibility as was Roland at Roncevaux: there is
no way, short o f destroying the manuscript, of terminating the narrative
absolutely. Broch/Virgil/Roland all seek to have the perfection o f the narrative
coincide with the moment o f their deaths.

In terms of their production of

subjectivity, one striking difference between the Roland and the T.D.V. is that
the form er constructs the subject out o f death the latter in movement toward
death. The importance of this distinction between these two types o f subject
construction is that the one (T.D.V.) attempts, however in vain, to inscribe the
author’s subjectivity into the text; Virgil is ever conscious of the need and
desire to place his name -a n d tha t o f Augustus— into the ‘sublime and
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unending line o f Fathers' (‘die erhaben unendliche Reihe de r VSter' p. 178).
In the other text, Roland’s efforts to end the geste with the complete
appropriation o f all narrative, to his name only, fails; the true subject o f the
narration is not Roland him self but rather the ‘post-Roncevaux’ subject that is
not so much inscribed into, as produced by the text.
Roland, Broch, and Virgil all share a sim ilar anxiety regarding the
continuation o f narrative. Although Virgil and Broch choose, at some point, to
‘die with the text,’ Roland chooses instead to destroy Durendal, the instrument
of narrative inscription. Yet, the Roland gives the clearest example o f how the
narrative is transformed subsequent to its creation. Charlemagne returns not
only to continue the battle against the Saracens, but also, and especially, to
continue the narrative abruptly left o ff by Roland.

The continuation is not

merely an extension o f narrative, but a rewriting o f what Roland has already
written.

W hen Roland dies, he dies as a conqueror of nations, but he is

commemorated as a force granting validity to a social and political order quite
alien to the feudal warrior ideal. Roland is commemorated into an order of
social and political organization that is premised upon the recognition of, and
absolute obedience to, Charlemagne’s monarchical right, his dreiture.
Likewise, Virgil fears fo r the posthumous manuscript. Subsequent to
Virgil’s death, Augustus will effect those manipulations which render the
Aeneid subservient to his own political will and ambitions. More than just an
instrument of state propaganda, the Aeneid will be used to redefine the
Roman subject in terms favorable to Augustus' conception o f state.

In the

lengthy chapter, Book III of T.D.V., in which Virgil and Augustus argue over
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the survival o f the Aeneidt Virgil insists repeatedly upon the inefficacy o f the
text. Virgil laments to Augustus ‘I have not reached my goal’ ([Ich habe m ein
Z iel nicht erreicht, p. 299); and in another passage Virgil attempts to reassure
Augustus that Rome is its own creation, independent of any text: ‘Rome is the
parable, Rome is the symbol that you yourself have created, Caesar1(‘Rom is t
das Gleichnis, Rom ist das Sinnbild, das du geschaffen hast, CSsar', p. 333).
Virgil deprecates the text in an attem pt to minimize its ‘public’ value,
suggesting that Caesar has created ‘parable’ and ‘symbol’ in the building o f
the city itself.
As the passage on page 297 clearly illustrates, Augustus’ need fo r the
text is desperate. There Caesar wears the toga - ‘that was as dry as singed
paper1 ( ‘das trocken w ar wie angesengtes P apier)— that is thirsty for V irgil’s
ink. As the text is transferred from the parchm ent, that is described as being
‘as white and smooth and tender1as Plotia’s body (cf.: p. 388), to the toga with
which Augustus cloaks himself, there can be little doubt that transcription
entails translation.

To the extent that we can speak o f two aspects o f

subjectivity immanent to the text, o f ‘das Ich1and of ‘das zweite Ich,’ both are
already in place at the moment o f the text’s creation. Self as other, the socalled ‘second I,’ issues from the text a t the moment it leaves its author’s
hands. In the case o f the Roland and o f the Aeneid* the alterity o f authorial
‘s e lf proceeds to replicate itself in the public to which it is presented; its
readers and hearers perceive them selves in the text in ways that were
previously unknown to them.
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Once the work is released, it becomes the appropriation o f the other
self.

So much is revealed to us in Broch’s account o f how he attempts to

claim the subject even after the m anuscript has found its way out into the
world. He writes to Huxley on May 10, 1945: ‘

rather, the reader m ust be

brought to exactly the same process tha t I have gone through, and for his part
work through it in exactly the sam e way* ( ‘

vielm ehr muRte d e rL e se rd a zu

gegracht warden, genau den gleichen ProzeR, den ich durchgemacht habe,
nun seinerseits genau so durchzugehen’).

This is Broch’s Durendal, his

attem pt to end all narration once the pen has been put to rest. Broch would
have the reader relive the same death that he has experienced, he would
have the reader assume the very 1’ that he him self had inscribed into the text.
Broch's terror at letting go the text seems a tacit acknowledgement o f
the sentim ent Maurice Blanchot expressed when, in L ’espace Utt6rairex he
observes:
L’6crivain appartient d I’oeuvre, mais ce qui lui appartient, c’est
seulement un livre, un amas muet de mots st6riles, ce qu’il y a
de plus insignifiant au monde.
(p. 16)
(The writer belongs to the work, but that which belongs to him is
merely a book, a mute heap of sterile words; that which is the least
significant thing in the world.)

The writer, whether Roland or Virgil o r Broch, is never able to attain that o f
which he is in search. Each agonizes in the knowledge that not he, but some
other, will find in this ‘mute heap o f sterile words’ the subject that remains
hidden from him, hidden within the text.
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Clercs,” Literature 42 (1981) pp. 40 - 56. uR6digeant ses L6gendes 6piques d
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I’approche du premier conflit mondial, Bgdier dgpeint dans la C.R. un des
premiers fleurons de notre literature: I’origine ne peut qu’en §tre frangaise,
savante, et individuelle. De quelques donn£es I6gendaires, d iffu s e s par les
sanctuaires de la route de Compostelle, un po6te de g£nie a fa it une oeuvre
forte, erra nt du meme coup le genre 6pique. Le plus remarquable dans la
th£orie de Joseph B6dier est qu’elle aligne le Roland sur la conception
modeme de I’oeuvre litteraire. Cette chanson de geste se voit ainsi attribuer
un auteur, Turold, lequel participe de cette promotion, et, surtout, I’unicite” (p.
42).
12. Paul Michael Lutzler, Hermann Broch, eine Biographic, Frankfort
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985. The most comprehensive biography to
date though others such as Ernestine Schlant’s Hermann Broch, Boston:
Twayne, 1978, and in particular Manfred Durzak's Hermann Broch, D er
Dichter und seine Zeit, help piece the life together. The biographical detail
from outside the correspondence remains, however, of little use in
understanding the subjective relation between author and work.
13. Lutzler, Materialien zu Hermann Broch ‘D er Tod des Vergil, p. 216.
14. Lutzler, Materialien zu Hermann Broch ‘D er Tod des Vergil, pp. 233
-23 9.
15. Lutzler, Materialien zu Hermann Broch ‘D er Tod des Vergil, p. 221
-228.
16. Aniela Jaffe, “Hermann Broch: ‘D er Tod des Vergil’. Ein Beitrag
zum Problem der Individuation,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der
Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, Munchen: W ilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp.
135-1 76 .
17. Gundi Wachtler, “Der Archetypus der GroOen M utter in Hermann Brochs
Roman D er Versucher,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed.
Manfred Durzak, Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 231 - 250.
18. Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis,
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978.
19. Erich Kahler, “W erttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann
Broch,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak,
Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370.
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1. Peter Haidu,
The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993. See the passage page 87 beginning “The Franks
shout out Charles’ sign
"
2. La Chanson de Roland, ed. Joseph B6dier, Paris: L’6dition D’art H.
Piazza, 1927. (All translations are my own).
3. Douglas D. R. Owen, “Beards in the Chanson de Roland,” Forum
for Modem Language Studies 2 4 :2 (1988) pp. 175 -1 7 9 .
4. Ernst Robert Curtius, EuropSische Literatur und Lateinisches
Mittelalter, Bern und Munchen: Franke Verlag, 1948.
5. David Hult, “ 'C/ fa it la geste’: Scribal Closure in the Oxford Roland,”
Modem Language Notes 97:4 (1982) pp. 890 - 905. Hult remarks upon the
textual im plications o r Turpin’s reference to a ‘prior’ geste: “Turpin’s allusion to
a written geste is particularly intriguing, inasmuch as it necessarily precedes
the actions which are taking place; the concept o f the written geste would thus
not lim it itself to a docum entary source fo r the present poem. In other words,
the documentary nature o f the events and heroes is already incorporated into
the narrated action, effecting at the very least a subversion of the normally
intuited relationship between action and narrated account: if the present poem
is based on (a) previous geste(s) guaranteeing the historicity o f the events,
the latter are in turn predicated upon earlier written accounts. This perceptual
layering, a confusion o f act and document (already inherent in the word
geste), will prove central to the poem at hand” (pp. 896 - 897).
6. For the source of the incestuous birth o f Roland see: Alina Clej. “Le
Miroir du Roi: Une reflexion sur la Chason de Roland,” Romance Philology
XLIV: 1 (1999) pp. 36 - 53.
OUTLAWS
1. Peter Haidu,
The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993.
Haidu correctly recognizes that the failure to
guarantee protection in the Roland is systemic: “The failure o f the garant, the
absence o f protection from the feudal superior, in spite o f the vassalic
contract, is thus not a personal phenomenon but one that is generalized: it is
not just a particular actor who is aimed at, it is the role (in the semiotic sense)
that is inculpated. Roland, Charles, Baligant, all fail to fu lfill their contract o f
protection with their social and military subordinates.......................” (p. 93).
2. See: Haidu. In examining Blancandrins’ proposal it becomes clear
that the alterity Saracen/Frank undergoes erasure. Haidu remarks upon the
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collapse o f one polity into the o th e r “Insofar as the alterity o f ‘Saracen’ has no
substantive consistency, the figure o f the “Saracen” in the Roland becomes
m erely another representation o f the essential problematic which is at w ork in
(the representation and reality of) the Frankish polity. W e will see, in fact, that
the same pattern of complex political relations and (non)fulfillm ent o f contracts
obtains within the figure of the Saracens as within the Christian camp” (p. 38).
3. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, trans. W illard R. Trask, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1968. Auerbach points out that the epic is history
not in that it recounts ‘actual’ events but that it performs a ‘historico-political
function’: “It is only about the year 1200 that the first vernacular chronicles
are composed, but they do not relate the past, they are eye-witness accounts
o f contem porary events, and even so they are strongly influenced by the epic
style. And indeed, the heroic epic is history, at least insofar as it recalls actual
historical conditions -how ever much it may distort and simplify them —and
insofar as its characters always perform a historico-political function” (p. 122).
Through the manipulation and alteration of the sequence o f narrative -e ve n ts
Roland gives the reader a brilliant example o f how fiction ‘creates’ history: by
putting into place forces (vengeance) that will result in an alteration o f the
historico-political reality.
4. Albert G6rard, “L'axe Roland-Ganelon : valeurs en conflit dans la
Chanson de R o la n d Le Moyen Age : Revue d’histoire et de Philologie 76
(1969) pp. 445 - 466. Charlemagne’s unmitigated abrogation o f vassal
obligation clearly points to the privileging of the ‘royal person’. G£rard
connects this moment with the shift toward the privileging o f the nation state:
“Si I’&pisode de la mort de Roland met en question le primat de la gloire
personnelle sur I’interet de la nation, le proems de Ganelon met en relief, de
fagon paraltele et complementaire, I’absolue supr£matie de la personne royale
sur les droits et privileges des vassaux” (p. 460).
5. Brigette Cazelies, “Outrepasser les Normes : L’invention de soi en
France M edieval,” Stanford French Review XIV (1987) p. 69 - 92. Roland’s
status as ‘other1 provokes a societal instability that mitigates against his
continued existence. Cazelies speaks of the destabilizing desires that
‘otherness’ can evoke: “Outrepasser les normes permet au h6ros de d£passer
ses rivaux; I’admiration que suscite cette singularity ne va pas sans jalousie,
sans d£sir d’etre comme I’autre, d’etre I’autre, d’etre autre” (p. 88).
6. G£rard. Ganelon’s situation contrasts starkly with that o f Roland in
terms o f the ir open and furtive, respectively, betrayals o f those in their charge:
“
Ganelon n’a pas trahi : il a annonce sa vengeance ouvertement,
clairem ent et loyalement (laisses XX £ XXIV), il a respects les obligations du
code de I’honneur traditionnel” (p. 454).
7. G6rard. G£rard describes the hesitancy o f the French thus: “ Les
barons ne refusent pas d Charlemagne le droit de r£clamer vengeance : il est
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assez Evident qu’il a 6t£ I6s6 ; mais Ganelon avait agi selon son droit et dans
le respect des formes. On se demandera, d6s lors, pourquoi les barons ne
d6clarent pas formellement que Ganelon n’a pas trahi. C’est que leur
perplexity porte prycis6ment sur ce concept de trahison, dont la polyvalence
les trouble” (p. 455). The view that the French in this scene are perplexed by
the question o f Ganlon’s treason is a common one. I contend, however, that
the French initially judge ‘correctly' according to feudal law and that only then
does Charlemagne confront them with the fact that the old law has fallen and
largely by m erit o f the doings o f the Franks themselves. Charlemagne
introduces the French, in an incontrovertible manner, to their own culpability in
transgressing the ‘old law1.
8. Haidu. The fact that the te xt describes the social structures o f the
Saracen in terms identical to those o f the Franks makes Blancandrins
manipulation o f the same all the more plausible: “The fact that the Saracens
are portrayed as feudal lords and vassals makes them reliable judges o f
feudal obligations” (p. 91).
9. Kari-Heinz Bender, Kdnig und Vassal, Untersuchungen zu Chanson
de geste des XII. Jahrhunderts, Heidelberg: W inter Verlag, 1967. The
execution o f Ganeion’s kin indicates that a far greater ‘victory’ has been won
than mere dominance over his vassals. Charlemagne’s dreit impinges upon
all aspects o f feudal society: “Ein Zweikampf bringt die Entscheidung
zwischen Pinabel, dem Reprdsentanten der Sippe Ganelons, und Tierri, dem
Vorkam pfer der lehnsherriichen Gewalt. Mit dem Sieg Tierris uber Pinabel
trium phiert die Autoritdt des Lehnsherm nicht nur uber das unbeschrankte
Fehderecht der Barone, sondem auch uber die Macht der Sippe. Ganelon
und seine drei&ig Verwandten, die dem Ideal der Feudalgesellschaft
zuwiderhandelten, werden auf BeschluB aller anwesenden Vasallen
hingerichtet” (p. 35).
HONUR EDREITURE
1. Clej, Alina. “Le Miroir du Roi : lin e reflexion sur la Chanson de
Roland,” Romance Philology XLIV: 1 (1990) pp. 36 -53. Clej recounts the
tradition that assigns to Charlemagne the sin of incest: “Seule parmi les ecrits
de rypoque, la Kariamagnus Saga r£digee vers 1230 - 50, mais fo n d le sur
des textes plus anciens, d£crit ce p6che terrible
” (p. 40).
2. Peter Haidu, Peter The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993. Charles' behind the scene manipulations are noted by
Haidu: “Because the nomination is made by Roland, it is at Roland that
Ganeion’s anger can be vented. But that nomination would not have had the
meaning fo r Ganelon it does have, had it not been preceded by Charles's
exclusion o f the peers. It is Charles’s active narrative role in the deliberations
that produces the insulting meaning o f Roland’s nomination of his stepfather”
(p. 93).
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3. W illiam Paden, “Tenebrism in the Song o f Roland,” Modem
Philology, 86: 4 (1989) pp. 339 - 356. Paden assigns the spirit o f vengeance
principally to Ganelon: “Ganelon is the enem y o f Christians and pagans alike.
It is he who stages the battle o f Roncevaux, which is a defeat for both sides
and a victory only for his unfathomable rage fo r vengeance” (p. 352). To the
contrary, Roland is clearly the one to call fo r vengeance in the text and it is a
clever Charlemagne who manages to turn the workings of that vengeance
upon Saracen and Frank alike.
4. Bernard Cirquiglini, “Roland k Roncevaux, ou la Trahison des
Clercs,” Literature 42 (1981)
pp. 40 - 56. In a profoundly subtle reading
o f Ganeion’s response to this excess o f orguille Cirquiglini notes tha t as
Ganelon manipulates circumstances so the author o f the text m anipulates
narrative to ensure the elim ination o f Roland. Not ju st Roland but the social
and political order which he emblem atizes is purposefully overturned by the
narrative: “L’orgueil de Roland, qui le fa it inconsidgrement s’exposer au
danger, va lui porter malheur : Dieu le punire” : ce discours nous est fam ilier.
Dans la C.R., c’est, par trois fois, Ganelon le traitre qui le prononce (devant
les pai'ens, puis devant Charlemagne). L’interpretation cl£ricale c’est, en
somme, cede de Ganelon” (p. 49).
5. Karl D. Uitti, “Alexis, Roland, and French ‘Pods/e N ational’, ”
Comparative Literature Studies 32: 2 (1995) pp. 131 - 150. The geographic
nomenclature dulce France is one o f the surest indicators that this text is as
much as anything about the struggle to establish a ‘royal ideology’ in eleventh
century Capatian France: “But to what, geographically speaking, does the
term apply?
“France,” within the Carolingian framework, is an
anachronism
In fact, it turns out that Roland and the “dulce France” it
so frequently calls to mind, reflect closely the Capetian, or French, royal
ideology of the eleventh century” (p. 137).
6. George Jones, “Friendship in the Chanson de Roland”, Modem
Language Quarterly 24 (1963), pp. 88 - 98.
“To appreciate personal
friendships and hatreds in the Middle Ages, we must liken medieval
individuals to modem sovereign states. Now that the state protects its citizens
or subjects, private individuals are no longer in such constant fear o f
aggression as they were in the M iddle ages, when every free man was
responsible for defending his own life, property, and honor. Kings and other
rulers protected their subjects from foreign enemies but not from each other,
since all free men had the right to settle their own disputes by feud” (p. 90). If
we accept Jones’ definition of ‘am i’ as such then we are able to glimpse the
perverse nature o f the relationship Charlemagne/Roland: Roland is Charles’
protector! Furthermore, Charlemagne sacrifices not ju st ‘un am i’ in sacrificing
Roland, rather he sacrifices this defining paradigm o f feudal organization.
7. Paul Zumthor, Essai de Poktique Mkdikvale, Paris: Seuil, 1972. It
is interesting that Zumthor should see in Charlemagne a figure emblematic o f
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the ‘collectivity’: “Moins que reflet d’une r6alit6 ou d’une experience pass£e, la
chanson est conscience de soi. Elle compense la rupture survenue entre le
reel et I’imaginaire. Elle exploite moins un souvenir qu’elle ne le projette en
prophetie
En ce sens, le sujet reel de Taction, c’est la collectivity mSme
: ces pluriels interchangeables, Francs, Frangais, Chretiens, barons, rythmant
et glosant de leurs exclam ation p£riodiques le r6cit du Roland; tout
Charlemagne, figure imp£riale qui les englobe et les repr6sente” (p. 336). In
fact, I would argue that the prophetic nature of the Roland is not in its
representation but in its creation o f a future subject. The Roland gives the
reader not a tableau o f ‘Francs, Frangais, Chretiens, barons
as
Zum thor suggests but the outline o f subjectivity determined by its relation to
the newly emerging nation state.
8. Emmanuel J. Mickel, “Ganeion’s Defense,” In Romance Epic:
Essays on a M edieval Literary Genre, ed. Hans Erich Keller, Kalamazoo:
Medieval Institute Publ. (1987), pp. 163 - 172. uln his speech Ganelon
emphasizes that he loves France and would never betray Charlemagne.
Roland had wronged him, he argues, and he had defied his stepson, Roland,
in open court. As everyone knows, once formal ties o f fealty had been broken
openly, a man could no longer be accused o f oath breaking, and hence
treason, if he were to kill his adversary in a subsequent confrontation” (p.
163).
9. Karl-Heinz Bender, Kbnig und Vassal, Untersuchungen zu Chanson
de geste des XII. Jahrhunderts, Heidelberg: W inter Verlag, 1967. The
opposition reis/emperere is read as a reflection o f the increasing power o f the
Capetian dynasty: “W enn nun Charlemagne bereits im ersten Vers der
Chanson de Roland als: Carles li reis, nostre imperere magnes
eingefuhrt wird, dann entspricht die Verwendung dieser beiden Titel nicht nur
der Uberlieferung von Karl d. Gr., sondem auch der staatsrechtlichen
Konzeption der kapetingischen Monarchie am Ausgang des XI. Jahrhunderts”
(P- 27).
10. Eugene Vance, “Roland, Charlemagne, and the Poetics o f
Illumination,” Olifant 6: 3 - 4 (1979) pp. 213 - 225. “Though Charlemagne
languishes to be conjoined with Roland and the twelve peers in heaven —to a
point where he is ready to join bodily in the grave— he remains a prisoner of
his role of em peror o f this world, a prisoner o f both language and history
”
(p. 222). Vance is quite right in suggesting that Charlemagne’s anguish
derives from the fact that, unlike Roland, he cannot escape this existence;
unlike Roland Charlemagne cannot cease to be. As ‘prisoner o f language and
o f history’ Charlemagne is condemned to the sisyphean torm ent o f having to
endless sustain narrative.
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VEIRE PATE(R)NE
1. Peter Haidu, The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993. Haidu notes how in that scene Roland is depicted as
author within the text: “Part o f the extraordinary quality o f the death scene is
that Roland is not only arranging a scene but disposing his own body and
Adjuvants into a message. The Destinator uses him self as the signifier to
transcend his own death as meaning to be apprehended by those dear to him
who survive. There is a self-conscious semiotic manipulation of self as object
that is remarkable, even if it is recounted briefly and receives little emphasis in
the narration. But this mise-en-scene of the process o f semiotic production
has an unexpected secondary effect: the assertion that is produced by the
sem iotic message (it is stressed by the text) is that o f the Destinator in the
text, not by the text as Destinator. The text, by deploying this structure, does
not take it upon itself to say
that Roland died a conqueror; it merely cites
him as saying so
” (pp. 29 - 30).
2. Leopold Peeters, “Le ‘faire’ et le ‘dire’ dans la Chanson de Roland,"
Revue des Langues Romanes 81 (1975) pp. 377 - 93. The ‘deed’ and the
‘word’, as Peeters points out, are largely one: “La parole, au moyen dge, n’est
pas seulement designation ni expression ou communication, elle est
essentiellem ent manifestation. Elle n’est pas du tout surajoute aux choses
existant en soi (par le terme choses je d6signe tout ce que la parole peut
m an ifeste r: objets, sentiment, id§es) mais ce par quoi tout se manifeste, ce
qui est incarne dans le monde. Le verbe appelle les choses & I’existence. II
n’y a pas de solution de continuity entre le dire et le faire, entre le verbe e t le
reel, mais le dire
est le manifestation du faire” (382).
3. Haidu. “The issue of Roland’s innocence or culpability is inversely
related to that of Charles’s innnocence or culpability” (p. 92).
4. See Bedier’s note (Roland, p. 339) on the abreviation o f the name
Roland in the Oxford manuscript: “Le nom du heros est le plus souvent ecrit
en abrege: R. une seul fois (au v. 2118), Roll’ 171 fois.”
5. Clej, Alina. uLe Miroir du Roi : Une reflexion sur la Chanson de
Roland,” Romance Philology XLIV: 1 (1990) p. 36 -53. Charlemagne supporte
la blessure du royaume par delegation, dans le coips de Roland qui s’immole
e sa place” (p. 49). Though I disagree with Clej’s general thesis that the
Roland moves toward the reestablishment of a lost equilibrium her remarks
concerning Charlemagne’s willingness to sacrifice Roland are astutely
perceptive.
6. The Holy Bible. Old and New Testaments in the King James
Version, Nashville: Thomas Nelson Inc., 1972.
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7. Brigette Cazelies, “Outrepasser les Normes : L’invention de soi en
France M6di6val,” Stanford French Review XIV (1987) pp. 69 - 92. The act o f
transgressing the law is essential to the act o f artistic creation, as Cazelies
well point out: “Ces considerations
ont surtout pour but de poser la
probiematique du sujet dans le contexte de la creation artistique. Dire que
I’invention et imitation sont synonymes, ceci revient e signifier I’impossibilite
de toute initiative et originalite personnelles
au contraire
la
transgression est, des les debuts de la production vemaculaire medievale, au
coeur de I’acte cr6ateur” (p. 75). Charlemagne’s move toward inventing a
new social and political order begins with a transgression o f the old.
8. Haidu. The refusal of exchange marks a rupture in the social fabric,
as Haidu correctly observes: “Not only is the ideal hero o f the society dead
[...]; the basic principle of social organization -th a t o f exchange— has been at
least interrupted and suspended. This is the ultimate significance o f Aude’s
refusal. If the normal pattern o f exchanges encoded in the laws and
conventions o f the society no longer hold, if the damage to the social fabric is
so grievous that its system of compensatory awards is refused by those whom
it should benefit, then the very principle o f sociality has been suspended” (p.
62).
9.
Alexandre Leupin’s article (critique 1994) first brought this
observation to my attention. Speaking o f the ‘miracle o f the witness’ he
states: “£tonnant miracle, en effet! D’ou vient ce baron fdodal survivant, qui
existe sans exister, pure fiction don’t la Chanson souligne de fa it la vacuity?
Et pourtant, de la chartre qui lui est Ii6e, texte qui authentifie la Chanson de
Roland elle-m£me, le destin du sens semble dependre: sans la connaftre,
nous n’y entendrons rien, nous dit le texte. En fait, par la reference au
tgmoignage de visudu baron Gilles (un nom qui signifie aussi “tromperie” en
ancien frangais) qui n’gtait pas £ la bataille, pure “fiction qui av6re la v6rite,” la
geste s'authentifie elle-m£me, circulairement, en renvoyant du m§me coup &
sa propre fictionnalite.”
10. Eugene Vance, “Roland, Charlemagne, and the Poetics o f
Illumination”, Olifant 6: 3 - 4 (1979) pp. 213 - 225. I fully concur with Vance’s
thesis that it is Roland who initiates the process of inscription: “Thus, the tw o
halves o f the Roland clearly convey to us two opposed notions o f
monumentaiity, one oral, one textual. Roland, one will recall, died with the
certainty that the memory of his legend would live on in good songs that would
be sung by future bards. Charlemagne, by contrast, whose army now teems,
we are suddenly told, with “bishops, abbots, monks, canons and tonsured
priests” (CCXII), after uttering his oral planctus lamenting the loss of Roland,
immediately proceeds to make plans for supplementing that memory with
monuments of stone that is, with inert signifiers that belong to the world o f
tablets, inscriptions and of the letter” (p. 223).
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11.
Hans Aarsleff,
“Scholarship and Ideology: Joseph Etedier’s
Critique o f rom antic Medievalism,” IN Historical Studies and Literary Criticism,
ed. Jerome J. McGann, Madison: University o f W isconsin Pr., 1985, pp. 93 113. In a sim ilar fashion B6dier, too, makes the distinction between history
and fiction as AarslefF here summarizes: “B6dier could not accept the principle
‘that nothing could be fictive in a chanson de geste and that no one could be
so deprived o f imagination as a poet.’ He was baffled by a ‘method of
investigation, which, beginning with a simple fictive work, knew how to restore
the dignity o f history to apparent fictions and discover the them es o f lost epics
with surprising precision.’ The best epics were the creations o f good poets,
for ‘a masterpiece begins and ends with its author,’ not with the ‘collective,
unconscious, anonymous forces’ that were used to replace the individual
poet” (p. 103).
ICH-VERLUBT
1. Harald Binder, “Die Idee ist ewig”, In Hermann Broch - D er Denker,
ed. Harald Binder, Zurich: Rhein Verlag, 1966, pp. 9 - 29. For Broch truth
cannot be grasped but only experienced; and yet Broch does clearly insist
upon the existence of truth. Cognition (Erkenntnis), therefore, is not a
‘knowledge’ o f truth but a process o f subjective inter-reflection wherein the
subject perceives itself ‘perceiving’ truth. To illustrate cognition as process
Broch alludes to Hegel’s preface to the Phenonmenology o f S pirit and in
particular to the example o f the bud and the rose bush. W here Hegel refers to
bud and rosebush Broch refers to fruit and tree respectively: “
Der Weg
zur Erkenntnis fSllt m ir mit der Erkenntnis selbst zusammen.
Von
Endergebnissen la&t sich da wohl uberhaput nicht sprechen —so wenig als
man FrQchte Endergebnisse des Baumes nenne kann" (p. 9)
2. Paul M. Lutzler, Materialien zu Hermann Broch ‘D er Tod d e r Vergil’,
Frankfort am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976, pp. 221 - 228.
3.
Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis,
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. Broch hopes to leave an experience
of death, which is an experience o f the ‘real’, as a literary legacy. Broch
projects this received ‘real’ into the experience o f the reader so that this ‘real’,
Broch’s own cognitive construct, should find its place in the world. Compare
Durzak’s observations on the ‘real’ and the Brochean ‘experience’: “Die
Struktur der W irklichkeit -u n d das hei&t von Brochs Kantianischer Basis aus:
die Erfahrung der W irklich keit- und die Form des Gedichtes sind aufeinander
bezogen” (p. 21).
4. W alter Hinderer, “GrundzQge des T o d des Vergils’,” In Hermann
Broch: Perspektiven d e r Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, Munchen: W ilhelm
Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 89 - 134. Hinderer puts forth an argument for
Brochean mysticism and his argument can be summed up in this one
sentence: “Der Mensch mu&, um das gottliche W under zu erfahren, seines
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ganzen Selbstes und aller Dinge ledig warden” (p. 94). The passage from
T.D.V. p. 41 indicates not a movement toward the ‘mystical’ through the
spuming o f material existence but, to the contrary, a state o f trauma wherein
Vergil is forceably stripped o f all material support. As the novel continues
Vergil resituates him self within ‘the things o f this world’ (Dingwelf) (compare
T.D.V., pp. 1 7 9 -1 8 0 e t passim).
5. Erich Kahler, “W erttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann
Broch,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven d e r Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak,
Munchen: W ilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370. The authority o f the
forebears, consolidated in the fiction o f the Aeneid, would put in place an
ethical framework out of which the individual subject would function. The
absence o f such a framework results, according to Broch, in the ‘autonomous
system o f values’ exemplified by such expressions as “A rt for arts sake”,
“Business is business”, and “W ar is war”. The choice fo r Broch is one of
situating the ‘deed’ -th e creative impulse that determine one’s actions— either
within the direct actions o f the ‘autonomous subject’ or within the ‘word’, i.e.
within the larger fiction o f the text. Kahler points out the path to which the
purely rational logic of the ‘autonomous subject’ may lead: “Da nun der
Mensch, wenn in ihm die V e m u n ff Aufddmmert und Befriedigung veriangt,
seine Beweggriinde zu rationalisieren sucht —'was immer er tut, es ist ihm in
jedem Augenblick plausibel, e r m otiviert es sich mit Grtinden, die ihm
W ahrheit sind, er stellt es unter eine logische Beweiskette’- so entwickelt sich
m it jedem autonom funktionellen Wertsystem, das aus dem Tun der
Menschen erfolgt, und dem sie folgen, allmahlich eine zugehorige funktionelle
Logik: es bildet sich eine ‘Logik des Militdrs’, eine ‘Logik des
W irtschaftsfuhrers’, eine ‘Logik des Malers’, einen ‘Logik des Revolutiondrs’,
eine ‘Logik des burgeriichen Faiseurs’, usw.” (p. 354).
6. Maurice Blanchot, Le Livre a Venir, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1959.
Blanchot describes a Broch who ‘awakened to die’ (s'eveiUe p o u r mount)
cannot seem to exit death's realm, who continues to write his way into death
without ever attaining that end:“
C’est dans la prison ou il vient d’dtre jet£
et lorsqu’il est promis d une fin toute proche que Broch commence son oeuvre
centrale, un recit qu’il ne peut esp6rer mener d “bien” que dans cet espace de
la m ort qui s’ouvre £ lui, mais aussi par des ann6es de survie et de calme
travail. Celui qui s’6veille pour mourir, 6crit done la premiere page d’une
oeuvre dont l’ach£vement lui demandera dix ans. D6fi merveilleux, confiance
presque effrayante” (p. 159).
7. Richard Brinkmann, “Romanform und W erttheorie bei Hermann
Broch,” In Hermann Broch, Perspektiven d e r Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak,
Munchen: W ilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 35 -68. The passage from pages
1 1 0 -1 1 1 introduces the concept o f ‘mute language’ (die Stumme Sprache)
and the three ‘wastrels’ illustrate this concept well. In Broch Die Stumme
Sprache is a babelization o f language a fragmentation and subsequent
dissolution of the ‘real’ constituted by language: Hier und immer w ieder bei
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Broch ist von der Stummheit die Rede. Es ist in der Tat einsichtig, daft in
einer W elt des W ertzerfalls einer den anderen nicht mehr versteht und einer
dem anderen sich nicht m ehr verstdndlich machen kann; denn es gibt keine
gemeinsame Sprache mehr.............. Sie besagt im Grunde nichts mehr; es
entspricht ihr keine W irklichkeit mehr; sie ist ein Arsenal entleerter Symbole.
diesem Problem gilt im Grunde Brochs gewagtester und groOartigster
Versuch: ‘Der Tod des V irgil’" (p. 59).
SCHICKSAL
1.
Hermann
Broch,
“W erttheoretische
Bemerkungen
zur
Psychoanalyse,” In Hermann Broch, Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie,
Frankfort am Main: Surkamp Verlag, pp. 173 - 194. The ‘entombment* of
death becomes necessary as Broch concedes that death cannot be
experienced directly: “
einem Fremdling gleich ftih lt sich das Ich in den
Zeitstrom hineingehalten, und von da aus ist es wohl auch zu verstehen, daS
das Ich vollkommen unfdhig ist, sich eine Vorstellung vom eigene Tod zu
machen” (186).
2. Hermann Broch, “Logik einer Verfallenden W elt,” In Hermann Broch,
Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie, Frankfort am Main: Surkamp Verlag, pp.
156 - 172. Compare this passage from T.D.V. with the following: “
das
Bewu&tsein in seiner solipsistischen Einsamkeit befindet sich im Zustand
maximaler W ahrheit” (p. 158).
3. Richard Brinkmann, “Romanform und W erttheorie bei Hermann
Broch", In Hermann Broch, Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak,
Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 35 -68. Brinkmann states succinctly
the blurring o f the line between observed and observer in Broch: “
Der
Beobacktungsakt hat selbst Anteil am Beobachtungsresultat, er wird selbst
m it in das Beobachtungsfeld introduzierf ” (pp. 55 - 56). I would only add that
Broch carries this one step further so that not only are ‘subject’ and ‘object’
mutually implicated in the moment o f observation, ‘subject’ and ‘object1
become inter-reflecting positions that constitute a single subjectivity. In this
sense, the subject gazing at the observes sees him self observing himself from
the 'object* within his view.
4. Maurice Blanchot, Le Livre it Venir, Paris: Editions Gailimard, 1959.
Blanchot describes death as an indeterminate space reflecting the ‘dying poef
and his s o n g :...... II n’y aura pas de communication veritable, ni de chant, si
le chant ne peut pas descendre, en degd de toute forme, vers I’informe et vers
cette profondeur ou parte la voix exterieure d tout langage. C’est done cette
descente -descente vers I’ind6termin6— que le po&te mourant cherche d
accomplir par sa mort. L’espace du chant et I’espace de la mort nous sont
ddcrits comme li£s et ressaisis I’un par I’autre” (p. 169).
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5. Manfred Durzak, “Hermann Brochs Auffassung des Lyrischen,” In
Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis, Stuttgart: Verlag W . Kohlhammer,
1978. On a larger plane the ‘death-recognizing word’ (das todeserkennenden
Wort) is the word (text) that encompasses not only the rational but the
‘irrational’ as well. For Broch the ‘real’ embedded in the text is an ‘irrational’,
opaque real. Literary Kitsch, by way of contrast, presents reality as something
completely rational and transparent. Below, Durzak notes the difference:
“Broch hat den ProzeB des Dichtens als Rationalisierung eines Irrationalen, d.
h. als sprachliche Formung konkreten Erlebens gesehen, wobei das
Irrationale als Kem bewahrt bleiben soil. Totale rationale Durchsichtigkeit war
ihm, ob im Roman oder im Gedicht, ein Zeichen von Kitsch” (p. 302).
6. Paul Micheal Lutzler, “Die Kulturkritik des jungen Broch. Zur
Entwicklung von Hermann Brochs Geschichts- und W erttheorie,” In Hermann
Broch: Perspektiven d e r Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, Munchen: Wilhelm
Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 329 - 352. Broch, in repudiation o f the rationalist
philosophy o f his age, locates the ‘real’ in the irrational, in the ‘unknown
fam iliar’ o f subject relation. Lutzler’s presents Broch’s position vis-d-vis
rationalism in an instructive light: “
Unter dem E influd der vielfdltigen
Stromungen der damals herrschenden Lebensphilosophie betrachtet er als
die Denkweise der abendllndischen Kultur den Rationalism us, der ihr
“Generationengeddchtnis” gegragt habe.
Agens des rationalistischen
W issensdurstes und der “geographischen Neugierde” sei die ‘Furcht vor dem
Unbekannten’, die zu einem Sich-selbst-Beruhigen-mussen, zum W illen, alles
£ tout prix erkldren zu wollen, gefuhrt habe” (pp. 330 - 331).
7. Erich Kahler, “W erttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann
Broch,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak,
Munchen: W ilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370. The ‘thing’ (das Ding)
attains reality only to the extent that it ‘receives’ the human subject; the
human cognition constructs the ‘real’ within the *thing’. Kahler summarizes
this Brochean concept: “Der ‘Setzung der Setzung’ introduziert das intelligible
Ich in alle Dinge der W elt, denn die Dinge kdnnen nur durch das Eingreifen
eines W ertsubjektes erfaftt werden, ja durch die einheitsstiftende Auslese des
W ertsubjektes erhalten sie uberhaupt ihren Dingcharakter” (p. 362).
8. Hermann Broch, “Leben ohne Platonische Idee," In Hermann Broch
- D er Denker, ed. Harald Binder, Zurich: Rhein Verlag, 1966, pp. 31 - 37. In
“Leben ohne Platonische Idee” Broch speaks o f the hero who is tragic by
definition in that he is left to accomplish the im possible deed, otherwise
assigned to religion, o f overcoming death. Religion overcomes death by the
promise of an afterlife the tragic hero, on the other hand, m ust complete his
task through a process ‘rebirth’ that occurs within the confined o f the earthly
sphere. Vergil/ Broch, is the potential ‘hero’ who would ‘overcome death' in
reshaping the ‘real’, in refashioning the ‘System o f values’ (Wertsystem) that
no longer obtains within the political and social context in which the author
finds him self living. Broch’s hero is discovered by substituting the word
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‘author1fo r ‘hero’ in the passage here cited: “Der Held ist immer tragisch. Das
ruhrt nicht nur davon her, daG e r -seinem irdischen Charakter gemaG—
auGerhalb des umfassenden religidsen W ertsystems steht, dad er also immer
innerhalb eines kleineren W ertsystem s wirken muG und sein Streben nach
Allgemeingeltung von vomeherein zum Scheitem verdammt ist, er ist auch m it
der Verpflichtung zur Freiheit belastet.
Die religidse Aufgabe der
Uberwindung des Todes ist ihm, dem Irdischen aufgelastet worden” (p. 48).
9.
Manfred Durzak,
Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis,
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. ‘Discovering' death's form , i.e.
experiencing the ‘real’, leads to a ‘self-realization’, or to the location o f self, o f
one's proper subjectivity within the ‘real’. Durzak outlines the progression:
“Die Frage nach dem Urgrund d e r W irklichkeit wandelt sich also fGr den
Menschen zur Frage nach der W ahrheit, die zum Orientierungszentrum all
seiner Erkenntnis wird.
Die W ahrheit wird zum ‘Erkenntnisgrund’ des
Menschen. Durch die Realisierung dieser haltung verwirklicht der Mensch die
Idee seiner selbst, e r hat Anteil am ‘Jetzt seines eigenen Sinnbildes,’ d.h. an
der Zeitlosigkeit der Platonischen Idee seines Ichs. Daraus erwdchst als
letzte Konsequenz, daG die ‘Erkenntnisaufgabe,’ m it der der Mensch an alles
W irkliches herantritt, ihn gleichzeitig zur Selbstverwirklichung fuhrt. Gestaltet
ist also in der Tat ein Druchbruch zu einer Erkenntnis, die Qber das
BewuGtsein Vergils hinausreicht, die aber im folgenden w ieder ihm
zuruckfuhrt” (pp. 100 -101).
ROME
1. Hermann Broch, “Zur Erkenntnis dieser Zeit,” In Hermann Broch,
Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie, Frankfort am Main: Surkamp Verlag, pp.
11 - 80. ‘Truth’ and the ‘real’ are to be understood in Broch’s writing as
‘cognitive-content’ and ‘cognitive-acf respectively. These terms speak to the
interrelation, the exchange, between the cognitive values with which a work is
imbued and the effect these values exercise upon, the way in which they work
themselves upon the world. Subjectivity prominently exhibits this exchange
between ‘cognitive-content’ and ‘cognitive-act’. Compare the following: “Die
Situation andert sich erst, wenn auch das Subjekt des Erkennens objektiviert
wird. In dieser objektivierten Gesamterkenntnis laGt sich einwandfrei eine
Grundscheidung, namlich eben die [in] Subjekt und Objekt, aufweisen: es
ergeben sich aus ihr die bekannten Zerspaltungen in Erkenntnisakt und
Erkenntnisinhalt
” (p. 20).
2. Hermann Broch, “Qber syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten”, In
Hermann Broch, Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie, Frankfort am Main:
Surkamp Verlag, pp. 246 - 299. Broch speaks o f symbolization as an
‘irreversible’
process
of
representation
whereby
surplus
(das
InhaltsuberschuR) is produced. This surplus, which he calls the ‘indicated
unknown’ (das angedeutete Unbekannte), is the material out of which the
‘real’ constructs itself. “Symbolisierungen sind irreversible Abbildungs-
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prozesse. Zwar ih n e ln sie den reversibien, da sie gleichfalls m it Hilfe eines
Abbildes ein Urbild ‘reprasentieren’, aber es wird nun dieses hier nicht mehr
wie dort als vollkommen ‘bekannt’ angenommen, gestattet nicht m ehr eine
Punkt fu r Punkt isomorphe (eben reversible) Abbildung, sondem erfordert
kraft
seines
‘Inhaltsuberschusses’
eine
andersgeartete,
eine
‘andeutungsweise’ Representation.
Ooch damit erhebt sich schon die
verzweifelte Frage: wie soil etwas Unbekanntes angedeutet werden?” (p.
268).
3. Jean-Paul Bier, Hermann Broch e t ‘La Mort de Vergile’, Paris:
Librairie Larousse, 1974. The ‘divine’ and the ‘human’ unite definitively in
death. However, these two qualities, the divine and the human, exist side by
side in the brochean subject. It is the supposition that both are immanent to
the suject and the presumption o f their perpetual ‘internal conflict upon which
Broch bases his theory that an alteration o f the ‘real’ begins with a movement
within the individual subject.
‘Death’, as in the Death o f Vergil, is a
symbolization of the resolution o f this conflict in the production of previously
unknown ‘real’. “
[.’existence humaine est congue par lui (Broch) comme
un mouvement perp6tuel et circulaire entre I’gclatement de I’harmonie
pr£6tablie du sujet et de I’objet, entre le moi et le monde, et le retour d6finitif £
I’lntemporel initial, l’£veil £ I’unit6 retrouv6e que constitue la mort” (p. 126).
4.
Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis,
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. The ‘deed’ can be defined as the
agency o f the ‘irrational’ within the ‘rational’ word as Durzak explains below:
“Broch hat den ProzeB des Dichtens als Rationalisierung eines Irrationalen, d.
h. als sprachliche Formung konkreten Erlebens gesehen, wobei das
irrationale als Kem bewahrt bieiben soil. Vollige rationale Durchsichtigkeit war
ihm, ob im Roman oder im Gedicht, ein Zeichen von Kitsch” (p. 23).
5. Bier. In citing Broch’s use of the term ‘epistemological novel’ Bier
indicates that such a ‘genre’ would, to the extent that it were possible, reveal
the 6pist6m& o f its time. I agree with this, however, with respect to Broch’s
implementation o f the term through the writing of T.D.V. I would say that such
a work would not merely ‘reveal’ the 6pisteme of its time but would agency its
construction. “Cette legitimation du roman par une theorie du monde et de la
culture, acquise par des voies rationnelles, etait le fondem ent de ce
qu’Hermann Broch appela alors le “roman epistemologique” (H.B. Lettres,
Gallimard, 1961; p. 25 - sqq.) : le roman se devait d’aller au-deie de
I’explication psychologique des comportements humains pour mettre £ jour
leur fondement ‘epistemologique’. Une telle entreprise fondait la valeur
cognitive de I’oeuvre litteraire” (p. 49 - 50).
6. Erich Kahler, “W erttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann
Broch,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak,
MGnchen: W ilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370. This image o f Augustus
as the ‘Person o f the One’ illustrates well the concept o f the 'whole' person,
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the completely rationalized subject. It suggests the complete transparency o f
the subject whereby the void around which subjectivity is constructed is
successfully eliminated. Kahler speaks o f the ‘rationalized system’ o f which
the ‘rationalized subject’ would be but one example: “Es ergibt sich aber im
rationalen System, das prinzipiel IQckenlos sein muB, noch eine andere, eine
interne
A rt
von
Unbekannten
durch
auftauchende
Lucken,
SchiieBunterbrechungen, Unschlussigkeiten innerhalb des Systems” (p. 369).
7. Richard Brinkmann, “Romanform und W erttheorie bei Hermann
Broch”, pp. 55 - 56. See Brinkmann for the equivalence in Broch between the
deed and the ‘real’. “Ein uberaus wichtiges Moment in dieser Entwicklung der
Neuzeit ist aber auch die Inthronisierung der Tat als eigentlich W irklichen” (p.
53).
8. Kahler. The underlying rational fo r Rome as ‘symbol’, is based on
the idea found in Broch that the concept o f ‘nation’, ‘state’, and so forth are
primarily if not uniquely cognitive constructs. Kahler signals this notion as
inherent to Broch’s conceptual outlook: “
fur Broch die geschichtlichen
Einheiten und Vorgange -S ta a t, Nation, Epoche, Stil, Kuftur— nur vom
individuellen Ich aus faBbar erschienen
” (p. 361).
9. Hannah Arendt, “Hermann Broch und der modeme Roman”, In
Hermann Broch, Perspektiven d e r Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, Munchen:
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 25 -33. Arendt correctly indicates that for
Broch the ‘moment’ of ‘noch nicht und doch schon’ is a moment of crisis
situated at the ‘turning o f an age’. The author Broch places him self -p la ce s
Vergil as his surrogate—just at the center of crisis, squarely in the chaos that
exists between the collapse of one age and the birth o f another in order to
orchestrate a subsequent reconfiguration of the ‘real’. “Jede Krise, jede
Wende der Zeiten ist Anfang und Ende zugleich. Als soiche birgt sie, in den
Worten Brochs, ein Dreifaches in sich: das Nicht-mehr’ der Vergangenheit,
das ‘Noch-nicht’ der Zukunft und das ‘Doch-schon’ der Gegenwart” (p. 25).
CONCLUSION
1.
Ernst Robert Curtius, Europ&ische Literatur und Lateinisches
Mittelalter, Bern und Munchen: Franke Verlag, 1948. (pp. 315 et passim)
2.
Peter Haidu, The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993.
3. Brian Stock, “Lecture, int£riorit6 et modules de comportement dans
I’Europe des Xle s.”, Cahier de Civilization M6di6vale XXXIII, (1990) pp. 103 112. One could almost apply the terms ‘tradition’ and traditionalism ’, as they
are employed by Stock, to Roland and St. Giles, respectively: “II faut faire la
distinction entre la tradition, heritage nonconscient d’une civilisation, et le

309

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

traditionalisme, force active ‘fabriqu£e’ d’interpretation consciente de la
tradition. Dans le deuxfeme cas, c’est la lecture qui est la force crgatrice.
Sans lecture, pas d’interpr§tation : sans interpretation, pas de traditions
nouvelles” (p. 112). St. Giles effects change by first ‘reading’ the highly
stylized narrative executed by Roland at Roncevaux. A careful reading o f that
‘narrative’ clearly dem onstrate the profound changes and weaknesses that
have already come into existence in the feudal order.
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